holding that a motion that “merely took umbrage with the court’s ruling and rehashed arguments” was properly rejected by the district court
How later courts described this case
- holding that a motion that “merely took umbrage with the court’s ruling and rehashed arguments” was properly rejected by the district court
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
LEE ANTHONY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 22-CV-018
EMIL TONEY, et al.,
Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 11, 2023, the court granted summary judgment on the merits in favor of
the defendants and dismissed this case, entering judgment accordingly. (ECF Nos. 41,
42.) On May 23, 2023, pro se plaintiff Lee Anthony Brown filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s summary judgment order. (ECF No. 43.) Brown cites
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in support of his motion, but Rule 54 does not
apply because the court fully disposed of Brown’s case.
There are two possible rules that could apply—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) allows a party to
file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the court entering
judgment. “Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment only if the petitioner
can demonstrate a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence.” Obriecht
v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487
F.3d 506, 511-12, (7th Cir. 2007)).
Rule 60(b) allows a court to grant relief within a “reasonable time” after entry of
a final judgment for a specific set of reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect,” newly discovered evidence, or fraud or misconduct. Rule 60(b)
also allows a court to grant relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies
relief,” but the movant seeking such relief “must show extraordinary circumstances
justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Ramirez v. United States, 799 F.3d 845
(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)).
Brown’s motion is timely under Rule 59(e), but in his motion he does not
demonstrate that the court made a manifest error of law nor does he present newly
discovered evidence. Brown also does not demonstrate that the court should grant relief
from judgement under Rule 60(b). He takes issue with the way the court considered the
parties’ evidence, but this is not a basis for granting relief from judgment. See Oto v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 244 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a motion that
“merely took umbrage with the court’s ruling and rehashed arguments” was properly
rejected by the district court). Brown argues that the court erroneously determined that
the defendants could not be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his
placement in temporary lock up; that the court should have found his conditions of
confinement to be an atypical and significant hardship; that he did have a liberty
interest in his time in segregation; and that the process he was afforded was
constitutionally deficient. The court already considered those arguments and rejected
them. Brown is simply rehashing arguments and taking umbrage with the court’s
determinations.
2
His motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 44) is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 13th day of June, 2023.
BY THE COURT
WILLIAM E. DUFFI
United States Magistrate Judge