Opinion

Brown v. Toney

Court
District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
Filed
Dec 19, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LEE ANTHONY BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-018

EMIL TONEY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

On November 2, 2022, plaintiff Lee Anthony Brown, who is confined at

Oshkosh Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a motion asking the

court to compel the defendants to allow him to view video evidence. (ECF No. 20.) On

December 8, 2022, Brown filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and

preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 26).

Regarding the motion to compel, Brown stated that he would not be allowed to

view the video before the November 14, 2022, discovery cut off. (ECF No. 20 at 2.) The

defendants responded, explaining that the discovery deadline pertains to serving and

responding to discovery requests, and if Brown wishes to view the video after that

deadline he can make a request with Oshkosh officials and the defendants will

facilitate it. (ECF No. 21 at 1.) As such, Brown’s motion is denied as moot.

Regarding Brown’s motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, he seeks a

transfer to another institution because the defendants continue to deny him due

process. (ECF Nos 26, 27.) In order to receive injunctive relief, either through a

temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish

that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim; (2) he has no adequate

remedy at law; and (3) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dept.

of Health, 669 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). Prisoner litigation also has an additional

requirement that injunctive relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than

necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the

least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2);

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012).

In his brief in support of his motion Brown does not explain in detail what the

defendants are doing to impede his due process rights. Regardless, if the defendants

continue to infringe on his due process rights, he can file an inmate grievance and, if

after exhausting his administrative remedies the allegedly infringing conduct

continues, he can file another civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, he has an

adequate remedy at law available to him. Additionally, his request for a transfer to

another institution is beyond the scope of what a court can order. See Westefer v.

Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (“[T]he PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the

Supreme Court in cases challenging prisoner conditions: ‘[P]rison officials have broad

administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage.’”)

2

(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)). His motion for a TRO and a

preliminary injunction is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Brown’s motion to compel (ECF No. 20)

is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brown’s motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 26) is DENIED.

Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 19th day of December, 2022.

BY THE COURT

WILLIAM E. DUFFIN

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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