State of Tennessee v. John Wayne Britt

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 3, 2003

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHN WAYNE BRITT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henderson County

No. 01027-3 Roger A. Page, Judge

No. W2002-01923-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 31, 2003

Indicted for the February 10, 2001 first degree premeditated murder of Anthony Sims, the defendant,

John Wayne Britt, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of second degree murder. Following

a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years in the Department of

Correction. Now on appeal, the defendant claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction

and that his sentence is excessive. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON and

DAVID G. HAYES, JJ., joined.

Lloyd R. Tatum, Henderson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, John Wayne Britt.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Thomas E. Williams, III, Assistant Attorney

General; Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; and Bill Martin, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In his first issue, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.

The defendant posits that the witnesses’ accounts of this tavern homicide were so diverse and that

the witnesses themselves were so intoxicated that no reasonable trier of fact could have relied upon

the state’s evidence to convict the defendant of second degree murder.

The defendant’s three-day trial began on December 10, 2001. In the light most

favorable to the state, the trial evidence is summarized as follows. On the night of February 10,

2001, a large crowd was patronizing the Golden Spur Tavern in Lexington. The patrons included

the victim, the defendant, Aaron Lyles, James Lee Wood, and David Burton. The victim and Lyles

were cousins. Sometime during the evening’s festivities of playing pool, dancing, and drinking beer,

either Lyles or the victim left his barstool and went to the rest room. When he returned, he found

the defendant occupying his stool, and words were exchanged among Lyles, the victim, Wood, and

the defendant. According to Lyles, he had been the one occupying the stool, and when he returned

from the rest room and argued with the defendant then seated on the stool, the victim came to Lyles’s

aid and told the defendant that if the defendant wanted to start trouble, he would have to deal with

the victim. Perhaps 30 to 45 minutes later, the defendant went outside, and soon Lyles, Wood, and

Burton followed. The victim may or may not have gone outside at this time.

In any event, in front of the tavern, the men began “mouthing.” Some witnesses

recounted that the defendant removed his jacket and held an open knife in his right hand. Lyles went

to his Jeep and obtained an automatic pistol, which he brandished in front of the defendant and

others. Wood tried to intervene; he took the pistol away from Lyles and put Lyles in the Jeep.

Burton took the gun away from Wood and gave it to the bartender. The defendant tried to get into

the Jeep and yelled threats at Lyles. At some point, the victim came outside and stood by the front

door drinking a beer.

During the defendant’s siege of the Jeep, Lyles left the Jeep and ran away. Some

witnesses recalled that the unarmed victim began walking around a truck when the defendant

accosted him, asked him if he wanted “some, too,” and without provocation, began stabbing the

victim. One witness, who was seated in her vehicle in front of the tavern, testified that the victim

did not threaten the defendant and did nothing “other than just stand there and get stabbed.” Some

witnesses recounted that the episode was initiated by the victim throwing a beer bottle that hit or

nearly hit the defendant in the shoulder. One witness testified for the defense that after the victim

threw the bottle, he “tackled” the defendant, and they fought. In any event, after a scuffle between

the victim and the defendant in the parking lot, the victim was left lying prone and bleeding. He had

sustained three significant stab wounds to his chest and abdomen, the lethal wound having penetrated

bone before piercing the victim’s heart.

Witnesses testified that the defendant wore a knife sheath on his belt. When the

police arrived to find the mortally wounded victim in the parking lot, the defendant emerged from

the side of the tavern building. The officers frisked him and found no weapons. The defendant had

dirt or gravel stains and, apparently, bloodstains on his jeans. The defendant stated, “I think I broke

my finger,” and added, “I had to defend myself.” The defendant appeared to have no impairment

in talking or walking and did not seem to be intoxicated. The officers found a knife sheath behind

the tavern and found the automatic handgun in a box behind the bar. They found no knife on the

premises.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree

murder, a Class A felony. Second degree murder is defined as the knowing killing of another.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a) (2003).

Familiar rules govern the appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a conviction. The reviewing court must determine whether, considering the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

-2-

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276-77 (Tenn. 2002). “A guilty verdict by the

jury, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves

all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

Issues of the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual

issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and the appellate court does not

re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Id. Nor may the appellate court substitute its inferences drawn

from circumstantial evidence for those drawn by the trier of fact. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277. A verdict

of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and on

appeal the defendant has the burden of establishing why the evidence is insufficient to support the

verdict rendered by the jury. Id. Conversely, the state on appeal is entitled to the strongest

legitimate view of the trial evidence, as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may

be drawn therefrom. Id.

Upon our review of the evidence in the case, we readily discern that witnesses gave

diverse and sometimes conflicting accounts of the details of the events of the evening. We also

discern that most of the witnesses were in some state of intoxication at the time the events unfolded,

and several of them were impeached at trial based upon their having been previously convicted of

felonies or crimes involving dishonesty. See Tenn. R. Evid. 609. Also, some witnesses’s testimony

conflicted with their prior written statements. See id. 613. These factors, however, go to the weight

and credibility of the evidence. As mentioned above, this court defers to the jury to determine the

weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. We note that at least one eyewitness, who

had not been drinking at the time of the homicide, testified affirmatively that the defendant attacked

and stabbed the unarmed victim without provocation. The medical pathologist who performed the

autopsy on the body of the victim testified that the lethal stab wound that entered the victim’s heart

was necessarily applied with enough force to penetrate bone. Thus, in our view, the evidence is

sufficient to support a finding that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

In his other issue, the defendant claims that the sentence was excessive. The 25-year

sentence was the maximum for a Class A offense in Range I, the sentencing range stipulated by the

parties.

In determining whether the trial court has properly sentenced an individual, this court

engages in a de novo review of the record with a presumption that the trial court’s determinations

were correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (2003). In conducting our de novo review, we must

consider the evidence at sentencing, the presentence report, the sentencing principles, the arguments

of counsel, the statements of the defendant, the nature and characteristics of the offense, any

mitigating and enhancement factors, and the defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation. Id. §§

40-35-210(b) (2003), 40-35-103(5) (2003); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). On

appeal, the appellant has the burden of showing that the sentence imposed is improper. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-401(d), Sentencing Comm'n Comments (2003); Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169.

-3-

In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this court must consider: (a) the

evidence, if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing; (b) the presentence report; (c) the

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors;

(f) any statement that the defendant made regarding sentencing; and (g) the potential or lack of

potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102 (2003), 40-35-103 (2003),

40-35-210 (2003); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

To determine the length of the sentence, the trial court applied three statutory

enhancement factors: The defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal

behavior in addition to that necessary to establish the proper range, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2)

(2003); the victim was particularly vulnerable, id. § 40-35-114(5) (2003); and the defendant

employed a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, id. § 40-35-114(10) (2003). The

court applied no mitigating factors.

At the outset, we note that the trial court made extensive references to the sentencing

principles and guidelines and recorded thorough findings of fact. Accordingly, the sentence is

accompanied by the statutory presumption of correctness.

We first consider the application of enhancement factor (2), the defendant’s criminal

history or behavior. The presentence report revealed the defendant’s record of prior convictions:

driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (2000), assault and battery (1993, 1990, and 1987),

disorderly conduct (1990), leaving the scene of an accident (1990 and 1983), and public intoxication

(1999 and 1993). The trial court relied upon the defendant’s criminal record to apply enhancement

factor (2), and the record supports the trial court’s use of and assignment of “considerable weight”

to this factor.

Concerning factor (5), that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or

physical or mental disability, the trial court determined that the victim was particularly vulnerable

because of intoxication. The court reviewed the testimony of the pathologist, who testified about

the victim’s blood-alcohol level, which exceeded .20. The pathologist testified that the victim’s

ability to defend himself would have been effectively impaired. The court applied the factor because

the defendant was not intoxicated at the time of the assault and was able to take advantage of the

victim. The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions; we will not disturb the application of

factor (5).

The trial court applied factor (10), that the defendant used a deadly weapon in the

commission of the homicide, and unquestionably that factor applies. The defendant’s use of a knife

to kill the victim essentially is not controverted in the evidence. Thus, factor (10) applies.

The trial court declined the defendant’s request to apply mitigating factors (2), that

the defendant reacted to strong provocation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(2) (2003); (3), that

substantial grounds exist to excuse or justify the criminal conduct, id. § 40-35-113(3) (2003); and

-4-

(11), that the defendant, although guilty of the crime, committed the offense under such unusual

circumstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated the conduct, id.

§ 40-35-113(11) (2003). We find no fault with the court’s conclusions.

Although the defendant and the victim may have engaged in a disagreement in the

tavern 30 to 45 minutes before the homicide, and although some evidence indicates that the victim

threw a bottle at the defendant, substantial evidence supports the view that the unarmed victim did

nothing of substance to provoke the defendant’s fatal attack. This evidence justifies the trial court’s

rejection of factor (2).

Similarly, the record fails to evince a basis for concluding that no substantial grounds

exist tending to excuse the criminal conduct. In this regard, the defendant posited that his need to

defend himself should mollify his sentence; however, the record contains substantial evidence that

the defendant attacked an unarmed, defenseless victim who had done nothing “other than stand there

and get stabbed.” Thus, the trial court was justified in rejecting mitigating factor (3).

The court was also justified in rejecting the claim, via factor (11), that the crime was

committed under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that the defendant held a sustained

intent to violate the law. The trial judge relied upon the “lull . . . in [the] altercation” following

Lyles’s escape from the scene on foot as a basis for finding that “there had been a cooling off period

. . . , there was a long enough period of time here, I’m finding there was a sustained intent to violate

the law that motivated this conduct.” Thus, we find no error in rejecting mitigating factor (11).

Based upon the record and our analysis of it, the trial court’s sentencing judgment is

justified.

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

___________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

-5-