Opinion

Caroline Smith v. Mark Smith

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jan 10, 2002
Status
Published
On the bench
Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.9%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

January 10, 2002 Session

CAROLINE ELIZABETH SMITH v. MARK O. SMITH

Direct Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Sumner County

No. 2509-G Barry R. Brown, Judge

No. M2001-00689-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 16, 2002

This is an appeal by appellant Caroline Elizabeth Smith from an order of the trial court which

provided that the custody of the minor children of Caroline Elizabeth Smith and Mark O. Smith

shall remain in the custody of Mark O. Smith. We affirm the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed

and Remanded

IRVIN H. KILCREASE, JR., Sp. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J J., joined.

Gary M. Williams, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Caroline Elizabeth Smith.

Michael W. Edwards, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mark O. Smith.

OPINION

Background

This appeal involves a petition for change of custody of two (2) minor children, Jessica Anne

Smith, born March 11, 1985, and Sarah Jayne Smith, born September 10, 1986, from their father,

appellee, Mark O. Smith (“Father”) to their mother, appellant, Caroline Elizabeth Smith(“Mother”).

On June 27, 1996, the Father was granted an absolute divorce from the Mother on the ground

of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded joint custody of the parties’ minor

children, Jessica Anne Smith and Sarah Jayne Smith, with primary placement with the Father.

The provisions of the Final Decree of Divorce restrained both parties from possessing or

consuming drugs or alcohol in the presence of the children.

After the divorce from the Father, the Mother married another man and divorced him in

October, 1999.

In May, 1999, the Mother moved into the home of the Father and their two (2) daughters.

The reason that she returned to the Father's home is disputed. According to the Father, the Mother

had surgery in April, 1999. The Father said that he felt it would help the Mother if she moved in

with him and their daughters. The Mother testified that she did not know the reason that the Father

insisted that she live with him, but her illness was not the reason.

While the Father and Mother lived together, after their divorce, they had an intimate

relationship. Further, the Mother assisted with the housekeeping and care of the children. However,

the Father was the primary care provider for the children.

On May 5, 2000, the Father was charged with domestic violence based on a complaint filed

by the Mother. However, the charge was subsequently dismissed.

On May 23, 2000, the Mother was ordered to move from the Father’s home within ten (10)

days as a result of a Detainer Warrant filed against her by the Father. However, the Father allowed

the Mother an additional ninety (90) days to remain in the home. The Mother moved from the home

in August, 2000.

Subsequent to the divorce and while the Father and Mother were living together during the

years 1998-1999, the Father drank alcoholic beverages and smoked marijuana. However, the Father

denied that he or anyone else used marijuana in the presence of the minor children, Jessica or Sarah,

or that he was ever intoxicated in the presence of the children.

The Mother complained that the Father took several trips and left the children with her.

However, the Final Decree of Divorce provides that if the Father is in need of a babysitter the wife

shall be given the right of first refusal.

Prior to the Smith's divorce, the Father drank alcoholic beverages and smoked marijuana.

The trial court in a supplemental order entered on August 8, 1996, issued a "mutual restraining order

restraining both parties from allowing anyone who is intoxicated or under the influence of illegal

drugs while the minor children are in their care."[sic]

The minor children, Jessica and Sarah, testified that they never saw their father or anyone

else intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, or use marijuana in their presence.

The Mother testified that the Father received e-mails on his home computer which contained

pornographic material and he would show her this material. However, the Mother participated in

this activity by sending humorous pornographic e-mail to the Father. The humorous pornographic

e-mails the Father received were from his friends and co-workers. There is no evidence that the

children ever saw the humourous pornographic e-mail.

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Jessica, a minor child of the parties, is satisfied living with her Father. Sarah, a minor child

of the parties, testified that she is satisfied living with her Father, but has no opinion as to whether

she wants to live with her Mother or Father.

The trial court, in its order entered on December 27, 2000, found that there had not been a

material or substantial change of circumstances in the custodial management and refused to change

custody of the parties’ minor children from the Father to the Mother.

On March 9, 2001, the Mother filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order of the trial Court.

Standard of Review

This case was tried before the Court without a jury. Child custody cases are reviewed by

this court in the same manner as other non-jury civil cases. Bass v. Knighton, 676 S.W. 2d 554, 555

(Tenn. App. 1984). Our review is pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) which provides in pertinent

part that review of findings of fact by the trial court in civil actions shall be de novo upon the record

of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. No presumption of correctness attaches to the trial

court’s legal conclusions. Doles v. Doles ,848 S.W. 2d 656, 661 (Tenn. App. 1992); York v. Vulcan

Materials Co., 63 S.W. 3d 384, 387 (Tenn Ct. App. 2001).

Our de novo review is also subject to the well-established principle that the trial court is in

the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses; accordingly, such determinations are

entitled to great weight on appeal. Thompson v. Adcox, 63 S.W. 3d 783, 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Analysis

The Mother argues that there has been a material change in circumstances affecting the

welfare of the children since the Final Decree of Divorce and the supplemental orders of the trial

court. Further, the Mother argues that because the alleged change in circumstances, custody of the

children should be changed from the Father to her.

The trial court, at a bench trial, considered the testimony of the Mother, the Father, the minor

children and the exhibits and concluded that there had not been a material or substantial change in

the custody arrangement and declined to change custody from the Father to the Mother.

The Mother’s main complaint about the Father’s conduct was his use of alcoholic beverages

and marijuana. However, the Mother testified that the Father drank alcoholic beverages and used

marijuana prior to and after their divorce. Therefore, no change in his conduct has occurred.

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The Mother claims she became the primary caretaker of the children when she returned to

the home of the Father. The Father claims that he continued to be the primary caretaker of the

children while he and the Mother lived together.

The trial judge resolved the issues of credibility of the witnesses in favor of the Father. We

defer to the trial judge’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses. Massengale v.

Massengale, 915 S.W. 2d 818, 819 (Tenn App. 1995)

Our examination of the evidence persuades us to conclude that the evidence preponderates

in favor of the trial court’s decision that there has not been a material or substantial change of

circumstances in the custodial arrangement to warrant a change in custody of the children from the

Father to the Mother.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. This case is remanded to the trial court for such

further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant

Caroline Elizabeth Smith and her surety, for which execution may issue, if necessary.

________________________________

Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Sp. J.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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