finding that “recusal is not warranted where the only challenged conduct consists of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “recusal is not warranted where the only challenged conduct consists of judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments”
- holding that a plaintiffs “disagreement with the court’s rulings . . . provides an inadequate basis for recusal”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
U.S. BISTRICT COURT
ee □□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT —
FOR THE 2021 JUN 28 AM 9: □□□
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
CLERK
By___ WW
PRINCESS C. MONTPELIER, ) DEBIT CLERK
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) Case No. 2:20-cv-150
)
SEAN BROWN, Commissioner of Vermont _)
Department for Children and Families, )
)
Defendant. )
ENTRY ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR RECUSAL
(Doc. 46)
Plaintiff filed a second motion for recusal fourteen days after her first motion for
recusal was denied by the undersigned and ten days after it was denied by separate order
by Chief Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford. Plaintiff's grounds for recusal are largely
unchanged. She also seeks recusal in any other action in which she is a litigant.!
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a judge must recuse herself when a party files a “timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455 obligates a federal judge to
“disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” id. § 455(a), or where any of the subsection-b criteria are satisfied, including
where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” id. § 455(b)(1).
Where a party files an affidavit seeking recusal under § 144, “a judge has an affirmative
duty to inquiry into the legal sufficiency of such an affidavit and not to disqualify
' Plaintiff has filed seven actions in this court under her present and former names but currently
has only one action pending.
h[er]self unnecessarily.” LoCasio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
The Second Circuit has explained that recusal under §§ 144 and 455(b)(1) is
determined by “look[ing] to extrajudicial conduct as the basis for making such a
determination, not conduct which arises in a judicial context.” Apple v. Jewish Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). “[T]he substantive standard for recusal is whether a reasonable
person, knowing all the facts, would conclude that the court’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Apple, 829 F.2d at 333.
“(JJudicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 55 (1994); LoCascio, 473 F.3d
at 495. Similarly, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at
555; LoCascio, 472 F.3d at 495.
Plaintiff's second motion for recusal cites the legal reasoning of this court’s May
19, 2021 Opinion and Order as the basis for her request for recusal. Plaintiff asserts that
the court incorrectly granted leave to amend “as if wishing to be gratuitous” and that the
court addressed certain motions “as a resentment or a gripe[.]” (Doc. 46 at 1-2.) Plaintiff
further takes issue with the court’s reasoning that legal counsel is generally not appointed
in civil cases because “generally does not apply to [her].” /d. at 2 (capitalization omitted).
Plaintiff does not identify any extrajudicial conduct as a basis for recusal or support her
recusal motion with an affidavit.
Disagreement with the court’s rulings is not grounds for recusal. See S.E.C. v.
Razmilovic, 738 F. 3d 14, 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that “recusal is not warranted where
the only challenged conduct consists of judicial rulings, routine trial administration
efforts, and ordinary admonishments”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted);
Johnson v. Monaco, 350 F. App’x 324, 327 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a plaintiffs
“disagreement with the court’s rulings . . . provides an inadequate basis for recusal”).
Plaintiff offers her opinions as to the alleged errors and reasons for the rulings but this
alone does not provide grounds for recusal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for recusal (Doc. 46) is DENIED.
The undersigned will refer the motion for recusal to Chief Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford
for his independent ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 2 day of June 2021.
United States District Court