“The principles of Younger are applicable to habeas petitions from pending [Wisconsin] sexually violent person commitments.”
How later courts described this case
- “The principles of Younger are applicable to habeas petitions from pending [Wisconsin] sexually violent person commitments.”
- explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
BRIAN SCOTT BROWN, ) CASE NO. 7:21CV00043
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
ERIN FERGUSON, ) By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad
) Senior United States District Judge
Respondent. )
Petitioner Brian Scott Brown, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After a jury trial in 2017, Brown was found
to be a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”) under Virginia Code Ann. §§ 37.2-900–920 and was
sentenced to involuntary inpatient sex offender treatment at the Virginia Center for Behavioral
Rehabilitation (“VCBR”), in the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Behavioral
Health and Developmental Services (“DBHDS”). Now in jail again on a separate criminal matter,
Brown challenges his continued custody by the DBHDS commissioner. This habeas case is
currently before the court on three motions seeking interlocutory relief. After review of the record,
the court finds that these motions must be denied.
On April 16, 2020, Brown was granted conditional release from the VCBR and moved to
Roanoke. He was arrested in September 2020 for a probation violation on a prior conviction in
the Pulaski County Circuit Court. He has been confined since then. He asserts that he is being
held in the custody of both the Pulaski County sheriff and the commissioner of DBHDS. Court
records available online indicate that in Pulaski County Circuit Court Case No. CR05001313-01,
on March 30, 2021, the Court revoked Brown’s probation and sentenced him to serve three years
in jail, to run consecutively with another unspecified sentence. In Brown’s Case No. CL16000379-
00, the Court has scheduled a hearing for June 25, 2021.
In Brown’s § 2254 petition, he challenges only his custody by the DBHDS commissioner,
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence. The court has
directed respondent to answer or respond to Brown’s § 2254 claims, and Brown will have an
opportunity to reply. In Brown’s current motions, he seeks orders from this court for his immediate
release from DBHDS custody altogether or for a stay of any state court proceedings to reevaluate
him for possible recommitment to the VCBR. The court cannot find that any such relief is
appropriate at this time.
In Brown’s “motion to stay,” ECF No. 6, he asserts that because of this pending § 2254
case, the state court should be barred from proceeding with CL16000379-00, which apparently
relates to consideration of Brown’s status as an SVP and whether his recent behavior warrants
recommitment for inpatient treatment.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a
federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except
in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d
881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger
Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no
adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44; see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.
69, 72–73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is
appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there
are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state
interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state
proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm’n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d
1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Lott v. Sheek, No. 819CV00954DCCJDA, 2019 WL 3308415, at *7–8 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2019),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:19-CV-00954-DCC, 2019 WL 2511253 (D.S.C. June
18, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-7636, 2020 WL 2126445 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020). The Younger
abstention doctrine applies to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are
involved. Id. at *8. Other circuit courts have applied Younger to bar district court interference in
pending civil commitment proceedings. Id. (citing Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d 571, 572 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“The principles of Younger are applicable to habeas petitions from pending
[Wisconsin] sexually violent person commitments.”); Smith v. Plummer, 458 F. App’x 642, 643
(9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the Younger abstention doctrine extends to an ongoing state-initiated
judicial proceeding where the proceeding implicates important state interests, the litigant is not
barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding, and federal court action
would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so)).
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Younger doctrine bars this court from
interfering in the ongoing civil proceeding regarding Brown’s possible recommitment as an SVP.
Brown offers no argument that the protection of members of the public from possible recidivism
by a documented SVP is not an important state interest for purposes of the Younger abstention
doctrine, and the court finds none. Nor does Brown demonstrate that he is unable to raise federal
claims in the pending state court civil action concerning his SVP status and potential
recommitment. Accordingly, under Younger, the court will deny Brown’s motion to stay the state
court proceedings.
In a “motion for release,” ECF No. 7, Brown asserts that pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, this court should order his release from custody, pending
this court’s decision on his § 2254 petition. This argument has no merit. A § 2254 petition in the
district court does not equate with an appeal in the court of appeals, which would be subject to
rules governing appellate proceedings.
Finally, in Brown’s second “motion for release,” ECF No. 10, he states that on March 4,
2021, he gave all his legal documents to a jail official who allegedly threatened him with
unspecified violence and threw his documents in the garbage. Brown states: “I do not feel safe at
this facility,” and on that basis, he requests an order releasing him on his “own recognizance until
such time as [he goes] to court for the [probation] violation” Mot. 1, ECF No. 10. Brown’s
probation revocation proceeding has concluded, however. Therefore, this motion must be denied
as moot.
For the stated reasons, the court will deny Brown’s motions for interlocutory relief. An
appropriate order will issue this day. The clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum
opinion and the accompanying order to Brown and to counsel of record for respondent.
ENTER: This !2"? day of April, 2021.
GAL, Cnrzk
Senior United States District Judge