“Jurisdictional restrictions provide absolute limits on a court’s power to hear and dispose of a case, and such limits can never be waived or forfeited.”
How later courts described this case
- “Jurisdictional restrictions provide absolute limits on a court’s power to hear and dispose of a case, and such limits can never be waived or forfeited.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
DESHAWN BROWN, ) CASE NO.7:19CV00498
)
Petitioner, )
v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
)
WARDEN BRECKON, ) By: Hon. Glen E. Conrad
) SeniorUnited States District Judge
Respondent. )
Deshawn Brown,afederal inmate,filed this action, prose, as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. Brown asserts that he is actually innocent of the crime for which
he was convictedand sentencedunder Rehaif v. United States,__ U.S. __, 139 U.S. 2191 (2019).
See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1318,
203 L. Ed. 2d 600 (2019)(allowing §2241 challenge to federal sentence as imposed); In re Jones,
226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000) (allowing § 2241 challenge to federal conviction). Upon
review of the record, the court concludes that Brown’s petition under § 2241 in this court is more
appropriately construed as a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§2255.
I.
Brown is currently confined at the United States Penitentiary Lee County, located in this
judicial district. Pursuant to a judgment entered on June 10, 2015, in Case No. 6:15-cr-2001 by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Brown stands convicted of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)and924(a)(2).
On June 9, 2015,the Court sentenced Brown to a term of 120 months of imprisonment. The Court
also imposed three years of supervised release. Brown appealed, but the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. According to court records available online, Brown
has not filed any collateral attacks on his conviction orsentence in the sentencing court.
In response to Brown’s current petition under §2241 to this court, respondent argues that
the petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7.) Brown has filed a response
in opposition to the motion todismiss. (ECFNo. 11.) Thus, the matter has been fully briefed.
II.
A federal prisoner bringing a claim for relief from an allegedly illegal sentence must
normally do so in a §2255 motion in the sentencing court. Section 2255(e) provides that a §2241
habeas petition raising such a claim “shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has
failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied
him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(e) (emphasis added). The fact that relief under §2255
is barred procedurally or by the gatekeeping requirements of §2255 does not render the remedy
inadequate or ineffective. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332; seealsoCradle v. United States, 290 F.3d
536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it,
that is determinative. Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing
court does not grant relief, theone-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable
to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.”).
Severalcircuit courts of appeals, including the Fourth Circuit, have held that the last phrase
in §2255(e), known as the savings clause, is jurisdictional. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 424-25 (citing
Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013)). In other words, the savings clause
“commands the district court not to entertain a § 2241 petition that raises a claim ordinarily
cognizable in the petitioner’s first §2255 motion except in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at
425.1 In this circuit, the remedy in § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a
sentence when:
(1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court
established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct
appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed
and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is
unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive
motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error
sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.
Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429; see also Jones, 328 F.3d at 333-34. Thus, unless Brown demonstrates
that he can satisfy the Jones/Wheeler test so that the savings clause applies to permit his Rehaif
challenge in a §2241 petition, this court has no “power to act” on his §2241 claim. Id.; see also
Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 810 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Jurisdictional restrictions provide absolute
limits on a court’s power to hear and dispose of a case, and such limits can never be waived or
forfeited.”).
Brown argues that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif he is actually
innocent of his conviction and sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Section 922(g) provides that
“it shall be unlawful for certain individuals to possess firearms. The provision lists nine categories
of individuals subject to the prohibition, including felons . . . . A separate provision, § 924(a)(2),
adds that anyone who knowinglyviolates the first provision shall be fined or imprisoned for up to
10 years.” Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2194; see also18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In Rehaif, the Supreme Court
held that “the word knowingly applies both to the defendant’s conduct and to the defendant’s
status. To convict a defendant, the Government therefore must show that the defendant knew he
possessed a firearm and also that he knew he hadthe relevant status when he possessed it.” Rehaif,
1 The court has omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and/or citations here and throughout this
opinion, unless otherwise noted.
139 S.Ct. at 2194. According to Brown, he was not aware of his status as a prohibited person, nor
was he informed of that status by defense counsel, the prosecution, or the court. Therefore, he
claims,the elements of the crime were not proven, and he is actually innocent.
Brown further argues that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to challenge his conviction
and sentence for the following reasons. First, he asserts that he lacked a prior opportunity to
challenge hisconviction because such a challenge was foreclosed by circuit or Supreme Court law
at the time of his sentencing and direct appeal.2 Second, Brown contends that he would not be
able to bring his actual innocence claim in a “second or successive 2255 motion” because such
motion would be authorized by the circuit court only when the defendant makes a showing that it
contains:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense;
or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). However, Brown never filed a first § 2255 motion. Therefore, his current
petition would not be considered a second or successive § 2255 motion, and he would not be
subject to § 2255(h)’s restrictions.3 In short, Brown cannot demonstrate that § 2255 “is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
Accordingly, this court is constrained to conclude that Brown cannot proceed with his
Rehaif claim under § 2241. Therefore, the court will deny relief under § 2241, construe Brown’s
2 Brown also mentions his “first 2255 motion.” (ECF. No. 1 at 5.) However, as discussed above, the docket
in his criminal case does not reflect the filing of a § 2255 motion at any time.
3 In his response, Brown notes that he never filed a § 2255 motion and, therefore, does not require
authorization from the Eighth Circuit to do so. (ECFNo.11 at 15.)
submission as a § 2255 motion, and transfer it to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision.* The
Clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and accompanying order to petitioner
and to counsel of record.
ENTER: This _!8th day of September, 2020.
Senior United States District Judge
+ The court expresses no view on the merits of petitioner’s claim.