“The reconsideration of a judgment after entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998))
How later courts described this case
- “The reconsideration of a judgment after entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
RYAN GREGORY,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No. 3:19CV685
SEAN BROWN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ryan Gregory, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil action. By
Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on January 14, 2020, this Court dismissed the action
without prejudice because Gregory neither paid the initial partial filing fee nor averred that he
could not pay such a fee.
On February 11, 2020, the Court received from Gregory a Motion for Reconsideration
containing argument that the Court construes as a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) (“Rule 59(e) Motion,” ECF No. 14). Gregory asserts that he was in transit and
did not receive a copy of the Memorandum Order directing him to the pay the initial partial filing
fee. Gregory asks the Court to reconsider the dismissal of the action or to reopen the action as a
new case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized three grounds
for relief under Rule 59(e): “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991); Atkins v.
Marathon LeTourneau Co., 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990)). Gregory fails to
demonstrate that the Court committed a clear error of law or that reopening his case is necessary
to prevent manifest injustice. Nor does Gregory demonstrate any other basis for granting Rule
59(e) relief. See Williams v. Virginia, 524 F. App’x 40, 41 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The reconsideration
of a judgment after entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” (citing
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998))). Accordingly,
Gregory’s Rule 59(e) Motion (ECF No. 14) will be DENIED. Nevertheless, because Gregory
has clearly expressed his desire to continue to pursue his claims, the Court will DIRECT the
Clerk to refile Gregory’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) as a new civil action as of the date of entry
hereof.
An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: MAR 17 2020 United States District Judge
Richmond, Virginia