Opinion

Eddie Williams v. Dept of Corrections

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Oct 31, 2002
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Houston M. Goddard
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.9%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Brief October 31, 2002

EDDIE WILLIAMS, JR. v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Morgan County

No. 01-34 Frank V. Williams, III, Chancellor

FILED JANUARY 31, 2003

No. E2002-00306-COA-R3-CV

In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Morgan County the Petitioner/Appellant, Eddie

Williams, Jr., contends that the Trial Court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of certiorari for

failure to appear and prosecute. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Tenn. R. of App. P. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Cause

Remanded

HOUSTON M. GODDARD , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS and

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR.,JJ., joined.

Eddie Williams, Jr., pro se.

No brief filed by the Appellees.

OPINION

Mr. Williams is currently incarcerated at Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City.

On March 6, 2001, Mr. Williams filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court

for Morgan County wherein he sought review of a decision rendered against him by the disciplinary

board of the Brushy Mountain Correctional Complex while he was incarcerated there. On May 21,

2001, the Respondent/Appellee, Tennessee Department of Corrections, filed a motion to dismiss Mr.

Williams’ petition upon grounds of improper venue and failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Mr. Williams filed his response to that motion on June 1, 2001.

On January 15, 2002, the Trial Court received a motion from the Tennessee Department of

Corrections requesting that its motion to dismiss be heard on the briefs without oral argument. On

that same date the Court entered an order dismissing the case which recites the following:

It appearing to the Court that the above styled cause of action was set for

trial on 14th day of JANUARY, 2002 and Notice of Trial was thereafter served

upon the Parties in writing as reflected by a copy of such Notice hereafter filed in

the above styled cause. The Plaintiff or Attorney of record having failed to appear

and prosecute pursuant to the notice given, it is therefore;

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that this cause be and is

hereby dismissed for failure to appear and prosecute. Costs are taxed to the

Plaintiff for which execution may issue if necessary.

Thereafter, Mr. Williams timely filed his notice of appeal.

The sole issue addressed in this appeal is, as restated, whether the Trial Court erred in

dismissing Mr. Williams’ petition for writ of certiorari for failure to appear and prosecute.

The decision of a trial court to dismiss for failure to prosecute is discretionary and, therefore,

upon review this Court will not second guess the trial court unless it has acted unreasonably,

arbitrarily or unconscionably. Hodges v. Tennessee Attorney General, et al, 43 S.W.3d 918, (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2000).

The Tennessee Department of Corrections chose not to file a brief in this case; however, by

notice to this Court it recognizes that Mr. Williams was incarcerated on the trial date of January 14,

2002, and was “unable to appear for trial without a writ of habeas corpus or some other order

commanding that he be brought to court”. The record does not show that the Trial Court issued a

writ of habeas corpus or other order commanding that Mr. Williams be brought to court in this case.

The notice further states that “[i]n the interest of justice, the respondent, through counsel, believes

that dismissal under the circumstances was inappropriate and that the case should be remanded to

determine whether the motion to dismiss should be granted or writ should issue.” We agree.

First of all we note that, although the Trial Court’s order of dismissal states that trial of the

case was set for January 14, 2002, and that notice of trial was served upon the Parties, Mr. Williams

denies that he received such notice and we find no evidence of such notice in the record before us.

However, even if it is shown that Mr. Williams was served with notice of trial , we still disagree that

his petition was properly dismissed by reason of his failure to appear and prosecute.

In Whisnant v. Byrd, 525 S.W.2d. 152 (Tenn. 1975) the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized

“that a prisoner has a constitutional right to institute and prosecute a civil action seeking redress for

injury or damage to his person or property, or for the vindication of any other legal right...” The

Court further noted, however, that the prisoner’s right in this regard is qualified and restricted and

that “absent unusual circumstances” the prisoner would not be allowed to appear in court during his

or her term of imprisonment. Although the Whisnant Court held that such matters should be held

in abeyance until the prisoner’s release, in Logan V. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297 (Tenn. 2000) the

Supreme Court later overruled Whisnant to the extent that it granted an absolute right of a stay when

the prisoner was absent from litigation and held that the decision of whether to stay proceedings on

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behalf of a prisoner should be determined on a case by case basis at the court’s discretion. However,

nowhere in its opinion did the Court sanction dismissal of a prisoner’s case solely for failure to

appear and prosecute. In fact the Court specifically noted that “[m]any suits can be adjudicated on

the pleadings. Motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and other such pre-trial matters

can be litigated by an inmate in custody.”

In Smith v. Peebles, 681 S.W.2d 567, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) a prisoner appealed the trial

court’s dismissal of his suit for failure to appear and prosecute after denying his request for a

continuance. Citing language from Whisnant, ibid., we found that, in so doing, the trial court

effectively denied the prisoner’s “‘constitutional right to institute and prosecute a civil action’”.

In light of the foregoing it is our conclusion that the Trial Court improperly dismissed Mr.

Williams’ petition for writ of certiorari. The order of dismissal is, therefore, vacated and the case

is remanded for a ruling on Mr. Williams’ petition and on the motion to dismiss same filed by the

Tennessee Department of Corrections. Costs of appeal are adjudged against the Tennessee

Department of Corrections.

_________________________________________

HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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