The opinion
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT February 14, 2024
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
FOOD NOT BOMBS HOUSTON et al, §
Plaintiffs,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-0338
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS :
Defendant.
ORDER □
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Food Not Bombs Houston (“FNBH”) and Brandon
Walsh’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. (Doc. No. 4). The Court held a hearing on the Motion on February 12, 2024, where it
heard testimony from witnesses and arguments from counsel from both sides. Upon considering
the evidence, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction for the reasons set forth below.
L. Background
This case involves the constitutionality of § 20-252 and § 20-257 of the Houston City Code
(“the Charitable Food Sharing Ordinance” or “the Ordinance”). Plaintiff FNBH is an organization
that provides free meals to food insecure people in Houston. FNBH provides these meals four
evenings per week and has been doing so for nearly two decades. According to FNBH, the
organization serves food to protest the manner in which the government spends tax revenue;
specifically, FNBH serves food to urge the government to invest more resources into solving
problems like hunger, homelessness, and poverty rather than spending those resources on war and
violence. FNBH spreads this message not only by using traditional means of protests (including
signs, banners, t-shirts, etc.), but also by publicly sharing food and eating with people experiencing
homelessness. The meals are vegetarian or vegan and are usually donated from local businesses
that otherwise would have let the food go to waste. At its events, FNBH has a large banner with
the group’s name and slogan “Poverty Isn’t a Crime,” and members wear coordinated t-shirts.
Plaintiff Walsh is a FNBH member.
The Charitable Food Sharing Ordinance was passed in early 2012. In short, the Ordinance
makes it illegal to conduct or sponsor a charitable food service event without the consent of the
property owner, including on all public property.
Section 20-252 sets out the following:
“Use of property without consent prohibited.
It shall be unlawful for any organization or individual to sponsor or conduct a food
service event on public or private property without the advance written consent of
the public or private property owner or other individual with lawful control of the
property.
(Ord. No. 2012-269, § 2, 4-4-2012, eff. 7-1-2012).
Section 20-257 sets out the following:
Use of city parks and other city property for food service events.
The director of the parks department shall develop rules, regulations, and criteria
for the use of park properties for food service events and shall maintain a list of
park properties with areas approved for food service events. The director of public
health shall develop rules, regulations, and criteria for the use of other city property
for food service events and shall maintain a list of such properties with areas
approved for food service events. The parks department and the health department
shall coordinate designation of such properties to avoid redundancy and maximize
the most effective use of the properties.
(Ord. No. 2012-269, § 2, 4-4-2012, eff. 7-1-2012; Ord. No. 2015-820, § 17, 8-26-2015)
As noted in the above section, the Charitable Food Sharing Ordinance subjects the food
sharing events to regulations promulgated by the Houston Health Department. Most of these
“requirements” are, however, optional. For example, the regulation encourages, but does not
require, food sharing programs to register, obtain free food-handling training, and schedule the
food service on the City’s website. Only one regulation is actually mandatory. As stated in the
regulations, “[t]he only mandatory step is a requirement to obtain owner consent before using
either public or private property for food service of more than five people.”! (Defendant’s Exhibit
2).
When the Ordinance was passed in 2012, FNBH obtained consent from then Mayor Annise
Parker to host its food sharing events at the Houston Central Public Library across from City Hall.
FNBH believes that this is an ideal location for its food-oriented protest because it is highly visible.
Mayor Parker also approved eight other city-owned properties for food sharing. In February of
2023, under the administration of Mayor Sylvester Turner, the City withdrew its consent to use
these locations, including consent to use the Central Library. Instead, the City gave consent for
food sharing events at only one location—61 Reisner Street, Houston Texas (formerly a Houston
Police Department station).
The City of Houston believes that coordinating all food sharing events at 61 Reisner is the
best course of action to solve homelessness and the difficulties that come with it. The City works
with “data-driven” methods to maximize impact. For example, the City has shifted from a shelter-
based approach to end homelessness to a housing-based approach. City officials testified that an
organized feeding system at 61 Reisner will also assist with its goals by increasing predictability
for the homeless population. Moreover, because 61 Reisner is a unified location, the City contends
' FNBH does not challenge the portion of the Ordinance and accompanying regulations that pertains to obtaining
owner consent for food sharing on private property. In this instance, “owner consent” means permission from the
mayor.
that it will optimize outcomes for homeless individuals because there are other social services
offered at that location as well, including mental health and housing resources.
Finally, the City believes that a unified system at 61 Reisner will reduce health risks
associated with food sharing. The location includes increased sanitation (food washing stations
and portable bathrooms), decreased vehicle traffic, more trash receptacles, and improved lighting
and electricity as compared with other potential food sharing locations such as the library.
FNBH takes several issues with this location. Not only is it the sole location offered by the
City (which may result in overlapping schedules from charitable groups), but it also demonstrates
the complete discretion vested in city officials to determine where it conducts its protests. While
the City views 61 Reisner’s decreased traffic as a positive factor for safety, FNBH contends that
the location is less visible and therefore cannot spread its message as effectively. Moreover, part
of FNBH’s mission is to protest war and what it believes are other inappropriate applications of
tax-payer funds, and it contends that being associated with the old police station is at odds with
this mission.
These reasons, among others, have caused FNBH to disregard the City’s attempts to push
all food sharing to 61 Reisner and, by extension, to disregard the Ordinance. Rather than move its
operations to 61 Reisner, FNBH has continued to conduct its food sharing at the Central Library.
FNBH members and volunteers have been issued over 89 tickets (corresponding to what they claim
are potentially $178,000 in fines). Several FNBH volunteers claim that they have stopped
volunteering for fear of receiving a ticket. FNBH and Walsh filed this lawsuit alleging that the
Charitable Food Sharing Ordinance, facially and as applied, violates their First Amendment rights
of free speech and expressive association. Specifically, in the present motion, Plaintiffs request
that the Court find that they have a substantial likelihood on the merits of their “as-applied”
challenge. Consequently, Plaintiffs ask that the Court enter a temporary injunction enjoining the
City of Houston and its officers, employees, and agents from enforcing § 20-252 and § 20-257 of
the Houston City Code against Plaintiffs, FNBH members, and FNBH volunteers at the Central
Library location.
With this background in mind, the Court turns to the legal merits of Plaintiffs’ motion.
Il. Legal Standard
A party seeking a preliminary injunction generally must show: (1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the injury
outweighs any harm to the other party, and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the
public interest. Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 882
(Sth Cir. 2013) (citing Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 445 (Sth Cir.2009)). “A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted if the plaintiffs have clearly
carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d
364, 372 (Sth Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
HI. Analysis
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor for the Court to consider is whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their as-applied constitutional challenge.
Plaintiffs argue that the Charitable Food Sharing Ordinance is an unconstitutional restriction of
their First Amendment rights for three independent reasons: (1) it is an invalid prior restraint that
gives unbridled discretion to City officials; (2) it is an unconstitutional time, place, and manner
restriction because it is not narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest and does not
leave ample alternative channels, and (3) it violates the expressive association rights by dictating
that individuals may only engage in their expressive association at one location within the City of
Houston.
i. Expressive Conduct under the First Amendment
The threshold inquiry in this case is whether Plaintiffs are engaging in expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom
of speech... . or the right of the people to peaceably assemble.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. The Supreme
Court has “long recognized that [the First Amendment’s] protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Supreme Court held that conduct
receives First Amendment protection where “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [is]
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.” /d. at 410-11. In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme
Court relaxed the “particularized message” requirement by holding protected expressive conduct
need not convey “a narrow, succinctly articulable message.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). As the Eleventh Circuit articulated, “in
determining whether conduct is expressive, we ask whether the reasonable person would interpret
it as some sort of message, not whether an observer would necessarily infer a specific
message.” Holloman ex rel Holloman v. Hartland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Whether food distribution [or sharing] can be expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment under particular circumstances is a question to be decided in an as-applied
challenge[.]” Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2006).
Applying this expressive conduct jurisprudence, the Court finds that FNBH’s food sharing
is expressive conduct.” The likelihood is great that an observer would appreciate FNBH’s message
based on the context of the protest. Even setting aside the words on FNBH’s banners and t-shirts,
the political message of feeding the hungry, eating with them, and doing so on public property,
would be understood by an onlooker.
This finding is consistent with other Circuit precedent. The Eleventh Circuit examined the
food sharing protest by Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs and similarly found that the food sharing
was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit
examined the context of the food sharing. Specifically, the Circuit found that the (1) presence of
signage, (2) the public nature of the events, (3) the public forum status of parks, (4) the fact that
homelessness was an issue of public concern, and (5) the inherently expressive nature of food
sharing, all supported the conclusion that Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs was engaged in a form
of protected expression. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d
1235, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2018).
The Court finds that the activity, context, and environment here are nearly identical to those
above, such that an neutral observer would understand that Plaintiffs engage in food sharing as
part of and with the intent to protest the “criminalization of poverty,” “overinvestment in war” and
“policing at the expense of the hungry.” (Doc. No. 4 at 10). As such, Plaintiffs are engaged in
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
? This Court understands that a cogent argument can be made that the mere act of feeding the homeless might not
qualify as protected First Amendment expressive behavior. This Court need not decide this issue; rather, it finds that
the act of providing food to the food insecure, when combined with FNBH’s other activities, is an inherent part of the
Plaintiffs’ political protest because it is not practical to separate one from the other.
ii. Prior Restraint on Speech
Plaintiffs’ first basis for challenging the constitutionality of the Charitable Food Sharing
Ordinance is that, as applied to their protected activity, it is an unconstitutional prior restraint. “It
has long been held that ordinances regulating speech contingent on the will of an official—such
as the requirement of a license or permit . . . are unconstitutional burdens on speech classified as
prior restraints. ” Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2003). “Any system
of prior restraints of expression comes . . . bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963).
Any prior restraint on protected activity must be “related to [a] legitimate government
interest” and “narrowly drawn to prevent discretionary decision-making.” Beckerman v. City of
Tupelo, Miss., 664 F.2d 502, 509 (Sth Cir. 1981) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala.,
394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969)). This requires “narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority.” Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992)
(quoting Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51). Such standards “provide the guideposts that check
the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating
against disfavored speech.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758
(1988).
Under the Ordinance, it is a crime to sponsor or conduct a food service event “without the
advance written consent of the public . . . property owner.” Houston City Code § 20-252. Neither
the Ordinance’s text nor any administrative guidance explains why the City has selected only one
location, and why that location, as opposed to others, was the sole place chosen. Houston City
Code § 20-257 delegates authority to City agencies to develop “rules, regulations, and criteria for
the use” of public property for food service events, it contains no standards for how these rules
will be developed and seems to allow City agencies to change the rules at any time.
The latest rules promulgated by the Health Department have little bearing on how an
approved location is chosen. The rules state that the approved location will have (1) adequate
parking, (2) adequate trash containment, and (3) restrooms and hand washing stations available 24
hours per day, 7 days per week. (Defendant’s Exhibit 2). These three requirements are deemed
necessary by the City? but not sufficient—that is, there is no guarantee that if a location meets
these requirements, it may become an approved location. The rules do not provide a mechanism
for how to apply to get a location approved, what standards will be applied when reviewing an
application for a new location, and whether a location will actually be approved. Plaintiffs argue
that this lack of criteria leaves the decision of whether to grant consent to the whims of city
officials.
The Court agrees. The history of the Ordinance itself makes clear that the avenues for
speech depend solely on the discretion of the Mayor. Under former Mayor Parker, nine public
locations were available for food-sharing; under Mayor Turner, only 61 Reisner was available.
There was no reasoning provided for this change, nor was there any evidence that the formerly
approved locations were no longer feasible.* Moreover, the language of the Ordinance does not
even guarantee that at least one location will be permitted. It is therefore theoretically possible
that, as property owner, the City could withdraw all consent as to any public forum. This would
completely eliminate Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in their protest.
In Forsyth Cnty, the Supreme Court reasoned that the decision of how much to charge for
police protection (and whether to charge at all) was left to the “unbridled discretion” of the
> The Court notes that some evidence indicated that even 61 Reisner does not meet these 3 necessary requirements.
For example, FNBH members have observed padlocks on the restrooms at 61 Reisner, suggesting that the restrooms
are not available 24-7.
* City officials testified that 61 Reisner was a better location because the City had (or could locate) other services for
the homeless nearby. It could also guarantee certain facilities and security. While this makes sense, it is not enough to
justify banning all other locations to groups exercising their First Amendment rights.
administrator who was not required to rely on any objective factors, did not need to provide any
explanation, and whose decision was not reviewable. 505 U.S. at 133. Applying this reasoning
here, the decision of where to allow food sharing (and whether to allow food sharing at all) is left
to the whims of the Mayor’s office, whose discretion appears to be unbridled and whose decision
is not reviewable. Therefore, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of their as-applied prior restraint claim.
iii. Unconstitutional Time, Place, and Manner Restriction
Plaintiffs’ second basis for challenging the constitutionality of the Charitable Food Sharing
Ordinance is that, as applied to their protected activity, it is an unconstitutional time, place, and
manner restriction.
Even where the government does not attempt to prohibit speech on the basis of content,
intermediate scrutiny “prevents the government from too readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech for
efficiency.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of Blind
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). Under this level of scrutiny, the government must prove
the restriction is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and [] leave[s]
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Jd. at 477 (quotation
omitted) (emphasis added). Narrow tailoring requires the City to show that the Charitable Food
Sharing Ordinance does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary.” Jd. at 486
(quoting Ward v. Rock Case Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). A regulation is invalid
where “a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance is neither narrowly tailored to a significant
government interest, nor does it leave ample alternative channels for communicating its message.
The Court agrees.
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First, the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to a significant government interest. The
government interests offered by the City included its interest in promoting public health and food
safety, as well as its interest in minimizing vermin and unifying its efforts to support Houston’s
homeless. While the City undoubtedly has, and should have, an interest in public health and safety,
the requirements of the Ordinance are divorced from this justification. As noted, attending the
City’s food safety training is optional under the regulations, and the location of 61 Reisner has no
inherent food safety assurances associated with it (it is, essentially, a parking lot). Serving expired
or contaminated food is not illegal under the Ordinance so long as it is at 61 Reisner. Since there
is no nexus between the health and safety of the food and the City’s location, the Ordinance is not
narrowly tailored to the significant government interest. The City may impose restrictions on the
conduct of individuals with regard to health and safety, but it cannot limit that conduct to certain
locations in the name of health and safety when there are no actual health and safety protocols tied
to those locations. Although the City’s other interests—minimizing vermin and coordinating
efforts to solve homelessness—may very well be legitimate government interests, they, too, appear
to be divorced from the sole requirement of the Ordinance (obtaining the City’s consent).
Second, the Ordinance does not leave open adequate alternative channels of
communication. “[A]n alternative forum is not sufficient if it ‘foreclose[s] a speaker’s ability to
reach one audience even if it allows the speaker to reach other groups.’” Sarre v. City of New
Orleans, 420 F. App’x 371, 376 (Sth Cir. 2011) (quoting Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 907
(7th Cir. 2000)). Currently, the Ordinance leaves only one channel of communication—61 Reisner.
Plaintiffs contend, and this Court agrees, that 61 Reisner is an inadequate protest alternative
because it alters FNBH’s audience (both people being served food and those observing) and
FNBH’s message. As noted above, FNBH serves food as a form of protest to encourage
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governments to “divert resources away from war, policing, and environmental destruction and
towards meeting people’s direct material needs.” (Doc. No. 4 at 19). Forcing FNBH to engage in
that protected expression at 61 Reisner changes the impact of that message for multiple reasons. It
may give the appearance that FNBH is working with the City rather than criticizing the City.
Moreover, the 61 Reisner location is further from the center of downtown and has much less
visibility than the Central Library location, potentially further diluting the impact of plaintiffs’
message. It is also the location of the former police station—a group with which the Plaintiffs
would rather not be identified. In effect, the City concedes these factors; it conceded at the hearing
that the Plaintiffs could protest at their chosen location as long as they did not hand out food.
For the reasons above, the Court agrees at this stage with Plaintiffs that the Ordinance is
not narrowly tailored to a significant government interest and does not leave open ample adequate
alternative channels of communication. Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown they are substantially
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that, as applied, the Ordinance is an unconstitutional
time, place, and manner restriction.
iv. Expressive Association
Plaintiffs’ third and final basis for challenging the constitutionality of the Charitable Food
Sharing Ordinance is that, as applied to their protected activity, it is an unconstitutional restraint
on their expressive association. Having found a substantial likelihood of the success on the merits
of two other bases above, the Court need not address this third independent basis for the
unconstitutionality of the Ordinance at this stage of litigation. The Court’s decision not to address
this argument is not a comment on the merits, or lackthereof, of this third argument.
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b. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
Having found that the Plaintiffs have established a likely violation of their First
Amendment rights, the remaining three injunction factors similarly fall in their favor. The second
factor requires that Plaintiffs show a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not
granted.
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal
periods of time unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d
279, 295 (Sth Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S 347, 373 (1976)); see also 11A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (2d
ed. 1995) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that
no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”). This is true whether the “First Amendment
interests [are] either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief [is] sought.” Elrod, 427
USS. at 373.
Here, given that FNBH members have already received citations and continue to face the
threat of prosecution for violating the Ordinance, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have made a
sufficient showing of irreparable harm.°
c. Balancing the Equities and Public Interest
Likewise, the third and fourth factor weigh in Plaintiffs favor for granting an injunction.
The third preliminary injunction factor requires the Court to balance the harm to the parties. “The
third preliminary injunction factor requires [Plaintiffs] to show that, absent an injunction, [their]
threatened injury outweighs any harm [the City] will suffer as a result of the injunction.” Opulent
Life, 697 F.2d at 297. As discussed above, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs is an irreparable harm
> The Court notes it has a second case in which it is alleged that the Plaintiff actually was ticketed by the police for an
alleged violation of the Ordinance while at a FNBH rally. See Picone v. Ancira et al., 4:23-cv-1206.
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to their First Amendment rights. As for the City, it contends that it would suffer harm as a result
of the injunction because the goals of the Ordinance would be frustrated—namely, there could be
increased sanitation, health, safety, and trash-related risks. The City’s interests, however, do not
clearly implicate the constitution, and these addressing these risks may be achieved through less
restrictive means. Moreover, the Court is crafting its security requirement so as to minimize the
effect on the City. Upon balancing these harms, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden
on the third factor.
Finally, the fourth factor requires the Plaintiffs show that the injunction will not disserve
the public interest. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that “injunctions protecting First
Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.” Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics
Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (Sth Cir. 2013); see also Ingebretsen ex rel. Ingebretsen v. Jackson
Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (Sth Cir. 1996) (holding that where a law violates the First
Amendment “the public interest was not disserved by an injunction preventing its
implementation.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs succeed on the fourth and final factor as well.
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. No. 4) and will enter an order
of preliminary injunction enjoining the City of Houston and its officers, employees, and agents
from enforcing § 20-252 and § 20-257 of the Houston City Code against FNBH members and
volunteers at the Central Library.
IV. Bond
The final issue the Court must address is how to address the security requirement in Rule
65(c). Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65. The Plaintiffs have asked that the bond be waived because there is no
risk of monetary loss to the city. By contrast, the City has asked for a heightened bond to address
the risks associated with a food sharing event located at a property other than 61 Reisner. Having
considered the arguments of counsel, evidence, and legitimate concerns of the City, the Court gives
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Plaintiffs the following choice. The Plaintiffs may elect to post a bond in the amount of $25,000.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs may elect to post a lower bond in the amount of $2,500 provided that they
meet the following conditions as to each of their events. They are to:
e bring adequate trash receptacles to the events and ensure that all waste and receptacles
are removed following the event;
e provide handwashing stations, hand sanitizer, or hand wipes to all attendees;
e avoid congregating on sidewalks and in the streets so as to block a sidewalk or street;
and
e ensure that any food-handling member (who has not already taken the City’s food
safety training) attend the free, virtual training offered from 12-2 p.m. on the third
Saturday of every month. The next one should be this Saturday, February 17, 2024.
The procedural criteria of that election are set out in the accompanying order of injunction.
V. Conclusion
Having considered the parties’ arguments and applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have sufficiently demonstrated that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time.
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. No. 4). The Court in a separate
order will temporarily enjoin the City of Houston and its officers, employees, and agents from
enforcing § 20-252 and § 20-257 of the Houston City Code against FNBH members and volunteers
during the pendency of this litigation. While the City’s efforts to unify and streamline an efficient
end to homelessness and feed the hungry may make good policy sense, being sensible does not
always equate to being constitutional, especially when the consequence of that policy is restricting
the expressive conduct of those that are protesting government policy.
gh
Signed at Houston, Texas, this 14 day of February, 2024.
Andrew S. Hanen
United States District Judge
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