Waddleton v. Collier

January 27, 2022

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

LaDARYL DEWAYNE WADDLETON, §

TDCJ # 01201064, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-4015

§

BRIAN COLLIER, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff LaDaryl Dewayne Waddleton is incarcerated in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and

has paid the filing fee. He has filed a complaint (Dkt. 1) and several amendments (Dkt.

13, Dkt. 15, Dkt. 16) with leave of the Court (Dkt. 21). He also has filed a more definite

statement (Dkt. 28). Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 38) and Waddleton

has responded (Dkt. 45). The motion is ripe for decision. Having considered the

pleadings, the motion and response, the applicable authorities, and all matters of record, the

Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss for the reasons explained below. Defendant’s

motion to seal and Plaintiff’s motion to add supplemental exhibits will be GRANTED.

All remaining motions will be DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Waddleton alleges that officials at the Estelle Unit violated his rights in connection

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with his inmate trust-fund account, his mail, and prison disciplinary cases. He brings suit

against six Defendants: TDCJ Executive Director Bryan Collier; Assistant Warden

Christopher LaCox; law library supervisor Jeania Pegoda; assistant mailroom supervisor

Diana Tyler; Assistant Warden Tracy Hutto; and Sergeant Yazmin Galvan.1 With the

exception of Collier, all Defendants were at the Estelle Unit at the times relevant to this

lawsuit.

Most of Waddleton’s claims pertain to the funds in his inmate trust-fund account.

He states in his pleadings that he had a high balance in the account in 2018-19 because he

had been awarded $28,000 of his mother’s $40,000 life insurance policy. On April 6,

2018, he made a written request on an I-25 form to withdraw $18,000 from his account,

and requested that the funds be paid to David L. Phillips, a friend outside TDCJ.

Waddleton states that he directed his requests through the unit’s administrative channels to

Warden LaCox and later to LaCox’s successor, Warden Hutto. In addition to his request

for $18,000 on April 6, 2018, Waddleton submitted “multiple requests that ranged in value

from $18k through $495.00” between April 6, 2018, and June 11, 2019 (Dkt. 28, at 3).

He states that, with the exception of two $2,000 withdrawals for which Hutto granted

permission, all of the requests were denied. See id. at 2-4; Dkt. 1, at 6-10; Dkt. 1-1, at 3-4.

1 The Office of the Attorney General represents all Defendants except Galvan, who has

separated from TDCJ (Dkt. 39). However, its motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s

claims.

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Waddleton claims that the denials were unjustified and that officials failed to

provide an adequate explanation. He presents his inquiries about the denied withdrawals,

along with the official responses providing reasons such as “excess amount” for the

denials.2 He alleges that officials at the Estelle Unit failed to follow a policy (AD-14.62)

that “carefully outlines reasons” that can support a denial of an inmate’s withdrawal

request; that the officials used conflicting TDCJ rules and policies “as leverage to deny the

Plaintiff’s withdrawal without reasons”; and that officials “harassed” him with “holds” and

“blocks” that prevented him from accessing his funds (Dkt. 28, at 5, 7).

With his original complaint, Waddleton presents Grievance No. 2018133035, in

which he complained about the denied $18,000 withdrawal. On May 24, 2018, at Step 1

of the grievance process, Waddleton complained that Warden LaCox had denied his

request to withdraw $18,000, stating that LaCox had verbally informed him on May 11,

2 See, e.g., Dkt. 1-1, at 8-9 (letter to Inmate Trust Fund Department with response dated May

1, 2018, that lists several reasons why his I-25 form had not been processed); id. at 10-11 (I-60

request dated April 23, 2018, with response stating that large withdrawals require approval and

thus take more time); id.at 47 (initialed note dated July 25, 2018, states that an unspecified request

was “denied due to the amount”); id. at 51 (letter from warden’s secretary to Waddleton on July

31, 2018, states that a $9,000 withdrawal form had been returned to him due to “excess amount”);

id. at 52 (I-60 inquiry regarding withdrawals was answered by Pegoda on July 31, 2018, stating

that all I-25s must be approved by the warden and the trust-fund department); id. at 53 (I-60

inquiry regarding withdrawals was answered by Pegoda on August. 7, 2018, citing page 66 of the

handbook and stating “the agency may decide what funds shall be deposited, what funds may be

withdrawn, and to whom these funds may be paid”); id. at 61 (letter from Inmate Trust Fund

department dated September 7, 2018, informs Waddleton that his account “may contain excess

funds” but that “[t]here are no restrictions or limits” on the amount in his account, and further

states, “If you have an account at a bank or other financial institution, we encourage you to

consider sending your excess funds to this outside account where you can earn interest”).

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2018, that his request was denied “because Mr. Phillips wasn’t family” (Dkt. 1-1, at 13).

Waddleton claimed that LaCox had violated his constitutional rights and the TDCJ

Offender Handbook, which states that inmate funds will be disbursed solely at the inmate’s

request. On June 27, 2018, Warden G. Vaughn denied the grievance with the following

response:

Your claims noted. According to policy, the Warden has authorization to

deny a withdrawal from your account if it poses a security violation.

Warden La[C]ox interviewed you and the recipient, due to conflicting

reasons for the transaction, the withdrawal was denied. No further action

warranted.

(id. at 14). Waddleton then appealed to Step 2 of the process, complaining that LaCox had

verbally based the denial on family relations, not on security, and that there was no security

threat. Waddleton also cited again to the handbook and complained that LaCox should

not be able to prevent him from exercising his rights. The assistant regional director

denied his appeal, stating that he had been appropriately advised at Step 1 (id. at 44-45).

In addition to his allegations about denied withdrawal requests, Waddleton claims

that officials made improper withdrawals from his inmate account. In particular, he

claims that officials withdrew $10,108.23 on November 14, 2018, and $7,607.50 on

December 7, 2018 (Dkt. 28, at 5). However, he states that, after he went on a hunger strike,

Hutto gave him written notice that his funds “were not taken, but placed on hold” and that,

although his commissary receipt reflected a $0 balance on his account, the funds

“apparently actually never left [his] account” (id. at 6). Waddleton complained to the

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Office of the Inspector General and in early 2019, shortly after officials notified him they

would not investigate the issue, the funds were restored to his account (id. at 6-7).

Waddleton states that that the denied withdrawals from his inmate trust-fund

account prevented him hiring an attorney to represent him in a probate case that he filed

against his great-uncle and step-sister. He provides information regarding Case No.

201892254 and Case No. 201923116, both captioned Waddleton v. Waddleton and filed in

the 234th District Court of Harris County (id. at 10; Dkt. 45, at 13-14). He acknowledges

that he could have proceeded pro se but states that he needed an attorney to effectively

present his claims. See Dkt. 28, at 10-11 (explaining that his claim to his family estate was

in jeopardy and that he wanted to hire a private investigator because he “strongly believes

he has a child on the outside world that he has never met”).3

Waddleton claims in this lawsuit that Defendants LaCox and Hutto violated his

due-process rights by denying him access to and otherwise mishandling the funds in his

inmate trust-fund account. He alleges that Defendant Collier failed to provide an

adequate system to address the mishandling of funds. Additionally, he claims that Tyler

3 Publicly available online records from Harris County reflect that Waddleton filed

Waddleton v. Waddleton, Case No. 201892254, on November 5, 2018. He then filed a new suit,

Waddleton v. Waddleton, Case No. 201923116 on April 1, 2019. On November 8, 2019, the court

dismissed his 2019 case because his 2018 case was open. On July 2, 2021, after a warning to

Waddleton that his case could be dismissed, the court dismissed the 2018 case for want of

prosecution. See Record Search, Harris County District Clerk, available at

https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/Edocs/Public/search.aspx (last visited January 25, 2022) (records

accessible by searching for Case No. 201892254 & Case No. 201923116).

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and Pegoda mishandled his mail and interfered with his access to the law library, and that

Tyler, Pegoda, Hutto, and Galvan retaliated against him. See id. at 17-18. He sues

Defendants in their official and individual capacities, seeking both damages and injunctive

relief.

Defendants move to dismiss all claims with prejudice arguing that Waddleton lacks

standing and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standing

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

“cases” or “controversies.” See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71

(2013). The requirement that a litigant must have standing to invoke the power of a federal

court is “one of the controlling elements in the definition of a case or controversy under

Article III.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007)

(cleaned up). Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, a court has an obligation to

examine its own jurisdiction. In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 2019). To establish

Article III standing, an injury must be (1) “concrete, particularized, and actual or

imminent”; (2) “fairly traceable to the challenged action”; and (3) “redressable by a

favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s

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conduct may suffice to establish standing.” Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 230 (5th

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court

lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Smith v. Regional

Transit Auth., 756 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402

F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005)). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of

facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction. Venable v. La. Workers’ Comp. Corp., 740

F.3d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court must “take the well-pled factual allegations of

the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re

Mirant Corp, 675 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 2012).

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted if the pleading “fail[s] to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts generally must accept the factual allegations

contained in the complaint as true. Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d

141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). Federal pleading rules require “only ‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). The complaint must,

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however, contain sufficient factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions, to state a

claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78

(2009); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). The pleadings

also must claim that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir.

2005).

The court’s review is limited to “the complaint, any documents attached to the

complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the

claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank

PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). See Walch v. Adjutant General’s Dep’t of Tex.,

533 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2008) (on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, documents attached to the

briefing may be considered by the court if the documents are sufficiently referenced in the

complaint and no party questions their authenticity (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2004))). The court

also may consider matters of which a court may take judicial notice under Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011).

D. Pro se Pleadings and the PLRA

“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). A

pleading filed by a pro se litigant must be “liberally construed,” even if “inartfully

pleaded,” and “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

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lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted); accord Alexander v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 867 F.3d 593, 601 & n.36

(5th Cir. 2017) (declining to strictly construe pro se litigant’s pleadings in context of

motion to dismiss). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more

than “‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. (citation omitted).

Because the plaintiff is an inmate bringing suit about prison conditions, the court is

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act to scrutinize the claims and dismiss the

complaint at any time, in whole or in part, if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). A dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard under Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403,

407 (5th Cir. 2013)

III. ANALYSIS

Waddleton brings claims against six Defendants alleging (1) violations of his right

to due process of law, (2) denial of his right to access the courts, and (3) retaliation. Section

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1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a vehicle for a claim against a person “acting under color

of state law,” such as a state official, for a constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris

Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016); Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th

Cir. 2002). Defendants move to dismiss all claims on the grounds that Waddleton lacks

standing and fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Court addresses

each claim in turn.

A. Due Process

Waddleton alleges that LaCox and Hutto violated his due-process rights in

connection with his property, in particular, his money in his inmate trust-fund account. He

also alleges that Collier, although not personally involved in the alleged violation of

Waddleton’s rights, failed to provide an adequate system to address the issue.

In the prison context, officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the type and

amount of personal property that inmates possess. Rochon v. La. State Penitentiary

Inmate Acct., 880 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1989); McRae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 869 (5th

Cir.1983), abrogated on other grounds, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-33 (1984);

see Rosin v. Thaler, 417 F. App’x 432, 434 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing property interest in

inmate accounts). To the extent that Texas prisoners have a right to possess personal

belongings, the deprivation of property implicates the Constitution only if such deprivation

is accomplished without due process. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981),

overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

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Due-process requirements for deprivations caused by state officials’ authorized

conduct are different from those caused by officials’ unauthorized conduct. When a

deprivation is authorized by an official policy, an inmate must be afforded some

combination of notice prior to the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard. See

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990); Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. San Antonio, 508

F.3d 812, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2007). However, when officials engage in random and

unauthorized conduct depriving an inmate of property, the deprivation is not foreseeable

by the State and pre-deprivation process is impractical. For unauthorized deprivations,

therefore, the State can satisfy due-process requirements by making available a meaningful

post-deprivation tort remedy. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29; see Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541

(prison officials’ negligent loss of an inmate’s property was properly remedied by

post-deprivation procedures); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (state official’s unauthorized and

malicious destruction of the inmate’s property was properly remedied by post-deprivation

procedure). Texas provides a post-deprivation remedy for inmates whose property has

been taken in an unauthorized manner. TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 501.007, 501.008; see

Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1996); Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d

733, 737 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

1. Denied withdrawals

In this case, Waddleton alleges that LaCox and Hutto improperly denied his

requests to withdraw funds from his trust-fund account, including a large withdrawal

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request for $18,000.4 To the extent Waddleton alleges that LaCox or Hutto took

unauthorized actions when they denied his withdrawal requests, his remedy for the

unauthorized withdrawal would be a tort action in state court, not a federal due-process

claim. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29; TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 501.007, 501.008. To

the extent Waddleton alleges that LaCox or Hutto’s actions were authorized by an official

policy that permitted the denial of access to his funds, due-process protections would

apply.5

As stated above, for authorized deprivations of property, due process requires that

Waddleton be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at

127-28 (collecting cases). Waddleton asserts that he was not given reasons for the denied

withdrawal (Dkt. 28, at 4-5). However, he presents the records from Grievance

2018133035 in which he complained about his denied request for the $18,000 withdrawal.6

Officials responded to his grievance and explained that the withdrawal had been denied on

4 See Dkt. 28, at 17 (alleging that LaCox failed to allow him to withdraw funds); id. at 18

(alleging that Hutto failed to allow him to withdraw funds); Dkt. 45, at 3 (alleging that LaCox and

Hutto denied him his right to withdraw funds); id. at 12 (seeking order enjoining Hutto and LaCox

from denying withdrawal requests).

5 Defendants argue that Waddleton’s due-process rights were not violated because no funds

were withdrawn from his account. However, the Court will assume, for purposes of this opinion,

that Waddleton has adequately alleged a “deprivation” of his property rights because he claims

that he was deprived of the use of his funds to hire an attorney for his probate case. See Rosin, 417

F. App’x at 434.

6 The Court may consider this document when deciding the motion to dismiss because it was

attached to Waddleton’s complaint. See Lone Star Fund, 594 F.3d at 387.

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security grounds, additionally referring to Waddleton’s pre-denial interview with the

warden (Dkt. 1-1, at 14). Waddleton then appealed to Step 2, contesting the security

rationale and citing to the handbook, but his appeal was denied (id. at 44-45). Although

Waddleton did not prevail in the grievance process, his grievance records demonstrate that

officials provided him with notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at

374 (inmate does not have protected interest in having grievances resolved to his

satisfaction); Evans v. Baker, 442 F. App’x 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2011) (inmate “received the

due process protections required when he received notice of the basis for the confiscation

of the subject property and a fair opportunity to rebut the allegations concerning his

ownership of the property at the [disciplinary] hearing and in his grievances”); Allen v.

Thomas, No. H-02-3132, 2005 WL 2076033, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005) (despite “the

lack of a formal hearing,” inmate “was afforded ample notice and sufficient opportunity to

object to the confiscation of his property” because he “complained informally to [an

official] in person and formally by pursuing the two-step prison grievance process”); TEX.

GOV’T CODE 501.008(a) (grievance system provides “exclusive administrative remedy”

for an inmate’s claim against prison officials that arises during incarceration).7

7 Waddleton cites to Siggers-El v Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006), as

support for his property claim. Siggers-El has similar background facts regarding prison

officials’ decision to deny withdrawals from an inmate’s account. However, because

Siggers-El brought only a retaliation claim, not a due-process claim, it is not relevant to the

analysis above. Waddleton’s retaliation claims are discussed below.

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Because any due-process requirements that apply to the denied withdrawals were

satisfied, Waddleton’s claim will be dismissed.

2. Improper withdrawals

Waddleton also alleges that officials made improper withdrawals from his account,

or placed holds on his funds, in the amounts of $10,108.23 and $7,607.50 in November and

December 2018. He acknowledges, however, that the funds were restored in January or

February of 2019 (Dkt. 28, at 5-6). Because Waddleton does not attribute the allegedly

improper withdrawal to the action or inaction of any Defendant, the Court cannot redress

his alleged injury by directing an order towards any Defendant in this suit. Additionally,

because Waddleton states that his funds actually were not withdrawn but rather placed on

hold and then restored, he fails to plead any concrete injury. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409;

Lujan, 504 U.S. 560-61; Smith v Marvin, 846 F. App’x 259, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2021).

Waddleton has not pleaded sufficient facts that could show his standing to bring the claim,

see Stallworth, 936 F.3d at 230, and his claim will be dismissed.

3. Claim against Collier

Waddleton alleges that Collier, the executive director of TDCJ, violated his

due-process rights because Collier failed to provide an adequate system for appealing the

unconstitutional deprivation of his property rights. Dkt. 45, at 2-3 (alleging that Collier is

responsible for “ill-written” policies regarding disbursement of inmate funds); id. at 11

(seeking order from court enjoining Collier to change handbook to clearly permit

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withdrawal of funds from inmate accounts). Because this claim is dependent on his

due-process claims against LaCox and Hutto, which have been dismissed, it must fail for

the reasons stated above. Additionally, to the extent Waddleton claims that the grievance

process itself violate his due-process rights, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374.

C. Access to Courts

Waddleton’s pleadings could be construed to allege that Tyler and Pegoda violated

his First Amendment right to access the courts. Defendants move to dismiss the claim.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wells v. Thaler, 460 F. App’x 303, 308

(5th Cir. 2012). The constitutional right is generally afforded by the First Amendment, the

Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. 403, 415 & n. 12 (2002) (collecting cases that demonstrate the “unsettled . . . basis of

the constitutional right of access to courts”). However, a prisoner’s right of access is not

unlimited, and the Supreme Court has not held that prisoners have a freestanding right to a

law library or legal assistance. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d

322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999); see Wells, 460 F. App’x at 308. The Constitution does not

guarantee inmates “the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable

of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Lewis, 518

U.S. at 355. Rather, the constitutional right to access a prison law library encompasses

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only “a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging [an

inmate’s] convictions or conditions of confinement.” Id. at 356; Jones, 188 F.3d at 325.

Therefore, an access-to-courts claim is not cognizable unless the inmate can show an

“actual injury,” in other words, that the inmate’s nonfrivolous legal claim had been

frustrated or was being impeded by the defendants. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-53; see Wells,

460 F. App’x at 308.

In this case, Waddleton’s access-to-courts claims fail because he identifies no actual

injury resulting from Tyler’s or Pegoda’s conduct. Regarding Tyler, the mailroom

supervisor, Waddleton alleges that she interfered with his mail in May 2018 and that she

made excuses for delayed or failed deliveries.8 However, he also states that all of the mail

in question was eventually delivered to him, with the exception of 80 pictures and a J-pay

letter from Phillips that contained an account number. See Dkt. 28, at 9. His allegations

are insufficient to state an access-to-courts claim because they fail to allege that any

nonfrivolous legal claim was frustrated or impeded by Tyler. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at

352-53; see Wells, 460 F. App’x at 308.

8 See Dkt. 28, at 8-9 (alleging that Tyler “aid[ed] in collective harassment” of Waddleton by

doing “numerous things” such as “hold[ing] Plaintiff’s incoming mail for several days . . . to

purposely consume Plaintiff’s reply time back to courts,” making false claims that she had

attempted to deliver the mail to Plaintiff, or passing his mail to another department for inspection

“resulting in increased chances of the Plaintiff’s mail becoming lost/stolen”); Dkt. 45, at 8

(alleging that Tyler received Waddleton’s mail but merely passed the mail to Pegoda without

notifying Waddleton that the mail had been detained, as policy required).

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Regarding Pegoda, the law library supervisor, Waddleton alleges that she harassed

him by sending his requested legal materials “late, or not at all,” thus interfering with his

state court litigation regarding his mother’s estate (Dkt. 28, at 11). He also alleges that

Pegoda instructed her staff to deny Waddleton access to courts by failing to deliver legal

materials when Waddleton was confined to his cell, or by sending materials that were

different from the ones Waddleton requested (Dkt. 45, at 6-7). He claims that Pegoda

caused him mental anguish, stress, and loss of sleep, and that he “very likely” lost half of

his mother’s estate and belongings (Dkt. 28, at 11). However, he makes no specific

allegation that Pegoda was responsible for frustrating or impeding a particular legal claim,

much less that the claim was nonfrivolous, and otherwise alleges no specific injury caused

by Pegoda that is relevant to his right to access the courts. In fact, Waddleton states that

he “cannot admit to being completely denied access to courts because there is always a [pro

se] avenue” (id.). He therefore fails to show any access-to-courts injury caused by

Pegoda. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-53; see Wells, 460 F. App’x at 308.

Waddleton’s access-to-courts claim will be dismissed.

D. Retaliation

Waddleton alleges that officials at the Estelle Unit retaliated against him by

delaying his mail and bringing three bogus disciplinary cases against him. To state a valid

claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the

defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a

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retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation. Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 312 (5th

Cir. 2019). If an inmate is unable to point to a specific constitutional right that has been

violated, the claim will fail. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). To show

intent, the inmate must allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of

retaliation. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). The inmate

must produce direct evidence of motivation, or allege a chronology of events from which

retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. As for causation, a

successful claim of retaliation requires a showing that “but for” some retaliatory motive,

the complained-of adverse action would not have occurred. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.

1715, 1722 (2019); Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

First, Waddleton alleges that officials retaliated against him when they harassed him

in connection with his mail. In particular, he states that he never received 80 photographs

that Phillips sent him in May 2018 (Dkt. 28, at 8). When asked by the Court which

Defendants were responsible for interference with his mail, he stated that Tyler, as the

mailroom supervisor, delayed his mail beyond the period permitted by policy, falsely

claimed to have made attempts to deliver his mail, or passed his mail to another department

in order to delay delivery (id.). He also appears to allege that Pegoda interfered with his

mail delivery (id. at 11; Dkt. 45, at 6-7). However, he does not sufficiently allege that either

Tyler or Pegoda intended to retaliate against him for his exercise of a specific

constitutional right, as the law requires. See Baughman, 935 F.3d at 312; Woods, 60 F.3d at

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1166. He also fails to allege facts that could show that, “but for” a retaliatory motive of

Tyler or Pegoda, the 80 photos would have been delivered. See Baughman, 935 F.3d at

312; Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. Therefore, his retaliation claim regarding mail interference

must be dismissed.

Next, Waddleton alleges that officials brought three disciplinary cases in order to

retaliate against him for complaining about his denied access to his funds. In the first

case, Case No. 20180076891, Waddleton was found guilty of possession of a cell phone

(Dkt. 28, at 11-13). He claims that the verdict was unsupported and states that

administrators at the unit use disciplinary cases to retaliate against inmates who complain.

See id. at 12 (alleging that each grievance or complaint to the Office of the Inspector

General that Waddleton filed was perceived by the administration as a “rock being

thrown,” which “compels” TDCJ personnel “to attack the Plaintiff either by direct

command or by loyalty to the warden(s)”). However, he does not allege that LaCox, or any

other Defendant, was motivated to bring Case No. 20180076891 against him because

Waddleton had filed complaints. In fact, when asked by the Court for specific

information about the Defendant or Defendants who brought the case motivated by

retaliatory intent, Waddleton failed to answer the Court’s questions, instead alleging only

that he “believes this is the case that stated the avalanche of harassment/retaliations”

because he grieved his case and filed a related habeas corpus petition (id. at 13).

Waddleton also failed to answer the Court’s questions about which Defendant brought the

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case against him, what Waddleton had supposedly done to bring about the retaliation, and

why the Defendant was motivated to retaliate against him, among others. See Dkt. 27, at 8

(posing questions).9 He therefore fails to state a claim against any Defendant regarding this

first case.

The second disciplinary case, Case No. 20190333717, was brought against

Waddleton on August 5, 2018, for failure to hand over law library materials (Dkt. 28, at

13). After a hearing, Waddleton was found not guilty because he had never received the

legal material in question. When asked to explain the connection between this case and

any defendant in this action, Waddleton did not provide a direct answer, although he stated

that the case “stems directly from” Pegoda, that he “strongly believes it was prompted by

loyalty to “the warden(s),” and that he “can take the cluster of circumstantial events to see

clearer of who, what, when or where, and even how things happen[ed]” (id. at 14). When

asked for evidence of retaliatory intent, Waddleton stated that before he received the prior

disciplinary case in November 2017, he had “multiple trustworthy jobs within the prison”

and had “absolutely no problem” with the administration (id.). These allegations are

insufficient to state a claim for retaliation. Waddleton does not allege that any Defendant

9 Waddleton alleges that the hearing officer told him, off the record, “I’ve gotta find you

guilty [because] [Major Kevin Smith] wrote the case,” which is an “exact example of the

illustration previously used by the plaintiff of the rocks rolling downhill, and subordinates being

compelled to do what [their] superiors command” (id. at 13). However, even assuming this

allegation suffices to plead intent for a retaliation claim against Smith or the hearing officer,

neither person is named as a defendant in this action.

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brought or prompted Case No. 20190333717, and thus fails to allege a retaliatory adverse

act by any Defendant. See Baughman, 935 F.3d at 312. He also fails to allege facts that

could prove that, but for retaliatory motive on the part of a Defendant, the case would not

have been brought against him. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. As stated above, his

personal belief that retaliation occurred in insufficient. See Johnson, 110 F.3d at 310.

He therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the second case.

In the third disciplinary case, Case No. 20190073525, Waddleton was found guilty

of soliciting assistance to violate a TDCJ rule by sending a letter to Phillips regarding

money. Waddleton alleges that Sergeant Galvan wrote the case against him at the

direction of Major Smith and Major Rigsby, but does not allege that she intended to

retaliate against him for exercising a specific constitutional right. He also fails to allege

that but-for causation as to Galvan, given his allegation that she acted at the direction of

other officers (Dkt. 28, at 15-16). Additionally, even if Waddleton had sufficiently

alleged retaliatory intent by Smith or Rigsby, neither is a defendant in this action.10 As

with the other disciplinary cases, Waddleton fails to allege more than his personal belief

that he was the victim of retaliation and fails to plead facts that could show that, but for the

10 Waddleton also alleges that Smith and Rigsby were acting at the direction of Hutto (Dkt.

28, at 15-16), who is a Defendant. However, he states that Hutto’s involvement is apparent only

“through circumstantial events and sometimes clues within someone’s conversations,” and

provides no further detail or information about the “events” or “clues” to which he refers (id. at

16). These allegations are insufficient to allege that Hutto acted with retaliatory intent in

connection with Case No. 20190073525 or that his retaliatory motive was the “but for” cause for

the case being brought against him.

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retaliatory intent of Galvan or any Defendant, the disciplinary case would not have been

brought against him. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; Johnson, 110 F.3d at 310. He therefore

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the third case.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Waddleton’s retaliation claims will be granted. His

claim against Galvan, who has not appeared in this action, also is dismissed for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 38) is GRANTED. All of Plaintiff’s

federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over any state-law claims regarding Waddleton’s property. Plaintiff has the

option to pursue this state-court remedy, if appropriate, and is advised that the period of

limitations to file any claims in state court is tolled while the claim is pending in federal

court and “for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer

tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594,

605 (2018).

3. Defendants’ motion to seal the last-known address of Yazmin Galvan (Dkt.

39) is GRANTED.

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4. Plaintiffs motion to add supplemental exhibits (Dkt. 47) is GRANTED.

5. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on January 27, 2022.

Signed on January 27, 2022, at Houston, Texas.

George C. Hanks, Jr

United States District Judge

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