Opinion

Brown v. Commonwealth

  • 26 Va. App. 758
  • 497 S.E.2d 147
  • 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 161
  • 1998 WL 112685
Court
Court of Appeals of Virginia
Filed
Mar 17, 1998
Status
Published
Author
Baker
On the bench
Baker, Willis, Overton
Cited by
23 cases
Authority
More cited than 82.2%

upholding contempt against an attorney who arrived at trial forty minutes later because he had scheduled “multiple matters in different jurisdictions at the same time”

How later courts described this case

  • upholding contempt against an attorney who arrived at trial forty minutes later because he had scheduled “multiple matters in different jurisdictions at the same time”
  • where court imposed fine in amount greater than allowed by statute, court reduced fine to statutory limit
  • upholding summary contempt where the attorney arrived forty minutes late for trial
  • “Where the court’s authority to punish for contempt is exercised by a judgment rendered, its finding is presumed correct and will not be reversed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

CURTIS T. BROWN

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 0815-97-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER

MARCH 17, 1998

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK

William F. Rutherford, Judge

Curtis T. Brown, pro se.

Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General;

Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General,

on brief), for appellee.

On March 3, 1997, attorney Curtis T. Brown was adjudged by

the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial court) to be in

contempt of court, in violation of Code § 18.2-456. Brown

contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court's finding of contempt and the punishment imposed. We hold

that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction but

that the fine imposed is invalid to the extent it exceeds the

statutory limit of $50.

The record indicates that, in a civil action pending in the

trial court in which Brown represented the plaintiff, Brown filed

a praecipe requesting that the case be set for trial by jury. At

the court's October 2, 1996 docket call, with Brown's agreement,

the matter was set to be heard at 9:30 a.m. on March 3, 1997. At

the scheduled time, the judge, a jury, defense counsel, and

witnesses were present and prepared to try the case; however,

when the clerk inquired whether the plaintiff was ready, the

trial court noted: "He answers not." Defense counsel advised

the court that defendant was ready. The trial court announced

that Brown would be given fifteen minutes to appear, after which

contempt proceedings would begin pursuant to Code § 18.2-456.

At 10:08 a.m., thirty-eight minutes later, Brown appeared.

When asked if plaintiff was ready, Brown responded only: "The

plaintiff moves for a nonsuit." The court responded: "All

right. So ordered," and directed Brown to "approach the bar."

When the trial court asked for an explanation, appellant replied:

It was just a mistake, Your Honor. I

wasn't aware of it. I left town last week,

we didn't have our docket book. My secretary

made a mistake. I didn't know about it.

When she called -- I guess the clerk called.

Friday morning I was in South Carolina. I

had an uncle that just passed and I didn't

call back to the office to even find out

about the case. Me and [defendant's counsel]

are good friends. We talk all the time, but

this is one case we didn't talk about.

When the court noted that a praecipe signed by Brown had been

filed, Brown replied:

Yes, sir, I'm aware of that. I'm aware

that the case was set but I didn't -- it was

one of the things that I just didn't write

down in my docket book. I've got four cases

down at [Virginia Beach] and I was down there

this morning, but I called back to the office

and they told me about the case. I wasn't

aware.

Brown then advised the court that he had set four other

cases for the same day in Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic

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Relations District Court and had gone there to attend to those

cases, having not put the subject case in his docket book. The

transcript shows no other reason for his failure to appear at the

pre-scheduled time. 1 In making its finding, the trial court

said:

All right. Mr. Brown, I find that you

are in contempt of court, in violation of

Virginia Code [§] 18.2-456, and that your

misbehavior interrupted the administration of

justice this morning. I fine you $400, $10 a

minute for every minute you were late.

You're in contempt of court and ordered to

pay the $400.

In relevant part, Code § 18.2-456 authorizes trial courts to

punish officers of the court for "[m]isbehavior in the presence

of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the

administration of justice."

"Contempt is defined as an act in

disrespect of the court or its processes, or

which obstructs the administration of

justice, or tends to bring the court into

disrepute." 4A Michie's Jurisprudence

Contempt § 2 (Repl. Vol. 1983). Any act

which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or

obstruct the court in the administration of

justice is contempt. Potts v. Commonwealth,

184 Va. 855, 859, 36 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1946).

Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 396, 345 S.E.2d 5, 7-8

(1986).

1

In his brief to this Court, appellant represents that he

telephoned the deputy clerk prior to 9:30 a.m., explained his

error and asked her to relay his desire for a nonsuit to the

judge. The record contains no indication that these

representations were communicated to the trial judge either by

the deputy clerk or by appellant when he arrived in court.

Therefore, we may not consider them on appeal.

- 3 -

Where the court's authority to punish for contempt is

exercised by a judgment rendered, its finding is presumed correct

and will not be reversed unless plainly wrong or without evidence

to support it. See Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368, 374,

417 S.E.2d 891, 895 (1992).

We hold that, where an attorney schedules multiple matters

in different jurisdictions at the same time, his assertions of

good faith "[do] not negate the reasonable inference that he

recklessly or wilfully failed [timely] to advise the court of his

conflicting schedule." See Murphy v. Maryland, 416 A.2d 748, 756

n.11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980). Here, appellant's actions in

scheduling multiple matters for trial in different courts in

different jurisdictions at the same time support the trial

court's finding of "[m]isbehavior in the presence of the court,

or so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration

of justice."

Although we find sufficient evidence to support the

conviction, we hold that the punishment imposed exceeded the

limits allowed by law. Where punishment is by fine and

determined without a jury, Code § 18.2-457 limits the sum to no

more than $50. Where the sentence imposed is in excess of that

prescribed by law, only the part that is excessive is invalid.

See Royster v. Smith, 195 Va. 228, 235, 77 S.E.2d 855, 860 (1953)

(citing Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 46 S.E.2d 340

(1948)); see also Deagle v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 304, 305, 199

- 4 -

S.E.2d 509, 511 (1973).

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court

finding Brown's conduct to be in violation of Code § 18.2-456 is

affirmed but the fine assessed is reduced to the statutory limit

of $50.

Affirmed as modified.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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