The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
OMAR SHAWN SHAHEED, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1519
)
ONIKA TANYA MARAJ PETTY and )
ISIS NAIJA GASTON, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Omar Shawn Shaheed’s Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis, (Docket No. 1), along with a proposed Complaint, which was lodged pending
disposition of the IFP Motion. (Docket No. 1-4). After reviewing Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the
Court finds that he is without sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. Thus, Plaintiff will be
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Turning to Plaintiff’s Complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) gives the Court the authority
to screen and dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019). In
analyzing whether a complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court
applies the same standard governing motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Heffley v. Steele, 826 F. App’x 227, 230 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
To that end, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
well-pleaded factual content in the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009), and also “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the
factual allegations should be separated from allegations that merely recite the legal elements of the
claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The well-pleaded facts are
accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 210-11. Next, a determination
is made as to “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff
has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This “plausibility”
determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his Complaint and
employs less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, there are limits to the Court’s procedural flexibility -
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . they
cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that he purports to assert a copyright
infringement claim against Defendants, alleging the following: his poem called Money Sprinters
Printers Car Wash is registered with the copyright office; he posted a video of himself reciting the
poem on his YouTube channel; he also posted the video on Instagram and tagged one of the
Defendants and other artists; his videos have been viewed thousands of times on social media; he
does not know who has viewed his videos because he does not have that information; nonetheless,
he believes that Defendants saw the video of his poem before writing their song, “Princess Diana,”
because the phrase “keep it a stack” appears in his poem and it also appears in Defendants’ song
seven times. (Docket No. 1-4 at 1-2). Because Defendants’ song contains the phrase “keep it a
stack,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed his copyright on the poem. (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint are insufficient to plausibly allege a copyright
infringement claim. In order to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege:
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also Dun
& Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002).
“To satisfy that second element, the plaintiff must supply plausible allegations of fact ‘showing
not only that the defendant had access to a copyrighted work, but also that there are substantial
similarities’ between the original work and the one purportedly produced via plagiarism.” Frazier
v. City of Philadelphia, 778 F. App’x 156, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Dam Things from
Denmark, a/k/a Troll Co. ApS v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 290 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Applying the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, the allegations in Plaintiff’s
Complaint do not plausibly allege a copyright infringement claim. Even assuming that Plaintiff
has a registered copyright for the poem called Money Sprinters Printers Car Wash, he has failed
to allege the second element of a copyright infringement claim. To that end, his Complaint does
not contain plausible allegations showing that Defendants had access to his copyrighted poem and
that there are substantial similarities between his poem and their song. While Plaintiff states that
he does not know if Defendants saw a video of him reciting his poem, he nonetheless alleges that
they must have copied the phrase “keep it a stack” because that phrase appears in his poem and
Defendants’ song. To reiterate, such a threadbare recitation of the elements of a copyright
infringement claim will not suffice; rather, the allegations must set forth facts and they must be
plausible. Overall, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show that he has a
plausible copyright infringement claim.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s purported copyright infringement claim is deficient, and the
Court concludes that it would be futile to allow amendment. It is well established that “[a] District
Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to
the deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.” Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund
Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002). The futility of amendment is shown by Plaintiff’s
repeated prior attempts to pursue a copyright infringement claim against the same Defendants in
Civil Action Nos. 23-808 and 23-1120. In those cases, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to
plausibly allege a copyright infringement claim and dismissed his Complaint without prejudice to
amendment to the extent he could state a plausible claim for relief. In each case, Plaintiff
subsequently filed an Amended Complaint which still failed to plausibly allege a copyright
infringement claim, and the Court concluded that it would be futile to allow another amendment.
Consequently, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with prejudice and closed the
cases at Civil Action Nos. 23-808 and 23-1120. Plaintiff then sought yet another bite at the apple
by attempting to re-assert a copyright infringement claim in this case against the same Defendants,
but he still has failed to plausibly allege any such claim. Under these circumstances, affording
Plaintiff another opportunity to amend would be futile.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2024, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, (Docket No. 1), is
GRANTED;
(2) Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Docket No. 1-4), is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;1 and,
(3) The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed.
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc: Omar Shawn Shaheed (via U.S. mail)
620 Sixth Street, Apt. 1003
Braddock, PA 15104
1 In light of this ruling, Plaintiff’s Motion for Service by U.S. Marshal, (Docket No. 3), is DENIED AS
MOOT.