The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL A. WALKER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1537
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 26th day of September, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and his claim for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp.
942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting
Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981)).2
2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly downplayed
evidence regarding his knee osteoarthritis, leading to flawed findings in her analysis of the
medical opinion evidence and her credibility findings. The Court disagrees and finds that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) and her ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled.
The Court first notes that Plaintiff somewhat misstates aspects of the ALJ’s decision. He
argues, for example, that the ALJ’s reliance on his failure to follow prescribed treatment to deny
his benefits request did not comport with the requirements of 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1530 and 416.930.
However, the ALJ did not deny benefits for failure to follow prescribed treatment under Sections
404.1530 and 416.930; rather, she merely cited Plaintiff’s decision to decline a recommended
steroid injection as part of his relatively conservative treatment for his knees. This was, of
course, a proper factor in considering Plaintiff’s subjective testimony and in evaluating the
medical opinions, including that of consultative examiner Alexandra Smith-Demain, M.D. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), (3), 416.929(c)(2), (3); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A.
Mar. 16, 2016).
Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ relied on his reduced knee flexion, positive grinding
test, and severe right knee osteoarthritis in discounting his testimony and Dr. Smith-Demain’s
opinion. However, this is not reflected in the record. The ALJ cited and discussed those factors
(R. 19) not specifically to discount Plaintiff’s testimony or any medical opinion, but as part of
her explanation of the evidence she relied upon overall in finding that Plaintiff was restricted to a
limited range of medium work. In fact, her discussion of this evidence confirms that she
considered all of the evidence in the record, regardless of whether it would be deemed favorable
or unfavorable to Plaintiff, in making her findings.
With this in mind, the Court finds no error here. As noted above, the ALJ’s consideration
of Plaintiff’s knee osteoarthritis was balanced, and she clearly explained how this condition
called for some functional limitations, but that Plaintiff’s conservative treatment and refusal of
injections, in light of a number of unremarkable clinical findings regarding gait, reflexes,
sensation, and strength, supported limitations less restrictive than those to which Plaintiff
testified. An ALJ is not under an obligation to simply accept what the claimant said without
question. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4); Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667
F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011). Moreover, where an ALJ has articulated reasons supporting a
“credibility” determination, that determination is afforded significant deference. See Horodenski v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2007); Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376,
380 (3d Cir. 2003). The Court finds that such deference is warranted in this case. See also Paula R.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 20-18808 (RBK), 2022 WL 950242, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2022)
(“Credibility determinations are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’” (quoting Hoyman v. Colvin, 606
Fed. Appx. 678, 681 (3d Cir. 2015))).
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 12) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
Likewise, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s treatment history and generally intact
gait, reflexes, sensation, and strength undercut the consistency of Dr. Smith-Demain’s opinion
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c. She also accurately noted that Plaintiff
appeared to be intoxicated for his appointment with Dr. Smith-Demain, further calling that
opinion’s accuracy into question. (R. 20, 464-65). The Court further notes that the ALJ relied
on several other medical opinions setting forth suggested limitations consistent with what was
ultimately included in the RFC. Substantial evidence supports these findings.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that
substantial evidence supports that decision. It will therefore affirm.