The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT COOK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1160
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and his claim for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp.
942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting
Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981)).2
2 Although Plaintiff raises several arguments as to why he believes the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in formulating his residual functional capacity (“RFC”), in finding his
conditions did not satisfy a listing, and in ultimately finding him not to be disabled, he essentially
asks simply for the Court to come to its own conclusion based on evidence he deems to be
persuasive. The Court cannot and will not do so, and in fact, has little to add to the particularly
thorough and well-reasoned decision of the ALJ. Accordingly, it will add to the discussion
contained in that decision only the following.
Plaintiff takes issue with certain pieces of evidence on which the ALJ relied in making
his findings, such as mental status examination results and his activities of daily living.
However, it is axiomatic that an ALJ can, and in fact must, consider objective medical evidence
such as clinical findings and mental status reports in making his or her findings. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5 (S.S.A. 2016). This
includes considering the consistency between a treating source’s opinion and his or her own
treatment notes. See Bryson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 Fed. Appx. 784, 787 (3d Cir. 2016);
Kibe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 787 Fed. Appx. 801, 802-03 (3d Cir. 2019). There was likewise
nothing inappropriate in the ALJ considering Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in evaluating the
severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i),
416.929(c)(3)(i); Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ. 10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
13, 2011). Moreover, the ALJ did not solely rely on the evidence cited by Plaintiff in
determining the RFC or in otherwise making his findings. Indeed, evidence such as Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living, including his volunteer work and significant physical exercise, and
objective findings such as largely normal mental status examinations and generally unremarkable
clinical findings as to his range of motion, gait, and muscle strength were discussed within the
context of all of the record evidence. The ALJ’s discussion was extremely thorough, balanced,
and clear. He weighed the testimony, objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s treatment history,
and the medical opinion evidence and explained how he did so.
As there was nothing wrong with the factors considered by the ALJ, all Plaintiff can
really ask the Court to do is reweigh the evidence. However, if supported by substantial
evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh
the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently. See
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Monsour Med.
Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). Moreover, “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that supports a
contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides
substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764
(3d Cir. 2009). To the extent the Court is being asked to come to its own conclusion based on
the evidence, therefore, it declines to do so.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 18) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ, in his well-crafted decision, applied the
correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports that decision. It will therefore
affirm.