WELLS v. HOUSTON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

ERIC DANTE WELLS, )

)

) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01641-CBB

Plaintiff, )

) United States Magistrate Judge

vs. )

) Christopher B. Brown

M. HOUSTON, LIEUTENANT; J. )

BEUCHAT, CAPTAIN; K. GEIBEL, )

)

SERGEANT; S. BALSAMO,

)

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; J. )

FLICKINGER, CORRECTIONAL )

OFFICER; Z. POWELL, )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; E. )

)

CHRISTMANN, CORRECTIONAL

)

OFFICER; J. FISCUS, )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; AND J. )

SHAW, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN, United States Magistrate Judge

Pro se plaintiff Eric Dante Wells (“Wells”), a prisoner at the State

Correctional Institution at Mercer (“SCI-Mercer”), brings this civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officers

and employees concerning their actions during a medical emergency he experienced

on June 25, 2022.

1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. See ECF Nos. 20, 29, and 46.

Pending is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 59, Wells’s

brief in opposition, ECF No. 69, Defendants’ Reply Brief, ECF No. 72, and Wells’s

Sur-Reply, ECF No. 74. The motion is fully briefed and the factual record

thoroughly developed. ECF Nos. 60, 61, 62, 67, and 68.

After careful consideration of the motion, the material in support and in

opposition thereto, the parties’ memoranda, the relevant case law, and the

summary judgment record as a whole, the motion for summary judgment will be

granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment will be granted on Wells’s

Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

However, the Court finds that issues of material fact exist from which a factfinder

could decide that Defendants used excessive force during and after the medical

emergency. Therefore, summary judgment will be denied on that claim.

I. Factual and Procedural Background2

On June 25, 2022, Wells suffered a grand mal seizure. Wells claims that

Defendants, the responding corrections officers, misdiagnosed his symptoms as a

drug overdose and incorrectly initiated an “overdose” protocol by administering

Narcan prior to medical personnel arriving on the scene. Wells alleges that

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by (1) being deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs and (2) by using excessive force on him

during and after his medical emergency.

2 The factual summary is derived from Wells’s verified amended complaint,

Defendants’ concise statement of material facts, Wells’s responsive concise

statement, and the exhibits submitted by the parties’ in support of their respective

positions.

On November 18, 2022, Wells filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (the “IFP Motion”). Attached to the IFP Motion was a verified Complaint

which named Lieutenant Houston and three John Doe defendants. ECF No. 1-1.

The IFP motion was granted on December 5, 2022, and the Complaint officially filed

that day. ECF No. 8. Defendant Houston filed an Answer on June 15, 2023. ECF

No. 23.

On August 22, 2023, with leave of court, Wells filed an Amended Complaint

in which he named nine corrections officers: M. Houston, J. Beuchat, K. Geibel, S.

Balsamo, J. Flickinger, Z. Powell, E. Christmann, J. Fiscus, and J. Shaw. ECF No.

34. Because the Amended Complaint was not signed, the Court returned it to

Wells, directing him to sign the Amended Complaint and return it for refiling. ECF

No. 35. On August 31, 2023, the Court received the signed verified Amended

Complaint and docketed it at ECF No. 39. Defendants filed an Answer on October

23, 2023. ECF No. 48. The Amended Complaint remains Wells’s operative

pleading.3

After the discovery period closed, Defendants filed the instant motion for

summary judgment. ECF No. 59.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court has jurisdiction over Wells’s case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases

3 “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and

renders the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82

(3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the

operative pleading.” Id.

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Venue is

proper in this district as the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to Well’s claims

occurred at SCI-Mercer, located in Mercer County, Pennsylvania, which is located

within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).

III. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for assessing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is well settled. Rule 56(a) requires the court to

enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)

(emphasis in original). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or

nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d

Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927

F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial,

the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom

in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. To avoid summary

judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated

allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of

identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond its pleadings with affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material

facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986).

B. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings

Wells is proceeding pro se, thus he is entitled to a liberal reading of his

pleadings and documents filed in opposition to the pending motion. Higgs v. Att'y

Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]he obligation to liberally

construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”). If the court can

reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail,

it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal

theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with

pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982).

Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court

need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary

support. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “But a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his

obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence

in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary

judgment.” Alston v. Little, Civ. Act. No. 1:22-cv-00183, 2024 WL 3048017, *2

(W.D.Pa. May 28, 2024) (quoting Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D.

Pa. 2017)) (citation omitted).

Because Wells is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make

inferences where it is appropriate. In examining the record, and in consideration of

Wells’s pro se status, the factual allegations set forth in his verified Amended

Complaint also will be considered as evidence to the extent that they are based on

his personal knowledge. Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 320 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016)

(“Because [statements in verified complaint and other court filings] were signed

under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, we consider them as

equivalent to statements in an affidavit.”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir.

1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion).

See also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an

affidavit is “about the best that can be expected from [a pro se prisoner] at the

summary judgment phase of the proceedings”).

C. Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Wells brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 which provides in pertinent

part:

4 Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 “is not a source of substantive rights

but a vehicle for vindicating rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution or by federal

statute.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted).

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, . . . .

To prevail on a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a

defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege,

or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. §

1983; see also Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005).

“The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right

allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)(citations omitted).

The Amended Complaint alleges Defendants violated Wells’s Eighth Amendment

rights by their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and by using

excessive force. Defendants do not dispute that at all relevant times they were

acting under color of state law. Thus, the Court’s analysis focuses on whether

Defendants deprived Wells of rights secured by the Eighth Amendment.

III. Discussion

A. Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Defendants first move for summary judgment on the ground that Wells failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. ECF No. 60 at 3-6.

Wells responds that his administrative remedies were rendered unavailable

because his final appeal was not responded to in a timely manner. Whether a

prisoner has exhausted administrative remedies is a question of law that is

determined by the court, even if that determination requires the resolution of

disputed facts.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” As recently explained by the Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit:

The exhaustion mandate is a “centerpiece” of the statute,

see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006), that serves

three important statutory goals: “(1) to return control of

the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2)

to encourage development of an administrative record,

and perhaps settlements, within the inmate grievance

process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts

by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits, Spruill

[v. Gillis], 372 F.3d [218,] 230 [3d Cir. 2004]. The PLRA

requires “proper exhaustion,” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92,

which means “complet[ing] the administrative review

process in accordance with the applicable procedural

rules.” Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 968

F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S.

at 88). The only limit on § 1997e(a)’s mandate is that

“administrative remedies must be available to the

prisoner” as both a formal and practical manner. Id.

(citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641-42 (2016)).

Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2024). An administrative remedy is

unavailable, and administrative exhaustion is thus excused, when it “operates as a

simple dead end(,) . . . is so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable

of use, or when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a

grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’ ”

Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Just as inmates must properly exhaust administrative remedies

per the prison’s grievance procedures, prison officials must strictly comply with

their own policies.” Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 367 (stating, “[w]hat is good for the goose

is good for the gander.”). “[A]s soon as a prison fails to respond to a properly

submitted grievance or appeal within the time limits prescribed by its own policies,

it has made its administrative remedies unavailable and the prisoner has fully

discharged the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 365.

The prison’s grievance policy is what “define[s] the boundaries of proper

exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,

230-31 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “prison grievance procedures supply the

yardstick for measuring procedural default.”). Therefore, the procedural

requirements for exhaustion in each case “are drawn from the policies of the prison

in question rather than from any free-standing federal law.” Shifflett, 934 F.3d at

364.

It is not the plaintiff’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate exhaustion.

Jones, 549 U.S. at 217 (holding that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense

under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or

demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”). Instead, the failure to exhaust must

be asserted and proven by the defendant. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir.

2002).

The Pennsylvania DOC has adopted a three-step grievance process set forth

in DC-ADM 804.5 First, after an attempt to resolve any problems informally, a

prisoner may submit a written grievance to the facility’s Grievance Coordinator for

initial review. If dissatisfied with the results of the initial review, a prisoner must

then appeal to the Facility Manager. If the prisoner receives an adverse response

from the Facility Manager, the prisoner then must appeal to the Secretary’s Office

of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”), the final level of review. DC-ADM

804 states that SOIGA will respond within 30 working days of receipt of the

grievance. See 37 Pa. Code § 93.9; DC-ADM 804; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232.

Here, Defendants argue that Wells did not properly exhaust all

administrative remedies available to him. They argue:

(1) Wells failed to comply with the proper procedures

when submitting his grievance for final review to SOIGA

as he did not submit the required and/or legible

documentation for proper review; and

(2) with the exception of Defendant Houston, Wells did

not identify or adequately describe in his Grievance the

remaining seven defendants in this lawsuit.

ECF No. 60 at 5 – 6.

Wells’s summary judgment submissions dispute both of Defendants’

arguments. He argues that he placed his final appeal, with all required paperwork,

in the prison mail system on September 21, 2022, and calculated SOIGA’s response

due date as November 10, 2022. ECF No. 69, at 15. When he did not receive a

5 Defendants did not attach a copy of DC-ADM 804 to their motion, but state

the policy is available online at www.pa.gov. ECF No. 60 at 4, n.1.

response from SOIGA by this date, he “construed this failure to respond as a denial

and proceeded to file the appropriate documents to commence this lawsuit.” ECF

No. 68 at ¶ 22. According to Wells, SOIGA’s failure to respond in a timely manner

rendered the DOC’s administrative remedies unavailable to him. ECF No. 69, at

12-14. See Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir.

2016) (holding that the exhaustion requirement satisfied where prison officials fail

to timely respond to an inmate’s properly filed grievance).

Defendants counter that their records show that Wells’s final appeal was

mailed on September 26, 2022, and was received by SOIGA on September 30, 2022,

thereby making the SOIGA response due date November 15, 2022, which is the date

SOIGA denied Wells’s final appeal. ECF No. 72, at 4. Wells replies that (1) he

placed his final appeal in the prison mail system for transmission to SOIGA on

September 21, 2022, in compliance with DC-ADM 804, (2) he has no control when

the prison put his envelope in the mail, and (3) he has no means to determine when

SOIGA actually receives the grievance appeal. He also has presented undisputed

evidence that his prison account was charged $1.68 on September 21, 2022, for the

postage to mail his grievance appeal to SOIGA. ECF No. 68, ¶ 20.

The Court finds Defendants have produced no evidence suggesting that Wells

received any notification of when his final appeal was received by SOIGA. Although

Defendants have produced their internal records showing the final appeal was

postmarked September 26, 2022 and received by SOIGA on September 30, 2022,

ECF No. 72-5, nothing in the summary judgment record indicates that Wells had

access to this information or that he received notification of when the final appeal

was received by SOIGA. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Wells’s

calculation of the response date was reasonable, that under that calculation SOIGA

did not respond within the time prescribed under DC-ADM 804, and, as a result of

the untimely response, the administrative remedies were unavailable to Wells and

he has fully discharged the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Shifflet, 934 F.3d

at 359; Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d at 154. Thus, this

asserted exhaustion defense does not provide a basis for an entry of summary

judgment.

In the alternative, Defendants argue that Wells has failed to properly

exhaust because his grievance does not contain appropriate identification of the

offending parties. ECF No. 60, at 6. Wells responds that during the medical

emergency he was not able to visually identify all responding corrections personnel,

but that the description in the grievance of “all responding correctional personnel”

was adequate identification to place prison officials on notice and the DOC

investigation would have revealed the identities of the “responding correctional

personnel.” ECF No. 69, at 15.

“[T]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem,

not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.”

Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 219).

“The PLRA itself does not have a ‘name all defendants’ requirement.” Byrd v.

Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 217). However,

DC-ADM 804 requires that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in

the events.” Green v. Maza, Civ. Act. No. 1:17-cv-223, 2020 WL 1249205, at *5

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020). The Court of Appeals has held that “in the absence of any

justifiable excuse, a Pennsylvania inmate’s failure to properly identify a defendant

constitute[s] a failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the

PLRA.” Williams v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 146 F. App’x 554, 557 (3d

Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).

Here, Wells submitted Grievance 992075 related to his June 25, 2022 medical

emergency. ECF No. 61-2. The grievance states, “Lieutenant Houston and other

responding correctional personnel” interfered with Wells’s medical treatment

during his medical emergency on June 25, 2022. Id. at 3. Defendants contend, with

the exception of Defendant Houston, this language does not identify nor adequately

describe the remaining seven individuals who are named as defendants in this

lawsuit. ECF No. 60. The Court finds that Wells has provided a justifiable excuse

for not identifying all the individuals involved in the incident – namely, that he was

having a medical emergency and was not able to visually identify all the

individuals.

The undisputed summary judgment record shows that Wells experienced a

medical emergency on June 25, 2022 on GP Housing Unit - E-unit and that

“correctional personnel” responded to the emergency. ECF Nos. 61-2, 61-3. The

Court finds that the grievance contains a sufficient degree of identification which

alerted prison officials to Wells’s medical emergency and to Wells’s concerns about

the medical treatment he received that day from the responding officers. For these

reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have not established the affirmative

defense of failure to exhaust based on lack of identification. Accordingly, their

motion for summary judgment based on that defense also will be denied.

The Court now turns to the merits of Wells’s claims.

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual

punishment on prisoners. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In the most general sense, a

prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two elements are established:

(1) the prisoner alleges an objectively serious deprivation by a prison official of food,

clothing, shelter, medical care, or safety; and (2) the prison official acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind to deprive the inmate of his right to food,

clothing, shelter, medical care, or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832,

(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

Wells’s claims will be addressed seriatim.

1. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by “intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribe.”

Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). Deliberate indifference can be established

when “necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons,” Natale v.

Camden Cty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2002), or “[w]here prison

authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment.” Monmouth Cty. Corr.

Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). See also Giles v.

Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Deliberate indifference may be shown by

intentionally denying or delaying medical care.”).

Wells’s deliberate indifference claim is two-fold: (1) Defendants made medical

judgments and rendered medical treatment without essential training,

qualifications, or medical supervision; and (2) Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his pre-existing seizure disorder and incorrectly initiated an overdose

protocol. ECF No. 39, § VI. Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim

arguing that the medical care provided to Wells was exclusively rendered by the

medical staff and that none of the Defendants knew about Wells’s pre-existing

seizure disorder. ECF No. 60, at 8-9.

Wells responds that prior to the nurse arriving on the scene, the corrections

officers initiated an overdose protocol by giving him Narcan and had the Defendants

recognized that Wells was experiencing a grand mal seizure, and not an opioid

overdose, the “treatment given while waiting for medical personnel to arrive on

scene would have vastly differed.” ECF No. 69, at 5. He argues that the

Defendants inappropriately made medical judgments and rendered medical

treatment without essential training, qualifications or medical supervision.

Defendants have produced records which indicate all medical treatment was

rendered by the SCI-Mercer medical staff and there was no delay in Wells’s medical

care, as the medical staff arrived at the scene 3 minutes after the emergency was

reported. For example, the Extraordinary Occurrence Report describes the incident

as follows:

On 6/25/2022 at 1822, a medical emergency was reported

via radio by CO1 E. Shultz on E Unit. Inmate Wells LS0414

was experiencing seizure like symptoms. At 1825, Medical

staff RN Michelle Merrick and LPN Sherry Kelly

responded to the unit. . . . At 1828, LPN Kelly

administered a dose of Narcan because the inmate was

speaking in a manner not consistent with seizure disorder

symptoms. At 1835, the inmate was administered a second

dose of Narcan. He was then placed on the stretcher, and

transported to medical. At 1850, after a medical evaluation

in the medical triage room, and specifically by order of the

on-call provider (PA Cassie Frank), the inmate was

administered a third dose of Narcan. The inmate’s seizure

symptoms began to subside. . . .

ECF No. 61-3, at 2. The separate Medical Report prepared by RN Michelle Merrick

states,

Called to Echo Block for possible seizure activity. Upon

arrival, inmate was on the floor on his Left side with

guards present. 1 dose of Narcan was administered, inmate

became combative and not following orders, then a second

dose of Narcan was administered. . . .

ECF No. 61-4, at 14. Additionally, the Initial Review Response denying Wells’s

grievance states, “You claim LT Houston medically assessed you and administered

Narcan, neither of which is true. You were assessed by a registered nurse, who also

administered the Narcan to you. LT Houston made no medical decisions nor

performed any medical actions.” ECF No. 61-2, at 5.

The undisputed summary judgment record reflects that, despite Wells’s bald

assertions to the contrary, all medical care provided to him on June 25, 2022, was

provided exclusively by the medical staff at SCI-Mercer.

The summary judgment record also reflects that none of the Defendants

knew that Wells had a pre-existing seizure disorder. In fact, Wells acknowledged

this during his deposition testimony:

Q: Do you know whether any of [the named defendants]

were aware that you had a seizure disorder on June 25th,

2022?

A: Outside of housing unit restrictions and employment

restrictions, the remaining Defendants wouldn’t know that

unless they looked it up or they asked medical personnel.

So, no, they wouldn’t’ have known that.

. . . .

Q: So, just so that I’m clear, on June 25th, 2022, the

Defendants did not know that you had a seizure disorder?

A: No, they did not.

ECF No. 61-1, at 22 (emphasis added).

Wells has produced no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find

that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to Defendants on Wells’s claim of

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

2. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force6

When a prison defendant is alleged to have used excessive force in violation

of the Eighth Amendment, the pivotal inquiry is “whether force was applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). An inmate does not have

to show that the harm suffered was sufficiently serious in order to make out a

constitutional violation where excessive force was used, and absence of serious

injury, while relevant, does not end the inquiry. Id. at 7; see also Brooks v. Kyler,

204 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Following Hudson’s focus on the force used, as

opposed to the injury inflicted, we conclude that although the degree of injury is

relevant for any [constitutional violation] analysis, there is no fixed minimum

quantum of injury that a prisoner must prove that he suffered through objective or

independent evidence in order to state a claim for wanton and excessive force”).

Whether a prison defendant used objectively unreasonable force requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those

circumstances include:

(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the

relationship between the need and the amount of force

that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the

extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis

of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts to temper

the severity of a forceful response.” Brooks [v. Kyler], 204

F.3d [102] at 106 [(3d Cir. 2000)]. De minimis injuries

may suffice to state a claim for excessive force. Id. at 103.

6 Wells labels the claim as a “misuse of force.” ECF No. 39, at § VII.

Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Brooks v. Kyler, 204

F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).

When a court considers such claims, the reasonableness of a particular use of force

often depends upon the relevant factual context and “must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) to

the extent any force was used, it was only de minimis and (2) the force was applied

in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. According to Defendants,

restraints were applied only after Wells became combative and agitated, and it

appeared he was hallucinating. ECF No. 62, at ¶¶ 7, 8, and 10. Further, once Wells

voiced complaints that the restraints were on too tight, the restraints were

loosened. Id. at ¶ 14.

Wells responds that he was having a medical emergency and there was no

need for restraints. According to Wells, Defendants should have known of the

substantial risk involved in forcefully restraining an actively seizing individual.

Wells states he “complained about the pain experienced from the handcuff tightness

and plead with correctional personnel to provide relief,” ECF No. 68, at ¶ 18, but the

handcuffs were only slightly loosened after the medical evaluation was completed.

Id. at ¶ 14.

After reviewing the summary judgment record, the Court finds there are

genuine issues of material facts in dispute. For example, while Defendants argue

that any injuries Wells suffered were de minimis, Wells contends that he was

diagnosed as having “handcuff neuropathy” and experienced numbness for at least

three months after the incident occurred. Id. at ¶ 19.

Defendants’ alternative argument, that the need for the application of force

was reasonable, relies entirely on facts in dispute. Defendants argue that Wells

was not showing signs of a seizure, but was combative and aggressive, symptoms

more indicative of a drug overdose, rather than a seizure. Wells disputes this

characterization. He argues his “seizure was perceived as aggression by responding

correctional personnel and as a result Wells was placed in restraints.” ECF No. 68,

¶ 8. In support of his position, Wells provides the Declarations of Michael Oravec

and Adam Keely. ECF 68-1 at 27 – 33. Mr. Oravec states he saw Wells “having

what I would call a seizure. . . I could hear Eric moaning/[illegible]/crying out. I

could hear the COs continually ask Eric what drug he took to cause this.” Id. at 28.

Similarly, Mr. Keely states that he saw Wells,

laying on the floor convulsing while another inmate who

was calling for help was trying to keep his head from

hitting the floor. . . . A group of C.O’s showed up first and

took over by trying to contain Mr. Wells trying to direct

him to obey there (sic) orders. They then cuffed his wrist

and ankles when they couldn’t control him and even

threatened to mace him if he tried to bite them again . . .

.”

Id. at 33. Wells also contends that he was not fully conscious until the seizure

began to subside, which was after he was moved to the medical unit.

The version of events offered by Defendants differs dramatically from the

version offered by Wells. It is not clear from the available summary judgment

record whether Wells was a physical threat and what amount of force, if any, was

necessary to subdue him. The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the

force used was constitutionally permissible. There are disputed genuine issues of

material fact, which if resolved in Wells’s favor, would allow a reasonable factfinder

to conclude that Wells’s constitutional rights were violated.

IV. Conclusion

For all these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

will be granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment will be granted on

Wells’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs

claim and denied on Wells’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 19, 2024

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Eric Dante Wells

LS-0414

SCI Mercer

801 Butler Pike

Mercer, PA 16137

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Kimberly A. Adams

PA Department of Corrections

Office of Chief Counsel

(via ECF electronic notification)