ROBINSON JR. v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALFRED DOUGLASS ROBINSON JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1136

)

MARTIN O’MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income

benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former

Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)

and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding him to

be not disabled. (Doc. No. 14). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ overlooked

the waxing and waning of his mental health symptoms, placed too much emphasis on his

self-assessment instead of on the medical source statements, gave too little weight to the

Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores found by Ms. Terry Sheffey, M.S.W.,

and wrongfully discredited parts of the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony. (Id. at 8-

12). Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ did not adequately consider the opinion evidence

as he did not consider the findings of Dr. Chantal Deines, Psy.D. (Id. at 10, 12). After

careful review of the record, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff for the following reasons.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the waxing and waning of his mental

health symptoms prevent him from working a full-time job. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff presents

this argument as a categorical rule, meaning that no claimant that has waxing and waning

of mental health symptoms could sustain a full-time job; however no such rule exists.

Indeed, “it is well-established . . . that a claimant need not be pain free or symptom free to

be found not disabled.” Null v. Saul, No. 18-759, 2019 WL 2867201, at *3 (W.D. Pa.

July 3, 2019); see also Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1986). Here, the

ALJ considered the waxing and waning of Plaintiff’s symptoms when determining that he

was not disabled and noted that the longitudinal record demonstrated that Plaintiff could

sustain work as there were not significant findings of psychosis, hallucinations, delusions,

or paranoia. (R. 25-26). Given this, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s

mental health symptoms did not prevent him from sustaining full time work.

Likewise, there is no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ placed too much

emphasis on his self-assessment. (Doc. No. 14 at 10). Plaintiff contends that the

medical source statements were a more reliable indicator of Plaintiff’s abilities and that the

ALJ should have credited these more than Plaintiff’s statements about how he spends his

typical day. (Id.). Plaintiff overlooks that the ALJ should and, in fact, must consider

the claimant’s activities of daily living in evaluating the severity of the claimant’s

symptoms and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i); Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ.

10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). Here, the ALJ appropriately

considered Plaintiff’s report of daily activities in accordance with the applicable

regulations. Plaintiff reported that he plays video games, plays pool with friends, and

spends time with others, including for sex “every time I get the chance[.]” (R. 22 (quoting

Ex. C5E)). The ALJ noted that these reports contrast with Plaintiff’s claims that he has

substantial problems in interacting with others and, therefore, weighed against the

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credibility of Plaintiff’s complaints. (R. 28). Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately

considered Plaintiff’s self-assessment in the context of the record.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not give appropriate credence to Ms.

Sheffey’s findings, specifically her finding that Plaintiff had GAF scores of 25 and 45,

which he argues suggest serious mental impairment. (Doc. No. 14 at 10). While an ALJ

should consider a claimant’s GAF scores in determining the impairments and limitations

necessary in the RFC, GAF scores are not dispositive of disability. See Irizarry v.

Barnhart, 233 Fed. Appx. 189 (3d Cir. 2007); Gilroy v. Astrue, 351 Fed. Appx. 714, 715

(3d Cir. 2009) (stating “a GAF score of 45, if credited, would not require a finding of

disability.”). Here, similar to the plaintiff in Gilroy, Plaintiff presented a GAF score of

45. (R. 26). The ALJ analyzed this score, as well as Plaintiff’s other GAF score of 25,

and explained that she assigned these scores little weight because they were not consistent

with Plaintiff’s prior medical records, showing “generally intact levels of neurocognitive

functioning” and his reports that he “lives independently in a multistory apartment[.]” (R.

26 (quoting Ex. C2F/8-9)). Indeed, as the ALJ explained, a GAF score of 25 is

“suggestive of behavior considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations, or serious

impairment in communication or judgment, or inability to function in almost all areas” and

that did not align with the Plaintiff’s medical history, which did not show significant

evidence of psychosis, hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia. (R. 25-26). Accordingly,

the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s GAF scores is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by not relying on the findings of Dr. Deines.

(Doc. No. 14 at 10-11; Ex. C14F). Plaintiff argues these findings were a more reliable

source of substantial evidence than Plaintiff’s self-assessment and that the ALJ should have

focused on Dr. Deines’ observations that Plaintiff had below average eye contact, had an

irritable affect, had difficulties with calculation and concentration, and was likely

functioning in the range of borderline intellectual ability. (Doc. No. 14 at 10-11). The

ALJ’s decision shows that she adequately analyzed the opinion of Dr. Deines and

considered this when determining that Plaintiff was not disabled. The regulations provide

that the ALJ is tasked with determining the persuasiveness for each medical opinion and

“the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions

are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also 20 C.F.R. §§

416.920c(b) and (c). Applying these regulations, the ALJ found Dr. Deines’ opinion

“overly restrictive and non-persuasive” because it was not supported by Dr. Deines’ exam

or consistent with the record. Specifically, the ALJ found this opinion was not supported

by Dr. Deines’ own exam where she remarked that Plaintiff “presented with perceived lack

of effort, including with regard to attention and concentration, while also noting no

‘particular impulsivity’ on testing[.]” (R. 30). The ALJ also found this opinion was not

consistent with the rest of the record, which showed Plaintiff had many activities of daily

life that required sustained attention and concentration and ability to interact with others.

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(Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision shows that she adequately considered the findings

of Dr. Deines and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ should have focused on his reports to Dr. Deines

where he stated that he did not like crowds and almost did not come to his appointment.

(Id. at 10). Plaintiff frames this as a finding of Dr. Deines, but it is well settled that the

mere memorialization of a claimant’s subjective complaints into a medical source’s

opinion does not transform those complaints into objective findings. See Hatton v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 131 Fed. Appx. 877, 879 (3d Cir. 2005). The ALJ did correctly

consider the Plaintiff’s complaints of not liking crowds and used this as a factor in

determining that Plaintiff was moderately to markedly limited in interacting with others.

(R. 22). Further, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined

that they were not fully credible. (R. 25). Given that the ALJ adequately considered

Plaintiff’s complaints, the Plaintiff’s argument is simply a request to reweigh the evidence,

which the Court declines to do. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-

91 (3d Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s argument does not undermine the fact that substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ wrongfully discredited a portion of the VE’s

testimony. (Doc. No. 14 at 11-12). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should

have credited the VE’s testimony that no jobs existed in the national economy for an

individual who required a 15-minute break after each hour of work. (Id.). However,

Plaintiff overlooks that an ALJ must only incorporate “credibly established” limitations

into the RFC. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ

asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions, including whether jobs existed for a person

who had problems with persistence at work, specifically when a person required a 15-

minute break after each hour of work. (R. 50). The VE testified that such a person

would not be able to maintain employment because the employer would not be able to

tolerate multiple 15-minute breaks. (R. 50-51). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should

have credited this and found Plaintiff disabled as this hypothetical was consistent with the

findings of Dr. Deines. (Doc. No. 14 at 11-12). Plaintiff’s argument assumes that the ALJ

should have found Dr. Deines’ opinion persuasive. As explained above, the ALJ found

Dr. Deines’ opinion “overly restrictive and non-persuasive” and this was supported by

substantial evidence. (R. 30). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

The Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner as it is supported by substantial

evidence.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

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