STEEVES v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TONI LYNN STEEVES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-732

)

MARTIN O’ MALLEY,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former

Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)

and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the Administrative

Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) non-disability determination. (Doc. No. 10). Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) was formulated in error as

the ALJ favored non-treating, non-examining sources over the opinions of her treating and

examining sources. (Id. at 18-22). Further, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ

inappropriately relied on evidence that she was able to foster children. (Id. at 22-23).

Plaintiff also argues that the RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence

as the ALJ relied on an incorrect reading of the underlying evidence and improperly

discounted Plaintiff’s consistent and supported symptoms. (Id. at 23-25). Lastly,

Plaintiff posits that the testimony from the vocational expert (“VE”) is not supported by

substantial evidence because it relies on an inaccurate RFC. (Id. at 25-26). After

conducting its own careful and independent review of the record, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial

evidence. The ALJ here was tasked with analyzing a variety of opinions, including those of

state agency physicians Drs. David Bristow, M.D., and Kevin Hollick, D.O., of consultative

examiner Dr. Anthony Elisco, M.D., and of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Michelle Rathgeb,

M.D., Mary Wasko, M.D., and Gina Laginya, PA-C. (As Plaintiff points out, Dr. Rathgeb is

referred to in the ALJ’s decision as Dr. Bathgen, but both Plaintiff and Defendant refer to this

doctor as Dr. Rathgeb and do not contest that the ALJ is referencing the same doctor). The

state agency physicians opined that Plaintiff had fewer limitations while Plaintiff’s treating

sources found her to be more limited. (R. 25-32). Plaintiff’s argument on this point seems

to invoke the inapplicable “treating physician rule,” which is applied only in cases where the

application is filed before March 27, 2017. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (applying

to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (applying to

later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). While the medical

source’s treating relationship with the claimant is still a valid consideration, “the two most

important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and

supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c). As Plaintiff’s

application was filed on July 5, 2020 (R. 15), the “treating physician rule” does not apply to

her claim and the ALJ was under no obligation to find the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating

physicians persuasive just by virtue of the physicians’ relationship with Plaintiff.

Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the opinions of Drs. Rathgeb,

Wasko, and Elisco should have been found persuasive because their findings are consistent

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with and supported by the record. (Doc. No. 10 at 21-22). As explained above,

consistency and supportability are indeed the two most important factors used to determine

the persuasiveness of medical opinions. Here, though, the ALJ appropriately analyzed

the consistency and supportability of Drs. Rathgeb, Wasko, and Elisco’s opinions based on

all the evidence. As to Dr. Rathgeb’s opinion containing many limitations, the ALJ found

this opinion unpersuasive because it was not consistent with the record, which showed that

Plaintiff’s physical examinations were generally unremarkable, and was not supported by

Dr. Rathgeb’s own examinations, which noted that Plaintiff’s prognosis was “good.” (R.

25). Further, the ALJ found Dr. Wasko’s very limiting opinion to be unpersuasive

because it was not consistent with the record, which showed no motor or neurologic deficit

and normal gait, and was not supported by Dr. Wasko’s own examinations, which showed

he assessed Plaintiff’s prognosis as “fair.” (R. 26-27). As to Dr. Elisco’s less limiting

opinion, the ALJ found this opinion only partially persuasive because it was mostly

consistent with the record, but his opined manipulative limitations were not consistent with

the Plaintiff’s normal extremities with no muscle atrophy and intact hand and finger

dexterity. (R. 28). Further, Dr. Elisco’s opinion was supported by his physical

examinations, which were generally unremarkable. (R. 27-28). Plaintiff points to

evidence within the record she believes to be more in line with these opinions in an effort

to have this Court reweigh the evidence, but the Court rejects her request to do so.

Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating “[c]ourts are

not permitted to reweigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations[.]”).

The Court also finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ inappropriately

relied on evidence that she was able to foster children as a factor pointing to her ability to

work. (Doc. No. 10 at 22-23). Plaintiff contends the ALJ acted improperly by relying on

her ability to foster children and questioning her on becoming a foster parent, subpoenaing

records from the Department of Human Services, and citing medical records noting Plaintiff

and her husband were fostering children in support of the decision that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (Id.). The Court disagrees. The ALJ is permitted to, and in fact required to,

evaluate a claimant’s activities of daily living as a factor in determining the credibility of his

or her claimed limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). More specifically, this

Court has previously affirmed decisions where the ALJ considered the Plaintiff’s regular care

for children in deciding that the claimant was not disabled. See Wilson v. Kijakazi, No. 22-

773, 2023 WL 6382544, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2023) (affirming the ALJ’s finding of

non-disability when he considered the plaintiff’s regular care for two children as a factor in

determining the credibility of the claimant’s alleged limitations); Hall v. Colvin, No. 15-150-

E, 2016 WL 5528230, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) (noting it was proper for the ALJ

to consider that plaintiff was raising a young autistic child in evaluating her credibility).

Similar to these cases, here, the ALJ properly considered evidence that Plaintiff was able to

foster children, in addition to other evidence showing her activities of daily life, in deciding

that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credible. Accordingly, the ALJ

appropriately included this evidence in his analysis.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 17) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC assessment

is in error because it relies on an incorrect reading of the underlying evidence and discounts

Plaintiff’s consistent and supported symptoms. Plaintiff points out that the evidence

shows that she has difficulty standing, walking, and sitting, requires rest breaks, and has

difficulty lifting, pulling, and holding. (Doc. No. 10 at 24-25). She contends that the

ALJ’s crafted RFC, stating she can perform light work with occasional climbing of ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds and without any manipulative limitations, is inconsistent with this

evidence. (Id.). However, the ALJ’s decision shows that he considered the evidence

documenting Plaintiff’s difficulties in these areas and appropriately rejected these

limitations. This was shown most clearly when the ALJ considered and analyzed Dr.

Rathgeb’s and Dr. Wasko’s opinions, which opined that Plaintiff’s impairments dictated

standing, sitting, resting, and manipulative limitations. (R. 25-26). As discussed above,

the ALJ appropriately found these opinions unpersuasive and explained why. (Id.).

Accordingly, the record shows that the ALJ considered evidence of these limitations and

appropriately rejected them.

Lastly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the testimony from the VE was

not supported by substantial evidence. The Court notes that “objections to the adequacy

of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to attacks on the

RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).

Hypotheticals posed to VEs need not reflect every impairment alleged by a claimant. See

id. at 544. Instead, hypotheticals “must accurately convey to the vocational expert all of

a claimant’s credibly established limitations.” Id. Substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s RFC assessment, and because the operative hypothetical accurately conveyed

Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ appropriately relied upon the vocational expert’s response.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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