GRIFFIN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIA ANISE GRIFFIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1162

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 31st day of July, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the Administrative

Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) non-disability determination. (Doc. No. 11). Specifically, Plaintiff

argues that her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) was formulated in error as the ALJ

ignored the state agency administration findings despite finding them persuasive, did not

incorporate the opined limitation that Plaintiff could only perform one to two step tasks,

and rejected her subjective testimony based on highly selective references to the record.

(Id. at 12-23). After conducting its own careful and independent review of the record, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit.

The ALJ was tasked with analyzing a variety of opinions, including those of the state

agency psychological consultants in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC. “The ALJ – not treating or

examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC

determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). See

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2,

1996). “There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that

an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed.

Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Similarly, there is no legal requirement that the ALJ adopt all

findings made by medical sources simply because he finds those opinions persuasive.

See Wilkinson v. Commissioner Social Sec., 558 F. App'x 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted) (explaining that “no rule or regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an

RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives the

source's opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight”). The Court finds the ALJ properly followed

this guidance and that his RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.

Here, the ALJ found the opinions of state agency psychological consultants

persuasive after analyzing these opinions in accordance with the applicable regulations.

(R. 28). These consultants opined that Plaintiff had a variety of limitations, including

moderate limitations in her ability to interact with others, and in adapting or managing

herself. (R. 28, Exs. B3A/8, B4A/21). Based on these opined limitations, these

consultants found that Plaintiff could complete one to two step tasks on a sustained basis.

(R. 28; Exs. B3A/17, B4A/23). The ALJ found these opinions persuasive, stating that

their conclusions were consistent with the overall record and that their conclusions were

supported by a detailed assessment of Plaintiff’s condition and by references to the medical

evidence. (R. 28). However, the ALJ stated that these opinions were limited in other

respects, explaining:

Nevertheless, the state agency psychological consultants did not benefit

from first-hand knowledge and experience with the claimant’s condition.

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They also did not have access to the additional medical evidence available

at the hearing level. As a result, the initial stat[e] agency psychological

consultant underestimated the impact of her condition on her ability to

adapt. At the same time, both examiners overestimated the impact of her

condition on her ability to understand, remember or apply information.

Furthermore, many aspects of their opinion are inconsistent. For example,

they note that the claimant had moderate limitations in her ability to adapt

and to interact with others. However, neither opinion contains and social

function [sic] or on her ability to adapt to changes, a conclusion that is

inconsistent with the previous assessment. As a result, the undersigned

incorporated elements of the state agency psychological consultant’s

opinions into the above residual functional capacity but included modified

restrictions more consistent with the totality of the evidence of record.

(R. 28). In this way, the ALJ fully explained why he found these opinions persuasive and

why he did not include all of their opined limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

Additionally, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ

inappropriately rejected her testimony based on selective references to the record. (Doc.

No. 11 at 17-23). Specifically, Plaintiff points out that the ALJ rejected her testimony

based on the following: (1) her “limited treatment;” (2) her “improvement;” (3) her normal

mental status examination findings; and (4) her activities of daily living. (Id.). Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ mischaracterized her treatment as “limited” even though the record

reflects that she had lifetime psychiatric care, including hospitalization, intensive therapy,

and medication trials. (Id. at 18). Further, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s reliance on her

“improvement” depends on her medication compliance, and she contends that her

noncompliance is a “medical eventuality.” (Id. at 19). Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ

did not explain how he valued her normal mental status examination findings or considered

them in the context of other abnormal findings. (Id. at 20-22). Lastly, Plaintiff contends

her activities of daily living do not indicate an ability to work full time as the ALJ never

addressed that she must make accommodations to her daily life based on her moods and

anxiety. (Id. at 22-23).

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that her subjective complaints were

improperly rejected based on selective references to the record. As to her “limited

treatment,” the Court finds this was not a mischaracterization, as the ALJ is allowed to

consider the frequency and extent of treatment when determining the credibility of these

complaints. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017) (stating “if the

frequency or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the

degree of the individual’s subjective complaints . . . we may find the alleged intensity and

persistence of an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent with the overall evidence of

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

record.”). Similarly, the ALJ correctly considered the effectiveness of Plaintiff’s

treatment in evaluating her subjective complaints. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v)

(allowing the ALJ to consider the effectiveness of the claimant’s medication and the

claimant’s treatment in determining the credibility of his or her subjective complaints).

Further, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ impermissibly used

evidence of Plaintiff’s noncompliance with medication as evidence of non-disability.

(Doc. No. 11 at 19). Instead, the ALJ permissibly used evidence of Plaintiff’s

improvement as one of many bases for discrediting her testimony. (R. 25). Moreover,

Plaintiff’s improvement while on medication was a valid reason for the ALJ to give less

weight to her subjective complaints. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). As to the ALJ’s

evaluation of Plaintiff’s normal mental status examination findings, the ALJ correctly

considered these findings as one component of the subjective complaints analysis. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (stating objective medical evidence “is a useful indicator to assist

[the ALJ] in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistency of [the

claimant’s] symptoms”); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (Oct. 25, 2017) (stating

“objective medical evidence is a useful indicator to help make reasonable conclusions

about the intensity and persistence of symptoms”). Lastly, the ALJ correctly evaluated

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in rejecting her subjective complaints. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3)(i) (stating that daily activities are one of the factors considered in

evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms).

Therefore, all of the factors considered by the ALJ in evaluating Plaintiff’s

subjective testimony were properly considered. Moreover, the ALJ did not rely on any

one of these factors but evaluated all of them in the context of the record as a whole, as he

was required to do. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments as to these points are without

merit.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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