URBAN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KARRIE LYNN URBAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-819

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of July, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under

Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,

48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported

by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court

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may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the Administrative

Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) non-disability determination. (Doc. No. 12). Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion

of Plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Timothy Lesaca, M.D. (Id.). After conducting its

own careful and independent review of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

contentions are without merit.

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled after considering all record evidence,

including all medical opinions of record. Among these opinions was that of Dr. Lesaca,

Plaintiff’s treating provider. (Ex. 14F). Dr. Lesaca opined that Plaintiff had extreme

limitations in every area of mental functioning and wrote that Plaintiff “has 100% total and

permanent psychiatric disability.” (Id.). Dr. Lesaca also stated that his opinion was

supported by his mental status examination on May 12, 2022. (Id.). The ALJ found this

opinion unpersuasive, stating:

[t]he undersigned finds the opinion of Dr. Lesaca unpersuasive. He opines

that the claimant has extreme limitation in every mental function. He

supports this opinion by citing the claimant’s mental status examination

from May 12, 2022 (Exhibit 14F). However, that examination shows good

reasoning and judgment, as well as normal memory, which would not

support extreme limitation (Exhibit 13F/10). Further, extreme mental

limitation is not consistent with her lack of psychiatric hospitalization.

Therefore, this opinion is not persuasive.

(R. 34-35).

Plaintiff argues the ALJ incorrectly analyzed Dr. Lesaca’s opinion. (Doc. No.

12). Specifically, she contends the ALJ should have found this opinion persuasive as it

was consistent with the record, as other doctors, specifically Drs. Joseph Richetti, M.D.,

and Amanda Slowik, Psy.D., indicated that Plaintiff’s mental impairments severely

impacted her ability to function. (Id. at 10). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Dr.

Lesaca’s opinion was not necessarily contradicted by other evidence within the record that

was observed within a controlled setting. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff also relies on Pepper v.

Saul, No. 18-1170, 2019 WL 4167281 (W.D. Pa. 2023) to argue that the ALJ’s reasoning

was inadequate. (Id. at 7). Further, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ provided no medical

evidence or other support to explain why psychiatric hospitalization was necessary to show

extreme limitations in this case. (Id. at 9).

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The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have found

this opinion persuasive. The record shows that the ALJ thoroughly evaluated the opinion

and reasonably concluded that it was not persuasive. (R. 34-35). Substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Lesaca’s opinion was not supported by his

examination, as Dr. Lesaca’s May 12, 2022 mental status examination showed Plaintiff

had a linear thought process, normal memory, and good reasoning and judgment, among

other findings. (Ex. 13F/10). Plaintiff points to no evidence within Dr. Lesaca’s exam

that contradicts this supportability finding. Further, as to consistency, the ALJ reasonably

found this opinion was not consistent with the wider record, showing lack of psychiatric

hospitalization. (R. 35). Plaintiff’s argument that the opinions of Drs. Richetti and

Slowik undermine this finding is unconvincing as the ALJ reasonably found both opinions

to be unpersuasive. (R. 34)

Further, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Lesaca’s

opinion was not necessarily contradicted by evidence that was observed within a controlled

setting. (Doc. No. 12 at 9 (citing Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356

(3d Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff overlooks that an ALJ can, and in fact must, consider objective

medical evidence such as clinical findings and mental status reports in making his or her

determinations. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c)(2) and 416.929(c)(2); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL

1119029, at *4-5 (Mar. 16, 2016). This includes considering the supportability between

a treating source’s examination and his own opined limitations. See Bryson v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 639 Fed. Appx. 784, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Kibe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 787

Fed. Appx. 801, 802-3 (3d Cir. 2019). Therefore, there was nothing inherently wrong

with the ALJ citing to Dr. Lesaca’s mental status examination in finding that this did not

support his opined limitations.

Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Pepper v. Saul is misplaced.

In Pepper, the court stated that “[g]enerally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion

of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source.” No. 18-

1170, 2019 WL 4167281, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1)). The

ALJ’s citation is noteworthy here as it references the regulations for evaluating opinion

evidence for claims filed before March 27, 2017. This regulation is inapplicable to

Plaintiff’s claims as she filed her applications on March 3, 2021. (R. 28). The

regulations applicable to Plaintiff’s claims have eliminated the “treating physician rule.”

Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the

regulations) and id. § 416.927(c)(2) (same) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (applying to

later cases) and id. § 416.920c(a) (same). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853 (Jan.

18, 2017). While the medical source’s treating relationship with the claimant is still a

valid consideration, “the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of

medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. Here, as

shown above, the ALJ properly analyzed the consistency and supportability of Dr. Lesaca’s

opinion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Lastly, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ was obligated to

explain and support his purported finding that psychiatric hospitalization was necessary to

show that Plaintiff had extreme limitations. The Court notes that the ALJ here did not

state that evidence of hospitalization is equivalent to disability or that lack of

hospitalization is definitive evidence of non-disability. Rather, the ALJ stated merely that

Dr. Lesaca’s opined “extreme mental limitation is not consistent with [Plaintiff’s] lack of

psychiatric hospitalization.” (R. 35). Consideration of a claimant’s treatment history,

including the level of treatment received, was a valid reason to discount Dr. Lesaca’s

opinion. See Foor v. Berryhill, No. 18-64, 2019 WL 1296882, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21,

2019) (noting lack of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization is an “appropriate bas[i]s” for

discounting a treating provider’s opinion that a claimant is subject to extreme limitations).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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