noting that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions”
How later courts described this case
- noting that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KARLA SUE PODLUCKY and )
GREGORY JOSEPH PODLUCKY, )
) 2:23-cv-2144
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. )
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
ECF 1. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient proof of indigency,
and therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion. After careful consideration, however, the
Court will sua sponte dismiss the attached complaint (ECF 1-1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, because the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an in forma pauperis
complaint and dismiss the case if it is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019). Separately, the Court
must also dismiss a complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116,
122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
See Aldossari on Behalf of Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 260 (3d Cir. 2022).
Because Plaintiffs are pro se, the Court liberally construes the complaint, and
“appl[ies] the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.”
Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “Yet pro se litigants still
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[, a]nd they . . . must
abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. (cleaned up).
Plaintiffs label their claims as being brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. ECF 1-1, p. 3; see also id. at p. 4 (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)’s language,
highlighting the “negligent and wrongful acts and omissions of agents and employees
of the United States”). But the Court doesn’t simply credit the label of the claim. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that a “plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions”) (cleaned up). Upon review of the actual allegations, it is clear Plaintiffs
are actually asserting a breach-of-contract claim against the government. That is,
Plaintiffs contend the government agreed to return nearly $5 million in jewelry seized
during Plaintiffs’ criminal investigations, a promise memorialized in Mr. Podlucky’s
June 2011 plea agreement. See ECF 1-1, pp. 6 (“CLAIM ONE: The DOJ failed to
return the Plaintiffs’ personal property pursuant to the Plea Agreement.”), 11-12
(“The Personal Property is the subject-matter of [Mr.] Podlucky’s plea agreement as
agreed to by the United States.”), 12 (“The United States failed to return the Personal
Property by and through negligent and wrongful acts and omissions as promised and
agreed to as documented in Paragraph B.5 of Gregory Joseph Podlucky’s plea
agreement.”).1
This Court shares jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims over any “civil
action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded
. . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(2). Yet “[o]riginal jurisdiction over such claims seeking more than $10,000
1 Even if Plaintiffs’ complaint could be construed to assert a tort claim, it would be
barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). There is
over a decade between the most generous accrual date of June 2011 (the date of the
government’s alleged promise to return the jewelry) and Plaintiffs’ alleged
presentment of the claim to the DOJ in October 2022. ECF 1-1, p. 5.
vests exclusively in the Claims Court.” Dia Nav. Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1267
(3d Cir. 1994) (cleaned up); 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Plaintiffs allege, at a minimum, nearly
$5 million in compensatory damages. ECF 1-1, p. 17. Jurisdiction in this Court is
therefore lacking. See Pomeroy, 34 F.3d at 1267 (holding district court properly
dismissed claim where plaintiff “alleged damages amounting to $127,580, far in
excess of the maximum claim over which the district court could exercise its
jurisdiction”).2
* * *
Accordingly, after careful consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 1) is GRANTED, and
the Clerk of Court is directed to file the Complaint on the docket. It is FURTHER
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ complaint (ECF 1-1) is DISMISSED without prejudice
to refiling in the proper venue. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case as CLOSED.
Dated: July 10, 2024
BY THE COURT:
/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan
J. Nicholas Ranjan
United States District Judge
cc:
Karla Sue Podlucky
Gregory Joseph Podlucky
15 Gold Coin Court
Colorado Springs, CO 80919
2 Plaintiffs also allege diversity jurisdiction. ECF 1-1, p. 3. But “the United States is
not a citizen for diversity purposes and cannot be sued under section 1332.” Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nelson, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1303 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Com.
Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cleaned up)); see
also Lewis v. City of Philadelphia Parking Violations, No. 23-1649, 2023 WL 3362583,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2023) (same).