The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GREGORY GEORGE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-826
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY, 1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and his claim for supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp.
942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
1 Martin O’Malley is substituted as the defendant in this matter, replacing former Acting
Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981)).2
2 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to adequately assess
the medical opinions in this case in formulating Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
He further contends that the ALJ misinterpreted the term “stable” and that he failed to consider
the differences in Plaintiff’s RFC from before and after Plaintiff’s date last insured. The Court
finds no merit to these arguments and finds instead that the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding the opinions of the state agency
consultants (R. 95-125, 128-78) to be more persuasive that that of his treating primary care
physician, Joseph Labuda, M.D. (R. 463-68). However, while Plaintiff frames his argument as
one challenging the ALJ’s evaluation of the consistency and supportability of the various
medical opinions, he emphasizes that it was improper for the ALJ to have found the opinion of
his “treating, examining” doctor to be less persuasive. (Doc. No. 10, p.18). The Court
emphasizes, though, that for cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the
amended regulations set forth at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c apply to an ALJ’s
consideration of medical opinion evidence. There are several differences between the old and
new versions of the regulations, probably the most significant of which is that the newer version
has eliminated the “treating physician rule.” Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
416.927(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (applying to later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, at 5853
(Jan. 18, 2017). Although the medical source’s treating relationship with the claimant is still a
valid consideration, “the two most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of
medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§
404.1520c(b) and (c), 416.920c(b) and (c). While Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ’s analysis
failed to comport with these criteria, the Court disagrees.
In assessing the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ thoroughly discussed the
objective medical evidence, including diagnostic imaging and clinical examination findings
that generally showed no more than mild issues and normal muscle strength and gait. He
also referenced Plaintiff’s largely effective treatment history and his activities of daily living.
(R. 17-19). The ALJ then outlined how this evidence was more supportive of and consistent
with the state agency consultants’ opinions than with that of Dr. Labuda. (R. 20-21). In
doing so, he even acknowledged Dr. Labuda’s treating relationship with Plaintiff. (R. 20).
All of this constitutes substantial evidence in support of his findings. The Court further notes
that the ALJ considered not just the opinions of the state agency consultants, but also that of
Mitchell Stotland, M.D., a consultative examiner, all of whom suggested an RFC no more
restrictive than what the ALJ ultimately formulated. (R. 19-22).
Much like his argument that Dr. Labuda’s opinion is more supported by and consistent
with the record than those of the state agency consultants, Plaintiff’s argument in regard to the
RFC determination in general constitutes a request for the Court to reconsider the evidence and
make a different finding. However, if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
merely because it would have decided the claim differently. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d
1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).
Moreover, “[t]he presence of evidence in the record that supports a contrary conclusion does not
undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record provides substantial support for that
decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). To the
extent the Court is being asked to come to its own conclusion based on the evidence, therefore, it
declines to do so.
Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ, in making his findings, improperly treated
evidence of medical stability as evidence of improvement. Citing Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310 (3d Cir. 2000), he argues that evidence that a claimant is stable does not demonstrate an
ability to return to work. Plaintiff is correct that evidence of the stability of a claimant’s
symptoms does not necessarily demonstrate medical improvement or an ability to work; a
claimant’s debilitating symptoms, even if stable, are still debilitating. However, the ALJ did not
equate stability with improvement or ability to work; rather, he referenced the stability of
Plaintiff’s conditions in explaining that those conditions had not changed subsequent to earlier
relatively benign clinical findings. (R. 17-18). In this case, when the ALJ said stable, he meant
stable. Moreover, Plaintiff’s symptom stability was just one of many factors considered by the
ALJ in analyzing the medical evidence. See Jones o/b/o E.D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-2133,
2022 WL 17660974, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom., Jones on behalf of E.D. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-CV-02133, 2022 WL 17627776 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 13, 2022).
This argument somewhat undercuts Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ erred in failing to
determine two separate RFCs – one for his date last insured that would apply to his DIB claim
and one as of the date of decision that would apply to his SSI claim. This argument, however,
relies on the assumption that Plaintiff’s condition got worse after his date last insured of
December 31, 2019. Evidence of medical stability, therefore, was relevant in determining if this
was in fact the case. In any event, the RFC determined by the ALJ was as of the date of his
decision, December 7, 2021, and was applied to the entire period at issue. To the extent that the
ALJ would have made a separate finding as of Plaintiff’s date last insured nearly two years
earlier, such an RFC presumably would have been less restrictive. However, as discussed, the
ALJ’s reliance on the stability of Plaintiff’s conditions implied that he did not (and did not intend
to) make separate findings for Plaintiff’s DIB and SSI claims. Rather, he crafted an RFC that
represented the most Plaintiff could do at any time during the relevant period.
Throughout his brief, Plaintiff argues that the evidence demonstrates greater restrictions
than were included in his RFC. However, as noted above, the Court cannot accept Plaintiff’s
invitation to reweigh the evidence and reach its own conclusion. The ALJ considered the
combined effect of all of Plaintiff’s symptoms, and his decision is consistent with the governing
law and supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore will affirm.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 12) is GRANTED.
s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record