GRUSOFSKI v. SPEEDWAY LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES AARON GRUSOFSKI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-474

) Judge Nora Barry Fischer

SPEEDWAY LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a personal injury action brought by Plaintiff James Aaron Grusofski (“Grusofski”)

against Defendant Speedway LLC (“Speedway”) arising from a workplace injury Grusofski

sustained on October 26, 2021 when he was hit by a vehicle driven by a Speedway employee in a

marked construction zone on a highway in Ohio County, West Virginia. (Docket No. 1-1). This

case was initiated in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and was later removed here

by Speedway on March 29, 2024. (Docket No. 1). Presently before the Court are Grusofski’s

Motion to Remand, Speedway’s Response in Opposition, Grusofski’s Reply and the parties’

Responses to the Court’s Show Cause Order. (Docket Nos. 5; 9; 11; 14). After careful

consideration of all of these submissions, and for the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion [9] is

granted and this matter will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, forthwith.

II. BACKGROUND

Grusofski is a resident of Washington, County, Pennsylvania. (Docket No. 1-2 at ¶ 1). As

noted, he was injured in an accident on October 26, 2021 in Ohio County, West Virginia when a

Speedway employee hit him with her vehicle while he was working in a marked construction zone

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on the highway. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-18). Grusofski proceeded to file his Complaint in the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County on October 24, 2023 asserting claims of negligence and

vicarious liability against Speedway and several related entities, i.e., SEI Speedway Holdings, LLC,

7-Eleven, Inc., SEJ Asset Management & Investment Company, Inc., Seven-Eleven Japan Co., Ltd,

and Seven & iHoldings Co., Ltd., (collectively “other 7-Eleven Defendants”), all of which were

citizens of Delaware, Texas and/or Japan. (Docket No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 2-7). The allegations set forth in

the Complaint make clear that the case was removable at all times on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction because all of the original parties were of diverse citizenship and the amount in

controversy plainly exceeded $75,000, particularly given the lengthy list of Grusofski’s injuries

including, among others, several fractures, permanent damage to nerves and mobility, mental and

emotional distress and PTSD. (Id. at ¶¶ 17(a)- 17(z)). He asserts that he has required multiple

surgical procedures and ongoing treatment for his physical and mental health issues. (Id.).

Grusofski also seeks damages for such medical treatment/procedures, lost wages, a Worker’s

Compensation lien in excess of $40,000, and punitive damages. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s counsel Noah Geary, Esq. (“Plaintiff’s counsel”) mailed the complaint and an

acceptance of service form to the Dinsmore & Shohl Law Firm in West Virginia on November 14,

2023. (Docket No. 9 at ¶ 5). Attorney David Bolen of Dinsmore & Shohl emailed Plaintiff’s

counsel on November 20, 2023 and advised that his firm was not authorized to accept service of the

Complaint but that Speedway would be assigning the matter to Pennsylvania counsel for further

handling. (Id. at ¶ 6). Attorney Bolen then sent the Complaint to current defense counsel Rebecca

Sember Izsak, Esq. of the law firm of Thomas, Thomas and Hafer, LLP in Pittsburgh, (“defense

counsel”), who admits that she received a “courtesy copy” of the Complaint at that time. (Docket

No. 11 at 2-3).

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Approximately one week later, defense counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel and proposed

that the parties stipulate that the other 7-Eleven Defendants be dismissed, and the caption and

complaint be amended to reflect same and conveyed that Speedway would accept service of the

Complaint upon the approval of the stipulation by the Court of Common Pleas. (Docket No. 5 at 2-

3). In light of these discussions, Plaintiff’s counsel did not proceed to formally serve the Complaint

on Speedway, or the other 7-Eleven Defendants, and defense counsel did not sign the waiver of

service form which had been provided. (Docket No. 11 at 3). Thereafter, a formal stipulation was

prepared by the parties under the case caption of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.

(Docket No. 1-3 at 4-6). In pertinent part, the Stipulation reads:

STIPULATION TO DISMISS LESS THAN ALL

DEFENDANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE, ACCEPT

SERVICE OF COMPLAINT AND TO AMEND CAPTION

The undersigned counsel and parties herein agree and

stipulate as follows:

1. The following Defendants have not yet been served

and all parties agree that they shall be dismissed without

prejudice:

a. SEI SPEEDWAY HOLDINGS, LLC, a

Delaware Limited Liability Company;

b. 7-ELEVEN, INC., a Texas Corporation with

its principal place of business in Irving, Texas;

c. SEJ ASSET MANAGEMENT &

INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC.;

d. SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN Co, LTD; and

e. SEVEN & iHOLDINGS CO., LTD;

2. SPEEDWAY LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability

Company agrees to accept service of the Complaint on the

date that the Order approving this stipulation is signed;

3. All references to the dismissed entities above shall be

stricken from the Complaint;

4. The caption of the above captioned matter shall be

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amended to reflect the deletion of the dismissed parties

set forth in a. – e., above; and

5. The case caption should be amended to read as

follows:

[JAMES AARON GRUSOFSKI, Plaintiff v. SPEEDWAY

LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant].

(Docket No. 1-3 at 4-6). Defense counsel signed the Stipulation as counsel for Speedway LLC on

January 23, 2024. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff’s counsel then executed the Stipulation on behalf of his client,

Grusofski, on February 29, 2024. (Id. at 5). The parties’ Stipulation was filed with the Court of

Common Pleas along with an uncontested motion certification form listing the addresses, phone

numbers and emails of counsel for both Grusofski and Speedway, a proposed order and a certificate

of service signed by Plaintiff’s counsel on February 29, 2024, indicating that the Stipulation was

mailed to defense counsel at the same address on that date. (Docket No. 1-3). Notably, it appears

that, on the certificate of service, Plaintiff’s counsel crossed out the typed date of “December __,

2023” and a typed reference to “Counsel for Walmart Defendants”1 and hand wrote “February 29,

2024,” and “Counsel for Plaintiff” when signing the form. (Id.).

The Court of Common Pleas adopted the parties’ proposed order and approved the

Stipulation on March 4, 2024. (Docket No. 1-4). In relevant part, the Order provides that:

[u]pon consideration of the Stipulation of the parties, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. SEI SPEEDWAY HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware Limited

Liability Company; 7-ELEVEN, INC., a Texas Corporation with

its principal place of business in Irving, Texas; SEJ ASSET

MANAGEMENT & INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC.;

1 The Court notes that defense counsel has represented Walmart and related entities in several prior actions before

this Court. See e.g., Hernandez et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Civ. A. No. 21-499 (W.D. Pa. 2021); Wheeler v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. A. No. 22-785 (W.D. Pa. 2022); Green v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Civ. A. No. 23-176

(W.D. Pa. 2023).

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SEVEN-ELEVEN JAPAN Co, LTD; and SEVEN &

iHOLDINGS CO., LTD, are hereby dismissed from this matter

and from the caption without prejudice;

2. SPEEDWAY LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

agrees to accept service of the Complaint as of the date of the

signing of this Order;

3. All references to the dismissed entities above shall be stricken

from the Complaint;

4. The caption of the above captioned matter shall be amended

to reflect the deletion of the dismissed parties set forth in 1,

above; and shall read as follows:

[JAMES AARON GRUSOFSKI, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY LLC, a

Delaware Limited Liability Company]

(Docket No. 1-4). Speedway did not file an answer or preliminary objections to Grusofski’s

Complaint while the case was in state court.

On March 29, 2024, Speedway filed its Notice of Removal removing this case on the basis of

diversity of the parties. (Docket No. 1). In its Notice of Removal and briefs, Speedway maintains

that it timely removed the action within 30 days of the State Court Order of March 4, 2024, which it

claims is also the effective date of its acceptance of service of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Docket Nos. 1;

5; 11). Speedway alternatively suggests in a footnote that the matter was timely removed within 30

days of March 1, 2024 when the parties filed the Stipulation with the Court of Common Pleas.

(Docket No. 11). Grusofski counters that this matter should be remanded to the Court of Common

Pleas because the removal was not made within 30 days of Speedway’s receipt of the Complaint in

November of 2023 or its waiver of service by defense counsel signing the Stipulation on January 23,

2024. (Docket Nos. 9; 14). Although Speedway initially objected to this Court’s authority to sua

sponte issue an Order to Show Cause on the timeliness of the Notice of Removal, Grusofski

subsequently moved to remand, rendering such objection moot. (Docket Nos. 5; 9). The parties

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have now had a full and fair opportunity to brief Grusofski’s motion to remand such that it is fully

briefed and ripe for disposition. (Docket Nos. 5; 9; 11; 14).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A notice of removal must be filed “within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through

service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which

such action or proceeding is based....” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Our Court of Appeals has recognized

that “the removal period for a defendant does not begin to run until that defendant is properly served

or until that defendant waives service.” Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App’x 747, 751 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999)).

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than

lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after

the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any

time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order

remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “‘The removing party ... carries a heavy burden of showing that at all stages of

the litigation the case is properly before the federal court. Removal statutes are to be strictly

construed, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of remand.’” Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce

Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2014), aff'd, 578 U.S. 374, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 194 L.

Ed. 2d 671 (2016) (quoting Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir.2009) (internal citations

omitted)).

IV. DISCUSSION

At the outset, the parties appear to agree that Grusofski did not formally serve his Complaint

on Speedway and that defense counsel received a courtesy copy of the Complaint in November of

2023. (Docket Nos. 5; 9; 11; 14). Hence, in deciding Grusofski’s motion to remand, the Court must

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resolve the parties’ disputes as to when the removal clock commenced by determining the date upon

which Speedway accepted or waived service of process under Pennsylvania law. (See id.).

Speedway maintains that it did not accept service of process until the Stipulation was filed with the

Court of Common Pleas on March 1, 2024, or the date that Court entered the order approving the

parties’ Stipulation on March 4, 2024, making its March 29, 2024 removal timely. (Docket Nos. 5;

11). Grusofski asserts that defense counsel’s actions leading to her execution of the stipulation on

January 23, 2024, sufficiently demonstrated that Speedway was consenting to the jurisdiction of the

Court of Common Pleas such that service was waived. (Docket Nos. 9; 14). Having carefully

considered the parties’ positions, the Court agrees with Grusofski that defense counsel effectively

waived service under Pennsylvania law more than 30 days before this case was removed.

The Supreme Court held in Murphy Brothers that a defendant’s mere receipt of a courtesy

copy of a Complaint is not enough to trigger the removal clock set forth in § 1446(b), absent formal

service of the Complaint or a waiver of service. See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350-51; see also Di

Loreto, 351 F. App’x at 751. Since formal service was not effectuated here, the Court must

determine if and when service was waived. As this Court has recognized previously,

“The question of whether service, or waiver thereof, occurred [is] a

question of state law.” Cmiech v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.,

520 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (M.D. Pa. 2007). Pursuant to Pennsylvania

law, “effective service of process may be obtained through waiver or

consent.” Fleehr v. Mummert, 857 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2004) (citation omitted). “One can waive service of process by

various means, and become a party to a suit by voluntary

appearance.” Id. (citing Vandegrift v. Knights Road Industrial Park,

Inc., 490 Pa. 430, 416 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. 1980)). “A defendant

manifests an intent to submit to the court’s jurisdiction when the

defendant takes ‘some action (beyond merely entering a written

appearance) going to the merits of the case, which evidences an intent

to forego objection to the defective service.’” Id. (quoting Cathcart

v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1984)).

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Ricci v. Rockwater Ne. LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-1281, 2015 WL 6509442, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28,

2015).

In the same matter, this Court “reviewed the relevant precedent governing the waiver of

service by actions of authorized counsel” and noted the emergence of following principles:

Of course, counsel’s execution of a waiver of service form on behalf

of a client constitutes a valid waiver of service as of the date of the

waiver. See PA. R. CIV. P. 402(b) (“In lieu of service under this rule,

the defendant or his authorized agent may accept service of original

process by filing a separate [acceptance of service] document”). An

attorney’s entry of an appearance on the court’s docket, by itself,

does not suffice to waive service. See PA. R. CIV. P. 1012(a) (“A

party may enter a written appearance [with the court] … Such

appearance shall not constitute a waiver of the right to raise any

defense including questions of jurisdiction or venue.”); see Fleehr,

857 A.2d at 685. Moreover, an attorney’s efforts to negotiate a

waiver of service (through email correspondence or otherwise) with

opposing counsel is not enough to demonstrate that service was

waived. See e.g., Di Loreto, 351 F. App’x at 752; Cmiech, 520 F.

Supp. 2d at 674. However, service may be waived if the attorney

moves beyond these types of nominal activities and appears in court

to represent the client’s interests on the merits of a case—without

preserving any defenses based on the allegedly defective service. See

Cmiech, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (one factor courts finding service was

waived by counsel was “common is interaction with the court;

whether by filing complaints or making appearances, defendants in

the above cases acted in such a way as to submit themselves to the

authority of the court.”).

Ricci, 2015 WL 6509442, at *2. In Ricci, this Court found that service had been waived by counsel

who had received a copy of the lawsuit, appeared in the Court of Common Pleas on behalf of the

client and participated in a discovery hearing between additional parties to the suit. Id. at *3.

Although counsel signed a waiver of service form a few days after that hearing, and removal would

have been timely if that date had been utilized, the Court concluded that counsel had waived service

by participating in the discovery hearing, without preserving any objections to service of process.

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Since the hearing took place more than 30 days before the removal was filed, the Court remanded

the matter to the Court of Common Pleas. Id. In reaching this decision, the Court relied on the

Superior Court’s decision in Fleehr v. Mummert, which had similarly found that service had been

waived when counsel appeared at a hearing in the Court of Common Pleas and agreed to consolidate

the matter with another arbitration case, plainly evidencing the party’s consent to the jurisdiction of

the Court of Common Pleas and waiving service. Fleehr, 857 A.2d at 685.

While it is true that defense counsel in this matter did not physically appear in the Court of

Common Pleas to defend her client, Pennsylvania courts have found that service may be waived by

the out-of-court actions of a party or authorized counsel directed toward the merits of the litigation.

To that end, in Sharpe v. McQuiller, the Superior Court held that a pro se party participated in the

merits of the litigation and waived service by tendering handwritten discovery responses to opposing

counsel on a piece of paper that did not include the case caption. 206 A.3d 1179, 1185 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2019). Likewise, in Ball v. Barber, the Superior Court determined that service was waived when

counsel submitted a notice of deposition to another party to the litigation seeking school records

relevant to the merits of the lawsuit. 621 A.2d 156, 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Most relevant to this

matter is the recent decision of the Superior Court in Reddy v. Tharp, which held that the defendants

“waived service when they entered into [a] Stipulation, and submitted to the court’s jurisdiction” at

that time. 313 A.3d 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024).

Briefly, the essential facts of Reddy are that a complaint alleging that defendants had

defaulted on a promissory note was filed in June of 2019 but not served. Reddy, 313 A.3d at 197.

Later, in August of 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation that amended the case caption,

changed the names of one of the defendants, set forth a settlement and payment plan for defendants

to pay off the balance, and stated that a consent judgment could be entered in the Court of Common

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Pleas if the payments were not timely made. Id. The Stipulation was not filed immediately. Id.

Rather, after 10 months had passed and several payments had been missed, in June of 2020, the

Stipulation and a consent judgment were filed. Id. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the

trial court denying a petition to strike the judgment, finding that the language of the “Stipulation

established the [defendants’] intent to put [themselves] under the court’s jurisdiction and waived the

need for service.” Id. The Superior Court also rejected the argument that the failure of the plaintiff

to reinstate the complaint precluded the entry of judgment because service had been waived. Id.

Following such authority, this Court must examine the actions of defense counsel and the

language of the Stipulation in this matter to determine if Speedway manifested the intent to submit to

the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas by taking some action “evidenc[ing] an intent to forgo

an objection to the defective service.” Sharpe, 206 A.3d at 1184. In this Court’s estimation, the

undisputed facts plainly show that defense counsel took steps well beyond the nominal activities

which courts have recognized would not be sufficient to demonstrate a waiver of service (i.e., merely

entering an appearance, negotiating a waiver of service, filing a rule for the plaintiff to file a

complaint, or attending a scheduling conference without arguing the merits) when she executed the

Stipulation on behalf of her client and served it on her opponent. See id. The Court reaches this

decision for several reasons.

First, the Stipulation is written under the case caption of the Court of Common Pleas, states

that “the undersigned counsel and parties herein agree and stipulate,” to the terms thereof, and is

executed by defense counsel of behalf of Speedway, all of which plainly evidence Speedway’s

admission that it is a party to the action and its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court of Common

Pleas. See Reddy, 313 A.3d at 197; see also Sharpe, 206 A.3d at 1184.

Second, the Stipulation is broad in scope and involves actions covered by several different

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Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which require leave of court or the consent of opposing

parties, further evidencing Speedway’s intent to forgo any objection to service and submit to the

jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. See id. To that end, the parties agreed that Grusofski’s

Complaint would be discontinued against the other 7-Eleven Defendants, an action covered by Rule

229(b)(1). See Pa. R. Civ. P. 229(b)(1) (“a discontinuance may not be entered as to less than all

defendants except upon the written consent of all parties or leave of court upon motion of any

plaintiff or any defendant for whom plaintiff has stipulated in writing to the discontinuance.”). In

addition, the parties stipulated that the caption would be amended to correct the name of Speedway

and to amend the Complaint to strike “[a]ll references to the dismissed entities,” i.e., the other 7-

Eleven Defendants, actions which are covered by Rule 1033(a). See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1033(a) (“A

party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at any time change the

form of action, add a person as a party, correct the name of a party, or otherwise amend the

pleading.”). Lastly, the Stipulation purports to set a deadline for Speedway’s acceptance of service

under Rule 404(b) by tethering it to “the date that the Order approving this stipulation is signed” by

the Court of Common Pleas, and Rule 1003 generally allows a waiver of deadlines “by agreement of

the parties.” See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1003 (“Rules relating to the manner of commencing an action or the

time for serving process or for filing or serving pleadings may be waived by agreement of the

parties. The court on cause shown may extend or shorten the time within which pleadings shall be

filed or process served.”). However, as the Superior Court has held, “[o]nce a party takes action on

the merits of a case,” by engaging in matters unrelated to preserving objections to defective service,

that party “waives his right to object to defective service of process.” Ball, 621 A.2d at 158.

Third, although the Stipulation attempts to set a prospective date in the future for Speedway’s

acceptance of service, both the title and language of thereof make clear that Speedway is agreeing to

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accept service of the Complaint, demonstrating Speedway’s intent to waive any objections to

defective service. See Reddy, 313 A.3d at 197; see also Sharpe, 206 A.3d at 1184. Speedway has

not cited any authority supporting its position that its prospective acceptance of service on a future

date is authorized by Rule 402(b). (See Docket Nos. 5; 11). However, following Reddy, it is this

Court’s opinion that Speedway waived service and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court of

Common Pleas when defense counsel executed the Stipulation on January 23, 2024. Reddy, 313

A.3d at 197. Further, the facts that the Stipulation was not filed immediately and that it was not until

several weeks later that the Stipulation was joined by Plaintiff’s counsel and approved by the Court

of Common Pleas are not dispositive. Id. Moreover, Speedway’s contention that the Complaint

expired and needed to be reinstated to effectuate service is overruled because, again, Speedway

waived service and any alleged defects in same. See Reddy, 313 A.3d at 197 (“Tharp argues that the

Complaint had not been reinstated and therefore expired when not served. As stated above,

Appellants waived the service requirement when they entered the Stipulation and submitted to the

court's jurisdiction.”).

Fourth and importantly, it is well established that this Court does not have the authority to

extend the 30-day deadline for the filing of a notice of removal set forth in § 1446(b). Brown v. Rite

Aid Corp., 415 F. Supp. 3d 588, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (internal quotation omitted) (“Unless otherwise

authorized by statute, this 30-day time limitation is mandatory and cannot be extended by the

court.”). Likewise, neither state court orders nor stipulations of parties in state court are effective to

extend the statutory deadline for filing a notice of removal. See e.g., THS Co., LLC v. Sheraton

World Resort Orlando, Civ. A. No. 06-4956(FLW), 2006 WL 3731205, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2006)

(quotation omitted) (“[w]here the right of removal has been lost by failure to file a petition within the

statutory period, it cannot be restored by order of the court or by stipulation of the parties.”); Wright,

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Miller and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure at § 3731 Procedure for Removal—Time for

Seeking Removal, 14C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3731 (Rev. 4th ed.) (“these statutory periods [for

removal] will not be extended by state court demurrers, motions to set aside service of process, pleas

in abatement, stipulations, trial court-granted continuances, or various other state-court orders.”).

Hence, the parties’ Stipulation purporting to set the date for the acceptance of service in the future

would simply not operate to extend the deadline for filing the notice of removal in this case.

To conclude, the totality of the circumstances sufficiently demonstrates that Speedway took

actions addressing the merits of this litigation, waived service, and consented to the jurisdiction of

the Court of Common Pleas when its authorized counsel entered into the Stipulation on January 23,

2024. Sharpe, 206 A.3d at 1184. The removal statutes are to be strictly construed “so that the

Congressional intent to restrict federal diversity jurisdiction is honored” and must be “rigorously

enforced by the courts.” Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004)

(quotation omitted). Since Speedway waived service and then delayed in filing its notice of removal

until March 29, 2024, it failed to adhere to the 30-day statutory deadline set forth in § 1446(b), and

this matter must be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [9] is GRANTED. An appropriate

Order follows.

s/ Nora Barry Fischer

Nora Barry Fischer

Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 27, 2024

cc/ecf: All counsel of record.

2 The Court notes that the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County now operates a mandatory mediation

program which may assist the parties in resolving this matter. See Allegheny Cty, Local Rule 212.7.

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