Ridgeway v. Warden of FCI-Schuylkill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEROME RIDGEWAY,

Petitioner CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01551

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

WARDEN OF FCI-SCHUYLKILL,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

Jerome Ridgeway, an inmate confined at Federal Correctional Institution, Schuylkill

(“FCI-Schuylkill”), has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

(Doc. 1). Because Ridgeway has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies and the

petition indicates that exhaustion would not be futile, the Court will dismiss the petition

without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A review of court records indicates that on May 18, 2012, in the Northern District of

Georgia, Ridgeway pled guilty to possession of a substance containing cocaine base with

intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)) and was sentenced to 192 months imprisonment.

See USA v. Ridgeway, No. 12-CR-0001-TCB (N. D. Ga. 2012).

Ridgeway’s petition is difficult to parse, but he alleges that he is entitled to early release

under the First Step Act because he has earned 650 days of time credit. However, his release

has not been arranged, and he has received contradictory explanations from various personnel

at FCI-Schuylkill. He alleges that a case manager, Prorambo, “put [him] in for [a] halfway

house” in Atlanta, Georgia, but proceeded to give various reasons he could not be released.

These included waiting for “medical” to sign off, Prorambo “forgetting” to sign off, and

“pending charges” against Ridgeway. A unit manager, Dewald, told Ridgeway that she was

“waiting on Grand Prair[i]e1” for paperwork related to Ridgeway’s completion of the RDAP

drug treatment program. Another staff member, Egar, told Ridgeway that he had no pending

charges and she was “working on getting [him his] release” but would not provide any other

details.

Ridgeway concedes that he has not pursued administrative remedies. He argues it

would be futile to do so based on the facts in his petition, because he “do[es] not have the

time” to pursue the four-step administrative process.

II. DISCUSSION

“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the

clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District

Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 4 (also applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b)); see

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss

summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.”).

The Bureau of Prisons has an internal system through which federal prisoners can

request review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. That process begins with an

informal request to staff and progresses to formal review by the warden, appeal with the

Regional Director, and, ultimately, final appeal to the General Counsel. See 28 C.F.R. §§

1 The Court infers that Ridgeway is referring to the BOP’s Designation and Sentence

Computation Center, located in Grand Prairie, Texas. See Johnson v. Ebbert, No. 3:14-CV-

1218, 2017 WL 402056, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2017).

542.10-.19. Although there is no explicit requirement to exhaust administrative remedies for

Section 2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627,

634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the relevant

agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and

provides agencies the opportunity to “correct their own errors” thereby fostering

“administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted). Exhaustion is not

required when it would not promote these goals, such as when it would be futile. See, e.g.,

Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).

Here, Ridgeway appears to argue that he does not “have the time” to proceed through

the administrative process because his release date is imminent. Courts have consistently

found that this argument does not justify a futility exception. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sage, No.

1:22-CV-2053, 2023 WL 2309781, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2023) (courts have “repeatedly

rejected the argument that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply

because his projected release date is approaching, and he may not complete his administrative

appeal before the release date”) (listing cases); Brown v. Sage, No. CV 3:22-0325, 2022 WL

1295414, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2022) (same); see also Wofford v. Spaulding, No. 4:22-CV-

01862, 2023 WL 2486590, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2023) (“the BOP must first be given an

opportunity to apply its expertise and to correct, if necessary, any mistakes it has made” in

calculating FSA time credits). Further, Ridgeway’s argument that he is entitled to release

based on time credits does not “challeng[e] the legality of BOP regulations or present[] an

issue of statutory construction that might justify excusing him from the exhaustion

requirement.” See Meadows v. Warden, FCI-Allenwood Low, No. 3:24-CV-952, 2024 WL

3871810, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2024).

The fact that various members of the prison staff informally gave him different

explanations about his release also does not show that exhaustion would be futile. To the

contrary, the fact that Ridgeway “does not appear to know why the BOP has refused to apply

the FSA credits at issue . . . shows the need” for him to seek a clear answer at the

administrative level, to develop a factual record. Sanchez-Leyva v. Knight, No. CV 23-3606

(CPO), 2023 WL 5369908, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2023); see also Moore v. Hutchinson, No. 1:23-

CV-52, 2023 WL 8545280, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2023).

Ridgeway cites to a case in which a petitioner asserted his right to immediate release

and the court found that exhaustion of remedies would be futile. See Woodley v. Warden, USP

Leavenworth, No. 24-3053-JWL, 2024 WL 2260904 (D. Kan. May 15, 2024). However, in that

case, the petitioner followed the instructions of BOP personnel by submitting a grievance

directly to the regional office, which considered and rejected his claim. The court reaffirmed

that “the futility exception is not satisfied merely because exhaustion could not be completed

by the release date that would apply if a petitioner received the claimed credits.” See Woodley,

2024 WL 2260904, at *1.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus

without prejudice. An appropriate Order shall issue.

Dated: October 23, 2024 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge