Wolfe v. Rivello

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES A. WOLFE, : Civil No. 3:24-cv-21

Plaintiff . (Judge Mariani)

v .

JOHN RIVELLO, et al, .

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff James Wolfe (“Wolfe”), an inmate confined at the State Correctional

Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Huntingdon’), initiated this negligence action on

January 3, 2024. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are, inter alia, Superintendent John

Rivello, Unit Manager Barbara Hollibaugh, Counselor Mark Grimme, and Unit Manager

Megan Yost (collectively, the “DOC Defendants”).' Presently before the Court is the DOC

Defendants’ motion (Doc. 32) to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Allegations of the Complaint

Wolfe alleges that the events giving rise to his negligence action arose at SCI-

Huntingdon on July 11, 2019, and “on or after March 20, 2020 up to the present date and

have not ceased.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). He alleges that he received an “eye cut on [his] nose

1 Also named as a Defendant is Nurse Jessica Cousins. By separate Memorandum and Order,

the Court addressed Defendant Cousins’ motion to dismiss. (Docs. 57, 58).

bridge at tooth and gum” and was given improper medication. (/d.). He further alleges that

he was monitored by unknown individuals and he “was deceased in an observation cell.”

Based on these events, Wolfe alleges that defendants “are and have breached public

trust.” (/d. at p. 5). Wolfe also alleges that he suffered a traumatic brain injury and

emotional, mental, and physical distress. (/d.). He seeks monetary relief. (/d.).

ll. Legal Standard

A complaint must be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if it does not allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff must

aver “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

“Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.

Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,

“[flactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court “take[s] as true all the factual

allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those

facts, but. . . disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ethypharm S.A. France v.

Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to

determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the

elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show(n] - that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). This “plausibility” determination will be a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.

However, even “if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court

must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a

defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment

would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she

has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.

Id.

It. Discussion

A. — Claim Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

The DOC Defendants first seek to dismiss the FTCA claim lodged against them, as

they are individual state employees and not subject to civil liability under the FTCA. Itis

well-settled that the United States “is the only proper defendant in a case brought under the

FTCA.” CNA v. United States, 535 F. 3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Government is

the only proper defendant in a case brought under the FTCA.”); Feaster v. Federal Bureau

of Prisons, 366 F. App’x 322, 323 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The only proper defendant in an FTCA

suit is the United States itself.”); Dambach v. United States, 211 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir.

2006) (noting that “the only party potentially answerable for any injury [under the FTCA] is

the United States.”). Wolfe thus cannot bring an FTCA claim against individual state

employee Defendants. The Court will dismiss the FTCA claim against these individual

Defendants.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim?

The DOC Defendants next seek to dismiss the complaint based on Wolfe’s failure to

state a viable Eighth Amendment claim and failure to allege that they were personally

involved in the alleged violations.

2 The Court construes the complaint as presenting an Eighth Amendment claim relating to

deliberate indifference to Wolfe's medical needs.

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent

to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To

succeed on such a claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an objective

showing that ‘those needs were serious.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526,

534 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d

Cir. 1999)).

Deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials “intentionally deny[ ] or delayf ]

access to medical care or interfer[e] with the treatment once prescribed.” Pearson, 850 F.3d

at 534 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05). “Allegations of medical malpractice are not

sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation,” nor is “[mJere disagreement as to the

proper medical treatment.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A “failure to

provide adequate care...[that] was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors” is

actionable under the Eighth Amendment, but “inadequate care [that] was a result of an error

in medical judgment” is not. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993); Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105-06. As long as a physician exercises professional judgment, his or her

behavior does not violate a detainee’s constitutional rights. See Brown v. Borough of

Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990).

Individual liability will be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played

an “affirmative part’ in the alleged misconduct. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353

(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). Liability

“cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Id. In other words,

defendants in Section 1983 civil rights actions “must have personal involvement in the

alleged wrongs...shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge

and acquiescence.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); Rode, 845 F.2d

at 1207-08. A plaintiff must establish the particulars of conduct, time, place, and the person

responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. When a plaintiff

merely hypothesizes that an individual defendant may have had knowledge of or personal

involvement in the deprivation of his or her rights, individual liability will not follow. Atkinson,

316 F.3d at 271; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.

The Court finds that the spare facts alleged by Wolfe do not state a viable Eighth

Amendment claim against the DOC Defendants because he does not describe deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. With respect to the serious medical need

requirement, it has been recognized by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that cuts requiring

no more than small bandages do not constitute serious medical needs covered by the

Eighth Amendment. See Stankowski v. Farley, 251 Fed. Appx. 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2007).

Wolfe's allegation that he received a “cut” (Doc. 1, p. 4), does not constitute an obvious

serious medical need as required under Estelle.

Assuming that this injury constitutes a serious medical need, the Court must next

determine whether Wolfe has demonstrated deliberate indifference to that medical need.

Wolfe’s complaint clearly alleges that “he was being monitored” and was provided

medication for his ailments. (Doc. 1, p. 4). He has not been denied treatment but, instead,

is expressing a dissatisfaction with the quality of care. This claim reduces to a dispute

concerning the adequacy of treatment. Such allegations do not support an Eighth

Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. Courts have

repeatedly held that when an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim entails nothing more than a

disagreement concerning which type of medication to prescribe for a particular ailment,

prison officials are entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Gause

v. Diguglielmo, 339 F.App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (dispute over choice of medication does not

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation); Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454 (3d

Cir. 2009) (same); Whooten v. Bussanich, 248 F. App’x 324 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Ascenzi

v. Diaz, 247 F. App’x 390 (3d Cir. 2007) (same). It is also well-established that the mere

misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition,

is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a

constitutional violation. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence

or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute

deliberate indifference.”); Hartman v. Corr. Med. Servs., 366 F. App’x 453, 455 (3d Cir.

2010) (noting that the “[inmate] himself referred to his lawsuit in terms of the negligence of

the defendants” and finding that “[a]llegations of medical negligence do not trigger

constitutional protections”) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67).

Fatal to Wolfe’s claim is his explicit allegation that Defendants’ conduct amounted to

negligence. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Therefore, the Court will dismiss this claim with prejudice.

Entirely unrelated to the factual allegations in the complaint, Wolfe states that he

suffered a traumatic brain injury. (Doc. 1, p. 5). The Court finds that this medical condition,

traumatic brain injury, could potentially constitute a serious medical need for purposes of the

Eighth Amendment. However, the complaint is completely devoid of allegations that the

DOC Defendants had any personal involvement in Wolfe’s medical care or that they acted

with deliberate indifference to his need for such care. Further, Third Circuit precedent

makes clear that “a non-medical prison official’ cannot “be charge[d] with the Eighth

Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference” when the “prisoner is under the

care of medical experts” and the official does not have “a reason to believe (or actual

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a

prisoner.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (holding that non-

physicians cannot be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to

respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by

the prison doctor). Wolfe alleges that he was provided medication and “monitored.” (Doc.

1, p. 4). By Wolfe’s own averments, the DOC Defendants are not medical providers. It is

clear that Superintendent Rivello, Unit Manager Hollibaugh, Counselor Grimme, and Unit

Manager Yost are non-medical prison personnel in that are not responsible for directly

rendering medical care to inmates. Wolfe does not plead any facts from which a plausible

inference could be drawn that the DOC Defendants had “reason to believe (or actual

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not treating) [him].”

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.

The complaint falls well short of plausibly alleging that the DOC Defendants violated

Wolfe’s constitutional rights. Consistent with the foregoing, dismissal of the complaint

against the DOC Defendants is warranted.

IV. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, the Court must grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be inequitable or

futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In the

instant matter, amendment would be futile because the underlying conduct and claims

against the DOC Defendants do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

V. Conclusion

The Court will grant the DOC Defendants’ motion (Doc. 32) to dismiss. A separate

Order shall issue.

E hy ‘ '

C Fe ih

Rover D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: October 2024