Pennsylvania Heavy & Highway Contractors Pension Fund v. Valley Seeding Company, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

‘MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA FILED

: SCRANTON

HIGHWAY CONTRACTORS SEP 24 202

PENSION FUND, and MICHAEL PER

SAPORITO, TRUSTEE, : DEPUTY CLER

Plaintiffs : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-cv-1623

Ve, : (JUDGE MANNION)

VALLEY SEEDING, INC., :

Defendant :

: MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

(Doc. 10). On September 29, 2023, Plaintiffs initiated this action against

Defendant to collect unpaid, withdrawal liability payments pursuant to

Section 4219(c)(5)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 (TERISA’) plus accrued pre- and post-judgment interest, liquidated

damages of twenty percent (20%) on the unpaid principal amount due and

owing, attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation. (Doc. 1, J{J26-30, 33-37; Doc.

10). Asummons was issued to Defendant on September 29, 2023. (Doc. 2).

On October 18, 2023, a return receipt indicating service upon Defendant on

October 16, 2023, was filed with the court. (See Docs. 3 and 4). Defendant

did not file an answer or otherwise timely respond to the complaint, and the

clerk of court entered default against Defendant for failure to answer or

otherwise defend the instant suit on November 20, 2023. (Doc. 6). On

December 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their first motion for entry of default

judgment against Defendant. (Doc. 7). By letter request, such motion was

withdrawn shortly thereafter on December 29, 2023. (Docs. 8 and 9).

Plaintiffs have now renewed their motion for default judgment. The motion

was decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.

The court has considered the submissions and, for the reasons set

forth below, will grant Plaintiffs’ motion and award all relief requested, with a

modification to attorneys’ fees.

I. Background‘

Plaintiffs brought this action to recover withdrawal liability due to

Pennsylvania Heavy & Highway Contractors Pension Fund (the “Pension

Fund’) from the Defendant, pursuant to Section 4219(c)(5)(A) of ERISA, 29

1 The facts and procedural history are drawn from the complaint (Doc.

1), Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 10), and the Plaintiffs’

submissions regarding material facts (exhibits to the complaint (Docs. 1-2,

1-3 and 1-4) and exhibits to the motion for default judgment (Docs. 10-1, 10-

2, 10-3, 10-4 and 10-5). See /n re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114

F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

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U.S.C. §1399(c)(5)(A) and 29 C.F.R. §4219.33; plus accrued pre-judgment

interest pursuant to Sections 4301(b), 515, and 502(g) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.

§§1451(b), 1145 and 1132(g); liquidated damages of twenty percent (20%)

on the unpaid principal amount due and owing pursuant to Section | □

502(g)(2)(C) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)(C); and costs of litigation and

attorneys’ feés pursuant to Section 502(g)(2)(D) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132

(g)(2)(D). (Doc. 1, J]J26-30, 33-37). The Pension Fund is a retirement trust

and plan established pursuant to Section 302(c)(5)(C) of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5)(C), and ERISA, which is

maintained by ts Board of Trustees to provide retirement benefits for its

eligible participants and beneficiaries, which collects and receives

contributions made on behalf of those participants, which supports their

retirement benefits from various employers having collective bargaining

agreements with Pennsylvania Heavy & Highway, and to provide pension

benefits for eligible participants and beneficiaries. (/d. J2). The situs of the

Pension Fund is Harrisburg, PA, within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

(/d.). Plaintiff Michael Saporito is a Trustee of the Pension Fund, and

therefore a fiduciary of the Pension Fund within the meaning of Section 3(21)

of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(21). (/d. 75).

Defendant Valley Seeding, Inc. is an employer in an industry affecting

commerce within the meaning Sections 3(5), (11) and (12) of ERISA, 29

U.S.C. §§1002(5), (11) and (12). (Doc. 1, 98).2 Defendant was party, and

therefore bound, to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the

United Steelworkers Union (the “Union”) that obligated Defendant to make

monthly contributions to the Pension Fund on behalf of its employees .

represented by the Union and covered by the CBA. (/d. 412). In 2019,

Defendant effected a complete withdrawal from the Pension Fund by

permanently ceasing to have an obligation to contribute under the plan. (/d.

713). The Pension Fund calculated Defendant's withdrawal liability to

amount to $376,099.00. (/d. 14).

On October 24, 2022, the Pension Fund sent a letter to Defendant

advising, among other things, that the Pension Fund had calculated

Defendant’s withdrawal liability, in the single sum amount of $376,099.00

and prepared a payment schedule for fifty-three (53) quarterly installments

of $10,436.75, plus a final payment of $6,673, to begin within sixty (60) days

2 The court notes that the Plaintiffs’ complaint and brief are lacking any

further enlightening description of Defendant's industry. Nevertheless, for the

purposes of this ruling, the court is satisfied with the pleaded factual

allegations and will accept them as true. See Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Johnson

Auto Repair, Inc., 2001 WL 253873, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2001). Such an

oversight, however, calls into question the 22.2 billable hours allegedly

required to file and draft the complaint.

: _ 4 _

of mailing said demand letter. (Doc. 1, 14-15). The letter also advised

Defendant of its right, within ninety (90) days from receipt of such letter, to

demand relevant information from the Pension Fund to verify, request,

review and/or contest Defendant’s withdrawal liability, but that

notwithstanding such request, quarterly payments must still be made to the

Pension Fund. (/d. 916; Doc. 1-3).? Defendant never contested any of the

Pension Fund’s respective determinations of its withdrawal liability, nor did

Defendant ever initiate arbitration of the amount of withdrawal liability

assessed against it within the ERISA timeframe. (Doc. 1, 416). Defendant

subsequently failed to make any of the quarterly installment payments — or

any payment at all — placing it in default and allowing the Pension Fund to

accelerate total payment of withdrawal liability. (/d. 18-23). The Pension

Fund and its trustee thereafter commenced this action.

3 The court notes that a discrepancy was found between the complaint

(Doc. 1, 916) and the letter of October 24, 2022 (Doc. 1-3, Exhibit B to the

Complaint) regarding the allocated time provided to Defendant to exercise

its right to review the withdrawal liability assessment. The court elected to

use the 90-day period in the factual background section of this memorandum

given that such is the statutory period. However, again, such an oversight

calls into question the 22.2 billable hours allegedly required to file and draft

the complaint.

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Il. Legal Standard

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to enter

a default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a

timely responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); see Broad. Music, Inc.

v. Kujo Long, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00449, 2014 WL 4059711, at “1 (M.D. Pa.

Aug. 14, 2014) (entry of default judgment is typically appropriate for a

defendant failing to appear at least until the defendant comes forward with a

motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(c)) (citing

Anchorage Assocs. v. V./. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 177 n. 9 (3d Cir.

1990)). “A consequence of the entry of a default judgment is that the factual

allegations of the complaint . . . will be taken as true.” Comdyne I, Inc. v.

Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Whether to grant default judgment is left “primarily to the

discretion of the district court.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180

(3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

Prior to entering default judgment, the court must determine whether it

has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted and personal

jurisdiction over the parties. Mark IV Transp. & Logistics v. Lightning

Logistics, Inc., 705 F. App’x 103. 108 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “A

court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties when the complaint and

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summons are properly served upon the defendant. Effective service of

process is therefore a prerequisite to proceeding further in a case.” Lamps

v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1991)). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(h)(1)(B) Provides that a corporation must be served by

“delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a

managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment

or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Further,

the Court must determine whether the moving party’s complaint establishes

a legitimate cause of action. Trustees of Laborers Loc. No. 1174 Pension

Fund v. DB Util. Contractors, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-01160, 2023 WL 3743573,

at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2023).

If these initial requirements are met, then the Court must consider three

factors. to.determine whether entry of a default judgment is appropriate: “(1)

prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant

appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant's delay is

due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d

Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d

192, 195 (3d Cir. 1984)).

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lll. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether it has subject

matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted and personal jurisdiction over the

parties. See Mark IV Transp. & Logistics, 705 Fed. App’x at 108 (citation

omitted). A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over disputes arising

under federal law and those between parties of diverse citizenship. 28 U.S.C.

§§1331, 1332.

For a district court to have federal question jurisdiction over a dispute,

the dispute must “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. §1331. Here, the matter arises under 29 U.S.C. §§1381-

82, and 1451.4 The Court, accordingly, has subject matter jurisdiction over

this matter. □□

As to personal jurisdiction, “[a] court obtains personal jurisdiction over

the parties when the complaint and summons are properly served upon the

defendant.” Lamps, 952 F.2d at 700-01. Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of service

4 "The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of an action under this section without regard to the amount in

controversy, except that State courts of competent jurisdiction shall have

concurrent jurisdiction over an action brought by a plan fiduciary to collect

|| withdrawal liability.” 29 U.S.C. §1451.

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for the complaint and summons. (Docs. 3 and 4). The Court, therefore, has

personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.

B. Legitimate Cause of Action .

Plaintiffs ‘allege that Defendant violated §515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.

§1145, by failing to make contributions to the Pension Fund plan, as required

under the CBA, and bring this action under §4301(b) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.

§1451(b) to compel Defendant to pay its unpaid withdrawal liability and other

damages. (Docs. 1, 10, 11). Section 515 of ERISA “requires an employer to

contribute to a multiemployer benefit plan in accordance with the ‘terms and

conditions’ set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.” Cent. Pa.

Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1111

(3d Cir. 1996) (dissent) (citing 29 U.S.C. §1145). In the complaint, Plaintiffs

allege that the Defendant was delinquent with its contributions to the plan,

failed to cure this delinquency, and failed to remit payment for its unpaid

withdrawal liability. (Doc. 1, {]18-23). Taking the allegations of the complaint

as true, Plaintiffs have established a legitimate cause of action under §515

of ERISA.

C. Chamberlain Factors

Because Plaintiffs have established a legitimate cause of action, the

Court must next consider the three Chamberlain factors to determine

Soe ~ “_g-

whether entry of a default of a judgment is appropriate, specifically: “(1)

prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant

appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant's delay is

due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164 (citing $55,578.05

in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195).° The court addresses each factor in turn.

As to the first factor, “Plaintiffs will be prejudiced if the court declines to

enter default judgment, as they are unable to proceed with the action due to

the Defendant's failure to respond and have no other means of recovering

against Defendant.” Trustees of Laborers Loc. No. 1174 Pension Fund v. DB

Util. Contractors, LLC, No. 1:22-CV-01160, 2023 WL 3743573, at *2 (M.D.

Pa. May 31, 2023) (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Kujo Long, LLC, No. 14-cv-

00449, 2014.WL 4059711, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding that the

“Tpjlaintiffs will be prejudiced . . . by their current inability to proceed with their

action due to Defendants’ failure to defend”)). Here, the Defendant has failed

> A court may “enter a default judgment based solely on the fact that

the default occurred” without considering the Chamberlain factors if the

defendant has been properly served but fails to appear, plead, or defend an

action. Trustees of Laborers Loc. No. 1174 Pension Fund, 2023 WL

3743573, at *2 (citing Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 177 n.9 (3d Cir.

1990)). Nevertheless, this court will consider the Chamberlain factors in its

ruling. chs

. . - 10 - :

to participate; therefore, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of

granting default judgment.

As to the. second factor, “a... defense[ ] will be deemed meritorious

when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would...

constitute a complete defense.” Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cos, Co., 747

F.2d 863, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing $55,578.05 in U.S. Currency, 728

F.2d at 195). Here, the Defendant has not asserted any meritorious

defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims through the filing of an answer or other

responsive pleading to the complaint, or through the filing of a response to

the present motion. Accordingly, the court is unable to conclude from the

Defendant’s silence that it has a viable, litigable defense and finds that this

factor also weighs in favor of granting default judgment.

As to the final factor, the court considers “whether Defendant[’s] delay

is due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164. “[C]ulpable

conduct means actions taken willfully or in bad faith.” Gross v. Stereo

Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123-24 (3d Cir. 1983). A failure to

respond “at the very least . . . reflects willful conduct.” United States v.

DiPiazza, No. 16-518, 2016 WL 7015625, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2016); see

also Innovative Office Prods., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 10-cv-04487,

2012 WL 1466512, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2012) (explaining that “[a]

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defendant's default, or its decision not to defend against allegations in a

complaint, may be grounds for concluding that the defendant’s actions are

willful’). Here, the Deféndant was properly served and failed to respond. The

court “cannot discern from the record any excuse or justification for the

Defendant's default apart from its culpability.” Trustees of Laborers Loc. No.

1174 Pension Fund, 2023 WL 3743573, at *2. Therefore, given the

Defendant's willful conduct, the court finds that the third factor weighs in favor

of granting default judgment.

D. Damages

Having found that Plaintiffs established a legitimate cause of action for

a violation of ERISA, and having found the Chamberlain factors weigh in

favor of granting default judgment, the Court turns to the issue of damages.

After finding a party is entitled to default judgment, the well-pleaded,

factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the damage

amount, are accepted as true and treated as though they were established

by proof. See Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Johnson Auto Repair, Inc., 2001 WL

253873, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2001); see also U.S. ex rel. Motley v.

Rundle, 340 F.Supp. 807, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing Thomson v. Wooster,

114 U.S. 104, 114 (1884)). A party’s default does not suggest that the party

has admitted, the amount of damages that the moving party seeks. See

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Comdyne I, Inc., 908 F.2d at 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). A court may conduct a

hearing to determine the proper amount of damages, Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2), but no hearing is needed where the damages can be determined

from the evidence submitted, and “a reasonable calculation of damages

should be made by looking at the evidence and the affidavits submitted by

the moving party.” FE. Elec. Corp. of New Jersey v. Shoemaker Const. Co.,

652 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (citing J&J Sports Prods.

V. Roach, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109055 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2008)). “Itis a

familiar practice and an exercise of judicial power for a court upon default,

by taking evidence when necessary or by computation from facts of record,

to fix the amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover and to give

judgment accordingly.” Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1,12 (1944).

Under ERISA, a civil action “to compel an employer to pay [unpaid]

withdrawal liability” is treated the same as an action to collect delinquent

contributions under §1145. See 29 U.S.C. §1451(b); see also United Retail

& Wholesale Emps. Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn

& McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1986), affd, 481 U.S. 735,

(1987). As noted above, Plaintiffs’ action to recover withdrawal liability here

is treated as an action brought under Section 1145. Section 1132(g) provides

that in any.action brought by a pension plan to enforce Section 1145 in which

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a judgment is awarded in favor of the plan, the court must award interest on

the unpaid _contributions, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and the

greater of either 20% of the unpaid contributions or an amount equal to the

accrued interest. 29 U.S.C. §1132(g). Such an award is mandatory. See

Yahn, 787 F.2d at 134 ("§1132 made attorney’s fees, costs and liquidated

damages mandatory upon a judgment in favor of a pension plan’). “The

unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages generally are

considered ‘sums certain’ pursuant to the calculations mandated in ERISA

and the parties’ agreements.” /nt’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension

Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2002)

(citation omitted). However, the reasonableness of the requested attorney’s

fees is a “judgment call” which only the court can make. /d.

The court addresses each category of damages in turn.

1. Unpaid Withdrawal Liability

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant waived its defenses to the Pension

Fund’s assessment of withdrawal liability when the Defendant failed to

initiate arbitration, failed to contest the assessment, failed to pay any liability

in accordance with the payment schedule, failed to cure the delinquency,

and failed to even respond to any of the notices. (Doc. 11, pp. 2-4), The

-14- .

Defendant has not presented any counterarguments or response to

Plaintiffs’ contentions..

Under ERISA, an employer may contribute to a pension plan on behalf

of its employees who belong to a participating union. Congress found,

however, that ERISA did not adequately protect pension plans from the

adverse consequences that resulted when employers withdrew from the

plans. Flying Tiger Line v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia,

830 F.2d 1241, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.

v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 722 (1984)). Congress, therefore, enacted

_ [the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA’) in

order to protect the solvency of multiemployer pension plans. See /UE AFL—

CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir.

1986) (“The MPPAA was designed ‘(1) to protect the interests of participants

and beneficiaries in financially distressed multiemployer plans, and (2) . . . to

ensure benefit security to plan participants.’””) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 869,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

2918, 2939). Pursuant to the MPPAA, when a contributing employer to a

multiemployer pension plan withdraws from participation in the plan, the

plan's trustees may collect withdrawal liability from the employer. 29 U.S.C.

§§1381(b), 1391(a). “An employer may discharge that obligation by making

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a series of periodic payments according to a postwithdrawal schedule set by

the pension fund's trustees, or it may prepay the entire debt at any time.”

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of

California, 522 U.S. 192, 195 (1997).

In other words, the procedure imposed by the MPAA is as follows.

Once an employer withdraws from a pension plan, the plan’s trustees must

make a determination of the amount of the withdrawal liability owed. 29

U.S.C. §§1381, 1382(1). The trustees must then notify the employer of the

amount of the liability assessed and demand payment. 29 U.S.C. §§1382(2),

1399(b)(1). The employer then has 90 days from receipt of the notice to

request a review of the liability determination by the trustees of the plan. 29

U.S.C. §1399(b)(2)(A)(i). If the dispute over the existence or amount of the

liability is not resolved, either party may institute arbitration proceedings. 29

U.S.C. §1401(a)(1). If the employer fails to initiate arbitration proceedings,

the withdrawal liability assessment becomes due and owing and the trustees

may commence an action to collect the unpaid withdrawal liability from the

employer. 29 U.S.C. §§1401(b)(1), 1451.

Here, the Plaintiffs seek an award of unpaid withdrawal liability in the

principal amount of $376,099.00. (Doc. 1, {] 36; Doc. 10). The court finds that

Plaintiffs are entitled to that award given its compliance with the requirements

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of §1382. In essence, the Defendant became subject to the strictures of the

MPAA when it agreed to the CBA with the Union—thus, becoming bound to

make monthly contributions to the Pension Fund on behalf of its employees

represented by the Union and covered by the CBA. When the Defendant

ceased to fulfill its obligation, the Plaintiffs informed the Defendant of its

withdrawal liability assessment, provided the Defendant a payment schedule

to make installment payments on such assessment, and notified the

Defendant of its right to review and/or contest such an assessment. Failing

to exercise that right, the Defendant may not subsequently contest that

assessment... Furthermore, failing to make any of the quarterly installment

payments — or any payment at all for that matter — placed the Defendant in

default and allowed Plaintiffs to accelerate the total payment of the

withdrawal liability making it immediately due and owing.

Accordingly, having found Plaintiffs established a legitimate cause of

action for a violation of ERISA, and having found the Chamberlain factors

weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs default judgment, the court awards

Plaintiffs’ damages for unpaid withdrawal liability in the amount of

$376,099.00.

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2.. Interest and Liquidated Damages

Plaintiffs seek an award of pre-judgment interest in the amount of

$18,299.74, liquidated damages in the amount of $11,282.97 and post-

judgment interest to run at the rate prescribed under 29 CFR §4219.32(b)

from the date of the instant motion until paid. (Doc. 10, p. 1).

ERISA mandates the award of “interest on the unpaid contributions”

when judgment is entered in favor of a plan. See 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)(B).

“In the event of a default, a plan [fiduciary] may require immediate payment

of the outstanding amount of an employer’s withdrawal liability, plus accrued

interest on the total outstanding liability from the due date of the first payment

which was not timely made.” 29 U.S.C. §1399(c)(5). “[I]nterest on unpaid

contributions shall be determined by using the rate provided under the

[P}lan....” 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)(E). In addition to an award of unpaid

withdrawal liability and interest on that liability, ERISA mandates an

additional award of “an amount equal to the greater of [ ] [1] interest on the

unpaid contributions [ ] or [2] liquidated damages provided for under the plan

in an amount not in excess of 20 percent . . . of the amount [of unpaid

contributions].” 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(C).

Section 502 algo requires a court to award any plaintiff who receives a

favorable judgment in an action to enforce Section 515 “unpaid contributions,

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interest ‘on those unpaid contributions, liquidated damages [at a rate not to

exceed twenty percent], and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Trustees

of Laborers Loc. No. 1174 Pension Fund, 2023 WL 3743573, at *3 (citing 29

U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)). As explained above, unpaid contributions, interest, and

liquidated damages generally are considered “sums certain” pursuant to the

calculations mandated in ERISA and the parties’ contractual agreements.

See Int. Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine

Drywall Company, Inc., et al., 239 F.Supp.2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2002).

Here, Plaintiffs have argued that 29 C.F.R. §4219.32 should guide this

court in assessing the interest on unpaid principal withdrawal liability both for

pre- and post-judgment, and has accordingly furnished this court with a table

summary of such calculations. (Doc. 11, p. 4; Doc. 10-3, p. 2).° To comply

with the regulatory requirements, Plaintiffs have varied the interest rates

based on the applied time periods for a total due prejudgment interest

amount of $18,299.74. Similarly, the court have provided a similar calculation

of the liquidated damages for a total amount of $11,282.97. See Trustees of

Nat'l Elec. Benefit Fund v. Mirarchi Bros., Inc., No. 21-cv-04399, 2022 WL

221610, at *4_(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2022) (concluding that the plaintiffs had

6 The court notes for the benefit of Plaintiffs’ counsel that 29 C.F.R.

§4219.32 is a regulation and not a statute.

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stated a claim ‘undet ERISA because the “[clomplaint sufficiently allege[d]

that [the] [dJefendants were delinquent on their contributions and _ that,

pursuant to the CBAs, Trust Agreements, and ERISA §502(g), the [t]rustees

are entitled to recover the delinquent contributions, interest, and liquidated

damages’).

Furthermore, the court also finds that the final aggregate “judgment will

accrue interest from the date of the entry of judgment until it is repaid in full

at the current legal rate under 28 U.S.C.§1 961, which ‘statutorily mandate[s]’

interest. on all post-judgment debt." Trustees of Laborers Loc. No. 1174

Pension Fund, 2023 WL 3743573, at *3 (citing Dunn v. HOVIC, 13 F.3d 58,

62 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that that “post-judgment interest is awarded by

statute as a matter of law so it is automatically added, whether or not the

district court orders it’).

Accordingly, the court is satisfied with this sum certain and awards

Plaintiffs prejudgment interest damages in the amount of $18,299.74 and

$11,282.97 in liquidated damages. The court will also award post-judgment

interest on the unpaid withdrawal liability at the rate prescribed under 29 CFR

§4219.32(b) and on the aggregate sum from the date of the entry of judgment

until it is repaid in full at the current legal rate under 28 U.S.C. §1961.

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3. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs seek an award for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of

$10,474.00. (Doc. 10, p. 1). ERISA mandates an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)(D); see also Laborers Loc.

Union 158 v. On-Call Flagging, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00843, 2017 WL 1344667,

at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2017) (“29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2) instructs that the Court

must award the [pension fund] reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the

action, to be paid by the defendant”). A district court uses the “lodestar”

formula. to -determine. a reasonable attorneys’ fee award. See City of

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). The party seeking attorneys’

fees must produce evidence that the hours spent and rate charged are

reasonable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).

In Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals explained how courts apply the lodestar formula:

Under the lodestar method, “[t]he party seeking attorney’s fees

has the burden to prove that its request. . . is reasonable.” Rode

v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). “When the

applicant for a fee has carried [its] burden of showing that the

claifned rates and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting

product is presumed to be the reasonable fee to which counsel

is entitled.” Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir.

2001) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for

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Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439

(1986)). But courts “have a positive and affirmative function in

the fee fixing process, not merely a passive role.” /d. “In

calculating the hours reasonably expended, a court should

‘review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were

reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes

described and then exclude those that are “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”” /d. (quoting Pub.

Interest Research Grp. Of N.J. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188

(3d Cir. 1995)).

903 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2018). The court will address the reasonable

hourly rate and number of hours reasonably expended in turn.

i. Reasonable Hourly Rate

“The ‘starting point’ in determining the appropriate hourly rate is the

attorneys’ usual billing rate. The Supreme Court has directed that the district

court should then consider the ‘prevailing market rates’ in the relevant

community.” Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152

F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). The court should

“assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party’s attorneys and

compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing

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Student Public Interest Research Group v. AT & T Bell Laboratories, 842

F.2d 1436, 1447 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Here, Plaintiffs request a rate of $375 per hour for the representation

of their attorneys and $200 per hour for the representation of their paralegal.

To support this request, Plaintiffs have submitted a copy of invoices for their

counsel’s work on the instant matter, which included detailed entries for the

work undertaken, with a table providing their rates. (See generally Doc. 10-

4). Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel of record has submitted an affidavit

certifying that ihe “flees in this matter have been billed at rates customarily

charged in similar matters to clients of [counsel’s] firm.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 2).

The court finds that the requested hourly rates for Plaintiffs’ counsel's

representation falls within the range of rates prevailing in the community for

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and

reputation. See, e.g., Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Philadelphia &

Vicinity v. Reyes, No. 17-cv-05107, 2018 WL 3437212, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July

16, 2018) (finding reasonable a $340.00 hourly rate for litigating a motion for

default judgment motion for default judgment in an ERISA action).’ The court

’ Case law in this district does not speak enough about paralegal hourly

rates, however, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel's paralegal rate to be

reasonable—despite being on the high side.

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will next turn to the number of hours expended on the litigation before making

a final determination of attorneys’ fees.

li. Reasonable Hours Expended on the Litigation

When awarding fees, a district court must “decide whether the hours

set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes

described and then exclude those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426

F.3d 694, 710 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Windall,

51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Clemens, 903 F.3d at 400.

A district court has an affirmative role in ensuring that a request for

fees is “accompanied by ‘fairly definite information as to hours devoted to

various general activities.” UAW Local 259 Soc. Sec’y Dept. v. Metro Auto

Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evans v. Port Auth. of NLY. &

N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001)). Therefore, “[w]here the

documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the

award accordingly.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983)). The Third Circuit has emphasized that a district court must “go line,

by line, by line’ through the billing records supporting the fee request.”

Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 713 (quoting Evans, 273 F.3d at 362).

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Upon inspection of the invoices attached to the instant motion (Doc.

10-4, pp. 4-12), the information on the various activities by counsel regarding

the drafting and filing of the complaint (including, but not limited to, “[vJideo

conference. .. re complaint,” “[i]n office conference . . . re complaint,” “[d]raft

complaint,” “[rjeview and revise draft complaint,” and “[rleview exhibits to

draft complaint”) did not adequately support the time expended on such

complaint nor the reasonableness of the requested attorney fees. Plaintiffs’

counsel spent a total of 22.2 billable hours drafting, reviewing and discussing

a complaint of merely 9 pages in length,® double-spaced, with generous

margin lines and relatively standard language found in complaints seeking

similar relief. Now, the court does note that “[iJt is well-recognized that

‘ERISA is a complex field that involves difficult and novel legal theories and

often leads to lengthy litigation.” Stevens v. SEI Invs. Co., No. 18-4205, 2020

WL 996418, at *18-4205 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2020) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, the court finds that 22.2 billable hours required for this

complaint to be drafted and discussed is unnecessary and unreasonable.

See Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184 (“Hours that would not generally be billed

to one’s own client are not properly billed to an adversary.” (quoting Pub.

Interest Research Grp., 51 F.3d at 1188)). Accordingly, the court will allow

8 8 pages if the caption and signature block were removed.

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_ | for the first two invoices ((1) “Invoice No. 104167” for $2,310 (Doc. 10-4, p.

4); and (2) “Invoice No. 104512” for $1,122.50 (Doc. 10-4, p. 7)) and disallow

the third invoice (“Invoice No. 105353” for $3,545.00 (Doc. 10-4, p. 10))—

nearly halving the total fee and reaching a reasonable fee to draft and file

this complaint.

As to the final invoice (“Invoice No. 105620”), the overwhelming

majority of the time periods (7.2 of 8.2 billable hours) was expended “re

service of process.” (Doc. 10-4, pp. 14-15). Specifically, after a short

telephone conference,® Plaintiffs’ counsel expended 2 hours on “10/02/23”

to “[rlesearch service of process question,” and then, subsequently,

expended 4.9 hours to further “[r]jesearch,” “[clonfer,” “conference,” “[e]mail”

and “[flollow up” on “service of process.” (Doc. 10-4, p. 14). The court is

straining to understand what type of question regarding service has so

confounded counsel that they required 7.2 hours to resolve. The time entries

have not provided any explanation or details regarding the issue faced about

service of process. Accordingly, the court will allow only the _ initial

conference, fesearch and discussion of service of process on “10/02/203”

(i.e., 2.7 attorney billable hours for $1,012.50) of the invoice and disallow all

° A total 0.3 hours of “[t]lelephone conference . . . re service of process.”

(Doc. 10-4, p. 14).

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other billed entries from “10/03/2023” to “10/16/23.” (Id.).'° As to the rest of

the entries on that invoice from “10/20/23” to “10/27/23” (0.3 billed by “LG

[Paralegal]” for “Video conference . . . re default judgment” and 0.7 billed by

the attorneys “RP* and “BME” regarding “default judgment,” “complaint,”

“lalnswer’ and “planning for next steps”), the court finds such fees ($322.50)

to be reasonable and will allow for them. (/d., pp. 14-15).

iii. Final Calculation of Fee Award and Costs

Accordingly, the court will exclude “Invoice No. 105353,” (Doc. 10-4,

pp. 10-11), and the 4.5 hours expended on “service of process” in “Invoice

No. 105620” between “10/03/23” and “10/16/23”, (/d., p. 14), from the

calculation for attorneys’ fees. The litigation costs of $684.00, which included

“IcJourt fees” on “10/01/23” and “[s]ummons and complaints filing,” are

deemed reasonable and allowed. (Doc. 10-4, p. 15). As a result, Plaintiffs

will be awarded a total of $5,451.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment

(Doc. 10) will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs will be awarded

$376,099.00 for unpaid withdrawal liability, $18,299.74 in prejudgment

10 Such amount of time is reasonably sufficient to resolve a question

concerning service of process.

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interest, $11,282.97 in liquidated damages, $5,451.50 in attorneys’ fees and

costs, post-judgment interest on the withdrawal liability at the rate prescribed

under 29 CFR §4219.32(b), and post-judgment interest on the aggregate

sum at the rate prescribed under 28 U.S.C.§1961. Plaintiffs will not be

awarded attorneys’ fees at the requested $10,474.00. An appropriate order

will follow.

3[Matachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: September 24, 2024

23-1623-01

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