Conklin IV v. Doe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONALD R. CONKLIN IV, : No. 3:24-CV-0189

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

Vv. :

JOHN DOE, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Donald R. Conklin IV initiated the above-captioned pro se action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' alleging constitutional violations by prison officials at

Carbon County Correctional Facility (CCCF), in Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania.

The court will dismiss Conklin’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted but will provide limited leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Conklin’s handwritten complaint is abbreviated, but it appears that he is

attempting to sue unidentified CCCF officials for two unrelated constitutional

violations that occurred in 2023. (See generally Doc. 1). First, Conklin alleges

that he was forced to wear handcuffs and shackles during his exercise periods.

(Id. at 4). In an unrelated incident, Conklin alleges that he was “denied due

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by

state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism for

vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,

284-85 (2002).

process” and punished with “loss of privileges” before the adjudication of a

pending misconduct. (Id.) He asserts that he “does not know who or what is

responsible for causing these violations of [his] civil rights” because prison

officials informed him that the treatment (about which he now complains)

conformed to prison policy. (Id.)

Conklin alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated due to the

“cruel and unusual punishment” with respect to being handcuffed and shackled

during exercise periods. (Id. at 5). He claims that his Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated when he was lost telephone privileges prior to the

adjudication of his misconduct. (Id.)

Conklin sues a single “John Doe” defendant and the Carbon County

Correctional Facility. (Id. at 2-3). He seeks “monetary relief’ and certain

injunctive relief regarding CCCF practices. (Id. at 5). Conklin, however, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so the court will dismiss his

complaint.

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”

unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening

stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted[.]” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they

utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Grayson v.

| Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov't, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(nonprecedential); cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

| “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

| offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

| (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

| inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

| Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

| claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

| When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). At step

| one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state

| a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in

original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded factual allegations—

which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions, which “are not

entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id. (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

I Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

|common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 6871.

| Because Conklin proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

| stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v.

| Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when

the pro se litigant, like Conklin, is incarcerated at the time he filed his complaint.

| See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

|

DISCUSSION

| Before addressing the sufficiency of Conklin’s complaint, the court must

identify the claimed constitutional violation or violations. See Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (“The first step in any [Section 1983] claim is to identify

the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989) (explaining that analysis of a Section 1983 claim requires

| “identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged”

| conduct).

Conklin cites the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Doc. 1 at 5).

| He first claims that being handcuffed and shackled during his exercise periods

| amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment However, Conklin indicates in his complaint that he was a pretrial

detainee at CCCF, (see id. at 2), so this conditions-of-confinement claim would

implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.2 Conklin correctly

cites the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to his claim that his procedural due

| Process rights were violated when he was “punished” with denial of phone

|? See Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v. Cumberlanc

| Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005.

(Hubbard 1); see_also Paulino v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, 438 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2011

(nonprecedential) (explaining that “sentenced prisoners are protected from punishment that is

‘cruel and unusual,’ while pretrial detainees are protected from any punishment” (citing Hubbarc

1, 399 F.3d at 166-67)).

access prior to the adjudication of his misconduct. These two Fourteenth

Amendment claims, however, are deficient for multiple reasons.

| A. Personal Involvement

| It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.

| Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also

Ashcrof v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens

context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that

| demonstrate the defendant's “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”

Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374. Personal involvement can include direct wrongful

| conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through evidence of

“personal direction” or “actual knowledge and acquiescence”; however, such

averments must be made with particularity. Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

Furthermore, it is equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance

| process alone does not give rise to Section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming

| dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal involvement when

officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s

ee, Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015)

| (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006)

(nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005)

| (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims against certain defendants

| were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against them “merely assert

| their involvement in the post-incident grievance process’).

Conklin’s complaint is completely silent as to the alleged action (or inaction

| of any specific Defendant. He names a “John Doe” defendant and CCCF. He

does not, however, explain how the John Doe defendant violated his civil rights.

| Moreover, CCCF has already been dismissed from this action because it is not a

| “person” for Section 1983 purposes and Conklin has not identified an

| unconstitutional policy or practice by Carbon County. (See Doc. 8). Simply put,

Conklin fails to allege that any “person” was involved in the purportedly

| unconstitutional conduct at CCCF, so the court must dismiss all Section 1983

claims for lack of personal involvement.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

When a pretrial detainee asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim, the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to consider

“first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by the[] conditions, and

second, whether the[] conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” See

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hubbard II) (quoting Union

Lonty Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)). If pretrial

detainees are subjected to conditions that are not reasonably related to a

|

legitimate governmental objective, an inference may be made that the purpose of

| the prison official’s action is punishment. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972

F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, “a particular measure amounts to

punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of

detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally related

to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is

excessive in light of that purpose.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir.

2007) (quoting Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).

As the Third Circuit instructs, courts confronted with a Fourteenth

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must “consider the totality of the

circumstances of confinement.” Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (citing Hubbard |, 399

F.3d at 159-60). And, like an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement

claim asserted by a convicted prisoner, a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim by a pretrial detainee requires a showing of deliberate

indifference on the part of prison officials. Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 F.

App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby

a 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991)).

Conklin’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim fails

because he has not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by any Defendant.

| Conklin has not alleged who was potentially responsible for the purported

|

conditions (i.e., being restrained during exercise periods), who had knowledge of

| the conditions and was deliberately indifferent toward them, or whom he informec

about the conditions and subsequently acted with deliberate indifference toward

|them. Without such fundamental allegations of deliberate indifference by any

Defendant, dismissal of this claim is required. See Edwards, 663 F. App’x at

135-36.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim

To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural due

process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual

interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of

‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide

‘due process of law.” Hill vy. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). If a plaintiff

cannot identify a protected interest that is “at stake,” the analysis is at an end.

See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).

Conklin has not identified a protected liberty or property interest with

respect to being denied phone privileges during the pendency of his misconduct.

Such a minor inconvenience for a limited period of time does not reflect an

| “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life” such that it could implicate a protected liberty interest

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sandia v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486

(1995); see also Patel v. Hayman, No. 08-CV-3586, 2009 WL 1748964, at *7

| (D.N.J. June 18, 2009) (finding that loss of phone privileges for over three years

| did not reflect “atypical and significant hardship”); Morgan y, Warden, USP-

| Allenwood, No. 1:24-CV-00094, 2024 WL 1589587, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2024)

(noting that “temporary placement in disciplinary segregation, a monetary fine,

and temporary loss of commissary, mattress, and phone privileges” did not

| amount to atypical and significant hardship for due process claim). Because

| Conklin has not identified a protected liberty interest that is at stake, he has failed

! to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.

| D. Leave to Amend

| Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. Conklin’s

Section 1983 claim alleging a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

| violation will be dismissed with prejudice, as leave to amend would be futile. See

| Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d

1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (‘“[T]he district court may properly deny leave to amend

where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”). Conklin’s

allegations of losing phone privileges for a short period of time do not, and

| 10

cannot, plausibly state an atypical and significant hardship such that he could

allege a due process violation.

It is conceivable that Conklin could amend his Fourteenth Amendment

| conditions-of-confinement claim related to being forced to exercise with

handcuffs and shackles. If he chooses to file an amended complaint in

| conformity with this Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document,

. . . .

complete in itself and without reference to any previous pleadings. The amended

complaint should set forth his conditions-of-confinement claim in short, concise,

and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs. Conklin must

address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Memorandum. He may not

include claims that have been dismissed with prejudice. He must identify

appropriate Defendants, properly allege personal involvement for each

Defendant, and must specify the offending actions taken by the official or

officials. Conklin must also sign the amended complaint and indicate the nature

Several months after filing his complaint, Conklin filed a document entitled “Additional

Defendants.” (Doc. 11). In this filing, he appears to attempt to add the following defendants:

Warden James Youngkin, Deputy Warden Derek George, the Carbon County Prison Board, the

| Carbon County Commissioner's Office, and “each individual correctional officer employed by

| CCCF who was ever assigned to the Maximum Security/RHU housing unit.” See id. at 1-2. Not

| only is this document an improper attempt to amend his pleadings, but it also violates multiple

pleading rules identified by this court in its previous April 10, 2024 Order and the instant

Memorandum. Accordingly, this improperly filed document will have no effect on the pleadings

| in this case.

11

of the relief sought. He may not include unrelated claims against different

| defendants in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2).

If Conklin does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal without

| prejudice of his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim will

automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the court will close this

| Case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Conklin’s complaint pursuant

| to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Limited leave to amend will be granted.

| An appropriate Order follows.

Date: _% □ TC OY

CV KM

ye District Zoux

|

12