Beltran v. Pittsinger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JESUS MANUEL BELTRAN, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-1141

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

C. PITTSINGER, Food Service :

Supervisor, et al.,

:

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint, two

applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, two uncertified prisoner

trust fund account statements, and a certified prisoner trust fund account

statement. After reviewing the applications and certified prisoner trust fund

account statement, and after screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B), the Court will grant one of the in forma pauperis applications,

deny the other as moot, and dismiss the complaint without prejudice to

Plaintiff filing an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Jesus Manuel Beltran (“Beltran”), an individual currently

incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Huntingdon (“SCI

Huntingdon”), commenced this action by filing a complaint (Doc. 1), an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“First IFP Application”)

(Doc. 2), and an uncertified prisoner trust fund account statement (Doc. 3),

all of which the Clerk of Court docketed on July 11, 2024. Because Beltran

did not submit a certified account statement as required by 28 U.S.C.

§1915(a)(2),1 an Administrative Order was entered requiring the

Superintendent or other appropriate official at SCI Huntingdon, to file a

certified statement of Beltran’s prison trust fund account. (Doc. 6.) On July

23, 2024, the Clerk of Court received Beltran’s certified account statement

from SCI Huntingdon. (Doc. 7.) Six days later, Beltran submitted another

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“Second IFP Application”)

and another uncertified prisoner trust fund account statement. (Docs. 8, 9.)

In the complaint, Beltran indicates that he is asserting claims under 42

U.S.C. §1983 for violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment against Defendants C. Pittsinger

1 Section 1915(a)(2) provides in pertinent part as follows:

A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action . . . without prepayment

of fees or security therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit filed

under paragraph (1), shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund

account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for

the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint . . ., obtained from the appropriate official of each

prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.

28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2).

(“Pittsinger”), a food service manager at SCI Huntingdon, and J. Rivello, the

Superintendent at SCI Huntington. (Doc. 1 at 1–3, 5.) Beltran alleges that

the following occurred on April 5, 2024:

UNSANITIZED WORKING CONDITIONS AT SCI-

HUNTINGDON’S KITCHEN DEPARTMENT. ROACH AND RAT

INFESTATION THAT GOES UNCLEANED AND UNCHECKED.

THE TRAY MACHINE THAT IS SUPPOSE [sic] TO CLEAN OUR

TRAYS IS INFESTED WITH ROACH [sic]. FOOD IS NOT

PROPERLY CLEANED FROM THE EATING TRAYS WHICH

CAUSE MOLD AND NEW FOOD IS THROWN ON TOP OF THE

DRY MOLDED TRAYS. THERE IS EXPOSURE TO BLACK

MOLD AND ASBESTOS DUE TO THE LACK OF

VENTILATION. THE WATER IS POLLUTED UNDRINKABLE

[sic]. FURTHERMORE[,] THERE IS [sic] FIRE SAFETY

HAZARD DUE TO THE DOUBLE LOCK MECHANISM ON ALL

DOORS. PRISONERS NEED NOT WAIT UNTIL ACTUAL

CASUALITIES OCCUR TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM AN

UNREASONABLE THREAT OF INJURY OR DEATH BY FIRE.

(Id. at 4.) Beltran describes his injury as: “FORCED TO EAT AND LIVE IN

SAID CONDITIONS.” (Id. at 5.) For relief, he seeks a declaratory judgment

as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)

II. THE IFP APPLICATIONS

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), the Court “may authorize the

commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, . . .

without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an

affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that

the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” See id. This

statute

“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful

access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,

Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court

costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone

else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from

pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d

1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a

litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in

forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among

other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2008)

(footnote omitted).

A litigant can show that they are unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit

“based on a showing of indigence.” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5. The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals has not defined what it means to be indigent;

nevertheless, “[a] plaintiff need not ‘be absolutely destitute to enjoy the

benefit of the statute.’” Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Ct., 238 F. App’x 791, 793

(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.

331, 339 (1948)). Some district courts have explained that all a litigant needs

to show is that because of their poverty, they cannot afford to pay for the

costs of the litigation and provide themselves with the necessities of life. See,

e.g., Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. Supp. 879, 880 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (“An

affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner cannot, because of his poverty,

provide himself and any dependents with the necessities of life is sufficient.”);

Jones v. State, 893 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“An affidavit to

proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient if it states that one cannot, because

of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still provide for him- or

herself and any dependents.”).

Here, after reviewing the First IFP Application and Beltran’s certified

prisoner account statement, it appears that he lacks the financial means to

prepay the filing fee in this matter. Accordingly, the Court will grant the First

IFP Application and allow Beltran to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court

will also deny the Second IFP Application as moot.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because the Court has granted Beltran leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, the Court must examine whether his complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or asserts

a claim against a defendant immune from monetary relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at

any time if the court determines that-- . . . (B) the action or appeal—(i) is

frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;

or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief”). A complaint is frivolous under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an

arguable basis either in law or fact,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, and is legally

baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch,

67 F.3d at 1085. A complaint is malicious if, after “engag[ing] in a subjective

inquiry into the litigant’s motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit,”

the Court determines that “the actions is an attempt to vex, injure or harass

the defendant.” Id. at 1086. “[A] district court may dismiss a complaint as

malicious if it is plainly abusive of the judicial process or merely repeats

pending or previously litigated claims.” Brodzki v. CBS Sports, No. 11-cv-

841, 2012 WL 125281, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2012).

As for the Court’s analysis under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the

standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

this subsection is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on motions

to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v.

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6)

standard to dismissal for failure to state claim under section 1915(e)(2)(B)).

Therefore, to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff’s factual allegations

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).

In addressing whether a pro se plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

claim, the court must liberally construe the allegations set forth in the

operative complaint. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2021) (“At this early stage of the litigation, we accept the facts alleged [in the

pro se] complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in [the pro se

plaintiff’s] favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, ...

contains facts sufficient to state a plausible ... claim.” (citation, internal

quotation marks, and all original alterations omitted)); see also Vogt v.

Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We construe Vogt’s pro se filings

liberally. This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with

imprisoned pro se litigants’ like Vogt.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013))).

Nevertheless, conclusory allegations will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555)). Neither will “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261

(3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, when construing a pro se plaintiff’s operative

complaint, the Court will “‘apply the relevant legal principle even when the

complaint has failed to name it.’” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704

F.3d at 244). However, pro se litigants “‘cannot flout procedural rules—they

must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.’” Id. (quoting

Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).

B. Analysis

In the complaint, Beltran asserts claims for Eighth Amendment

violations under Section 1983, the vehicle through which federal

constitutional claims may be raised in federal court. Section 1983 provides

in pertinent part as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. §1983. When attempting to establish a claim under Section 1983,

a plaintiff must allege and prove that a “person” deprived them of a

constitutional right while acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (“To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.”). In addition, a plaintiff asserting a

Section 1983 claim must allege the personal involvement of each defendant

in the alleged constitutional violation; in other words, the plaintiff must state

how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrence giving rise

to the claims in the complaint. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must

have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable under Section

1983); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is

inapplicable to . . . §1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution”); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845

F.2d at 1207)).

As just indicated, Beltran asserts Section 1983 claims for Eighth

Amendment violations. More specifically, he contends that his unsanitary

and unsafe conditions of confinement rise to the level of cruel and unusual

punishment.

The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates

challenging their conditions of confinement. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d

150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (referencing difference “between pretrial detainees’

protection from ‘punishment’ under the Fourteenth Amendment and

convicted inmates’ protection from punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual’

under the Eighth Amendment”). In the Eighth Amendment context, a plaintiff

must include sufficient allegations satisfying both an objective and subjective

component, akin to excessive force claims. See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d

468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment conditions-

of-confinement “test . . . turn[s] on an analysis of a subjective and an

objective component. That is, the incident must be objectively, sufficiently

intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official must have a

culpable state of mind”). In general, “[t]o determine whether prison officials

have violated the Eighth Amendment, [courts] apply a two-prong test: (1) the

deprivation must be ‘objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or

omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities’; and (2) the prison official must have been ‘deliberate[ly]

indifferen[t] to inmate health or safety.’” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d

431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994)). Regarding the first prong, necessities include food, clothing, shelter,

medical care, and reasonable safety. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen the government takes a

person into custody against his or her will, it assumes responsibility for

satisfying basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care,

and reasonable safety.” (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989))). As for the second prong, a prison

official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. Only conditions of confinement that “cause inmates to

ensure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of

time” violate the Eighth Amendment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233

(3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Beltran identifies three aspects of his incarceration which he

believes violate the Eighth Amendment. First, he alleges that SCI

Huntingdon’s kitchen is unsanitary because it is infested with roaches and

rats, and food trays are not properly cleaned before being used again by

inmates. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Second, he avers that he is being exposed to black

mold and asbestos due to the lack of proper ventilation at SCI Huntingdon.

(Id.) Third, and finally, he asserts that there is an existing fire hazard due to

the double-lock mechanism on the doors. (Id.)

Before addressing Beltran’s concerns about his conditions of

confinement, the Court must address a fundamental problem with the

complaint itself, namely, Beltran’s failure to tie any of his factual allegations

to Defendants. As stated above, Beltran must include factual allegations

showing that Defendants were personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violations to state plausible Section 1983 claims. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.”); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290

(3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is

only liable for his or her own misconduct” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)).

Beltran’s failure to connect any of his allegations to Defendants warrants

dismissal of the complaint for the failure to state a claim.

In addition, both Defendants appear to be supervisors at SCI

Huntingdon insofar as Pittsinger is a food services manager and Rivello is

the Superintendent. To the extent Beltran has attempted to assert Section

1983 claims against Defendants based merely on allegations that they

supervised individuals at SCI Huntingdon, he cannot do so because liability

under Section 1983 cannot be predicated on respondeat superior. See

Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015)

(“[Plaintiff] cannot predicate liability on her §1983 claims on a respondeat

superior basis.” (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207) (emphasis omitted));

Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov.

28, 2022) (“We agree with the District Court that Robinson’s second

amended complaint did not state a plausible claim for relief. First, he failed

to allege the defendants’ personal involvement, and he cannot predicate

liability on his §1983 claims on a respondeat superior basis.” (internal

citations omitted)). Instead, if Beltran seeks to hold Defendant supervisors

liable for unconstitutional acts by their subordinates, his allegations must

satisfy one of two theories of supervisory liability: First, “[i]ndividual

defendants who are policymakers may be liable under §1983 if it is shown

that such defendants, with deliberate indifference to the consequences,

established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly

caused [the] constitutional harm[;]” and second, “a supervisor may be

personally liable under §1983 if he or she participated in violating the

plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge,

had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex

rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted); see Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d

Cir. 2014) (explaining requirements for supervisory liability in section 1983

claim and describing “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may

be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates”), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).

To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first

theory—the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability—a plaintiff

such as Beltran must

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the

supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing

custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or

procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3)

the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4)

the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s

violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that

supervisory practice or procedure. Put another way, the inmate

must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions

demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the

supervisor, the act, and the injury.

Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d

205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). For the second theory of supervisory liability—

participating in, directing others to, or knowledge and acquiescence of

constitutional violation—generalized allegations that a supervisory

defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are

insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional

violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Saisi

asserted that some defendants were in charge of agencies that allowed this

to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that

their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable

‘simply because of [their] position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))); Zigler v. Warren, No.

21-cv-19474, 2022 WL 903383, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (“In simpler

terms, a supervisor is not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his

employees solely because he is a supervisor.”). Additionally, “[a]lthough a

court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of

wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge

must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker

v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201

n.6).

In this case, insofar as Beltran does not include a single factual

allegation linking either Defendant, or anyone else, to the alleged

unconstitutional conditions at SCI Huntingdon, he has failed to allege a

plausible Section 1983 claim against them based on Defendants’ roles as

supervisors under either theory of supervisory liability. This failure to so plead

also warrants dismissal of the complaint.

Turning now to Beltran’s concerns with his conditions of confinement,

none of his allegations rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Regarding his allegations about roaches and rats in the kitchen, as well as

the use of uncleaned food trays, the Court notes that prison conditions may

be harsh and uncomfortable without rising to the level of a constitutional

violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833–34. Here, Beltran has failed to state a

plausible Eighth Amendment claim because there are no allegations that

these kitchen conditions pose a substantial risk of harm to his health or

safety, or that Defendants knew of these conditions and disregarded an

excessive risk to Beltran’s health and safety. See Wheeler v. Walker, 303 F.

App’x 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Eighth Amendment claim where

prisoner failed to allege serious harm from two-week period where he had

only thin blanket to protect him from frigid area entering unheated cell

through window with broken latches, roaches crawled over him while he tried

to sleep on badly torn mattress, urine and waste “encrusted” sink and toilet,

trash, dirt, and debris covered floors, walls, and sink, and stench of waste

came from broken toilet); Robles v. Casey, No. 10-cv-2663, 2011 WL

398208, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2011) (recommending dismissal of pro se

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim based on, inter

alia, unsafe and unsanitary conditions in prison’s kitchen because plaintiff’s

allegations failed to state that the “unsanitary conditions in the kitchen posed

a substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety”), report and

recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 398203 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011); Hill v.

Smith, No. 04-cv-1724, 2005 WL 2666597, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2005)

(concluding that presence of mice and cockroaches in state prison’s cells did

not present health hazard sufficient to satisfy Eighth Amendment claim), aff’d

186 F. App’x 271 (3d Cir. 2006).

Concerning Beltran’s allegations about the presence of black mold:

[I]n the specific context of inmate claims stemming from the

alleged presence of black mold in the prison, it has been held

that: “Without any allegation as to suffering actual physical harm

from the mold, which is required to state his federal claim, [an

inmate] Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim regarding the

black mold . . . lacks constitutional muster.” Hall-Wadley v. Maint.

Dep’t, 386 F. Supp. 3d 512, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2019). Thus, absent

specific allegations of physical harm, “the mere presence of mold

does not indicate an objectively serious deprivation.” Johnson v.

Beard, No. 3:CV-09-886, 2014 WL 4793905, at *6 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 25, 2014) (citing Peterkin v. Jeffes, 661 F. Supp. 895, 915

(E.D. Pa. 1987)) (only mold which poses a real health hazard is

actionable). Accordingly:

It has been similarly held that the presence of black

mold in a prison shower did not to rise to a

constitutional violation where the inmate plaintiff has

not presented any facts alleging a substantial risk of

harm. Nickles v. Taylor, 2010 WL 1949447 *5 (D.N.J.

May 14, 2010). A perceived risk of future medical

issues about mold exposure is likewise insufficient.

See McIntyre v. Phillips, 2007 WL 2986470 *2–3

(W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2007).

Id. at 6-7.

Cummings v. Kramer, No. 22-cv-1118, 2022 WL 4594494, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 7, 2022) (alterations in original), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 4585535 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2022).

As with his allegations about the conditions of the kitchen at SCI

Huntingdon, Beltran has failed to allege that he suffered any physical harm

from his alleged exposure to black mold. He similarly failed to do so

regarding his allegations of asbestos exposure. Moreover, there are no

allegations that these conditions posed a substantial risk of harm to his

health or safety, or that Defendants knew of these conditions and

disregarded an excessive risk to Beltran’s health and safety.

Regarding Beltran’s fire safety allegations, they consist of Beltran’s

conclusory allegation that SCI Huntingdon’s double-locked doors constitute

a fire hazard. There is no reasonable inference which could be taken from

this conclusory allegation to show that a substantial risk of serious harm

existed to him because of the double-locked doors. Beltran does not allege

that there no other fire safety measures in place to mitigate any potential

harm from a fire. Furthermore, he again fails to plead that Defendants knew

that the doors constituted a serious fire hazard risk and disregarded an

excessive risk to Beltran’s health and safety by keeping them in place.

Overall, viewing the totality of the conditions at SCI Huntingdon as

Beltran alleges, the Court does not find he has plausibly pleaded that these

conditions, alone or in combination, deprive him of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991) (“Some conditions of confinement may

establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would

not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that

produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food,

warmth, or exercise-for example, a low cell temperature at night combined

with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some prison conditions may

interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are a

seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing so amorphous as

‘overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and usual punishment when

no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.”). Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss the complaint on this basis as well.

C. Leave to Amend

Having determined that Beltran’s claims against Defendants are

subject to dismissal, the question arises as to whether to grant him leave to

file an amended complaint. Although district courts should generally give

leave to amend, they may dismiss a complaint with prejudice where leave to

amend would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote

Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil rights

cases district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is

requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing

so would be inequitable or futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293

F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend

a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must

inform the plaintiff that [they have] leave to amend within a set period of time,

unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). “In determining whether

[amendment] would be futile, the district court applies the same standard of

legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” In re Burlington

Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).

In this case, the Court will dismiss Beltran’s claims without prejudice to

him filing an amended complaint because the Court does not find that further

amendment would be futile at this time. The Court will provide instructions

regarding the filing of an amended complaint in the accompanying Order.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the aforesaid, the Court will grant the First IFP Application,

deny the Second IFP Application as moot, and dismiss the complaint without

prejudice to Beltran filing an amended complaint. An appropriate Order

follows.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: August 6, 2024

24-cv-1141-01