Cayenne v. Tobyhanna Township, PA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSIAH CAYENNE, : CIV NO. 3:23-CV-1543

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

TOBYHANNA TOWNSHIP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

In this case, which comes before us for consideration of various motions to

dismiss, we are called upon to write the latest chapters in a legal saga which has

spanned the past five years. This saga arises out of what is alleged to have been a

sexually and racially charged episode at a local high school. When this saga began

in 2019, the plaintiff, Josiah Cayenne was a student at the Mount Pocono West

High School. (Doc. 19, ¶ 3). On May 9, 2019, a fellow student at the high school

reported to school officials that Cayenne had sexually assaulted her on a school

activity bus.

This reported sexual assault led to an inquiry by school officials. That

inquiry, in turn, inspired a referral to local law enforcement who engaged in a

criminal investigation. This investigation culminated in the filing of charges

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against Cayenne in August of 2019. Following protracted criminal proceedings in

July and August of 2021, Cayenne entered a guilty plea to corruption of minors

and was sentenced to one year’s probation. Cayenne appealed this guilty plea

conviction and, in November of 2022, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated

Cayenne’s conviction, setting the stage for the instant lawsuit.

In his amended complaint, Cayenne lodges nine separate claims of false

arrest, malicious prosecution, and various federal civil rights violations against two

institutional defendants and three individual defendants. (Doc. 19). These

defendants have now filed various motions seeking to dismiss Cayenne’s

complaint. Included among these motions are two motions to dismiss filed by

Detective John Bohrman and his supervisor, Chief Chris Wagner. (Docs. 20, 25).

In these motions the individual law enforcement defendants assert that Cayenne

has failed to allege well-pleaded facts which plausibly state any civil rights liability

claims under federal law. The motions are fully briefed and are, therefore, ripe for

resolution.

For the reason set forth below, the motions will be granted, in part, and

denied in part, as follows: First, Defendant Wagner’s motion to dismiss will be

GRANTED. Second, Defendant Bohrman’s motion to dismiss will be GRANTED

with respect to Cayenne’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim but

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DENIED in all other respects. However, we will order Cayenne to submit a more

definite statement of his remaining claims against Detective Bohrman within 30

days.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

With respect to Defendants Bohrman and Wagner, the well-pleaded facts,

which guide our resolution of this motion to dismiss, are set forth in Cayenne’s

amended complaint, (Doc. 19), which is the operative pleading in this case.1 That

amended complaint recites the following essential facts:

In 2019, Cayenne was a student at the Mount Pocono West High School.

(Doc. 19, ¶ 3). On May 9, 2019, a fellow student at the high school, identified by

the pseudonym AA, reported to a school official, Dean Nick Morrell, that Cayenne

had sexually assaulted her on a school activity bus the previous day. (Id., ¶¶ 21,

28-37). This report confronted school administrators with allegations of sexual

violence which also had a potential racial subtext, since Cayenne was African

American and his accuser, AA, was Caucasian.

1 We note that Cayenne has twice moved to further amend his complaint but has

done so in a fashion which did not comply with Local Rule 15.1. We have,

therefore, denied these motions without prejudice to consideration of a motion

which met the strictures of the local rule. To date Cayenne has not submitted a

further, rules compliant, motion to amend. Accordingly, in the absence of any such

motion, we will treat Cayenne’s current amended complaint as the operative

pleading in this case.

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Upon receiving this allegation, Dean Morrell then questioned Cayenne, who

acknowledged that he had engaged in sexual contact with AA but claimed that the

incident was consensual. (Id., ¶¶ 21, 22, 28-37). Dean Morrell also viewed the

pertinent school bus video which depicted Cayenne sitting next to AA with his arm

around her but did not otherwise disclose whether this contact was non-consensual.

After viewing this video, Dean Morrell referred this incident to the school public

safety officer, who conducted further investigation and interviews. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 25).

The results of this inquiry were then turned over to Detective John Bohrman

and, in August of 2019, Cayenne was charged with indecent assault and open

lewdness. (Id., ¶ 13). Following protracted proceedings in which Cayenne

unsuccessfully sought to suppress the statements which he had made to school

officials, on July 7, 2021, Cayenne pleaded guilty to corruption of a minor, in

return for the dismissal of the remaining charged lodged against him. On August

19, 2021, Cayenne was sentenced to one year’s probation following this guilty plea

conviction. (Id., ¶¶ 13-15).

Cayenne appealed this conviction, and on November 17, 2022, the

Pennsylvania Superior Court set aside his conviction holding that, under

Pennsylvania law, one minor could not be convicted of corruption of the morals of

another minor of comparable age. (Id., ¶¶ 17-20). Following this appeal, state

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authorities elected not to pursue any further criminal prosecution in this case.

It is against this backdrop that Cayenne has now filed this civil rights

lawsuit. In his amended complaint, Cayenne names three individual defendants:

Dean Morrell, Detective Bohrman, and Detective Bohrman’s supervisor, Chief of

Police Chris Wagner. (Id.) Cayenne brings eight counts against these individual

defendants, including federal civil rights claims against Detective Bohrman

grounded upon allegations of racially motivated bias, false arrest, and malicious

prosecution, as well as the state common law torts of false arrest, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. (Id., Counts I-III, and VIII-IX). In addition,

Cayenne levelled a supervisory federal civil rights claim against Chief Wagner,

Detective Bohrman’s supervisor at the Mount Pocono Regional Police Department.

(Id., Count IV).

Thus, the gravamen of Cayenne’s amended complaint is his allegation that

he was subjected to a meritless, malicious criminal prosecution and a false arrest

by these law enforcement officials. Given the focus of this case on the conduct of

police, curiously, the factual narrative in the amended complaint contains virtually

no reference to Detective Bohrman or Chief Wagner. (Id., ¶¶ 12-47). This narrative

portion of the amended complaint is almost completely devoid of well-pleaded

facts relating to these law enforcement defendants. Instead, with respect to

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Detective Bohrman, the amended complaint simply alleges, without further factual

detail, that:

Detective Bohrman violated Defendant’s Fourth and Fourteenth rights

to be free from unreasonable detention, false arrest and false

imprisonment without probable cause, when he callously, recklessly,

and maliciously arrested Plaintiff for engaging a course of conduct

arising the Aggravated Indecent Assault, a first degree felony, when

he was privy to a video depicting the alleged incident, which showed

that Plaintiff did not sexually assault the minor AA, then willfully and

intentionally concealed this exculpatory evidence from the defense.

(Id., ¶ 55).

Likewise, the amended complaint does not allege that Chief Wagner was

directly involved in this investigation and prosecution. Rather, the amended

complaint simply alleges that:

99. Defendant Chief Wagner was at all times the policymaker for the

Township Defendants and Mount Pocono Regional Police Department,

and in that capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and or

practices for the same.

100. Defendant Wagner developed and maintained policies,

procedures, customs, and/or practices exhibiting deliberate

indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, which were the

moving forces behind and proximately caused the violations of

Plaintiff’s constitutional and federal rights as set forth herein and in the

other claims, resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a

course of action from among various available alternatives.

101. Defendants Wagner and the Township Defendants have created

and tolerated an atmosphere of lawlessness, and have developed and

maintained long-standing, department-wide customs, law enforcement

related policies, procedures, customs, practices, and/or failed to

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properly train and/or supervise its officers in a manner amounting to

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and of the

public.

102. In light of the duties and responsibilities of those police officers

that participate in arrests and preparation of police reports on alleged

crimes, the need for specialized training and supervision is so obvious,

and the inadequacy of training and/or supervision is so likely to result

in the violation of constitutional and federal rights such as those

described herein that the failure to provide such specialized training

and supervision is deliberately indifferent to those rights.

103. The deliberately indifferent training and supervision provided by

Defendant Chief Wagner and the Township Defendants resulted a

conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among

various alternatives available to the aforementioned Defendants and

were the moving forces in the constitutional and federal violations and

injuries.

104. As a direct result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has

suffered emotional injury and other damages and losses as described

herein entitling him to compensatory and special damages, in amounts

to be determined at trial.

(Doc. 19, ¶¶ 99-104).

These allegations are noteworthy in two respects. First, they are entirely

lacking in any well-pleaded factual detail. Thus, Cayenne does not specifically

identify any constitutionally deficient custom, policy, or practice. Nor does he

explain what shortcomings in police training that were attributable to Chief

Wagner rose to the level of deliberate indifference and directly caused Cayenne’s

injuries. Instead, Cayenne merely recited, albeit in a talismanic fashion, the

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elements of a supervisory liability claim.

With Cayenne’s claims framed in this fashion, the law enforcement

defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Cayenne

has failed to adequately allege a civil rights claim under federal law. Upon

consideration, we agree that a number of these claims fail. Therefore, the motions

will be granted, in part, and denied in part, as follows: First, Defendant Wagner’s

motion to dismiss will be GRANTED. Second, Defendant Bohrman’s motion to

dismiss will be GRANTED with respect to Cayenne’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim but DENIED in all other respects. However, we will order

Cayenne to submit a more definite statement of his remaining claims against

Detective Bohrman within 30 days.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard

for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in

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federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d

Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s

decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),

pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice

pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff

to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to

dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel,

Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a

complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to

dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the .

. . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid

cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which

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“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a

motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.,

at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at

678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme

Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

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sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”

In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard

for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal.

The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility

standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556,

127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint

which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ]

“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

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three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally,

“where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick,

502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly

authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to

dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d

548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d

382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider

matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied

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upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss

in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of

the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a

proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines

what a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,

which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that

are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess the sufficiency of the

claims set forth in this amended complaint.

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B. Guiding Principles—Supervisory Liability Claims

As we have noted, in this case, with respect to Chief Wagner, Cayenne alleges

a unique species of civil rights liability, supervisory official liability. Federal civil

rights supervisory official liability is judged by exacting and precise legal

benchmarks. At the outset, to the extent that Cayenne premises Chief Wagner’s

liability on some sort of supervisory culpability, it is clear that a claim of a

constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the named

defendant was a police supervisor when the incidents set forth in the complaint

occurred. Quite the contrary, to state a constitutional tort claim the plaintiff must

show that the supervisory defendants actively deprived him of a right secured by the

Constitution. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997); see

also Maine v.Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Constitutional tort liability is personal in

nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct

shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence in the challenged practice. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d

1286 (3d Cir. 1997). As the Supreme Court has observed:

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior. . . . See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding no

vicarious liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);

see also Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812) (a

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federal official's liability “will only result from his own neglect in not

properly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates' duties);

Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203

(1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the

misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or

negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other

persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his

official duties”). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens

and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

Instead, “[t]here are two theories of supervisory liability,” one under which

supervisors can be liable if they “established and maintained a policy, practice or

custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm,” and another under which

they can be liable if they “participated in violating plaintiff's rights, directed others

to violate them, or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in

[their] subordinates' violations.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129

(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372

F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004)). Further when a supervisory liability claim is premised

upon some constitutionally infirm policy or custom it must be alleged with

supporting factual detail that the policy caused the plaintiff’s injury. On this score:

Proximate causation is established where the supervisor gave directions

that the supervisor “knew or should reasonably have known would

cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.”

Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 397 (7th Cir.1988); see also Snell v.

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Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir.1990). Particularly after Iqbal, the

connection between the supervisor's directions and the constitutional

deprivation must be sufficient to “demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus' or

‘affirmative link’ between the [directions] and the specific deprivation

of constitutional rights at issue.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121

(3d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Therefore, to state [a supervisory liability] claim . . . , [a plaintiff] needs

to have pled facts plausibly demonstrating that the [supervisors]

directed [others] to [act] in a manner that they “knew or should

reasonably have known would cause [others] to deprive [the plaintiff]

of h[is] constitutional rights.” Conner, 847 F.2d at 397.

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130.

In addition to these general guiding principles which govern supervisory civil

rights liability, other special considerations apply in a case such as this which arises

out of single incident like the arrest and prosecution of Cayenne. Single incident

supervisory liability claims are particularly demanding in terms of their pleading and

proof.

To do so, the plaintiff must plead facts that show “deliberate

indifference” on the part of these supervisors.

“ ‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of

Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)

(“Bryan Cnty.”). Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees” is

necessary “to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, –––

U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360, 179 L.Ed.2d 417

(2011). “Without notice that a course of training is

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deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can

hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training

program that will cause violations of constitutional

rights.” Id.

Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014). Single

incident supervisory liability for failure to train subordinates exists

only when the training failure is:

“so obvious” that a failure to provide such training could

provide a basis for single-incident municipal liability. Id.

Liability in single-incident cases depends on “[t]he

likelihood that the situation will recur and the

predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to

handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights.” Bryan

Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382.

Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223–24.

Boucher v. Lupacchini, No. 3:19-CV-2106, 2021 WL 11096471, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 1, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:19-2106, 2022 WL

19795967 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022).

Accordingly, Cayenne must meet these exacting legal guideposts to sustain

his supervisory liability claims against Chief Wagner.

C. Cayenne’s Supervisory Liability Claim Against Chief Wagner

Fails.

Judged against these benchmarks, we find that Cayenne’s amended complaint

fails to state supervisory liability claim against Chief Wagner. This amended

complaint simply does not make sufficient well-pleaded factual allegations which

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would permit a finding of supervisory liability. Thus, Cayenne has failed to specify

any constitutionally deficient custom, policy, or practice that can be attributed to

Chief Wagner. Nor does he identify any particular shortcomings in police training

that were attributable to Chief Wagner, rose to the level of deliberate indifference,

and directly caused Cayenne’s injuries. Further, Cayenne has failed to allege

sufficient facts to permit a finding of deliberate indifference from a single-incident

violation, since he has not alleged facts which plausibly show that the risk of injury

was a highly predictable consequence of the failure to train and supervise Detective

Bohrman.

These are fatal flaws since a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for

any supervisory liability claim, which “requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

Fairly construed, in its current form, the supervisory liability claim against Chief

Wagner set forth in Count IV of Cayenne’s amended complaint amounts to little

more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, a form of

pleading that, as a matter of law, “will not do.” Id. Therefore, Chief Wagner’s

motion to dismiss should be granted.

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D. Defendant Bohrman’s Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted, in

Part and Denied, in Part.

Finally, with respect to Defendant Bohrman, the police officer who conducted

the investigation into Cayenne’s conduct, we find that the amended complaint

alleges false arrest and malicious prosecution claims in a singularly spare fashion,

simply asserting that:

Detective Bohrman violated Defendant’s Fourth and Fourteenth rights

to be free from unreasonable detention, false arrest and false

imprisonment without probable cause, when he callously, recklessly,

and maliciously arrested Plaintiff for engaging a course of conduct

arising the Aggravated Indecent Assault, a first degree felony, when

he was privy to a video depicting the alleged incident, which showed

that Plaintiff did not sexually assault the minor AA, then willfully and

intentionally concealed this exculpatory evidence from the defense.

(Id., ¶ 55).

While we believe that this cursory style of pleading demands a more

fulsome factual recital and will direct that the plaintiff provide a more definite

statement of his claim against this defendant, we are cognizant that there is a

significant factual component to any analysis of false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims.

1. Cayenne’s False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims

Against Detective Bohrman Cannot be Addressed on the

Current Spare Record.

These claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution implicate Cayenne’s

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rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which

provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and now Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable

cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under § 1983. See

Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v.

O’Neill, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)). To bring a claim for false arrest, a

plaintiff must establish: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was

made without probable cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)).

Furthermore, to succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a

warrant, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “that the

officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made

false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant’; and

(2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause.’” Meyers v. Wolkiewicz, 50 F. App’x 549, 552 (3d Cir. 2002)

(quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)).

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Similarly, in order to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a

claimant must show that:

[The] defendant commenced a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding

terminated in plaintiff’s favor; (3) defendant “initiated the proceeding

without probable cause”; (4) defendant acted maliciously or with a

purpose apart from bringing plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff

“suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure

as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”

Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Johnson v.

Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)).2 We note that, in a case where a claim of

malicious prosecution is brought against a police officer:

Police officers (as opposed to prosecutors) may be liable for malicious

prosecution if they “conceal or misrepresent material facts” to the

prosecutor. Halsey, 750 F.3d at 297 (quoting Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359

F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004)). In particular, an officer is liable if he

“fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, makes false or

misleading reports to the prosecutor, omits material information from

the reports, or otherwise interferes with the prosecutor's ability to

exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to prosecute.”

Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting

Finnemen v. SEPTA, 267 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017)).

Further, whether cast as a false arrest, or malicious prosecution, proof that

probable cause was lacking is essential to any § 1983 claim arising out of the arrest

2 The elements of a common law malicious prosecution claim in Pennsylvania are

identical to a § 1983 claim. See Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., Inc., 660 A.2d

83, 85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).

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and prosecution of an individual. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable

cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or

circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person

of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person

being arrested.” U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause

to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances presented,

and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officers possessed at the

time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the

arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, the

probable cause determination which is typically pivotal to any false arrest claim is

often highly fact dependent and fact driven. In fact, the existence of probable cause

for an arrest is typically a question of fact for a jury, unless the evidence “reasonably

would not support a contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may determine

the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752

F.Supp.2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010).

Liberally construed, in his amended complaint, Cayenne has alleged that

Detective Bohrman included material facts in his affidavit which he knew to be

untrue and excluded exculpatory evidence that would have contributed to the

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determination of probable cause. In our view, at this stage where we must view the

facts alleged in a light favorable to plaintiff, Cayenne has alleged barely enough

facts at this stage to support the inference that his arrest was made without probable

cause, and accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against him arising out of that

arrest were initiated without probable cause. With our discretion cabined and

confined to the complaint itself, it would be inappropriate to dismiss his claims at

this early stage in the proceedings.3 Instead, the legal sufficiency of these claims

must await another day and another motion in the nature of a summary judgment

motion where we may consider matters outside the pleadings.

2. Cayenne’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Fails.

In Count VIII of his amended complaint, Cayenne brings a state law

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, arising out of Bohrman’s

involvement in these criminal proceedings. With regard to the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress, under Pennsylvania Law, “[o]ne who by extreme

and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress

to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the

3 We further note that these torts typically require some degree of actual pretrial

confinement, something that Cayenne needs to articulate in a more fulsome fashion.

See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005).

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other results from it, for such bodily harm.” 10 Restatement (Second) of Torts §

46(1) (1965). Our sister court has explained that, to establish a claim for IIED: “(1)

the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or

reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.”

Richardson v. Barbour, No. 2:18-CV-01758-JMG, 2020 WL 4815829, at *14 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 19, 2020). With regard to the level and severity of the conduct alleged, the

Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted:

“The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.”

Buczek v. First National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 558,

531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987). Described another way, “[i]t has not

been enough that the defendant has acted with intent which is tortious

or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress,

or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a

degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive

damages for another tort.”

Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 46, comment d; Daughen v. Fox, 372 Pa.Super. 405, 412, 539

A.2d 858, 861 (1988)).

In addition to alleging outrageous conduct, “a plaintiff must suffer some type

of resulting physical harm due to the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Reeves v.

Middletown Athletic Ass'n, 2004 PA Super 475, ¶ 17, 866 A.2d 1115, 1122–23

(2004) (citing Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559, 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995)). On

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this score, a plaintiff must allege “more than a conclusory recitation of two elements

of an emotional distress claim, namely causation and the requisite level of harm.”

White v. Brommer, 747 F. Supp. 2d 447, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

In the instant case, while Cayenne’s amended complaint may colorably state

other claims at this juncture, it simply does not describe conduct so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,

and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Instead,

the amended complaint recites that a school official received a report of serious

sexual misconduct by Cayenne, investigated that report, learned that Cayenne

admitted to sexual contact with the alleged victim while denying that the contact was

non-consensual, and referred the results of this disciplinary investigation to law

enforcement authorities. Following an investigation by Detective Bohrman, those

authorities later charged Cayenne, who actually pleaded guilty to corrupting the

morals of a minor, albeit a guilty plea conviction which was later set aside. Nothing

about this course of conduct can be described as beyond all possible bounds of

decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Therefore, Cayenne

has not met the exacting legal standards necessary for a claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law and this claim also fails.

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3. Cayenne Must Provide a More Definite Statement of his False

Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Detective

Bohrman.

While we regard dismissal of Cayenne’s false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims to be premature and inappropriate at this juncture, we recognize

that there is a somewhat enigmatic quality to these claims as they are currently

pleaded. Presented with these obstacles to a fully informed understanding of the

plaintiff's claims against Detective Bohrman, we note that, when a plaintiff's

complaint is unclear, the court may, sua sponte, order the plaintiff to file a more

definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in

order to clarify the plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Kyeame v. Buchheit, No.

1:07-CV-1239, 2011 WL 3651369, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2011); MFS, Inc. v.

Twp. of South Annville, No. 1:05–CV–1371, 2006 WL 3254535, at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Nov. 9, 2006); see also Moore's Federal Practice, § 12.36 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.)

(“Because of its potential usefulness ... courts will occasionally order a more definite

statement sua sponte, which they have the freedom to do”); Fikes v. City of Daphne,

79 F.3d 1079, 1082–83 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a more definite statement can

tighten a complaint and clarify which of several possible claims are being asserted).

In a case such as this, where the plaintiff's false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims against Detective Bohrman may not be clearly and thoroughly

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articulated, Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that

the court may order a party to prepare: “a more definite statement of a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the

party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Further, under this rule “[i]f the court

orders a more definite statement, and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after

notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading

or issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 12(e).

Here, we find that this particular complaint aptly:

highlight[s] the particular usefulness of the Rule 12(e) motion for a

more definite statement. Under Rule 12(e), [the court may order] a

more definite statement “[i]f a pleading ... is so vague or ambiguous

that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive

pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).... When a complaint fashioned under a

notice pleading standard does not disclose the facts underlying a

plaintiff's claim for relief, the defendant cannot reasonably be

expected to frame a proper, fact-specific ... defense....

The Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is perhaps the best

procedural tool available to the defendant to obtain the factual basis

underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief.

Thomas v. Independence Tp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir. 2006)

Given some of the legal and factual ambiguities of the plaintiff's false arrest

and malicious prosecution claims against Defendant Bohrman, the plaintiff will be

directed, pursuant to Rule 12(e), to submit a more definite statement of these claims

in the form of an amended complaint. At a minimum, this more definite statement

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should: (1) identify what form of confinement, if any, Cayenne experienced during

this state criminal case; (2) provide further well-pleaded facts concerning Detective

Bohrman’s involvement in this investigation, including the alleged suppression of

exculpatory evidence; and (3) set forth further well-pleaded facts supporting the

allegation that Detective Bohrman lacked probable cause at the time he initiated

these proceedings.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons Defendants Bohrman’s and Wagner’s motions to

dismiss this claim, (Docs. 20, 25), will be granted, in part, and denied in part, as

follows:

First, Defendant Wagner’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Second, Defendant Bohrman’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect

to Cayenne’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim but DENIED in all

other respects.

However, IT IS ORDERED that Cayenne submit a more definite statement

of his remaining claims against Detective Bohrman within 30 days.

An appropriate order follows.

S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: August 6, 2024.

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