Wildoner, Jr. v. Ransom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GLYNN A. WILDONER JR., No. 4:23-CV-01116

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

KEVIN RANSOM,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULY 19, 2024

Petitioner Glynn A. Wildoner, Jr., filed the instant pro se petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He seeks to overturn his 2018

convictions and sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne

County, Pennsylvania. Because Wildoner cannot satisfy the stringent requirements

for federal habeas relief, the Court will deny his Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2017, following a one-day jury trial, Wildoner was found guilty

of three counts of rape, three counts of statutory sexual assault, once count of

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than 16 years of age, four

counts of unlawful contact with a minor, one count of aggravated indecent assault,

four counts of corruption of minors, two counts of endangering the welfare of

children, and four counts of indecent assault.1 Those convictions stemmed from a

series of sexual assaults in mid-2016 against minors K.H. and A.H., who were both

14 years old at the time of the offenses.2 K.H. was the victim of most of the

sexually assaultive conduct, including rape and involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse.3 A.H., K.H.’s sister, only suffered one inappropriate encounter with

Wildoner where he attempted to remove A.H.’s pants.4

On January 26, 2018, Wildoner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 to

50 years’ imprisonment.5 He appealed, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

affirmed the judgment of sentence.6 In December 2019, the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania denied Wildoner’s petition for allowance of appeal.7

Wildoner then timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA),8 the state’s corollary to federal habeas relief.9 Following an

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Wildoner’s petition.10 Wildoner filed

a counseled PCRA appeal, although his appointed appellate attorney sought leave

1 Commonwealth v. Wildoner, No. 981 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2447057, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct.

June 11, 2019) (nonprecedential).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id., at *1-2.

5 Id., at *1.

6 Id., at *1, 7.

7 Commonwealth v. Wildoner, No. 406 MAL 2019, 222 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2019) (table).

8 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq.

9 See Commonwealth v. Wildoner, No. 779 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17999211, at *1 (Pa. Super.

Ct. Dec. 30, 2022) (nonprecedential).

10 Id.

to withdraw representation by filing a Turner/Finley11 no-merit brief, opining that

there were no arguable issues on which to appeal.12 On December 30, 2022, the

Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of Wildoner’s PCRA petition.13

It does not appear that he filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania.

Wildoner timely filed his Section 2254 petition in this Court in June 2023.14

After multiple extensions, Respondent filed a response on January 3, 2024.15

Wildoner did not file a traverse. His petition, therefore, is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)16

mandates that petitioners demonstrate that they have “exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief.17 An

exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly presented” to the state courts “by

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,”

and which has been adjudicated on the merits.18

11 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d

213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (en banc).

12 See Wildoner, No. 779 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17999211, at *1-2.

13 Id., at *1, 5.

14 Doc. 1.

15 Doc. 21.

16 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254.

17 Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

18 Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013).

If a state prisoner has not fairly presented a claim to the state courts “but

state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of

procedural default may come into play.”19 Generally, if a prisoner has

procedurally defaulted on a claim by failing to raise it in state-court proceedings, a

federal habeas court will not review the merits of the claim, even one that

implicates constitutional concerns.20

A few limited exceptions to this rule exist. One exception is that “[a]

prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the

default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.”21 “Cause for a procedural

default exists where something external to the petitioner, something that cannot

fairly be attributed to him[,] . . . impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s

procedural rule.”22 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that

there were errors that created a possibility of prejudice, but that they “worked to

his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.”23 If cause and prejudice are established, the federal

19 Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted).

20 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48

(1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977)).

21 Id. at 10 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).

22 Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

23 Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170 (1982)).

court reviews the claim de novo “because the state court did not consider the claim

on the merits.”24

Another rare exception that will excuse a procedural default is if the

petitioner can show that “failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental

‘miscarriage of justice.’”25 To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

exception, a petitioner typically will have to show actual innocence.26

When a claim is properly exhausted and then raised on federal habeas

review, the level of deference afforded to the state court decision is substantial.27

The AEDPA “does not ‘permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the

decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.’”28 Thus, under

Section 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims unless

the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”29 An unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent includes situations where “the state court

24 Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.

Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S. Ct. 740 (2018) (mem.) (citation omitted).

25 Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).

26 Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

27 Bey, 856 F.3d at 236.

28 Collins v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burt v. Titlow,

571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)).

29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”30

This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet.31 Section 2254(d)

“preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent.32 Thus, to obtain federal habeas

relief on an exhausted claim, a state prisoner must demonstrate that the state

court’s ruling on the claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of

fairminded disagreement.”33

Finally, if a state court has ruled on the merits of a claim, a federal habeas

petitioner generally must meet Section 2254(d)’s requirements “on the record that

was before that state court.”34 Absent compelling circumstances,35 district courts

cannot supplement the existing state-court record for claims adjudicated on the

merits.36 “Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to circumvent the

30 White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 425 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407

(2000)).

31 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

32 Id.

33 Id. at 103.

34 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011) (footnote omitted).

35 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

36 Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011).

finality of state court judgments by establishing a new factual record” on federal

habeas review.37

III. DISCUSSION

Wildoner purports to raise three grounds for relief in his Section 2254

petition. First, he alleges a standalone due process violation regarding the

“exclusion” of DNA evidence from his trial.38 Within this claim, he also contends

that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to attempt to admit

this DNA evidence.39 In his second ground for relief, Wildoner asserts that he was

“denied a fair trial” when the trial court excluded the testimony of “Brian

Mor[g]is,”40 which Wildoner maintains “would have impeached the testimony of”

victim K.H.41 Lastly, Wildoner reasserts—as an independent third ground for

relief—his ineffective-assistance claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to

introduce certain DNA evidence.42

Wildoner’s first claim alleging a standalone due process violation with

respect to the “exclusion” of the DNA evidence requires only brief discussion.

This Fourteenth Amendment claim was never raised in state court or pressed

37 Id.

38 Doc. 1 at 5.

39 See id.

40 Although Wildoner identifies this potential witness as Brian “Morris,” (see Doc. 1 at 6), his

appellate brief and the Superior Court’s decision on direct appeal both indicate that the

potential witness’s name is Brian “Morgis.” See Doc. 24-3 at 2, 20; Wildoner, 981 MDA 2018,

2019 WL 2447057, at *1.

41 Doc. 1 at 6.

42 Id. at 8.

through one complete round of appellate review and thus it is procedurally

defaulted. Wildoner does not discuss, let alone establish, cause or prejudice to

excuse his default of this due process claim, so it is unreviewable.43

Additionally, the Court observes that there logically could be no due process

violation by the trial court for excluding evidence that Wildoner never attempted to

admit. As noted above, within this first ground for relief, Wildoner faults his trial

counsel for failing to introduce the DNA report. Thus, Wildoner is actually

asserting only one constitutional error with respect to the DNA evidence: deficient

performance by his trial counsel for failing to seek admission of the DNA report.

Accordingly, only grounds two and three of his petition require further discussion.

A. Ground Two – Exclusion of Testimony of Brian Morgis

In ground two, Wildoner asserts that he was “denied a fair trial” when the

trial court excluded the proffered testimony of Brian Morgis, which Wildoner

claims “would have impeached the testimony of K.H. . . . and would have

potentially g[iven] reasonable doubt to [the] jury[.]”44 On direct appeal, Wildoner

challenged the trial court’s exclusion of testimony from Morgis (a corrections

officer who collected and inventoried Wildoner’s clothing following his June 16,

2016 arrest) and two other potential witnesses that would demonstrate that

43 See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.

44 Doc. 1 at 6.

Wildoner did not own or customarily wear underwear.45 He claimed that this

evidence was necessary to impeach K.H., who had testified that Wildoner had

removed his underwear before sexually assaulting her.46 Wildoner’s question for

review in the Superior Court asked whether “the trial court err[ed] or abuse[d] its

discretion by precluding the defense from presenting testimony of Brian Morgis”

and two other proposed witnesses concerning Wildoner not wearing or owning

underwear.47

The Superior Court, quite reasonably, treated this claim as a challenge to the

trial court’s evidentiary rulings based on relevant state-law rules of evidence.48

Consequently, the panel reviewed the pertinent Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence

and found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the

proffered testimony.49 In particular, the Superior Court found that, because the

trial court had permitted Wildoner to testify regarding his underwear habits and

Wildoner did not provide any testimony about this issue during his time on the

witness stand, he could not establish that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of the

other witnesses’ testimony.50

45 See Doc. 24-3 at 21; Wildoner, 981 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2447057, at *1-2.

46 Wildoner, 981 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2447057, at *2.

47 Id., at *1.

48 Id., at *2.

49 Id., at *2-3.

50 Id., at *3.

The fundamental flaw with Wildoner’s second ground for relief is that

evidentiary challenges based on state law are not cognizable on federal habeas

review.51 “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”52 As

the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly admonished, “it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-

law questions.”53 Rather, federal habeas courts may “entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”54 So if Wildoner is asserting

a challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings based on its application of state

law, that claim is a nonstarter.

Assuming Wildoner’s evidentiary claim in ground two could be construed as

asserting a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation,55 any such claim is

procedurally defaulted. Wildoner simply never asserted in state court that the trial

51 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (explaining that inquiry regarding evidentiary

ruling based on state law “is no part of a federal court’s habeas review of a state conviction”);

see also Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A] state court’s misapplication of

its own law does not generally raise a constitutional claim. The federal courts have no

supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs

of constitutional dimension.”).

52 Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted).

53 Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68).

54 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68.

55 Cf. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 416 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A federal habeas court, however,

cannot decide whether the evidence in question was properly allowed under the state law of

evidence. A federal habeas court is limited to deciding whether the admission of the evidence

rose to the level of a due process violation[.]”).

court’s evidentiary rulings resulted in a constitutional violation or a violation of his

federal rights.56 Nor does he discuss or establish cause and prejudice to excuse his

default. Accordingly, ground two—to the extent it can be construed as asserting a

due process violation—is procedurally defaulted and unreviewable.57 Indeed, the

Court cannot review the state court decision to determine whether it was “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”58 if

the state court was never presented with a federal claim in the first instance.

B. Ground Three – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, DNA Evidence

Wildoner’s primary claim in his Section 2254 petition is that his trial

attorney—John Donovan—was constitutionally deficient for failing to introduce a

January 13, 2017 DNA report at trial. Wildoner contends that the DNA test results

are “probative of a lack of intercourse” and thus exculpatory with respect to his

rape convictions.59 Wildoner, however, does not explain how the DNA report is

probative of a lack of intercourse, nor does he specify which of the report’s

56 See, e.g., McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[Petitioner] presented his

“prosecutorial vouching” claim to Pennsylvania’s courts as an evidentiary law challenge and

not as a violation of a federal or constitutional right. He did not assert this claim in terms that

bring to mind a constitutional right. On the contrary, his Superior and Pennsylvania Supreme

Court briefs articulated this claim in terms similar to a Rule 403 objection, contending that the

cooperation agreement testimony was “irrelevant” and “prejudicial” and therefore improperly

admitted. Nowhere are the terms “constitution,” “due process” or even “fair trial”

mentioned.”).

57 See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.

58 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

59 See Doc. 1 at 5, 8.

conclusions he believes to be exculpatory or otherwise would have had a

reasonable probability of altering the outcome of his trial.

As best the Court can discern, Wildoner is relying on a portion of the report

(section 9) that indicates that there was a “partial Y chromosome DNA haplotype”

found in the vaginal swab specimen of victim K.H., and that he was excluded as a

potential contributor of that Y chromosome DNA.60 As summarized during the

PCRA hearing, “Section 9 indicates . . . that they’ve [found] some DNA. It was

not the victim’s. It was not Mr. Wildoner’s, and it was some other individual for

which they didn’t have a match to. So it was some unknown third party[.]”61

Wildoner properly exhausted this ineffective-assistance claim in state court.62

A collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by

the familiar two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.63 To prevail on

such a claim, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation fell

below an objective level of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms,

and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial.64 The defendant bears the

burden of proving both prongs.65

60 See Doc. 1-1 at 4-5 ¶ 9 (highlighted portions); Mar. 3, 2022 PCRA Hr’g Tr. 21:22-22:15

(hereinafter “PCRA Hr’g __:__”).

61 PCRA Hr’g 22:10-14.

62 See Wildoner, No. 779 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17999211, at *2-3.

63 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

64 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

65 See id. at 687.

In determining whether counsel has satisfied the objective standard of

reasonableness under the first prong, courts must be highly deferential toward

counsel’s conduct.66 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.67 Only a “rare

claim” of ineffectiveness of counsel should succeed “under the properly deferential

standard to be applied in scrutinizing counsel’s performance.”68

To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must establish a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different.69 The district court need not conduct its analysis of the two

prongs in a particular order or even address both prongs of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.70

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been exhausted in

state court, review of that claim by a federal habeas court is significantly

circumscribed. The federal court does not review the ineffectiveness claim de

novo; rather, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the

Strickland standard was unreasonable.”71 Under this “doubly” deferential

standard, “so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the

66 Id. at 689.

67 See United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1989).

68 Id. at 711 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90).

69 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

70 See id. at 697; United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).

71 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added); Collins, 742 F.3d at 547-48.

state court’s decision,” a state court’s determination that a Strickland claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas relief.72

On PCRA appeal, the Superior Court denied this ineffective-assistance claim

on the merits.73 The panel reasoned that Wildoner had failed to establish how the

at-issue DNA evidence would have been beneficial to his case “as the defense

theory at trial was that [Wildoner] was falsely accused of sexually assaulting the

victims.”74 Attorney Donovan’s PCRA testimony bolstered this conclusion, as he

had “argued that there should have been no DNA results or physical evidence to

present at trial in light of Wildoner’s assertion that the abuse never occurred.”75

Thus, it appears that the Superior Court concluded that Wildoner had failed

to establish that Attorney Donovan’s performance was deficient. That is, Attorney

Donovan was not ineffective for failing to introduce the DNA report when the

theory of defense was that no physical evidence of rape existed because no sexual

assault on K.H. had occurred (as opposed to, for example, that the assailant was a

different person).

The Superior Court’s determination on this claim was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Attorney Donovan’s theory of defense was based on

Wildoner’s insistence that no sexual assault had occurred and that K.H.’s and

72 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101, 105 (citation omitted).

73 See Wildoner, No. 779 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17999211, at *3.

74 Id.

75 Id.

A.H.’s accusations were false.76 Attorney Donovan thus attempted to impeach the

victims’ testimony to establish that they were not credible, and he attempted to

show that it would have been difficult if not impossible for Wildoner to have

sexually assaulted K.H. when other people were nearby inside and outside the

house.77 The DNA report, in Attorney Donovan’s opinion, would only confuse the

jury and muddle the theory of defense.78

Attorney Donovan’s strategic litigation choices were not unreasonable or

below an acceptable level of professional judgment. This is not a situation where

the defendant’s theory of the case was that someone else had committed the sexual

assault and therefore Y-chromosome DNA from another unidentified male found

in a vaginal swab of the victim would be potent exculpatory evidence. Rather,

Wildoner claimed that no sexual assault had occurred. Moreover, as Respondent

points out, the at-issue DNA evidence—under the facts of this case—could imply

that K.H. was either sexually active with another person or was the victim of

sexual assault by another person. In either scenario, Section 9 of the DNA report

may very well have been inadmissible pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield

Law, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104.79

76 See PCRA Hr’g 20:8-16, 21:2-6, 22:22-24, 24:2-6.

77 Id. at 20:21-21:6.

78 Id. at 25:19-25.

79 “Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, past sexual

victimization, allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s

past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall

not be admissible in prosecutions of any offense listed in subsection (c) . . . .” 18 PA. CONS.

At bottom, the state court’s determination on this claim reflects a reasonable

application of Strickland. Wildoner has provided no argument or legal authority

establishing that his trial attorney’s strategic decision to omit the DNA report was

constitutionally deficient, or that the Superior Court’s application of Strickland was

unreasonable. Wildoner’s third and final claim, therefore, warrants no relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Wildoner’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court will likewise decline to issue

a certificate of appealability, as Wildoner has failed to make a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right,80 or that “jurists of reason would find it

debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.81 An appropriate

Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

STAT. § 3104(a). “The Rape Shield Law is intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries

regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988

A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[the] Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has explained that the specific purpose of the Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law

is to prevent a sexual assault trial from degenerating into an attack upon the collateral issue of

the complainant’s reputation rather than focusing on the relevant legal issues and the question

of whether the events alleged by the complainant against the defendant actually occurred.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 826 A.2d 900, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.

Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 1994)).

80 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

81 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).