JONES v. CARNEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AKHENATON JONES, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-3791

:

BLANCHE CARNEY, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Pappert, J. September 5, 2024

Akhenaton Jones filed a pro se Complaint (ECF No. 2) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights when he was a pretrial detainee

at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”).1 He named as Defendants the

City of Philadelphia (“the City”), Philadelphia Department of Prisons (“PDP”)

Commissioner Blanche Carney, PDP Chief of Staff Gregory Vrato, the Warden and

numerous other employees of CFCF (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”), as well

as PDP’s healthcare contractor YesCare and Jane Doe nurses employed by YesCare.

The Municipal Defendants’ moved to partially dismiss the complaint (ECF No.

16). The Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. Jones will be allowed to

amend his Complaint.

1 Jones is currently housed at the Riverside Correctional Facility. Whether his status has

changed from pretrial detainee to convicted prisoner is not apparent to the Court.

I2

Jones alleges that on January 28, 2023, he submitted a grievance at CFCF

seeking to enforce an order of the judge overseeing his state criminal trial.3 (Compl. at

8.) Jones avers that the order required CFCF to provide him with daily law library

access and “access to a computer to review [his] discovery on USB drives from the

District Attorney’s office” because he was proceeding pro se at that time in his criminal

case. (Id.) He claims that he “spoke to CFCF’s Captain Moore” (whom Jones does not

name as a Defendant) about the grievance and was told that Defendant Vrato would

have to be consulted on the content of any court orders. (Id.) Jones alleges that after

that conversation, unnamed CFCF officers searched his cell and confiscated the USB

drives, telling him that “Vrato ruled [Jones] was not allowed to keep them and that

they were contraband as they posed a security threat.” (Id.)

Jones asserts that when he next appeared before the state trial court on

February 17, 2023, the trial judge called CFCF administrators during the hearing and

instructed them to return the USB drives and to provide Jones with daily law library

visits and access to a computer to view the materials on the USB drives. (Id.) Jones

claims that based on CFCF’s delay in facilitating his discovery review, the judge

2 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Jones’s Complaint (ECF No. 2).

The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing

system. Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court

records, of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist.,

452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

3 No party has provided a citation to the criminal docket, included any exhibits from the

trial proceedings, or indicated the status of those proceedings. It appears that Jones’s

criminal docket may not be publicly available. See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. MC-51-CR-

0002322-2021 (Mag. Dist. Phila.) (noting Jones’s preliminary hearing and transfer of case

to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas).

continued the trial for eleven months from its scheduled start date of March 27, 2023,

until February 12, 2024, “guarantee[ing his] pretrial incarceration for at least another

330 days when [he] had already been in pretrial detention for 750 days.” (Id.) Jones

states that he was “provided very limited access” to his discovery materials beginning

on March 9, 2023. (Id.) He alleges that on May 9, 2023, “upon the orders of CFCF MIS

Captain Hurley,” unnamed CFCF officers confiscated the USB drives again and the

computer he had been using was replaced by one that was not equipped to process USB

drives. (Id. at 8-9.) He claims that since May 9, 2023, he has not had “adequate

resources” to review his discovery. (Id. at 9.)

Jones further alleges that on June 27, 2023, his legal visit was prematurely

terminated by CFCF corrections officer Antwyne Powell. (Id.) When he was returned

to his housing block, he complained to corrections officer Doreen Bright and Lieutenant

Crystal Bellinger. (Id.) Powell then allegedly arrived at the housing block, threatened

Jones, and directed racist and homophobic slurs at him. (Id.) Jones alleges that Powell

then punched him in the face, slammed him into a wall, threw him to the ground, and

destroyed his legal materials. (Id.) He claims that this assault happened in view of

Defendants Bright, Bellinger, and Shayla Duncan, as well as “Nurse Edourd[,] a

civilian employee of YesCare,”4 and none of them intervened. (Id.) Jones claims that

Defendant Bellinger and “Sgt Divers” (not named as a Defendant) fabricated a

misconduct charge against him, of which Defendant Harmer found him guilty at a

disciplinary hearing. (Id.) He states that he put in sick calls for his physical and

4 Although he uses the name “Edourd” in the body of the Complaint, he names only an

unspecified number of Jane Doe Nurses as Defendants in the caption of the Complaint.

(Compare Compl. at 3, with id. at 9.)

mental injuries stemming from the alleged assault by Powell, “yet never received any

treatment from nurses or other healthcare staff.” (Id.) Jones seeks injunctions

ordering the City to release him from custody and dismiss his criminal charges, as well

as money damages. (Id. at 6.)

The Municipal Defendants have moved to dismiss all but Jones’s claims against

Powell for excessive force pursuant to § 1983 and assault and battery under state law.5

(ECF No. 16 at 5.) YesCare has filed an Answer to the Complaint with affirmative

defenses. (ECF No. 19.)

II

“A 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the

complaint.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

5 Although Jones’s Complaint mentions “retaliation” in places (see, e.g., Compl. at 7), the

Municipal Defendants’ Motion does not address any retaliation claims. In order to state a

plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in

constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the

constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse

action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Coit v. Garman, 812 F. App’x 83, 86 (3d Cir. 2020) (per

curiam). Like the Municipal Defendants, the Court does not understand Jones to allege a

retaliation claim, because passing references to various legal precepts, without further

development, are not sufficient to state plausible claims. See Campbell v. LVNV Finding,

LLC and Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7,

2022) (“[A] ‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that

issue before the Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other.” (citing

Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398

(3d Cir. 1994))). In any event, to the extent that Jones intended to allege a retaliation

claim, it is not clear whom he brings that claim against and what the contours of that claim

might be.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) “Although the

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a

pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court must consider only the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). To determine whether a complaint

filed by a pro se litigant states a claim, a court must accept the facts alleged as true,

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and “ask only whether that

complaint, liberally construed contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.”

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); see also Vogt v.

Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (pro se filings are construed liberally). “When

presenting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the defendant bears the burden to show that the

plaintiff has not stated a claim.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016).

Additionally, since Jones is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may

independently screen his Complaint and dismiss it “at any time” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) if, among other things, it fails to state a claim. Brown v. Sage, 941

F.3d 655, 662 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“To repeat, the statute requires a court to

dismiss an IFP complaint ‘at any time’ if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim.”). The standard under this screening provision is

the same standard that governs a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v.

McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). This provision provides the Court with

an independent basis for assessing the plausibility of Jones’s claims, including by

addressing issues that the parties have not raised.

A complaint may also be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). Rule 8

requires a pleading to include a “short and plain statement showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” as well as a statement of the court’s jurisdiction and a demand for the

relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In determining whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s

“plain” statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a

pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by [the named]

defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation

omitted). “Naturally, a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot

reasonably be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). The important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s

language . . . presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the

merits.” Id. at 94.

III

Jones brings claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal

constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

A

First, to the extent that Jones seeks release from custody or dismissal of his

state criminal charges, he fails to state a claim to relief. When a prisoner seeks

dismissal of state charges or release from pretrial detention because of constitutional

violations, his claims must be pursued in state court or in a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus filed in federal court; such claims are not cognizable in a civil rights action under

§ 1983. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir.

2017) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him

as a result of constitutional violations, such relief is only available through a writ of

habeas corpus.”); Duran v. Weeks, 399 F. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(“[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result

of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for relief only available through

habeas corpus.”); see generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (when a

prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier

release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”).

B

The Municipal Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the City,

Commissioner Blanche Carney, Warden Angelucci, and “Official Visit Correctional

Officer” Michele Garner on the grounds that no facts are alleged against them. (ECF

No. 16 at 6,8).

1

To plead a basis for liability against a municipal entity such as the City of

Philadelphia under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s policy or

custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the

plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of

York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker

possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action

issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914

F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,

1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a

given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so

well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v.

Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of

an injury, a plaintiff must establish that the Defendant “had knowledge of similar

unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and

that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. (internal quotations and

alterations omitted).

It is not enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy or custom. “A

plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his

injuries.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95

F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative

link’ between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation” alleged.

Id. Allegations that simply paraphrase the standard for municipal liability are too

vague and generalized to support a plausible claim. See, e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock,

No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory

allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is insufficient

to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases).

Jones makes no allegations in his Complaint concerning a policy or custom of the

City. He has thus failed to present a cognizable legal claim to which the City could

respond on the merits. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94. Accordingly, any claim against the

City will be dismissed.

2

As to Defendants Carney, Angelucci, and Garner, the Municipal Defendants’

motion correctly asserts that Jones’s Complaint does not contain any factual allegations

about their involvement in his claims. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Jones’s response to the

motion indicates that he intended his allegations to be construed as raising claims for

direct or supervisory liability against some or all of these defendants in their individual

capacities.6 (See ECF No. 20 at 2-3.)

6 To the extent Jones indicated an intent to sue these or any of the other Defendants in

their official capacities, any such claims are dismissed as duplicative of the claims against

the City. See Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th

Cir. 2015) (“The district court correctly dismissed these defendants in their official capacity

because the Staneks also sued the District.”); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th

Cir. 2004) (“The district court correctly held that the § 1983 claim against Martin in his

official capacity as Superintendent is essentially a claim against the Board and thus should

be dismissed as duplicative.”); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As

long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the

alleged wrongs” to be liable. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988);

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is

inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”);

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366,

374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

“Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of

wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be

actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir.

2015) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d

at 1201 n.6).

Liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis. Id.

at 227. Rather, “[s]uits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general

requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir.

2017). There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc.,

766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575

U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “with deliberate

indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or

custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel.

J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration

in original)).

To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-practice strand

of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the

supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and

practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an

unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware

that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent

to the risk; and (5) the underling’s violation resulted from the

supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.

Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216

(3d Cir. 2001)). “Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific

acts or omissions demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s

risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.”

Id.

“[A] supervisor may [also] be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she

participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the

person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s

unconstitutional conduct.” Id. In this context, generalized allegations that a

supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are

insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation.

See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted

that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that

liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be

‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as

the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir.

2005))). Regardless of the theory of liability, a supervisory claim requires “a showing

that there was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of subordinates” before

finding liability on the part of the supervisory prison official. Allen v. Eckard, 804 F.

App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (concluding that failure to train and

supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants were meritless where the

plaintiff failed to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation).

To the extent Jones’s claims against Carney, Angelucci, or Garner stem from

their respective supervisory roles, they will be dismissed without prejudice because

there are no factual allegations to support any basis for a supervisory liability claim.

However, Jones will be allowed to amend his complaint to the extent he can allege facts

that describe “‘the actions taken by [the named] defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s

claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted).

C

Jones alleges that Vrato and Hurley prevented him from viewing his discovery

materials contrary to a court order issued by the judge overseeing his state criminal

prosecution and, relatedly, that Powell terminated his legal visit.7 The Court

understands Jones to allege that these acts violated his right to access the courts under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments and his right to the assistance of counsel under

the Sixth Amendment. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)

7 Jones’s Complaint is not clear as to whether he is proceeding pro se or with the assistance

of counsel in his criminal case. (Compare Compl. at 9, ¶ 12 (referring to the “preparation

for [his] pro se criminal defense”), with id. at 10, at ¶ 13 (alleging termination of an

“[o]fficial legal visit”).)

(recognizing that a constitutional right to effectively use the courts has been found in

the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause,

the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir.

2001) (noting that “the right to counsel and the right of access to the courts are

interrelated, since the provision of counsel can be a means of accessing the courts,” and

distinguishing the “access claims at issue in Lewis [v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996)]”

from the “Sixth Amendment right of a pretrial detainee, in a case brought against him

by the state, to utilize counsel in his defense”). Jones asserts that, owing to the

Defendants’ alleged interference, the state court delayed his criminal trial for eleven

months because the judge “sa[id] he would not hold the trial without [Jones] having had

the opportunity to review the discovery evidence.” (Compl. at 8.)

The Municipal Defendants argue that Jones fails to state a claim for interference

with his right of access to the courts. They assert that “only claims that involve ‘direct

or collateral attacks on a prisoner’s conviction or sentence, or civil rights suits

challenging the conditions of his confinement [can] support an access-to-courts injury,’”

and that Jones “alleges exactly as the Supreme Court instructs is a perfectly

constitutional consequence of conviction and incarceration—that his ability to prepare

for his trial was impaired.” (ECF No. 16 at 7 (first quoting Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th

909, 921 (3d Cir. 2022), then citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). This argument is

inapposite because, at the time of the events alleged in the Complaint, Jones had not

been convicted; he was a pretrial detainee, so the Defendants had no license to impose a

“consequence of conviction.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has previously rejected

the same argument the Municipal Defendants now make. See Prater v. City of

Philadelphia, 542 F. App’x 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (concluding that,

although access-to-courts claims brought by convicted prisoners are generally limited to

“only two types of cases—challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and

challenges involving conditions of confinement . . . because Prater had not been

convicted, we do not believe such a limitation is applicable”). “Further, although [Lewis

v.] Casey ‘limits the types of cases in which the prison must provide affirmative

assistance, it does not give free reign to prison authorities to interfere with and impede

a prisoner’s pursuit of other legal actions.’” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d

1311, 1317 (10th Cir.2010)).

Because the Municipal Defendants have failed to present a cognizable argument

entitling them to dismissal of Jones’s claims for denial of his rights to access the courts

and the assistance of counsel to prepare his defense, their Motion is denied as to these

claims. See Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 186 (holding that Lewis’s “actual injury”

requirement does not apply in the context of a pretrial detainee who claims prison

officials interfered with his access to counsel); cf. Harden v. Bodiford, 442 F. App’x 893,

897 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (vacating dismissal of pretrial detainee’s access-to-

courts claim “[b]ecause Harden’s undisputed allegations are sufficient, if believed, to

show that he was denied access to courts and suffered genuine prejudice, resulting in

prolonged incarceration”).

D

Jones asserts against Powell claims for excessive force under federal law and

assault and battery under state law. The Municipal Defendants’ Motion does not seek

dismissal of these claims, nor have they otherwise reported to them. These claims as

pled also survive statutory screening. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-

97 (2015) (holding that, to state a due process violation based on excessive force, a

pretrial detainee must allege facts to plausibly suggest that “that the force purposely or

knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable”).

Jones further alleges that Bright, Bellinger, and Duncan witnessed Powell’s

actions and did not intervene. “[A] corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating

can be the basis of liability for [a] . . . violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer

had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.”8 Smith v.

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). “[T]he duration of the incident is key to

determining whether there was a reasonable opportunity” to intervene, and an

incident’s “brevity may defeat a failure-to-intervene claim.” El v. City of Pittsburgh,

975 F.3d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citing Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 479

(3d Cir. 2018)). Yet an incident’s duration is generally a factual rather than legal issue,

particularly “where the event unfolds in multiple stages.” Id. (citing Mensinger, 293

F.3d at 644, 650); see also Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2014)

(“Whether the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene is normally a question for

8 Jones also alleges that a YesCare employee Nurse was present and failed to intervene.

(Compl. at 9.) However, because Jones has not identified—and the Court is unaware of—a

similar duty to intervene for a civilian employee who is not a corrections officer, any claim

for relief on that basis will be dismissed because it is not plausible. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

the jury, unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly

conclude otherwise.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Jones alleged that Powell first directed slurs at him and threatened physical

harm, then punched him, slammed him into a wall, and threw him to the ground.

(Compl. at 9.) The Municipal Defendants assert that because Jones claims only that

this happened “in view” of Bright, Bellinger, and Duncan, the allegations are

insufficient to suggest “that they actually viewed the incident—or had a realistic and

reasonable chance to intervene, if say, the incident was too short in time for

intervention.” (ECF No. 16 at 7.) Because Jones alleges that these Defendants

witnessed Powell threaten violence, then engage in three separate acts of physical

force, Jones sufficiently states a claim by describing an event that “unfold[ed] in

multiple stages.” El, 975 F.3d at 335. Accordingly, the Municipal Defendants’ Motion

is denied as to Jones’s failure-to-intervene claim against Bright, Bellinger, and Duncan.

E

Jones further alleges that, following the incident with Powell, Defendant

Bellinger and Sgt. Divers (not named as a Defendant) “issued a fraudulent misconduct

report . . . which falsely stated that they were the complainant and supervisor involved

in the incident.” (Compl. at 9.) Jones states that Defendant Harmer found him guilty

on the misconduct charges “after denying [Jones] a request for witness evidence, review

of surveillance camera footage, and his presence at the disciplinary hearing.”9 (Id.)

9 The Municipal Defendants assert that “[t]he City has not accepted service on behalf of

Captain Harmer.” (ECF No. 16 at 4 n.1.) This assertion is contradicted by the record. (See

ECF No. 12 at 3 (accepting electronic service on behalf of Defendant Harmer); see also ECF

No. 15 (entering appearance on behalf of Defendant Harmer).) Although the City’s Motion

makes no arguments on behalf of Harmer in relation to the due process claims (see ECF No.

Jones asserts that after this hearing he was “placed in the hole” on June 27, 2023, but

does not indicate how long that placement lasted. (Id.)

The Court understands Jones to allege that he was placed in disciplinary

segregation without due process. Although Jones cites various other constitutional

provisions, these claims arise—if at all—under the Fourteenth Amendment, since he

was a pretrial detainee during the relevant period. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d

150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment governs claims brought by pretrial detainees); Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran

Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable law, irrespective of

whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”).

To establish a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a pretrial detainee

must allege that the conditions of his confinement amount to punishment. Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); Camps v. Giorla, 843 F. App’ x 450, 452 (3d Cir.

2021) (per curiam) (“[A] court must determine whether the conditions complained of

were imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to a

legitimate governmental objective.”). In that regard, a “particular measure amounts to

punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of

detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a

legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in

light of that purpose.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting

Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)), abrogation on other grounds

16 at 8), the Court has nonetheless evaluated the plausibility of these claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, --- F.4th ---, No. 22-2846, 2024 WL 3820969 (3d

Cir. Aug. 15, 2024); see also Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that

“[g]enerally, prisons may sanction a pretrial detainee for misconduct that he commits

while awaiting trial, as long as it is not a punishment for the ‘underlying crime of which

he stands accused.’” Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1003-06 (7th Cir. 1999)). However, while “pretrial

detainees do not have a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison

population, they do have a liberty interest in not being detained indefinitely in

[disciplinary segregation] without explanation or review of their confinement.”

Singleton v. Superintendent Camp Hill SCI, 747 F. App’x 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) (per

curiam) (quoting Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 375).

With respect to pretrial detainees, “the imposition of disciplinary segregation for

violation of prison rules and regulations cannot be imposed without providing the due

process protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 . . . (1974).” Kanu, 739

F. App’x at 116. Those protections contemplate that a disciplinary hearing will be held,

“includ[ing] the right to receive written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before

the hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and a

written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken and the supporting

evidence.” Id. (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66); see also Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70.

“[T]he filing of a fraudulent misconduct report and related disciplinary sanctions do not

without more violate due process,” Seville v. Martinez, 130 F. App’x 549, 551 (3d Cir.

2005) (per curiam), because “[d]ue process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an

opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly false misconduct reports,”

Thomas v. McCoy, 467 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also Smith v.

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[S]o long as certain procedural

requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports,

without more, are not enough to state a due process claim.”).

Jones alleges a plausible due process claim. Like their argument regarding his

access-to-courts and -counsel claims, the Municipal Defendants’ Motion fails to

recognize that Jones’s status as a pretrial detainee distinguishes him from a convicted

prisoner in legally significant ways.10 While allegations of false misconduct reports

“without more” are insufficient to state a claim, here there is “more.” Jones has alleged

that the disciplinary hearing resulting from the purportedly falsified misconduct report

proceeded without the requisite due process protections for pretrial detainees as

outlined in Wolff. Specifically, he could not present witnesses or evidence, and he was

not allowed to be present at the disciplinary hearing, denying him the “opportunity to

be heard and to defend against the allegedly false misconduct reports.” Thomas, 467 F.

App’x at 97. The Court denies accordingly the motion as to these claims.

F

Jones asserts that, following the incident with Powell and his placement in

restricted housing, he “put in sick calls for treatment of injuries” that he suffered from

the alleged assault, “yet never received any treatment from nurses or other healthcare

10 Specifically, the Municipal Defendants argue that Jones has not pled a due process

violation because he has not alleged an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. (ECF No. 16 at 8.) This standard, however, applies to

convicted and sentenced prisoners and is inapplicable in the pretrial detainee context. See,

e.g., Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 69 n.4.

staff.” (Compl. at 9.) The Municipal Defendants’ Motion does not address this claim, as

Jones does not tie these allegations to any of the named Defendants. YesCare filed an

Answer with affirmative defenses on behalf of itself and any of its employees named as

Doe Defendants. (ECF No. 19.)

To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment,

a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent

to his serious medical needs.11 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). A

prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “A medical need is serious, . . . if it is

one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so

obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.

1987) (internal quotations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of

a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2)

delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a

prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier,

11 Because Jones was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question, the

Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 166. However, the

standard under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims related to a

prisoner’s medical needs is essentially the same for purposes of the analysis. See Parkell v.

Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see also Moore v. Luffey, No. 18-

1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at *3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2019) (declining to address whether a

new standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues related to

medical care).

182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need exists where “failure to treat

can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Not every complaint of inadequate

prison medical care rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Anderson v. Price, No.

22-3058, 2023 WL 5814664, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (per curiam). “Where a

prisoner is receiving some amount of medical treatment, [courts] presume that the

treatment is adequate absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”

Id. (affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claims on screening) (citing Brown v.

Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Hayes v. Gilmore,

802 F. App’x 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some

amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because

prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of

prisoners.”). Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding

proper medical treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See

Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235

(3d Cir. 2004). Further, “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison

doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical

prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate indifference.” Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

To the extent Jones intends to assert a claim for denial of medical treatment

against any of the Municipal Defendants, who are not medical professionals, he fails to

allege that any specific individual was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.

Those claims will be dismissed without prejudice to amendment. As YesCare has filed

an Answer to the claim for denial of medical treatment related to Jones’s injuries, that

claim may proceed.12

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part. To the extent Jones seeks release from custody or

dismissal of his criminal charges, or to impose liability on any named Defendant based

on a theory of respondeat superior, those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Any

claims for municipal liability against the City, individual-capacity claims for

supervisory liability, and any claims against the Municipal Defendants for denial of

medical treatment are dismissed without prejudice to amendment. The Motion to

Dismiss is denied in all other respects.

Jones may amend his Complaint before the case proceeds to discovery. In

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), all Defendants should submit

responsive pleadings to any amended complaint that Jones may file. Should Jones

choose not to file an amended complaint or fail to do so within the allotted time, the

following claims will proceed as currently pled in the operative Complaint:

• claims against Vrato and Hurley for denial of access to courts;

• claims against Powell for excessive force, assault and battery under state

law, and interference with the right to counsel;

12 YesCare’s Answer primarily concerns the treatment Jones has received for other medical

issues and denies that Jones sustained any injuries from Powell’s alleged assault. (ECF

No. 19 at 2.) Jones has requested that any personal medical information unrelated to his

excessive force claims that is included in YesCare’s Answer be redacted. (See ECF No. 21.)

The Clerk of Court will be directed to mark YesCare’s Answer as viewable by internal court

users only. YesCare is instructed to refrain from divulging personal medical information in

any future publicly available filings.

• claims against Bright, Bellinger, and Duncan for failure to intervene in

Powell’s alleged excessive force;

• claims against Bellinger and Harmer for due process violations; and

• claims against YesCare and its employees for denial of medical treatment.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.