PIETY FOLEY v. DREXEL UNIVERSITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARILYN GAYE PIETY FOLEY, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.

DREXEL UNIVERSITY, ROGER KURTZ NO. 22-1777

Defendants.

OPINION

Marilyn Gaye Piety Foley, an academic philosopher, has sued her employer, Drexel

University, and the head of her Department, Roger Kurtz, for hostile work environment and

retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et

seq., as amended; the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951;1

and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq; and;

for violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I).2 Defendants have

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Factual Allegations Made in Plaintiff’s Complaint are not Evidence

Before delving into the facts, some housekeeping: In both her response in opposition to the

Motion and her counterstatement of facts, Piety Foley often cites to her Verified Second Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”) as “evidence.” She maintains that it is proper to do so because it is not

“a mere pleading but is a verified Complaint, which is appropriate for opposing summary

1 The claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act against Roger Kurtz is for aiding and abetting.

2 Piety Foley’s Complaint also included a breach of contract claim, which she abandoned in her summary judgment

briefing.

judgment.”

There are potentially some very few instances where “[a] verified complaint may be treated

as an affidavit with evidentiary value at the summary-judgment stage[,]” McKay v. Krimmel, No.

22-1302, 2023 WL 4231714, *2 n.4 (3d Cir. June 28, 2023), but these instances are carefully

cabined. Generally, they involve pro se plaintiffs, see McCowan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-

3326, 2022 WL 742687, at *2 (E.D. Pa. March 10, 2020) (collecting cases), in coherence with the

well-settled maxim that “pro se complaints are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” See Wilson v. Maben, 676 F. Supp. 581, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1987)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

But Piety Foley has not pointed to any cases in which a verified complaint submitted by a

counseled plaintiff has been treated as providing facts sufficient to challenge a summary judgment

motion. Indeed, that would “seem to run afoul of the Third Circuit’s requirement that ‘[a]t

summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond

pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.’”

McCowan, 2022 WL 742687, at *2 (quoting Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d

Cir. 2000), cf. id. at *2 (“[D]iscovery . . . would be an incredible waste of clients’ money, attorneys’

time, and judicial resources if a counseled plaintiff could always rely on the allegations in her

verified complaint at summary judgment.”). Accordingly, any allegations that are exclusively

supported by “record cites” to the Complaint, including those allegations supported only by cites

to paragraphs of her counterstatement of facts that simply refer back to the Complaint are not

competent evidence and will not be considered in deciding this motion.

B. Piety Foley’s Concerns of “Academic Bullying”

Piety Foley is a scholar of the work of 19th century Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard

and is a tenured Professor of Philosophy in the Philosophy Program at Drexel University, which

is housed in the Department of English and Philosophy, of which Defendant Kurtz is Head. Piety

Foley’s work at Drexel began as a visiting professor in 1998. She became an Assistant Professor

in 2001, was promoted to Associate Professor (in 2007), and was promoted again to full Professor

in 2016, making her the only tenured full Professor of Philosophy.3

According to Piety Foley, she has long been the target of gender-based bullying and

harassment perpetrated by several of her colleagues, namely: (1) Pete Amato, who is a Teaching

Professor and who has been the Director of the Philosophy Program since 2010; (2) Jacques

Catudal, who was an Associate Professor and, at various times, was the Director of the Philosophy

Program; (3) Kurtz, the Head of her Department since Fall 2017; (4) Andrew Smith, who is a

tenured full Professor of Philosophy and the Associate Program Director; (5) Abioseh Porter, who

is a Professor of English and was the Head of the Department until 2015; and (6) Ray Brebach,

who is an English Professor.

Even though Plaintiff believes that her Department is a “boy’s club” from which she has

suffered for years, the Defendants believe quite to the contrary. They say it is just an unpleasant

place to work: the personalities in the Department are “difficult,” people who work there have

“sharp elbows,” and aren’t always “civil to each other.” They maintain that the bad behavior of

which Piety Foley complains was “not directed specifically at [her], or even at women in general,

based on their gender.” Indeed, one of their colleagues stated that these patterns of behavior are

patterns across the University: “it’s almost the nature of academia.”

But Piety Foley is not buying it. She says that the bullying began after she published a

translation of two of Kierkegaard’s works for Oxford University Press and a book on

3 Her colleague, Andrew Smith, was promoted to full professor after the events described in the Complaint.

Kierkegaard’s epistemology for Baylor University Press in 2009 and 2010. She believes that these

publications made her “threatening” to her male colleagues, and thus a prime target for the

“academic bullying” she contends is commonly perpetrated against productive female scholars.

She describes the “academic bullying” as occurring across a period of more than thirteen years and

taking many forms, as set forth more fully below.

Piety Foley filed several official and unofficial complaints regarding this behavior with

Drexel’s Office of Equality and Diversity (“OED”). But, she says, after she filed a formal OED

complaint on May 5, 2020, the bullying did not stop. In August of that year, she dual-filed the

first of several complaints with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), in which she alleged Drexel and

Kurtz discriminated and retaliated against her based on her gender. Then a few months later, she

dual-filed a second charge with the EEOC and PHRC asserting more of the same. The EEOC

issued Notice of Right to Sue Letters on February 8, 2022, for both complaints. Then, on April

17, 2022, Piety Foley dual-filed a third charge, again alleging gender-based discrimination and

retaliation by Drexel and Kurtz. Ten days later, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue as to

the third charge. She subsequently filed this action.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A genuine dispute does not mean “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis added). Rather, “[a] genuine issue

is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find

in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof.” Doe v. Abington Friends Sch.,

480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986)).

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the “nonmoving party has failed to make

a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden

of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment

rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses[.]”).

To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not merely deny the allegations

in the moving party’s pleadings; instead [she] must show where in the record there exists a genuine

dispute over a material fact.” Doe, 480 F.3d at 256. Thus, summary judgment is “put up or shut

up” time for the non-moving party. Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.

2006) (citing Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir.

1985)). While “the nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor[,]’” Hunt v. Cormartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (emphasis added), “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with

facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or

oral argument.” Berkeley, 455 F.3d at 201 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,

772 F.2d at 1109-10).

When reviewing the record, the Court must “view the facts and draw reasonable

inferences” in favor of the nonmoving party,” but “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007) (emphasis added).

Further,“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” United States ex. Rel. Greenfield v.

Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII and PHRA Hostile Work Environment

i. Hostile Work Environment

To succeed on her Title VII/PHRA4 hostile work environment claim Plaintiff must show:

“(1) [she] suffered intentional discrimination because of [her] sex; (2) the discrimination was

severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected [her]; (4) the discrimination

would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) the existence of

respondeat superior liability.”5 Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.

2013); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . .

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

Defendants focus their challenge on elements one and two: they maintain that they are entitled to

summary judgment on Piety Foley’s hostile work environment claim because there is “absolutely

nothing in the record that establishes” that she suffered any intentional, gender-based

discrimination, or that the conduct described was sufficiently severe or pervasive.

It is important to note at the outset that “‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack

of good manners’. . . normally do not create an actionable Title VII violation,” including for a

hostile work environment. Yarnall v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 57 F. Supp.3d 410, 433 (E.D. Pa. 2014)

4 “Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.” Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d

447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006).

5 The familiar burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) does not

apply to hostile work environment claims because “there can be no legitimate justification for a hostile work

environment.” Moody v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 213 n.11 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Pollard v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2000)).

(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). The statute “does

not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68

(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). “[T]he ordinary

tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes,

and occasional teasing,” however objectionable, do not rise to the “extreme” level necessary to

“change . . . the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 788 (1998) (quotation omitted). Third Circuit precedent is replete with examples of untoward,

demeaning and/or insulting conduct that nonetheless did not—as a matter of law—create a hostile

work environment. See, e.g., Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 572 (3d Cir. 2023).

a. Intentional Sex-Based Discrimination

1. Legal Standard

It is, under Title VII, “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate

against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The

first element of a hostile work environment claim—intentional discrimination “because of” sex—

requires a “but for” causal relationship between the offensive treatment and membership in a

protected class. Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005). The element is met

if the record contains sufficient competent evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

the plaintiff’s sex was “a substantial factor in the harassment, and that if [she] had been [a man]

she would have not been treated in the same manner.” Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85

F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).

6 The 1991 amendment to the Act further specifies that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful

employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor

for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.’” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). However, the provision applies only to “mixed-

motive” discrimination cases, Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2000), and is not implicated

in hostile work environment claims.

This does not, of course, mean that only overtly discriminatory behavior should be

considered: “[T]he advent of more sophisticated and subtle forms of discrimination requires that

we analyze the aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, including

those concerning incidents of facially neutral mistreatment, in evaluating” the claim. Cardenas v.

Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). A viable hostile work

environment claim can be premised on a combination of overtly discriminatory conduct or

comments and otherwise facially neutral conduct that, when analyzed alongside the discriminatory

conduct, forms “a complex tapestry of discrimination.” Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083. It, accordingly, is

“improper to isolate incidents of facially neutral harassment and conclude, one by one, that each

lacks the required discriminatory animus.” Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir. 2006),

overruled in part on other grounds by Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 53.

At the same time, however, the Court cannot simply adopt Piety Foley’s subjective belief

about what happened. At her deposition, she regularly premised her gender discrimination

contentions on her perception, opinion, assumptions, and speculations. Standing alone, these

beliefs do not suffice to defeat Defendants’ Motion. See Wood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 395 F. App’x

810, 815 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential).

To be actionable, conduct the Plaintiff “subjectively perceive[s]” as hostile or abusive

must also “create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; see Schwartz

v. Nicomatic, Inc., No. 17-2516, 2017 WL 6606888, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2017) (granting

summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim where the plaintiff “offer[ed] no evidence

[her colleagues’] comments were based on her gender besides her own perception it was because

she was a woman”). Without more, an “inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not

create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment.” Robertson

v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield

Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he non-movant may not rest on speculation and

conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment.”) (citing Acumed LLC v. Advanced

Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009)).

2. Incidents Underlying Piety Foley’s Claim

The first step in evaluating Piety Foley’s hostile work environment claim, then, is to

“identif[y] the conduct that a reasonable jury could label” discriminatory. Jensen, 435 F.3d at

451.7 Piety Foley points to the following incidents8 as evidence of widespread sex discrimination

in the Department of English and Philosophy, which she argues illustrate how she has suffered

intentional discrimination because of her sex.9

i. Another Professor’s OED Complaints

Piety Foley raises two OED complaints alleging discrimination, which were filed by

7 To buttress her claim of intentional, gender-based discrimination, Piety Foley references scholarly articles on

“academic bullying” that she contends “describe[] in detail that [the harassment she suffered] are the kinds of

behaviors that female academics are subjected to that males are generally not subjected to.” Although she referred to

such articles in her deposition, neither she nor the Defendants included any of them in the evidentiary record docketed

in connection with the summary judgment briefing. This is in contravention of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,

which requires record evidence in support of factual assertions made in the briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). And the rule

makes admirable sense: if the evidence is not in the record, then the Court cannot determine its admissibility, its

relevancy, or how, if at all, it bears on the matters to be decided. Accordingly, these academic articles will not be

considered in deciding the motion.

8 In her briefing, Piety Foley does not address each of the instances set forth in her Complaint which she alleges

support her hostile work environment claim. Rather, she invites the Court to take a look at the Complaint for other

discriminatory “events in the record.” Leaving aside that allegations contained in her Complaint are not “events in

the record,” it is not the Court’s responsibility to do Plaintiff’s work for her by combing through the record to find

sufficiently supported evidence reflecting intentional, sex-based discrimination. On the contrary, it is expressly Piety

Foley’s job to “designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007)

(citing In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002)).

9 Although these incidents are discussed separately, their contribution to a hostile work environment are analyzed ut

totum. Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 261-62.

another female professor in the Department in 2015 and in 2022. An internal investigation of the

2015 complaint concluded that the Department was a “hostile work environment.” Nevertheless,

outside counsel, hired to investigate the 2022 complaint, concluded there was no sex

discrimination and, according to Piety Foley, that the professor’s complaints were “all in her

head.”10 Piety Foley argues that these complaints are evidence of “[w]idespread [d]iscrimination

in the Department.” “[W]hether evidence of discrimination against other employees by other

supervisors is relevant is fact based and depends on several factors, including how closely related

the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167

(citation omitted). Such evidence is especially helpful “in determining whether facially neutral

conduct on the part of [a defendant] was actually based on” the plaintiff’s protected status. Caver,

420 F.3d at 264 (citations omitted). In short, these OED complaints are relevant to Plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claims in that a rational factfinder could look to them to determine

whether, in this case, Piety Foley suffered intentional sex discrimination. See Tourtellote, 636 F.

App’x at 847; Caver, 420 F.3d at 264.

ii. Gender-Based Course Assignments

Piety Foley argues that intentional discrimination can be found in the “dramatic,

documented disparity between male and female tenure-line philosophy professors in the

assignment of introductory courses as well as upper-level courses.” Indeed, in the years 2011-

2023, women professors taught sixty-two introductory courses, while men taught forty-three.

Those disparities grow when comparing tenure-line, “research active” faculty members: the two

such women who taught those sixty-two introductory courses were both tenure-line, “research

active” faculty members; the two men who fit the bill, i.e., are actively publishing, taught only

10 Piety Foley, in essence, asks the Court to take a second look to reconsider the resolution of this second complaint,

which the Court declines to do.

thirteen such courses.11 Piety Foley argues that assignment of introductory courses can materially

impact one’s career in that teaching introductory courses pulls one away from research in one’s

area of expertise, which makes it harder to publish, which—in the dog eat dog world of

contemporary academia—is likely to have a negative impact on one’s career prospects.

Defendants argue that drawing any inference of sex discrimination from this disparity is

unreasonable because, per Kurtz’s testimony,12 courses are “not being scheduled according to

gender[,]” but are instead “done according to . . . faculty preferences. . . . We look at first at what

courses we need for any given term. We lay out what those courses are. We give faculty [sic]

opportunity to tell us what courses they want to teach. We assign them as much as possible

according to their preferences.” Moreover, Amato, the Director of the Philosophy Program who

was deeply involved in, if not primarily responsible for, scheduling, testified that the teaching

assignments reflect the individual teaching preferences of the professors, the needs of the program,

and the needs of the students. There is also record evidence reflecting that in situations where an

upper-level course is not filling fast enough, the assigned professor is asked (or volunteers) to take

on an introductory section that is filling.

At trial, a jury could very well credit these sex-neutral explanations for the disparity in

introductory teaching assignments. But it may conclude to the contrary that: (1) the appropriate

comparison is between tenure-line, “research active” faculty; and, (2) considering the nearly five-

to-one disparity in introductory courses taught by women versus men in that category, Kurtz’s and

11 During this period, Jacques Catudal, who was no longer “research active,” taught thirty introductory courses.

12 Piety Foley cites Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2005) for the proposition that the Court may not

consider Kurtz’s testimony at summary judgment because he is a named defendant, and therefore an “interested

witness.” However, Hill does not preclude “a party from presenting his own testimony on a summary judgment

motion.” DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 271-72. Rather, “in considering a motion for summary judgment the court should

believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently implausible even if the testimony is that of an interested

witness.” Id. at 272.

Amato’s ostensibly neutral behavior is better thought of “as part of a complex tapestry of

discrimination.” Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083. In this way, the assignment of introductory courses is

“evidence from which a jury could conclude” that Defendants “set [Piety Foley] up to fail.”

Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 262 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). The disparities in teaching introductory

courses thus informs the Court’s analysis of Piety Foley’s hostile work environment claim as well.

iii. Cancellation of Courses

Piety Foley next draws attention to the lopsided cancellation of courses on the eve of term

(fifteen of the seventeen courses cancelled were assigned to female faculty). Although she

provides sufficient factual support for the proposition that most of the courses canceled in the years

2017-22 were assigned to women, she does not provide any evidence that Kurtz and Amato

cancelled courses because of the gender of the assigned professor, or that they targeted Piety Foley

in course cancellations.13 Her belief that this was the case is speculation:

Q. You are not the only professor who has had classes cancel, right?

A. No, but I’ll get you anything, I don’t have those statistics, that I’ve more courses

canceled on me than anyone else.

Q. And that is gender discrimination, is that your testimony?

A. I believe that is the primary reason, yes.

Putting speculation aside, the record evidence demonstrates that low student enrollment

drives class cancellations, e.g., email exchange between Piety Foley and Amato about impending

cancellation of one of her 300-level classes due to low enrollment and her decision to teach a more

popular 100-level instead. In other words, unlike the assignment of introductory courses, which

13 Piety Foley also contends that Amato purposefully scheduled her to teach courses that he knew would get cancelled,

including by scheduling two professors to teach classes on the same subject during the same term. She does not,

however, provide any factual support for this beyond her own speculative deposition testimony.

is controlled by Defendants, courses are cancelled when not enough students sign up. Cancellation

of classes—albeit that the numbers skew to female taught classes—is not, then, something that

supports Piety Foley’s contention that there was widespread, sex-based discrimination in her

Department. See Nesmith v. Catalent USA Packaging, LLC, No. 21-5594, 2023 WL 3997955, at

*4 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2023).

ii. Kierkegaard Course Assignment

Piety Foley also takes issue with how Amato and Kurtz assigned a 400-level course on

Kierkegaard to a non-tenured female professor, Stacy Ake, in 2020, without first consulting her.

Not only, she says, was the assignment in violation of Department policy that “[t]enure-line faculty

are given priority in teaching/scheduling preferences,” but, more importantly, there is evidence

that it was applied differentially according to sex. Specifically, when she sought to teach a course

on the Philosophy of Mind, Amato told her that she would have to check with a non-tenure line

male adjunct professor who did not even have a PhD. Piety Foley, on the other hand, “was not

extended the same courtesy with respect to the Kierkegaard course.”

Whatever the exact nature of the Department’s policy—the parties differ as to whether the

policy applied to her and, if it did, how it applied to her—there is a material dispute that could lead

a rational factfinder to conclude that it was applied differentially based on gender. In that when

Piety Foley wanted to teach Philosophy of Mind, Amato directed her to run the idea by a non-

tenured male colleague, but when Amato approached Ake about teaching the Kierkegaard course,

he did not direct her to consult with Piety Foley—her tenured female colleague. A rational

factfinder could conclude in this circumstance that Piety Foley was intentionally treated less well

than her non-tenured male colleague on account of her gender.

iii. Who Holds Power in the Department

Next, Piety Foley maintains that “men disproportionately hold power in the Department”

which, she says, is “material fact” sufficient to defeat summary judgment. But even if she had

properly supported this contention with citations to documents other than her Complaint, which

she did not, absent more it would not be reasonable under present law for a jury to infer from the

fact that a woman has never been Department Head or Philosophy Program Director while Piety

Foley has worked at Drexel, that she was subjected to intentional discrimination because of her

sex. Any such inference would implicitly rely on the premise that people from social groups that

historically have held power necessarily discriminate against those who have not. Because the

Supreme Court has rejected the “presum[ption] that individuals will act a certain way based on

their membership in a protected class,” that inference would be improper. LaVeglia v. TD Bank,

N.A., No. 2:19-cv-01917, 2020 WL 2512802, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2020) (citing Oncale, 523

U.S. at 78 ([T]his Court has rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not

discriminate against members of his own race”)); cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499

(1977).

iv. Piety Foley’s Promotion to Full Professor

Next, even though Piety Foley was promoted to full professor in 2015, she contends that

her promotion was “almost thwarted by sex discrimination,” in that, as her promotion committee

chair Richard Astro explained, her promotion process was briefly stalled because: (1) there were

questions about one of the more than seventy courses she had taught at Drexel; and, (2) some of

the links she had inserted into the table of contents of her application materials did not work

efficiently. The Defendants point to evidence that the promotion committee had other, more

substantive concerns about Piety Foley’s application, including concerns about her teaching and

publishing record.14 That there were some small glitches in a promotion process that eventually

lead to her promotion is not on the record here evidence that she suffered intentional, sex-based

discrimination. See Nesmith, 2023 WL 3997955, at *4.

v. The Audi Visit

Piety Foley also maintains that intentional discrimination is illustrated by incidents in

which several of her colleagues—Amato, Smith, and Catudal in particular—boycotted dinners she

had arranged for a visiting scholar, Robert Audi, “one of the most prominent philosophers in the

country.” At the first such dinner, no other philosophy faculty members attended, and none let

Piety Foley know that they would be absent; it became clear to Piety Foley that her colleagues

“had organized an alternative to [another] Audi dinner.” Attendance was sparse at Audi’s

subsequent visits. A reasonable jury could point to both: (1) the overall contentious relationship

that Piety Foley had with her male colleagues, see Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 261-62; and, (2) the

repeated poor attendance at Audi’s talks despite his prominence in the field to conclude that, in

fact, they had intentionally refused to attend Piety Foley’s dinners as “part of a complex tapestry

of discrimination,” Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083.

Piety Foley also says Kurtz and Amato showed “hostility” toward her when she requested

Departmental monies to take Audi and some students to lunch. Amato rejected the request on the

grounds that Audi’s scholarship was too specialized for Drexel students and because the request

was for a “private lunch.” Piety Foley submits that her funding request was refused because she

14 Piety Foley argues that the Defendants may not support their version of the facts nor contradict Piety Foley’s

recitation by using various emails and other documents because they are “hearsay statements that would be

inadmissible at trial.” But so long as the authors of the emails or the notes are available to testify at trial regarding the

matters discussed—which Defendants have indicated they are, see Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of

Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2016), they may be considered at summary judgment. Id. at 238 (“The

proponent need only ‘explain the admissible form that is anticipated.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory

committee’s note to 2010 amendment).

was a woman. First, she avers in her Complaint that no male colleagues have been refused

Department funds to take students out to lunch. But there is nothing in the record to support that

contention, so it will not be considered in determining this summary judgment motion. See

Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 178. Second, she says that when she went to Kurtz to request the funds, he

accused her of attempting to “misappropriate” department funds. There is some back and forth

between the parties as to whether Kurtz actually used the word “misappropriate” when they

discussed whether she could use funds for this lunch. But even if a rational jury could conclude

from the evidence presented by the parties on this issue that Kurtz had in fact used the word, it

would not be reasonable to conclude on the record facts here that its use in this context suggests

that Kurtz’s initial refusal to fund the lunch stemmed from “sexist hostility.”

vi. Use of Piety Foley’s Married Name Against her Wishes

Finally, Piety Foley complains that although she expressed her desire to use her maiden

name (Piety) professionally and her married name (Piety Foley) in her personal life, Catudal and

others—out of a sexist desire to humiliate her—used her married name. When she registered that

name with Drexel’s Office of Payroll and Benefits, “as she was required to do so for pay, benefits,

and tax purposes,” she requested that she continue to be referred to by her maiden name

professionally, i.e., on her syllabi and on course lists, but was told that it could not be done. She

tried to change her name to Piety on her University e-mail, but her e-mails kept coming from

“Marilyn Foley.” And, when she asked her colleagues to continue to refer to her by her maiden

name, “some of them, including Catudal, refused to honor [the] request.”

Defendants respond with citations to the record that illustrate, they say, that she was far

from clear as to what surname she wanted them to use. They cite to a November 29, 2021, email

from one professor in which he notes that Piety Foley “appears to have input her name in an intra-

departmental survey as ‘Marilyn Piety Foley,’ which is apparently not how she wants her name

listed for official purposes.” They note that she made contributions to a publication “Kierkegaard’s

God and the Good Life” in her married name—“Marilyn Gaye Piety Foley”. And, that she referred

to herself in her professional blog and in commenting on students’ assignments as “Marilyn

Foley”. Further, she requested that her name be listed in Drexel’s Directory as both “Marilyn

Foley” and either “Marilyn Piety” or “M.G. Piety” (although she indicated her preference to be

listed in the Directory under “Piety”).

Thus, the record evidence suggests that Catudal and others use of her married rather than

her maiden name stems from confusion rather than discriminatory intent.

******

In sum, only some of the incidents that form the basis of Piety Foley’s claim are both:

(1) supported by the record; and, (2) took place in circumstances in which a rational jury could

conclude that Defendants subjected her to intentional discrimination based on her sex. The next

question is whether these incidents, taken as a whole, were either severe or pervasive.

b. Severe or Pervasive Discrimination.

To prevail on her hostile work environment claim, Piety Foley must show that her

workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive

working environment . . . .” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Severe” and “pervasive” harassment are two distinct types of

hostile work environments. “[S]ome harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an

environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the

workplace only if it is pervasive.” Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017).

“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not

amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524

U.S. at 788 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it is not enough that

“the employee subjectively perceives [the work environment] as abusive or hostile[.]” Ullrich

v. U.S. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs., 457 F. App’x 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential) (citing

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough “to create an objectively

hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile

or abusive[.]” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added).

The Defendants contend that none of the conduct of which she complains is sufficiently

severe and that the incidents of which she complains “are spread out over a span of more than 13

years, sometimes with years between claims.”

Turning first to the question of whether the events here, taken as a whole, constitute severe

harassment. The Third Circuit has vindicated hostile work environment claims predicated on

severe harassment only in cases involving substantially more serious misconduct, such as the use

of racial slurs or sexual harassment and assault. See, e.g., Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Com. Pl.,

50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2020); Moody, 870 F.3d at 215; Castleberry, 863 F.3d

at 265-66; Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1999). The events

underlying Piety Foley’s claim share little in common with these cases. Indeed, many can only

reasonably be treated as “isolated incidents” that are not “extremely serious” as “sufficient to

sustain a hostile work environment claim.” Caver, 420 F.3d at 262 (quotation omitted).

Second, the events supported by the record are too spread out temporally to constitute

pervasive harassment. In cases alleging pervasive harassment, plaintiffs seek to remedy “the

cumulative effect of a thousand cuts,” and acts “which are not individually actionable” but “may

be aggregated to make out a . . . claim.” O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-28 (3d

Cir. 2006). Such claims “must demonstrate a continuous period of harassment.” Drinkwater

v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.22d 853, 863 (3d Cir. 1990). At the summary judgment stage, the

plaintiff cannot rest on “general, unsubstantiated allegations that the alleged conduct occurred

‘regularly’ or ‘all the time.’” Nitkin, 67 F.4th at 571.

Although Piety Foley’s Department was far from a model workplace, a rational factfinder

could not conclude that these incidents, which took place over the course of more than a decade,

amounted to the sort of “steady barrage of opprobrious . . . comments” that characterize claims of

pervasive harassment. Al-Salem v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 97-6843, 1999 WL

167729, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999) (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110-11

(2d Cir. 1997)). Hostile work environment claims require discrimination to take place with far

greater frequency to be sustained. See, e.g., Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 258-59, 263 (holding that a

rational factfinder could find a hostile work environment where, over the course of about three

years, the plaintiff, a Hispanic man: (1) had been called “the boy from the barrio” and “an

affirmative-action hire;” was asked “why he had anglicized his name” and “whether [he] intended

to pull out a switchblade” to resolve workplace disagreements; (3) had his cubicle regularly

defaced with “derogatory” messages, including one that called him a “wetback”; (4) had his

performance ratings systematically lowered compared to his White colleagues’; and, (5) had been

given “knowingly contradictory instructions and assignments incompatible with his staff

resources” to damage his career); Durham, 166 F.3d at 145-46, 155 (affirming the finding of

pervasive harassment where, within two years, the plaintiff, a female insurance agent: (1) was told

that she “made too much money for a goddamn woman;” (2) was propositioned by her manager

who “reminded her that he had the power to fire her if she did not behave as he wished;” (3) was

ignored at an awards dinner despite being the top salesperson; (4) was deprived of support

resources that her male colleagues were given; (5) was “grabbed on the buttocks from behind;”

(6) was assigned a “heavy load” of less lucrative accounts that she did not have experience

handling; and, (7) had her office taken away along with the documents necessary to carry out her

job). Indeed, hostile work environment claims involving significantly more frequent instances of

discrimination have been rejected. See, e.g., Ali v. Woodbridge Twp. Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 174, 182

(3d Cir. 2020) (holding that an Egyptian-American Muslim was not subjected to pervasive

harassment when, over about a year, he was twice greeted as “Arabia Nights” and “Big Egypt,”

was asked if “they had computers in Egypt,” and was called “Mufasa” in reference to the character

from “The Lion King”); Sherrod v. Phila. Gas Works, 57 F. App’x 68, 7576 (3d Cir. 2003) (not

precedential) (holding that two racist comments in six months did not constitute a hostile work

environment).

In that a rational factfinder could not find that Piety Foley was subjected to severe or

pervasive harassment, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on her hostile work

environment claims under Title VII and the PHRA.

ii. Hostile Work Environment – Title IX

To succeed on her hostile work environment claim brought under Title IX, Piety Foley

must demonstrate: (1) a sexually hostile educational environment; (2) that she provided actual

notice to “an appropriate person” who had the authority to pursue corrective measures; and, (3)

that the institution’s response to the abuse amounted to deliberate indifference. Gebser v. Lago

Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291–92 (1998). Piety Foley must establish “that she suffered

intentional discrimination because of her sex, the discrimination was pervasive and regular, the

discrimination detrimentally affected her, and the discrimination would have detrimentally

affected a reasonable person of her sex in her position.” Bennet v. Pa. Hosp. Sch. of Nurse

Anesthesia, No. 01-CV-4098, 2002 WL 32341792, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2002) (citing Davis

v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)). In short, with the exception of notice

and deliberate indifference, “the operative elements” of a hostile work environment claim under

Title VII and Title IX are “essentially the same.” Colavecchia v. S. Side Area Sch. Dist., No. 2:22-

CV-01804, 2023 WL 3034777, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2023). Accordingly, for the reasons set

forth above, Piety Foley has likewise failed to present sufficient evidence in support of her hostile

work environment claim under Title IX.

B. Title VII and PHRA Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Piety Foley must “tender

evidence that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse

employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in

the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461

F.3d 331, 341-40 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).

If Piety Foley establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework requires the Defendants to provide a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its conduct.

Id. at 340–41. If the Defendants carry this burden, Piety Foley must “convince the factfinder both

that the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the

adverse employment action.” Id. at 342. “The onus is on [Piety Foley] to establish causation at

two stages of the case: initially, to demonstrate a causal connection as part of the prima facie case,

and at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework to satisfy her ultimate burden of

persuasion by proving pretext.” Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d

Cir. 2017).

Although the briefing on Piety Foley’s claim of retaliation is muddled, it appears that the

parties dispute: (1) whether any of the retaliatory actions of which she complains are materially

adverse; and, (2) whether Piety Foley has established a causal connection between those actions

and her protected activity.

Piety Foley argues that the following actions were retaliation for having filed her first OED

complaint in May 2020: (1) Kurtz and Amato scheduling her to teach a 400-level course on

Kierkegaard in the term immediately following the Kierkegaard course taught by Stacy Ake; (2)

Kurtz and Amato scheduling her to teach a 200-level course after she refused to teach the 400-

level course on Kierkegaard; (3) Amato scheduling her and Catudal to teach courses on the

dialogues of Plato during the same semester; (4) that she was the last professor in the department

to receive a computer upgrade; (5) Kurtz ignoring her requests to discuss the effects of the COVID-

19 pandemic on women in higher education; (6) Catudal sending an email to all philosophy faculty

that Piety Foley interpreted as “disparaging” her teaching; (7) Amato refusing to reschedule an

event for philosophy majors after she asked him to do so; (8) Kurtz appointing a different professor

to a committee even though she had volunteered for the position; (9) Kurtz not specifying in her

2020 annual review that one of the courses she taught was new and stated that she was an “active

scholar” rather than that she exceeded the number of publications necessary to be an “active

scholar”; (10) Catudal heckling her during a talk she gave on tenure and promotion, and Kurtz

asking to view the recording of the talk; (12) Kurtz turning down the opportunity to house the

Religious Studies Program in the Department; and, (13) Kurtz demanding that she retract her OED

complaint against him.

Many of these issues remain allegations not supported by record evidence: Piety Foley

cites to her complaint but nothing more. Her allegation that Kurtz ignored her requests to discuss

the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women in higher education; her allegation that Catudal

heckled her during a talk she gave on tenure and promotion; her allegation that Kurtz asked to

view the recording of that talk to intimidate her; and her allegation that Kurtz demanded she rescind

her OED complaint against him are all improperly supported. Similarly, her claim that Kurtz

conspired with Catudal to appoint another professor to serve on the bylaws committee is supported

only by citations to her complaint and her own speculative deposition testimony.

Other complained-of actions were not in the control of the Defendants. The fact that the

Religious Studies Program did not merge into the philosophy Department was a “dean-level

decision” not a decision made by Kurtz. That Piety Foley purportedly received her computer

upgrade late has nothing to do with Kurtz (or any other professor in the Department) because the

process of upgrading the faculty computers was under the control of Drexel’s IT Department. And

the only “evidence” Piety Foley has submitted that the delayed computer upgrade was retaliatory

or rooted in discriminatory animus is her own conjecture:

Q. Do you have any information or knowledge – do you actually know of Doctor

Kurtz putting you on some kind of low-priority list with respect to your computer

upgrade?

A. Epistemology, which is the study of knowledge, is one of my specializations.

The only thing you can know with certainty [are] mathematical truths. Everything

else is probabilistic. . . . I cannot prove that that’s the case . . . . I have the pattern

that suggests that that might have been the case.

But her speculation is unsupported by the record evidence: she did not immediately receive

her upgraded computer because the supplying company did not initially ship the full quantity of

the requested computers, and Piety Foley’s specified model and color was not included in the

initial shipment.

As for the remaining concerns raised by Piety Foley—that Kurtz and Amato scheduled

Piety Foley to teach a 400-level course on Kierkegaard in the term immediately following the

Kierkegaard course taught by Stacy Ake; that Kurtz and Amato scheduled Piety Foley to teach a

200-level course after she refused to teach the 400-level course on Kierkegaard; that Amato

scheduled Piety Foley and Catudal to teach courses on the dialogues of Plato during the same

semester; that Catudal sent an email to all philosophy faculty that Piety Foley interpreted as

“disparaging” her teaching; that Amato refused to reschedule an event for philosophy majors after

Piety Foley asked him to do so; and, that Kurtz did not specify in Piety Foley’s 2020 annual review

that one of the courses she taught was new and stated that she was an “active scholar” rather than

that she exceeded the number of publications necessary to be an “active scholar”—Piety Foley

must show that “a reasonable employee would have found [the alleged conduct] materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181,

195 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). None of these allegations

describe materially adverse employment actions—Piety Foley has not established that this conduct

resulted in any economic loss, change to the terms of her employment, or really any injury or harm

beyond feelings of insult, annoyance, or frustration. See Morrison v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 193

Fed. App’x 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential); Lecadre v. Att’y Gen. of Pa., No. 23-2898,

2024 WL 2763829, at *3 (3d Cir. May 30, 2024) (finding “satisfactory” rating in performance

review not adverse employment action); Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 419 (3d Cir. 2003)

(declining to find adverse actions where the “alleged retaliatory acts were criticism, false

accusations or verbal reprimands.”). The Court must “remain mindful that it is important to

separate significant from trivial harms because an employee’s decision to report discriminatory

behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often

take place at work and that all employees experience.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Thus, even

with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Piety Foley, a rational jury could not conclude

that she has established a prima facie case of retaliation against the Defendants.15

C. Equal Pay Act

To prevail on her claim under the Equal Pay Act, Piety Foley must “first establish a prima

facia case by demonstrating that employees of the opposite sex were paid differently for

performing ‘equal work’—work of substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under

similar working conditions.” Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting

E.E.O.C. v. Del. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1989)).

If she so succeeds, then the Defendants must “demonstrate the applicability of one of the

four affirmative defenses specified in the Act.” Id. (“The Equal Pay Act prohibits differential pay

for men and women when performing work ‘except where such payment is made pursuant to’ one

of the four affirmative defenses. We read the highlighted language of the statute as requiring that

the employer submit evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude not merely that

the employer’s proffered reasons could explain the wage disparity, but that the proffered reasons

do in fact explain the wage disparity.”) (internal citation omitted). These four defenses are: “(i) a

bona fide seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity

or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor other than sex.” Frintner v.

TruePosition, 892 F. Supp.2d 699, 708 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Stanziale,

200 F.3d at 107 n.6). Because the Defendants would bear the burden of proof at trial as to these

affirmative defenses, here they must “prove at least one affirmative defense ‘so clearly that no

15 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX, Piety Foley must “prove she engaged in activity

protected by Title IX, she suffered an adverse action, and there was a causal connection between the two.” Doe v.

Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 564 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-42). Courts in the Third

Circuit “apply the same standard for a retaliation claim whether raised under Title VII, Title IX, or the PHRA.”

Williams v. Pennridge Sch. Dist., 782 Fed. App’x 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2019) (not precedential) (citing Woodson v. Scott

Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)). Thus, for the same reasons provided, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Piety Foley’s Title IX claim will be granted.

rational jury could find to the contrary.’” Id. at 107 (quoting Del. Depot of Health, 865 F.2d 1408,

1414 (3d Cir. 1989).

The Defendants argue that Piety Foley’s claim falters at the jump because there is no wage

disparity. She, they say, was the highest-paid and highest-ranking member of the Philosophy

program at the time she filed this lawsuit. The second highest paid member of the Philosophy

program is Flavia Padovani, who is also female.16 Piety Foley counters by pointing out that from

2018 through 2021, Catudal—who is a “lower-ranking” male professor—was paid more than she

was. When asked about this discrepancy, Drexel’s 30(b)(6) witness explained that Catudal started

working at Drexel 20 years prior to Piety Foley’s arrival and had served in several administrative

roles, including Department Head and Vice Provost: Thus, Catudal would have received annual

raises in the form or either cost of living increases or merit increases for those additional 20 years,

and he would have received a salary bump for his work as Department Head and Vice Provost—

as contrasted with Piety Foley who has not served in any administrative capacity associated with

an increase in salary. Although these factors could explain the wage disparity, even the Defendants

recognize that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to establish that these facts do in fact

explain the wage disparity. As Kurtz, testifying in his capacity as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness stated:

“[T]hat would possibly be another reason for the discrepancy here.” Thus, there is a disputed issue

of material fact as to whether that reason may be gender and Piety Foley’s Equal Pay Act claim

must go to trial.

16 Piety Foley argues that the salary charts provided by the Defendants are hearsay documents that cannot be used at

summary judgment. The Defendants counter, with citation to United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 667 (3d Cir.

2011), that the salary charts would be admissible at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, which permits the use

of a summary of voluminous records that are otherwise admissible. Such explanation is sufficient under Fraternal

Order, 842 F.3d at 238, for the Court to consider these records at summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motion will be granted as to Piety Foley’s

Title VII, Title IX, and PHRA hostile work environment and retaliation claims,17 and summary

judgment will be denied as to Piety Foley’s claim under the Equal Pay Act.

An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Wendy Beetlestone, J.

___________________________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, J

17 “[I]ndividual employees cannot be held liable [under the PHRA] if the employer is not liable for a discriminatory

practice.” Deans v. Kennedy House, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 393, 414 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 587 F. App’x 731 (3d

Cir. 2014).