EASLEY v. WETZEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

WARREN EASLEY, :

: CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. : NO. 23-cv-1718

:

JOHN WETZEL, et. al., :

:

Defendants :

____________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Goldberg, J. July 23, 2024

Numerous Commonwealth Defendants1 have filed a motion for partial dismissal of

Plaintiff Warren Easley’s pro se complaint alleging various violations of his rights under the First,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under state common law.

(ECF No. 22). Although most of Easley’s claims are not viable, there are a few which are.

Consequently, the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

1 The Commonwealth Defendants are John Wetzel, George Little, Mandy Sipple, Jaime Sorber,

Tabb Bickell, Joseph Terra, David Mascellino, Andrew Reber, Jamie Luquis, Kevin Young,

Michael Bianco, Michelle Trinh, Jonathan Hall, Dion Hunter, Matthew Kull, Kysherald Patterson,

Ijia Phillips, James Nicholson, Richard Thompson, George Smits, Joseph Gonzalez, Decon

Voorhees, James Martin, Anthony Talarico, Moises Mateus, Tyler Moser, Jeff Brewer, Jamal

Gilliard and Anthony Hamilton.

2 Reading them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the facts set forth herein are all taken

from Easley’s Complaint with Jury Demand, which was filed on May 3, 2023. (ECF No. 2).

Easley is an inmate in the Pennsylvania state correctional system who is currently

incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Rockview, in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.

Easley initiated this action on May 23, 2023 to obtain redress for injuries allegedly inflicted by the

Commonwealth Defendants between 2015 and 2022 in violation of federal and state law while he

was an inmate at SCI Phoenix. The complaint is 58 pages long, contains 284 numbered

paragraphs, and endeavors to assert claims for the following violations of federal constitutional

law:

• Excessive force

• Cruel and unusual punishment

• Failure to protect and/or failure to intervene

• Failure to train

• Deliberate indifference

• Denial of medical care

• Conditions of confinement

• Due process

• Freedom of speech/expression.

Easley also raises the following state law claims:

• Medical malpractice

• Negligence

• Conversion and damage to personal property.

These claims arise out of Easley’s purported beatings, threats, and otherwise violent

encounters with SCI Phoenix corrections officers (“COs”) Smits, Gonzalez, Kull, Voorhees,

Martin, Mateus, Hunter, Brewer, Gilliard, Hamilton, and Thompson, and his alleged outright

denial of, or receipt of improper medical and dental care from Defendants Goldberg, Walsh,

Annino, Bazel, DiFrangresco, Bianco and Trinh.3 Easley also avers that CO Hunter and Unit

Manager Luquis removed various items of his personal property from his cell, including rugs and

several “non-nude” magazines, which were never returned, and photographs and books, which

were returned in a damaged condition. Easley seeks reimbursement for the removed and/or

damaged property, and further asserts that the magazines were confiscated pursuant to a prison

policy biased against heterosexual men and in violation of his rights to due process, freedom of

speech and freedom of expression.

The Commonwealth Defendants first move to dismiss all of Easley’s § 1983 claims to the

extent they are being asserted against them in their official capacities as state employees. In

addition, Defendants seek to dismiss those portions of Easley’s conditions of confinement claim

which relate to an alleged incident in 2015 as barred by the statute of limitations, and Easley’s

state law claims as barred by state sovereign immunity. Finally, Defendants move for the dismissal

of Easley’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising out of the withholding of his

magazines and his solitary confinement.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commonwealth Defendants invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in moving for partial

dismissal of Easley’s complaint. Under that Rule, “[t]he question is ‘not whether [the plaintiff]

will ultimately prevail, but whether [the] complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court’s

[pleading] threshold,” which “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement

3 Of these defendants, only Bianco and Trinh are employed by the Commonwealth. In a separate

filing, Defendants Saeed Bazel, M.D., Jason Goldberg, D.O., Carol Annino, D.O., and Jenna

DeFrangresco, CRMP, (the “Medical Defendants”), also move for dismissal of Easley’s complaint

or, alternatively, the entry of summary judgment. (ECF No. 25).

to relief.” Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2011). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations and

“need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise legal theory”; however, “a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss,

a federal court must construe the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and must then determine

whether under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.

Cheney v. Daily News L.P., 654 F. App’x. 578, 580 (3d Cir. 2016); Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of

Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 2015). Stated otherwise, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And of course, pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards

than those prepared by counsel and must be liberally construed. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

Accordingly, while courts are to apply the relevant legal principles even when a complaint fails to

name them, pro se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules” and “still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. at 244, 245.

III. DISCUSSION

By its terms, Section 19834 creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for

deprivation of rights established elsewhere. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).

“The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to identify the exact contours of the underlying

right said to have been violated and to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of

a constitutional right at all.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Nicini v. Mora, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)). In a Section 1983 action, the personal

involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element, and,

therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences

giving rise to the claims. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). These

allegations may take the form of “describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge

of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (internal quotation

omitted).

Furthermore, “[s]uits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general

requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).

It is settled law that under Section 1983, “Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556

4 In pertinent part, § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable . . .

U.S. at 662. But there are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307,

316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a

supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established

and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id.

(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(alteration in original)). A supervisor may also “be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she

participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id.

“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with

appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

A. Official capacity claims

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 94 (3d Cir. 2019). But a state is not a “person” within the

meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Therefore, at the

outset, the Commonwealth Defendants seek dismissal of all of Easley’s claims to the extent he

seeks to hold them liable in their “official” capacities.

Easley’s Complaint begins by alleging that all the moving defendants are employees in one

way or another of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections who violated several of his

constitutional rights. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 4-10, 12-16, 22-38). While it is obvious that “state officials

literally are persons,” the law is clear that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity

is not a suit against the official but is rather a suit against the official’s office. Will, 491 U.S. at

71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit

against the state itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-

capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent.’”)

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is an administrative department of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to 71 P.S. § 61 and § 732-102. As such, Pennsylvania

DOC employees share in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when they are

sued in their official capacities. Turner v. AG Pa., 505 F. App’x 95, 98-99 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2012);

Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, to the extent Easley is

advancing claims against each of the Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacities, the

motion to dismiss is granted and any and all of those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Most of Easley’s § 1983 claims are premised on the Eighth Amendment as he complains

of cruel and unusual punishment, the use of excessive force, failure to protect and/or intervene,

denial of medical care, deliberate indifference, and the overall conditions of his confinement at

SCI Phoenix.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S.

CONST. amend. VIII. This prohibition restrains prison officials from certain actions (such as use

of excessive force against prisoners) and imposes on them a duty to provide “humane conditions

of confinement.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “That is, prison officials must ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of inmates.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For an

alleged deprivation to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, it must result in the

“denial of [the] minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and a condition of confinement

violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is “so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under

contemporary standards” or “deprives an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of the

necessities of life.” McKinney v. Piazza, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225053 at *19 (D. N.J. Dec. 14,

2022) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835); Dickens v. Taylor, 464 F. Supp. 2d 341, 348 (D. Del.

2006). In cases charging prison officials with excessive force, an Eighth Amendment claimant

must show that officials applied force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm,” or used force “with a knowing willingness that harm occur.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-836

(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1992)).

As noted, the Supreme Court has also recognized the government has an obligation to

provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 103 (1976). Whether manifested by prison doctors in response to a prisoner’s needs, or by

prison guards intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering

with prescribed medical treatment, it is only deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

need which constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 104-105. “‘Deliberate indifference entails something more than mere

negligence’ and is a subjective standard that requires the official to both ‘be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’ and to ‘also draw

the inference.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 835-37. A medical need is “serious” if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician

as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the need for a

doctor’s attention. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.

1987) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accidental or inadvertent failure to provide

adequate medical care to a prisoner does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney,

509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); see also, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“A complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”). Thus, to successfully plead an Eighth Amendment

violation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs; and (2) those needs were serious. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

In this manner, the deliberate indifference standard affords considerable latitude to prison

medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients, and

the Courts generally disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular

course of treatment. Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Inherent in this latitude, however, is the

assumption that such an informed medical judgment has in fact been made. Id. But when prison

authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs,

deny access to a physician capable of evaluating the need for such treatment, or where denial or

delay in treatment causes an inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss, the

constitutional threshold established by Estelle has been crossed. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Inmates

of Allegheny, 612 F.2d at 762.

Medical Claims

In giving Easley’s complaint a liberal reading and turning first to his medical claims against

Commonwealth Defendants Michael Bianco and Michelle Trinh, both dentists, it appears they

arise out of Bianco’s replacement of several of Easley’s fillings with silver and composite caps,

and Trinh’s subsequent surgical “shaving” of one of his teeth to eliminate pain. (Compl. ¶¶ 179-

212). Easley contends that Bianco, “was at least 80 years old, appeared out of sorts, slurred

speech,”. . . “clearly was not fit to complete any surgery,” and “actually forgot what he was

supposed to do.” (Id. ¶¶ 179-180, 184). When Bianco removed Easley’s silver caps and put in

composites, Easley alleges Bianco “made a mistake and had to redrill the whole cap out,” causing

him to sit “in the dental chair in surgery for 1 hour and 45 minutes.” (Id. ¶¶ 186-187). Easley

further avers that when “Bianco was done, [he] immediately knew something was wrong even

though [his] mouth was numb,” he “had a nerve exposed which caused . . . severe pain,” and he

“could not chew food, properly breathe or even talk.” (Id.¶¶ 188, 193). As to Trinh, Easley alleges

he had to “put in many sick call requests due to severe pain” but was ignored and when she finally

saw him, Trinh “appeared annoyed and told [him] to wait, then became very abrasive and

confrontational asking him why he was there. (Id. ¶¶ 199-201). Easley contends Trinh

intentionally denied him an x-ray and treatment and made him wait for over a month before seeing

him for the exposed nerve. (Id. ¶¶ 202-207). Even after Trinh treated him, Easley submits he still

had the same problems with his teeth, and that Trinh intentionally delayed treating him to torture

him and cause him pain. (Id. ¶¶ 208-212).

As Easley’s pleadings make clear, he is not alleging a denial of medical care, but is rather

challenging the promptness in the delivery of that care and its sufficiency. Mere medical

negligence or disagreement with the treatment of an illness or condition does not give rise to an

Eighth Amendment violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. And while an exposed nerve is undoubtedly very painful, it does not rise

to the level of a serious medical need, given it is generally of short duration and does not a pose a

“life-long handicap.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-273 (3d Cir. 2003). Indeed, Easley

specifically outlined in detail the treatment he received for his teeth and although he may have

preferred to have been treated earlier, differently, or by Trinh from the outset, the Commonwealth

Defendants were not deliberately indifferent in failing to provide Easley the care he desired.

Because Easley fails to plead facts to support an inference of deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, he has not stated a plausible cause of action for denial of medical care under § 1983.

The Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is therefore granted with prejudice.

Conditions of Confinement Claims

Easley alleges there were several aspects of his conditions of confinement at SCI Phoenix

which violated the Eighth Amendment. First, he avers that on April 8, 2015, he was assaulted

“numerous times” by another inmate who was “known to be a feces thrower and known to assault

inmates.” (Compl. ¶¶ 122-123). This assault ostensibly occurred at the direction of Deputy

Superintendent Terra because Easley was a “known litigator and grievance filer.” (Id. ¶ 123-128).

“The feces got in Plaintiff’s face, eyes, hair and all over plaintiff’s clothes” but “at no point did

John Doe/Jane Doe” [an infectious nurse] “come and properly examine plaintiff for exposure with

Hep C, Hep. B, or H.I.V.” (Id. at ¶¶ 126-127).

Next, Easley alleges that on July 30, 2021, October 31, 2021, January 1, 2022, and January

24, 2022, he was placed in mental health and infirmary cells which were contaminated with other

inmates’ urine and feces and forced to live in those cells, which Lieutenants Patterson, Phillips,

and Nicholson, refused to have cleaned, for up to fourteen days at a time. (Id. ¶¶ 129-135). Then,

on May 16, 2022, at the direction of Deputy Superintendent Terra, Unit Manager Luquis, and

Captain Young, Easley was placed in a “hard cell” in which the light was controlled from outside,

there was no mattress, sheets or blanket and he was refused toilet paper, hygiene products and food

trays. (Id. ¶¶ 162-163). This cell was permeated with the odor of feces and urine because Young

ordered the prison staff to not flush Easley’s toilet and Easley was forced to use his hands to toilet

himself, defecate in the corner, and to urinate in the sink. (Id. ¶¶ 164-168). Additionally, Easley

avers the inmate in the neighboring cell “was paid by defendants . . . Young, Hall and Luquis to

torture” him by pounding on his toilet “constantly all night to prevent [Easley] from sleeping.”

(Id. ¶¶ 169-170).

As with numerous federal statutes enacted prior to 1990, § 1983 does not contain a specific

statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). The Supreme Court, however,

has resolved the matter by declaring that courts entertaining § 1983 claims are to “borrow” the

state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989)

(citing Wilson, supra). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is

two years. 42 Pa. C. S. § 5524; Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 589 (3d

Cir. 1998). Given that Easley did not file his complaint in this matter until May 3, 2023, his first

conditions of confinement claim, premised upon an event which took place on April 8, 2015, is

clearly time-barred, and is therefore dismissed.

Easley’s claims arising out of the other, July 30, 2021, October 31, 2021, January 1, 2022,

and January 24, 2022, incidents survive the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion. Again, the

standard for stating a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment based on a prisoner’s conditions

of confinement requires the condition to be “so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under

contemporary standards” or one which “deprives an inmate of the minimal civilized measure of

the necessities of life.” See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Living in a cell without a working

toilet, mattress, sheets, or blanket, permeated with feces and urine, and being denied basic toiletries

could well be viewed by a jury as an inhumane deprivation of life’s minimal civilized necessities.

I therefore find the facts which Easley has pled surrounding those incidents are sufficient to

plausibly state viable causes of action under the Eighth Amendment against the defendants named,

and the motion to dismiss is denied as to those claims.

C. First Amendment Claim

Easley has also endeavored to advance a claim under the First Amendment arising out of

the seizure of several of his “non-nude” magazines having the titles of “YKTV Viral – I love Girls

(Gold) Vol. #5,” “YKTV Viral Fetish – I love Feet,” “YKTV Viral – I love Girls (black) Vol. #5,”

“Viral I love girls Deluxe – Jesse thice,” and “YKTV Viral I love Girls (Platinum) Vol. #5.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 236-237). Easley contends he was denied access to these magazines pursuant to a

“spurious,” and “substantially overbroad” policy “bias[ed] toward heterosexual men” in violation

of his rights to freedom of expression and free speech. (Compl. ¶¶ 240-241, 252).

It is well-settled that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from

the protections of the Constitution,” and that “federal courts must take cognizance of the valid

constitutional claims of prison inmates. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). But running a

prison “is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning and the

commitment of resources.” Id. at 85. By its nature, “incarceration almost always results in a

narrowing, not a broadening, of constitutional protections.” Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 515

(3d Cir. 2002). Often, inmates’ constitutional rights “must in some respects be limited in order to

accommodate the demands of prison administration and to serve valid penological objectives.” Id.

And given that the judiciary is “ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison

administration and reform,” it “should therefore give significant deference to judgments made by

prison officials in establishing, interpreting, and applying prison regulations.” Id. (citing Turner,

482 U.S. at 84-85).

When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, however, it must be

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and not be an “exaggerated response” to

such objectives to be valid. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S.

at 87). In Turner, the Supreme Court identified four “relevant” questions to ask in determining the

reasonableness of the regulation at issue.” 482 U.S. at 89. These are:

First, is there a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the

legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it? Second, are there

alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates? Third,

what impact will accommodation of the asserted constitutional right have on guards

and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally? And fourth,

are ready alternatives for furthering the governmental interest available?

Beard, 548 U.S. at 529 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 87) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Easley’s challenge is to the Department of Corrections policy governing inmate mail and

incoming publications. (Compl. ¶¶ 235, 240, 250-252). That policy, DC-ADM-803,

https://www.cor.pa.gov/DOC/policies.aspx, in Section 2(e)(1)(c), prohibits “correspondence,

publications, and/or photographs containing explicit sexual material (other than in narrative form)

and/or nudity” from “entering a facility or being possessed within a facility” unless the DOC

determines that it has “artistic, educational, or medical value.” (DC-ADM 803 at 2-7). “Obscene

material is illegal and will not be permitted under any circumstances.” Id. This policy has

previously been found by the Third Circuit to be constitutional under Turner insofar as “the DOC

Officials have an undisputed legitimate governmental interest in maintaining prison safety and

security,” and “all they need to do to prevail is demonstrate that the policy drafters could rationally

have seen a connection between the policy and the penological interest.” Fontroy v. Beard, 559

F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Easley contends the five magazines to which he was denied access “all are non-nude

magazines of women in bikinis . . . which [he] has purchased on many occasions with no issues,”

and that he “currently has 17 magazines from the same company YKTV viral in which all

magazines are non-nude and is adamant to not show nipples or genitals.” (Compl. ¶¶ 236, 239).

He filed a Grievance with respect to the withholding of the magazines which was denied and the

denial was upheld by the Secretary’s Office of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

(Comm. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 22). As noted in the DOC’s Final Appeal Decision,

the Policy Office reviewed the publications in question and found the denial of Easley’s Grievance

to be appropriate because the publications contained sexually explicit photos. The Glossary of

Terms included within DC-ADM 803 states “obscene material” is, inter alia, “[a]ny book,

photograph, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, sound recording, explicit and detailed verbal

description, narrative account, or other material . . . if . . . an average person applying

contemporary community standards would find that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to

the prurient interest.” Because the DOC policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological

interest and Easley’s magazines contained material found to be obscene within that policy’s

definitions, Easley fails to state a cause of action based on the First Amendment on which relief

can be granted under Turner v. Saffley. This claim is therefore also dismissed with prejudice.

Easley’s complaint may also be interpreted as endeavoring to plead a claim under the 14th

Amendment for deprivation of his right to property without due process of law. The Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or

property, and those who seek to invoke its procedural protections must establish that one of these

interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). An essential principle of due

process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for

hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before one is deprived of any significant property

interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The pre-deprivation hearing need not be a full evidentiary hearing and need

not be elaborate. Id. at 545. Rather, all the process that is due are notice and an opportunity to

respond, either in person or in writing, why a proposed action should not be taken. Id. at 546.

On its face, Easley’s complaint states he was given the opportunity to challenge the

withholding of his magazines through the grievance process, he availed himself of that process

and of his right to appeal the denial of the grievance through the DOC procedures governing

grievances, but his appeal was denied and the decision to withhold the materials was upheld. It is

therefore clear that Easley received all the process he was due and he does not have a viable claim

that the Defendants denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

D. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim Arising

From Placement on Restrictive Relief List and Confinement in Intensive

Management Unit

Easley next asserts his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment and his rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment were

violated by DOC Secretaries Wetzel and Little, and Executive Secretary Bickell because he did

not have an opportunity to challenge his placement on the Restrictive Relief List (“RRL”) for more

than five years and he was not “seen every six months by the secretary or executive secretary of

the DOC”, as he was “supposed to.” (Compl. ¶¶ 256-261). According to Easley, RRL status is a

state of administrative custody where an inmate is held in solitary confinement in the Intensive

Management Unit and is subject to “severe restrictions on his ability to interact with anyone,

whether it be staff, other inmates or visitors from outside the prison.” (Id. ¶ 257).

The first step in analyzing a procedural due process claim is determining whether the nature

of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Then, if the asserted

interest is determined to be protected by the Due Process Clause, the question becomes what

process is due to protect it. Id. (internal citations omitted). A liberty interest may arise from the

Constitution itself, or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. To establish a state-created liberty interest under the Fourteenth

Amendment in the conditions of confinement context, “courts generally require a showing that the

alleged liberty interest is substantial” and confers “freedom from restraint which imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Porter

v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of

Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 559 (3d Cir. 2017) and Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997)

(alteration and emphasis in original).

Although the decisions in Sandin and Wilkinson have provided some guidance into the

inquiry on what constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship,” there nevertheless remain

inconsistent “conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and

significant.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 560 (3d Cir. 2017).5 Using

5 For example, in Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976), the Supreme Court held that any

change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner

involved is not, in and of itself, sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.

This is because “[t]he Due Process Clause standing alone, confers no liberty interest in freedom

from state action taken ‘within the sentence imposed.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480

(1995) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). Indeed, once validly convicted, “the

criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may

confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of

confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.” Meacham, 427 U.S. at 224. See also

Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding seven-month confinement in

Special Housing Unit based on false reports did not implicate protected liberty interest and noting

the holding in Sandin that “confinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be

sufficient without more to establish the kind of ‘atypical’ deprivation of prison life necessary to

implicate a liberty interest,” and therefore “the inmate’s segregated confinement was not a denial

of due process”); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding administrative

detention for fifteen months did not implicate liberty interest).

Wilkinson’s guidance, however, the Third Circuit established a two-factor inquiry: (1) what is the

duration of the challenged conditions, and (2) do the conditions overall impose a significant

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life? Id. (citing Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144).

In this case, Easley alleges he has been held in solitary confinement for more than five

years, during which he has been given ten to fifteen minutes to eat his meals alone in his cell, fed

lower quality food than general population inmates, placed in handcuffs and subjected to

mandatory strip searches whenever he leaves his cell, prohibited from talking with other prisoners

and from participating in any organized prison activities, vocational, recreational, or educational

programs, any form of communal religious worship, and from having any contact visitation and

physical contact with anyone, including clergy and family members. Easley also avers he was

limited in the amount of personal property he could keep in his cell, permitted to shower only three

times a week and confined to a cell illuminated by artificial lights 24 hours each day. (Compl. ¶¶

265(a) – (n)).

Easley contends these conditions have caused him stress, anxiety, depression, suicidal

thoughts, mental anguish, fear, deterioration in his mental health, have deprived him of sleep and

placed him “in serious danger of experiencing debilitating psychological impairments for the rest

of his life.” (Id. ¶¶ 267(d), (e), 269, 281-282). Easley also submits that throughout his

confinement, he was not afforded the opportunity to challenge his status, that he was “supposed to

be seen every six months by the secretary or executive secretary” but was not, and under DOC

policy DC ADM 802, he could only be returned to the general population upon receipt of “express

authorization” from the Secretary or Executive Secretary. (Id. ¶¶ 258-262). Given these alleged

conditions and the period of time in which Easley has purportedly been forced to endure them

without the opportunity to be heard or to challenge them, I find he has plausibly alleged a cause of

action under the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of his procedural due process rights. The

Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss is therefore denied in this regard.6

As noted, Easley also asserts his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment was violated by the foregoing enumerated conditions under which he was confined

pursuant to the RRL. Again, the two-prong Farmer test is utilized to determine whether prison

officials have violated the Eighth Amendment: (1) was the deprivation “objectively, sufficiently

serious” such that a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities, and (2) was the prison official “deliberately indifferent to inmate

health or safety”? Porter, 974 F.3d at 441 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “An official is

deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In support of the second component, Easley

cites to a number of mental health professionals who have written and opined on the deleterious

mental and physical effects of long-term solitary confinement, and asserts that the DOC in general,

and Defendants Wetzel and Little and Bickell in particular, knew of and previously acknowledged

these risks. (Compl. ¶¶ 270-279).

Because Easley’s pleadings are afforded a liberal reading, all factual allegations are

accepted as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, I find he has pled enough facts

6 Easley’s Complaint does not specify whether his Due Process claim is procedural or substantive

in nature. In the event he is seeking to state a substantive due process claim, that claim is dismissed

with prejudice. Under the more-specific-provision rule, “if a constitutional claim is covered by a

specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be

analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-844 (1998) (quoting

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621

F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010). As noted infra, in addition to his Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process claim, Easley also raises an Eighth Amendment challenge to the conditions of being

confined under RRL status.

to show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the potential harm posed by the conditions of

his solitary/RRL confinement to plead an Eighth Amendment claim under Farmer and Porter.

Accordingly, the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss Easley’s Eighth Amendment

claim based on the conditions of his solitary confinement is likewise denied. E. State law

claims

Easley also pleads a “tort” claim for certain missing items of personal property following

his relocation to another cell on January 29, 2022. (Compl. ¶ 225). Specifically, Easley alleges

he was not present when his property was moved to another cell and when he returned he

discovered his family photographs were torn, his sheets smelled of urine, and five books and one

magazine were missing. (Id. ¶¶ 226-227). He further contends that on June 4, 2022, when he

redid his property, Easley found “he was missing 23 magazines, 2 rugs, a bowl, soap dish totalling

258.63, for which he filed a grievance seeking reimbursement, which was denied.” (Id. ¶¶ 229-

231).

Conversion is a tort by which the defendant deprives the plaintiff of his right to a chattel

or interferes with the plaintiff’s use or possession of a chattel without the plaintiff’s consent and

without lawful justification. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Smith, 634 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super.

1994). “A plaintiff has a cause of action in conversion if he or she had actual or constructive

possession of a chattel at the time of the alleged conversion.” Id.

As previously noted, the Department of Corrections is an agency of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania and, as such, is protected by the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity from suit,

except insofar as certain enumerated categories in which that immunity has been specifically

waived are concerned. 42 Pa. C. S. § 8521. Specifically, under 42 Pa. C. S. § 8522(b), immunity

is waived for actions for damages against Commonwealth parties “arising out of a negligent act

where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of

action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign

immunity” and which fall into one of the following categories: (1) vehicle liability, (2) medical-

professional liability, (3) the care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or

control of the Commonwealth, (4) Commonwealth-owned real estate, highways and sidewalks, (5)

potholes and other dangerous conditions, (6) the care, custody or control of animals, (7) liquor

store sales, (8) National Guard activities, (9) toxoids and vaccines, and (10) sexual abuse. 42 Pa.

C. S. § 8522(b)(1) – (10).

Easley avers that Defendants Hunter and Luquis intentionally trashed his cell, destroying

his photographs of deceased relatives in the process. (Compl. ¶¶ 233-234). Trashing a cell and

converting the property found within it are not negligent acts nor do they fall within any of the

enumerated exceptions. As such, the DOC remains protected by sovereign immunity. See e.g.

Rhoads v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 978 A.2d 431, 433 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (“this Court has

specifically declared that intentional tort claims are not within the narrow exceptions set forth in

42 Pa. C. S. § 8522(b)”). What’s more, while Easley identifies Hunter and Luquis as the

individuals who trashed his cell, he fails to name them as the individuals who allegedly converted

his property, nor does he plead any facts from which a lack of legal justification for the alleged

taking may be inferred. Accordingly, this claim shall also be dismissed.

Finally, in paragraph 284(h) of his complaint, Easley asks for an award of punitive

damages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically held that punitive damages are not

recoverable against an authority or department that is an agency of the Commonwealth. Feingold

v. SEPTA, 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986). Easley’s punitive damages claim is thus likewise

dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, the Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Easley’s claims against the Commonwealth

Defendants in their official capacities, under the Eighth Amendment for improper medical care

and the assault of April 8, 2015 are DISMISSED with prejudice. Likewise, Easley’s claims

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for the withholding of his magazines, under the

Fourteenth Amendment for violation of his rights to substantive due process, state law tort claim

for conversion, and claim for punitive damages are all DISMISSED with prejudice. In all other

respects, the Motion is DENIED.

An appropriate Order follows.