COOK v. Tustin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SADIE L. COOK, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

No. 24-0431-KSM

v.

CHRISTOPHER F. TUSTIN, e¢ a/.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. July 17, 2024

Plaintiff Sadie Cook brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process against Defendant Pennsylvania State

Trooper Christopher F. Tustin. (Doc. No. 11.) Cook argues that Trooper Tustin violated her

Fourth and Fourteenth! Amendment rights when he secured a state criminal complaint and arrest

warrant for her on charges which were later dismissed. (/d.) Trooper Tustin has moved to

dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. (See Doc. No. 12.) Cook opposes that motion.

(Doc. No. 14.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.

L BACKGROUND?

This case centers around the stolen identity of nonparty Christine Marine Seeley.

In October and November 2021, Seeley placed her Delaware County house for sale and

held several house showings. (Doc. No. 11 at § 15.) After one such showing, Seeley noticed

' In her Amended Complaint, Cook represents that all three claims arise under the Fourth

Amendment, but as discussed below, see infra Part II].A.2, a constitutional claim for abuse of process

arises under the Fourteenth Amendment.

? These facts are taken from Cook’s Amended Complaint and the documents attached to that

pleading, including Trooper Tustin’s affidavit of probable cause. (See Doc. No. 11.)

that the papers on her desk had been rummaged through, and she was missing a camera card that

she had received from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) for purposes

of renewing her driver’s license. (Id.) On November 5, 2021, Seeley received a notice from her

bank that a white woman with reddish hair had used what appeared to be Seeley’s driver’s

license to withdraw $5,000 from Seeley’s account. (Id.)

Seeley reported the crime, and Defendant Trooper Tustin from Pennsylvania’s Vehicle

Fraud Unit was assigned to the case. During his investigation, Trooper Tustin learned that the

perpetrator had used Seeley’s name and camera card to complete a license renewal form at

PennDOT’s driver’s license center in Lawndale, Pennsylvania on November 4, 2021. (Id.)

During that renewal, PennDOT took a photograph of the perpetrator, and on January 28, 2022,

Trooper Tustin sent the photograph to several surrounding states for them to run against their

own DMV records. (Id.) That same day, Maryland State Police informed Trooper Tustin that

they “had a positive match” for the woman who took the November 4th photograph. (Id.)

In 2015, Maryland had issued a driver’s license to Plaintiff Sadie Lee Cook. (Id.) In his

probable cause affidavit, Trooper Tustin claimed that Cook’s “2015 [Maryland driver’s license]

image was a match for [the perpetrator’s November] 2021 picture.” (Id.) After further

investigation, Trooper Tustin discovered that three other states—Florida, Rhode Island, and

Massachusetts—had also issued driver’s licenses to a Sadie Lee/L. Cook/Jones/Dupuis. (Id.)

Trooper Tustin’s affidavit claims that the woman pictured on these licenses “is the same woman

who portrayed herself as my victim in PA on November 4, 2021.” (Id.) Trooper Tustin’s

affidavit also explains that “this woman used the same Social Security number in all five

states”—Maryland, Florida, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. (Id.) Based on this

information, Trooper Tustin requested an arrest warrant for Cook, and one was issued. (Id.)

On February 2, 2022, local police arrested Cook at her Farmville, Virginia house for

“identity theft, forgery, tampering with records, and tampering with records in Pennsylvania.”

(Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 6–8.) Cook spent 18 days in a regional jail awaiting extradition to

Pennsylvania, but when the Commonwealth failed to act on the extradition, she was released.

(Id. at ¶ 13.) Cook then retained counsel to represent her in the criminal matter, and on July 13,

2023, turned herself in to Pennsylvania authorities and was released on bail. (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.)

At that bail hearing, she was given copies of the criminal complaint and the affidavit of probable

cause underlying her criminal charges. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Cook returned to Pennsylvania for a preliminary hearing on August 4, 2023, and she was

given a photo array that included two photographs of herself alongside the November 2021

photograph taken by the perpetrator who used non-party Seeley’s identity. (Id. at ¶ 34.)

According to Cook, these photographs show that she and the perpetrator “have distinct and

different facial features, including but not limited to the birthmark on Plaintiff’s right cheek.”

(Id. at ¶ 35.) In addition, although the criminal complaint identified the perpetrator as a 200-

pound woman, Cook weighed 310 pounds at that time. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 30.) Finally, Cook notes in

her Amended Complaint that from October 18 to November 1, 2022 she had been undergoing

and recovering from surgery in Virginia, and therefore, could not have attended a house showing

in Pennsylvania during that time. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 28–29.)

At the August 4th hearing, Trooper Tustin offered to drop Cook’s charges down to

summary disorderly conduct if Cook agreed to plead guilty, but Cook refused. (Id. at ¶¶ 36–37.)

The magistrate judge then granted the Commonwealth’s request for a continuance until

September 15, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 38–39, 41.) When Trooper Tustin failed to appear for the

September 15th hearing, the Commonwealth requested another continuance, but the judge denied

the request and dismissed the charges against Cook. (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 44.)

On January 30, 2024, Cook filed this action, asserting several state and federal claims

against Trooper Tustin. (Doc. No. 1.) In her Amended Complaint, Cook dropped her state law

claims, but she continues to assert three claims against Trooper Tustin for Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983: (1) false arrest and imprisonment, (2) malicious

prosecution, and (3) abuse of process. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 50–70.) Trooper Tustin now moves to

dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety, arguing that Cook has failed to state a claim

against him and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Doc. No. 12.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. Likewise, although a plaintiff does not need to include “detailed factual

allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must “provide the grounds

of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see also Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d

Cir. 2017) (explaining that the court “must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, but [is]

not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” (quotation marks omitted)).

“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider

matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,

1426 (3d Cir. 1997). “However an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or

explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to

dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). In addition, a court “may consider

matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the

record of the case.” Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir.

2011) (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Trooper Tustin contends that Cook’s claims must be dismissed because she has failed to

state a claim under § 1983, and because Trooper Tustin is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc.

No. 12.) The Court addresses each issue in turn.

A. Failure to State a Claim

As stated above, Cook brings her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section

1983 states, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v.

Cordova, Civ. No. 22-6482 (KM) (CLW), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84428, *9 (D.N.J. May 15,

2023) (citing Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011)).

Trooper Tustin does not dispute that Cook has adequately alleged he was acting under

color of state law during the relevant period. Instead, he argues that Cook has failed to allege a

constitutional violation. (Doc. No. 12 at 14–15.) He asserts that Cook’s false arrest and

imprisonment claim and her malicious prosecution claim fail because Trooper Tustin had

probable cause to attain an arrest warrant against Cook. (Id. at 7.) As for Cook’s abuse of

process claim, Trooper Tustin emphasizes that Cook has alleged that the prosecution against her

was not legitimately initiated, and an abuse of process claim applies only when prosecution is

initiated legitimately but later used for an improper purpose. (Id.) The Court addresses each

issue in turn.

1. Fourth Amendment Claims for False Arrest and Imprisonment and

for Malicious Prosecution

The Court begins with Cook’s claim for false arrest and imprisonment and her claim for

malicious prosecution, both of which arise under the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To prevail on a false arrest and

imprisonment claim brought pursuant to this Amendment, the plaintiff must show that the

arresting officer lacked probable cause to seize the plaintiff. Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690,

697 (3d Cir. 2017). Likewise, to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must

show, among other things, that the defendant initiated the prosecution without probable cause.

See Chiaverini v. City of Napolean, 602 U.S. __, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 (2024) (“To succeed on”

a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim “a plaintiff must show that a government

official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.”);

see also Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (outlining elements of

malicious prosecution claim).

Courts normally evaluate probable cause by asking whether a reasonable officer with

knowledge of the facts and circumstances would have believed a crime had been committed. See

Zimmerman, 873 F.3d at 418 (citation omitted). Here, however, Trooper Tustin acted on an

arrest warrant. (Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 7, 53.) Although warrants do not “shield” officers from

liability in all circumstance, they do change the Court’s analysis. See Goodwin v. Conway, 836

F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016). Specifically, the Court looks to the affidavit of probable cause on

which the warrant is based and asks whether within that affidavit, the officer knowingly or

recklessly made a false statement or omission that was material to the probable cause finding.

See Pinkney v. Meadville, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024).

Accordingly, to succeed on her claims, Cook must allege facts plausibly suggesting that:

(1) Trooper Tustin “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, ma[d]e

false statements or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for a warrant”; and (2) that

these statements or omissions were “material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Id.

(quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The

Court addresses each element in turn.

a. False Statements or Omissions

First, the Court must determine whether Trooper Tustin “knowingly and deliberately, or

with a reckless disregard for the truth, ma[d]e false statements or omissions” in his affidavit of

probable cause. Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 748 (citation omitted). This analysis changes depending on

whether the plaintiff alleges omissions or misstatements by the officer. See Scuilli, 853 F.3d at

698.

i. Omissions

An officer makes an omission with reckless disregard for the truth when they withhold a

fact that “[a]ny reasonable person would have known. . . was the kind of thing the judge would

wish to know.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 787–88 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted)). To determine whether an officer recklessly omitted information, courts ask whether

that information “bears on probable cause such that it should [have] be[en] presented to the

magistrate [judge].” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 471 n.9.3 Although “negligent

or innocent mistake[s]” do not undermine probable cause, see Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (citation

and quotation omitted), there is otherwise no bright-line rule to determine which information

should have been included, see Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 473. Instead, courts consider the totality of

the circumstances to distinguish between the relevant and the unremarkable. See id.

Wilson and Dempsey are illustrative of the line between relevant and irrelevant

omissions. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787–88; Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 473. Beginning with relevant

omissions, in Wilson, the Third Circuit found multiple omissions in an officer’s probable cause

affidavit that showed a reckless disregard for the truth. 212 F.3d at 787–88. Notably, although a

police report described the perpetrator as being between 6’3” and 6’5”, the officer failed to

mention in his affidavit that the plaintiff’s driver’s license abstract listed him as 5’11”. Id. at

788. The officer also failed to mention that the victim did not identify the plaintiff in a

photographic lineup. Id. The court found that a reasonable person would have known that a

“significant height differential” and a victim’s failure to identify the plaintiff were “the kind of

thing[s] the judge would wish to know.” Id.

Likewise, in Dempsey the Third Circuit held that an officer’s affidavit charging the

plaintiff with sexual harassment, simple assault, and disorderly conduct omitted several relevant

facts. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 464, 473. For example, the officer’s affidavit did not mention that

the plaintiff and the victim had engaged in playful wrestling on multiple occasions before the

alleged assault or that the victim had been laughing when she left the room where the assault

3 This does not mean that the omitted information would have necessarily altered the magistrate’s

probable cause determination. See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 471 n.9.

occurred. Id. at 473. The officer also omitted reports from witnesses in the nearby hallway as to

what they heard when the plaintiff was in the room alone with the victim. Id. The Third Circuit

found that these omissions were “pieces of information a reasonable person would know a

magistrate would want to know given their relevance to [the] allegations.” Id.

In addition to these noteworthy omissions, Wilson and Dempsey also discussed irrelevant

omissions, emphasizing that officers are not expected to provide the “entire history of events”

and “every potentially evocative detail.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787–88; see also Dempsey, 834

F.3d at 474. For instance, the Wilson court found that the officer’s probable cause affidavit did

not need to note that the plaintiff looked ethnically different from the other men in the

photographic lineup because officers cannot “be expected to communicate the apparent

ethnicity” of individual suspects, or “slight variations in appearance” “absent circumstances

making these factors more important or prejudicial.” 212 F.3d at 788. Similarly, the court found

that the officer’s failure to flag that “the fact that height and weight [for each suspect] were not

listed on the photo array” shown to the victim was “so routine as to be unremarkable to a judge.”

Id. Finally, the Dempsey court emphasized that an omission is irrelevant where the officer did

not know the omitted fact at the time they swore to the affidavit of probable cause. See 834 F.3d

at 473–74.

ii. False Statements

In addition to omitting relevant information, an officer shows a reckless disregard for the

truth when they include knowingly false statements in their probable cause affidavit. See Wilson,

212 F.3d at 786–87. An officer makes a false statement when they demonstrate a “willingness to

affirmatively distort the truth,” for example, if there is evidence that the officer either

“entertained serious doubts as to the truth” or “had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy” of

their statements. Id. at 788 (citation and quotations omitted).

In Wilson, for example, the officer asserted in his affidavit that a witness near the robbery

scene had seen the plaintiff near the crime scene at around 3:00 p.m. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 785.

But the witness actually told the officer that she saw the suspect half an hour before the police

arrived, which would have been 3:30 p.m. Id. at 788. The officer thus had “obvious reasons to

doubt” the truth of his statement that the witness had seen the suspect at around 3:00 p.m. Id. at

788–89; see also Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 400 (holding that an officer made a false assertion when

they stated in their affidavit that they gave money to an informant and told the informant to buy

drugs but, in reality, gave the money and instructions to a third, unmentioned party).

b. Materiality

If an officer recklessly omits information or makes a false statement, the court moves to

the second step of the analysis and asks whether those omissions or false statements were

“material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (citation

omitted). An omission or false statement is material “if a reconstructed warrant application

containing the alleged omissions and excising the alleged inaccuracies would no longer establish

probable cause.” Goodwin, 836 F.3d at 327 (citing Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789).

To perform this analysis, the court begins by reconstructing the affidavit word-for-

word—adding the omitted information and removing the false statements. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at

470. The court then asks whether, considering the reconstructed affidavit, probable cause would

still have existed for the warrant to issue. Id. Probable cause exists if a reasonable officer with

knowledge of the facts and circumstances would have believed a crime had been committed. See

Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). This standard demands something

more than “mere suspicion”, id. at 482, but it is “significantly lower than the standard which is

required for conviction,” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

As part of this analysis, courts also consider whether there is “‘[i]ndependent exculpatory

evidence’ . . . that ‘outweigh[s]’ the probable cause otherwise established by the affidavit . . . .”

Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 479 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790). Though officers cannot “disregard

plainly exculpatory evidence,” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790 (citation omitted), there is no rigid test to

determine probable cause. See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467–68. Rather, the probable cause

analysis is “fluid” and turns on the facts of the case. Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).

c. Analysis

Trooper Tustin argues that the Court should dismiss Cook’s claims for false arrest and

imprisonment and for malicious prosecution because Cook has failed to allege that the affidavit

of probable cause supporting the arrest warrant contains material omissions and/or false

statements. (Doc. No. 12 at 17.) The Court agrees.

i. Identifying the Omissions and Misstatements4

The Amended Complaint identifies three categories of omissions and misstatements.

First, Cook claims that Trooper Tustin’s affidavit failed to “reflect that Defendant Tustin

compared the ‘photo match’ from the Maryland State Police with the PennDOT photo taken by

the perpetrator.” (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 55.) But this allegation is inconsistent with Trooper Tustin’s

affidavit. (See id., Ex. A at 15–16.) In that affidavit, Trooper Tustin attests that he sent the

4 In her Amended Complaint, Cook claims that Trooper Tustin’s affidavit lacked probable cause.

(Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 54.) Although at this stage the Court takes Cook’s factual allegations as true, Cook’s

allegation that Trooper Tustin lacked probable cause is “in reality . . . a legal conclusion . . . pleaded as a

factual assertion, which is not entitled to a presumption of truth.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700

F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Gebhart v. Steffen, 574 F. App’x

156, 159 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a plaintiff’s assertion that officers lacked probable cause was a legal

conclusion). Accordingly, the Court does not consider Cook’s conclusory assertion in deciding this

motion and instead focuses on Cook’s allegations that Trooper Tustin omitted relevant information or

made false statements in his probable cause affidavit.

driver’s license photograph taken by the perpetrator to states surrounding Pennsylvania on

January 28, 2022. (Id. at 15.) That same morning, Trooper Tustin received an email from

Maryland State Police stating that they found a “match” from a 2015 Maryland driver’s license

issued to Sadie Lee Cook. (Id. at 14–15.) According to the affidavit, Cook’s “2015 image was a

match for my Victim’s [November] 2021 picture.” (Id. at 15.) This statement suggests that

Trooper Tustin did, in fact, compare the two photos.

Next, Cook asserts that while the criminal complaint identified the perpetrator as a 200-

pound woman, Cook weighed about 310 pounds at the time. (Doc. No. 11 at 26, 30.) Even

assuming this weight difference is something a magistrate judge would want to know, it is not a

relevant omission because Cook has not alleged that Trooper Tustin knew about the weight

difference when he completed the affidavit. (See generally id.) As noted above, officers cannot

recklessly omit information which they themselves do not know. See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 473–

74.

Last, Cook asserts that Trooper Tustin failed to indicate in his affidavit that “Plaintiff and

the perpetrator have distinct and different facial features, including but not limited to the

birthmark on Plaintiff’s right cheek.” (Doc. No. 11 at ¶ 35.) According to Cook, this fact points

to both an omission and a potentially false statement in Trooper Tustin’s affidavit.5 The Court

agrees. First, Cook’s distinctive facial features are things “[a]ny reasonable person would have

known . . . was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.” Scuilli, 853 F.3d at 698

5 The Court may view an affidavit as containing both an omission and a misrepresentation as to

the same fact. See Scuilli, 853 F.3d at 695–99. In Scuilli, an officer reported that the victim had

described the suspect’s car as a red, four-door sedan. Id. at 695–96. The officer’s affidavit continued by

stating that, the following day the victim “spotted this same vehicle described above.” Id. at 696. In

reality, the victim’s second sighting was of a red, three-door coupe, which the officer knew was not a

four-door sedan. Id. at 695, 699. The Third Circuit treated the affidavit as containing a false statement

and an omission, striking the portion of the affidavit that stated the second spotting involved “this same

vehicle described above,” and replacing it with the phrase, “a vehicle, a red three-door coupe.” Id. at 700.

(quotation marks omitted). Though not as striking as a several-inch height difference or a

witness’s failure to identify the plaintiff in a lineup, different facial features (and in particular,

the existence of a facial birthmark) “bear[ ] on probable cause such that it should [have] be[en]

presented to the magistrate.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 471 n.9.

In addition to omitting any mention of the birthmark and slight difference in facial

features, Trooper Tustin states in his affidavit of probable cause that Cook’s Maryland, Florida,

Massachusetts, and Rhode Island driver’s license photographs were a match to the perpetrator’s

November 4th photograph. (Doc. No. 11, Ex. A at 16 (attesting that the woman depicted in the

Florida, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island driver’s licenses is the “same woman that portrayed

herself as my victim on November 4, 2021 in PA”).) If Cook has distinctive facial features—an

allegation the Court accepts as true at this time—then, Trooper Tustin’s statement that the

photographs were a “match” is one where he would have had “obvious reasons to doubt” its

accuracy. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788.

Because Cook sufficiently alleged an omission and a false statement in Tustin’s affidavit,

the question becomes whether either was material.

ii. Materiality

As noted above, the Court must first reconstruct Trooper Tustin’s affidavit to include the

alleged omission and remove the alleged false statements:

On January 28, 2022, I sent the digital photo taken on November 4,

2021 at the Lawndale PennDOT drivers [sic] license center to the

states surrounding Pennsylvania. I asked them to run the photo

against their DMV records to see if there were any matches. On that

day at 1130 hours, I received an email from the Maryland State

Police saying that they had a positive match for the woman that took

the photo on November 4th pretending to be my victim.

On August 8, 2015, the State of Maryland issued OLN

C200758497425 to Sadie Lee COOK with a date of birth of

06/06/75. [Despite some different facial features, including a

birthmark on Cook’s right cheek,] COOK’s 2015 image [appears

similar to] a match for my Victim’s 2021 [Pennsylvania] picture.

Through further investigation I discovered 3 other States that had

issued the same woman a driver’s license or ID.

On July 22, 2008, the State of Florida issued OLN D-120-792-75-

706-0 to Sadie Lee DUPUIS with a date of birth of 06/06/75. A

query of this photo is the same woman [The woman in the photo

appears similar to the woman] that portrayed herself as my victim

on November 4, 2021 in PA.

On an unknown date, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts issued

OLN S48081673 to Sadie L DUPUIS with a date of birth 06/06/75.

The woman pictured on this driver’s license is the same woman

[appears similar to the woman] who portrayed herself as my

victim on November 4, 2021 in PA.

On June 04, 2004, the State of Rhode Island issued OLN 9810805

to Sadie Lee JONES with a date of birth of 06/06/75. The woman

pictured on this driver’s license is the same woman [appears

similar to the woman] who portrayed herself as my victim on

November 4, 2021 in PA.

This woman used the same Social Security number in all 5 states,

ending in 9099. There were no variations of this SSN.

The Information contained within this document is true and accurate

to the best of my knowledge. I ask that an arrest warrant be issued

for the woman named in this Affidavit.

(Doc. No. 11 at 15–16.)

With this reconstructed affidavit in mind, the Court asks whether the affidavit

independently establishes probable cause for the arrest warrant against Cook. Several facts in

the affidavit lead the Court to answer that question in the affirmative. First, the affidavit shows

that Trooper Tustin received an email from the Maryland State Police—an independent law

enforcement agency—saying that Cook’s Maryland driver’s license photograph was a match for

the driver’s license photograph taken by the perpetrator. (Doc. No. 11, Ex. at 15.) Second,

Trooper Tustin’ additional investigation revealed driver’s licenses from Florida, Massachusetts,

and Rhode Island issued to Sadie Lee Dupuis, Sadie L. Dupuis, and Sadie Lee Jones,

respectively. (Id. at 16.) Each license had a photograph of a woman who looks similar to the

perpetrator. (Id.) Both Cook and the perpetrator have the same “reddish” hair color and similar

facial structures, and any differences in their facial features are difficult to discern given that the

perpetrator was wearing glasses and had her hair down, while Cook’s photos were taken without

glasses6 and with her hair pulled back. (Id., at Ex. B.) The lack of a birth mark on the woman

depicted in the January 2024 photograph does not undermine a finding of probable cause because

the mark could have, for instance, been covered with makeup. Finally, and most notably, the

same social security number was used to get all five driver’s licenses, including the fraudulently

acquired Pennsylvania license. (Id.)

A reasonable officer with knowledge of these facts would have believed that Cook

committed the crimes with which she was charged. See Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (discussing

probable cause standard); see also 18 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. § 4120(a) (“A person commits the

offense of identity theft of another person if [s]he possesses or uses, through any means,

identifying information of another person without the consent of that other person to further any

unlawful purpose.”); id. § 4101(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud or

injure anyone, or with knowledge that [s]he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by

anyone, the actor: alters any writing of another without his authority.”); id. § 4104(a) (“A person

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if, knowing that [s]he has no privilege to do so, [s]he

falsified, destroys, removes or conceals any writing or record, or distinguishing mark or brand or

other identification with intent to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any wrongdoing.”);

id. § 4911(a)(3) (“A person commits an offense if [s]he: intentionally and unlawfully destroys,

6 The use of glasses by the perpetrator is neither here nor there, given that many people who wear

glasses also wear contacts and someone could easily use non-prescription glasses to veil their identity.

conceals, removes or otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, document or

thing.”).

In sum, even if the Court adds the information about Cook’s distinctive facial features

and removes Trooper Tustin’s assertion that the woman pictured on these licenses was “the

same,” the affidavit would have still established probable cause. Cook’s distinctive facial

features, including a small birthmark, are not sufficiently exculpatory as to outweigh the

inculpatory evidence, which included a match by the Maryland State Police and the use of the

same social security number in each instance. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790, 791–92 (finding the

officer’s failure to mention a several-inch height difference was not material). Accordingly, the

Court finds Trooper Tustin’s alleged omission and false statement were not material.

* * *

Because the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause, Cook fails to state a

plausible Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and imprisonment or for malicious

prosecution and the Court grants the motion to dismiss as to these claims.

2. Abuse of Process Claim

That leaves Cook’s claim for abuse of process. This claim is founded in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir.

1977) (“An abuse of process is by definition a denial of procedural due process.”). “[A] section

1983 claim for malicious abuse of process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and

thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by law.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,

350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989). In other words, the claim centers not on the “wrongful procurement of

legal process” but rather on the “misuse of process.” Dunne v. Township of Springfield, 500 F.

App’x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst.

1977)). “Incidental motive[s] or spite[s] or ulterior purpose[s]” are not enough to show a misuse

of process, and a defendant is not liable if they have done “nothing more than carry out the

process to its authorized conclusion.” Napier v. City of New Castle, 407 F. App’x 578, 582 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted). Instead, “[t]he usual case of abuse of process is

one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pressure upon [the accused] to compel

him to pay a different debt or to take some other action or refrain from it.” Rest. 2d Torts § 682

cmt. b.

Trooper Tustin argues that Cook’s abuse of process claim must be dismissed because she

alleges that the prosecution against her was not legitimately initiated, a fact which would

preclude an abuse of process claim. (Doc. No. 12 at 20–21.) Trooper Tustin is correct. As

explained above, an abuse of process occurs when a “prosecution is initiated legitimately and

thereafter [ ] used for a purpose other than that intended by the law.” Napier, 407 F. App’x at

582 (cleaned up) (emphasis added); see also Napier v. City of New Castle, Civil Action No. 06-

1368, 2007 WL 1965296, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2007) (“As plaintiff has acknowledged, a claim

for abuse of process differs from a malicious prosecution claim in that a malicious prosecution

claim has to do with the wrongful initiation of the legal process, i.e., without probable cause and

with a bad motive, whereas an abuse of process arises when a prosecution is initiated

legitimately but thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by law.” (quotation

marks omitted)). As such, courts consistently dismiss abuse of process claims premised, like

Cook’s, on the assertion that an officer was “merely continuing to pursue a claim that was

initiated with malice.” Napier, 2007 WL 1965296, at *6; see also, e.g., Evans v. Durham Life

Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 00–281, 2001 WL 770803, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2001).

Cook does not dispute Trooper Tustin’s reading of the law, but instead, argues that the

Court should view her claim for abuse of process as an alternative count, which assumes the

prosecution against her was legitimately initiated but was later improperly continued. (Doc. No.

14 at 13–14.) The Court grants that request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) (“A party may set out 2 or

more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or

defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if

any one of them is sufficient.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do

justice.”).

So read, Cook claims that Trooper Tustin committed an abuse of process by

“continu[ing] to prosecute her” after she showed him “evidence that she was not [the]

perpetrator.” (Doc. No. 11 at ¶¶ 66–67.) Cook does not explain what evidence she showed

Trooper Tustin or how it leads to the conclusion that Trooper Tustin continued the prosecution

because he “was unwilling to admit that he made a mistake.” (Id. at ¶¶ 68–69.) But even

assuming that Trooper Tustin continued the prosecution because he did not want to concede a

mistake, this reason on its own does not state a constitutional claim for abuse of process.

The Third Circuit’s discussion in Napier v. City of New Castle is illustrative. In that case,

a narcotics officer observed a confidential informant buy drugs from someone who shared the

plaintiff’s name. 407 F. App’x at 580. The officer later examined the plaintiff’s driver’s license

photograph and determined that she was the woman who sold the drugs to the informant. Id.

But when the officer arrested the plaintiff three months later, he noticed that her hair style and

weight were different. Id. According to the plaintiff, the officer knew that she was not the

person he had seen selling the drugs, but he nevertheless continued the prosecution because he

“just didn’t want to look embarrassed in front of his peers by admitting he had the wrong

person.” Id. at 581–82. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim, and

the Third Circuit affirmed, explaining that “there is no liability where the defendant has done

nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad

intentions.” Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up); see also Evans, 2001 WL 770803, at *2 (“It is

not enough that the defendant had bad or malicious intentions or that the defendant acted from

spite or with an ulterior motive. Rather, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the

process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim. There is no liability where the

defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even

though with bad intentions.” (quoting AI Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188,

191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994))).

Like the plaintiff in Napier, here, Cook has not shown that Trooper Tustin used the

prosecution for an improper purpose, such as extortion. See Rest. 2d Torts § 682 cmt. b; see also

Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1219 (3d Cir. 1977) (“If the defendant . . . uses the threat of

prosecution for purposes of extortion, this is malicious abuse” of process.); Bristow v. Clevenger,

80 F. Supp. 2d 421, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (“Courts have held that when process is used to effect

an extortionate demand, or to cause the surrender of a legal right, or is used in any other way not

so intended by proper use of the process, a cause of action for abuse of process can be

maintained.” (quotation marks omitted)). To the contrary, Cook’s allegations suggest that she

and Trooper Tustin had competing evidence as to whether she was the perpetrator, and the state

court proceedings were continued “to determine whether [Cook] was guilty of the offenses in

question, which is precisely the purpose intended by the law.” Dunne, 500 F. App’x at 139

(quotation marks omitted). And even accepting Cook’s allegation that Trooper Tustin continued

the prosecution solely because he did not want to concede a mistake, “[m]erely carrying out the

process to its authorized conclusion, even with bad intentions, is not abuse of process.” Mawson

v. Pittston City Police Dep’t, CIVIL NO: 3:16-CV-00400, 2017 WL 4324840, at *17 (M.D. Pa.

Jan. 20, 2017) (emphasis added); see also Napier, 407 F. App’x at 582 (explaining that

“[i]ncidental motive[s] or spite[s] or ulterior purpose[s]” are not enough where defendants have

done “nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion”); Rest. 2d Torts

§ 682 cmt. b (explaining that “there is no action for abuse of process when the process is used for

the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior

purpose of benefit to the defendant”).

Because Cook has not alleged any facts from which the Court can find that Trooper

Tustin used the continued criminal prosecution for an improper purpose, the Court also dismisses

Cook’s claim for abuse of process.

B. Qualified Immunity

Because Cook has failed to sufficiently allege that Trooper Tustin violated a

constitutional right, the Court does not need to analyze whether he is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 792.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Trooper Tustin’s motion to dismiss is granted, and

Cook’s § 1983 claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. Cook will

be given an opportunity to submit a second amended complaint to the extent she can in good

faith cure the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum. An appropriate order follows.