The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAWN BROWN,
Case No. 2:23-cv-05155
v.
SAMEERAH MUHAMMAD,
MEMORANDUM
Not everyone who works in a government-funded program acts under color of
state law. Sameerah Muhammad worked at a privately owned halfway house, and she
relayed to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections a complaint that one resident
made about another. That wasn’t government action, so I will dismiss Shawn Brown’s
complaint against Ms. Muhammad. I will, however, give Mr. Brown a chance to allege any
additional facts that he might have to cure the flaws with his pleading.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Brown was paroled from the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Smithfield on
November 5, 2021, and transferred to Kintock-Erie, a residential treatment facility that the
Kintock Group operates. Ms. Muhammad was a Senior Case Manager at Kintock-Erie.
Kintock Group operates Kintock-Erie under a contract with the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections (“DOC”) to provide parolees with employment, vocational support, and
mental health treatment.
On December 30, 2021, Ms. Muhammad received a written statement from another
parolee alleging that Mr. Brown threatened him with bodily harm if he did not pay Mr.
Brown $600 per week. Mr. Brown was not present at the facility during the alleged
incident, so he claims that Ms. Muhammad knew the allegations were false. Ms.
Muhammad nonetheless reported the threat to DOC. DOC issued and executed a warrant
for Mr. Brown’s detention. From December 30, 2021, to March 24, 2022, authorities
detained Mr. Brown at SCI Smithfield while he awaited a hearing before the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole. At the hearing, the Board found in Mr. Brown’s favor,
determining that he had not violated any conditions of his parole, and ordered his release.
Mr. Brown filed this lawsuit on December 28, 2023, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, as well as state-law tort
claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution. On May 29, 2024, Ms. Muhammad filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and set forth affirmative defenses of
qualified and sovereign immunity. That Motion is ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” , 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quotation omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these
documents.” , 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016). Judges must “construe
those truths in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable
inferences from them.” , 809 F.3d at 790 (citation omitted). However, the tenet
that I must “accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals
of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). I am not required “to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983, Mr. Brown must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and show that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); , 446 F.3d 483, 499 (3d Cir. 2006). Ms.
Muhammad does not work for the government; she is a private person who works for a
private entity, The Kintock Group.
A private actor can act under color of state law if her conduct is “fairly attributable”
to the state. , 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). To determine whether state
action exists in such a circumstance, courts consider “(1) whether the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether
the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3)
whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the
acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”
, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). This determination is always
a fact-specific inquiry. , 289 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir.
2002) ( ). Additionally, “[a]cts of private contractors do not become acts of the
State simply because they are performing public contracts.”
, 925 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1991). Instead, there must be “such a
close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” , 870 F.3d 154,
160 (3d Cir. 2017).
Mr. Brown asserts that Kintock-Erie is a private entity working under a contract with
DOC and that Ms. Muhammad was a Kintock Group employee at the time in question.
But that’s not enough to establish action that one could fairly attribute to the state. In
similar situations, courts have rejected the contention that a private actor acts under color
of state law just because she participates in a government-funded, government-regulated
program. , 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (nursing home); ,
457 U.S. at 840-41 (public school). A panel of the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion
that I find persuasive, reached the same conclusion concerning a halfway house employee
in , No. 20-1736, 2021 WL 4166285, at * 2 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,
2021); , No. 21-CV-3434, 2022 WL 103351, *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
11, 2022). And in , 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987), the
Tenth Circuit held that a private actor did not engage in state action by calling the police,
even though the call resulted in the individual’s arrest.
These decisions make sense. Anyone can make a report to a government agency
like DOC, and the government agency can investigate or not, as it chooses. Contacting a
government agency to report misconduct does not constitute state action, even when the
person making the report works for a government contractor. Those complaints are not
the traditional prerogative of the government. State officials don’t help the private
individual make the complaint, they don’t act in concert with that person, and they aren’t
intertwined with the complaining party.
Given all of this, Mr. Brown’s complaint falls short of what he must plead. The facts
don’t establish that Ms. Muhammad acted under color of state law when she reported the
complaint to DOC. I will therefore dismiss his Section 1983 claim.
B. State Law Claims
Having dismissed Mr. Brown’s federal question claims, I cannot exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state tort claims. Under Third Circuit law, “where the
claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the
district court decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative
justification for doing so.” , 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). (quotation
omitted) (emphasis in original). I do not find any unusual circumstances in this case that
would lead me to decide Mr. Brown’s remaining state law claims. If Mr. Brown files an
amended complaint, he may include his state law claims, and I will address them if I
determine that a federal question can survive a motion to dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
I will dismiss Mr. Brown’s claims. He has not pled facts to establish that Ms.
Muhammad acted under color of state law, and I will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims. I will give Mr. Brown 28 days to file an amended
complaint to address the deficiencies in his current complaint. If he has more facts to
establish Ms. Muhammad’s status as a state actor, he should include them. An appropriate
Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
July 10, 2024 JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.