Phillips v. Chambers-Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

JERONICA PHILLIPS, : Case No. 2:24-cv-3900

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge James L. Graham

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, an Ohio state prisoner who is currently incarcerated at the Richland Correctional

Institution in Mansfield, Ohio, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The factual allegations forming the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint are alleged to have occurred

during Plaintiff’s incarceration at the Correctional Reception Center (“CRC”) in Orient, Ohio, and

Plaintiff names as Defendants Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Corrections; Jossette Okereke, Warden of the CRC; James Harris, Captain at

CRC; Jane or John Doe I, employee and/or corrections officer at CRC; Jane Doe II, nurse/medical

staff at CRC; and Lieutenant Holtz, also of CRC. (Doc. 1-1, at PageID #s 8-9). All Defendants

are sued in both their individual and official capacities.

By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This

matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the

complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.

from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); §

805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that –

* * *

(B) the action or appeal –

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) standards to

review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of

complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir.

2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action in connection with a slip and fall incident inside his cell at the

CRC. Plaintiff alleges that on January 28, 2024, he notified corrections officers that the ceiling of

his cell was “leaking profusely” and requested a mop. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint, at PageID #9.)

Plaintiff took a nap, and when he awoke for lunch, he “slipped in a puddle of water that now

covered the cell floor.” (Id.) Plaintiff hit his head on the floor and feared he had torn sutures from

a recent back surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff stayed on the floor “dizzy in pain for approximately 20

minutes” and was then “picked up” by an unnamed corrections officer and Lieutenant Holtz,

“contrary to medical protocol, and transported to Medical.” (Id.) At medical, Plaintiff’s vitals

were checked, his back was examined, and he was informed he could return to medical hourly if

needed. (Id. at PageID #s 10, 14.) Plaintiff alleges he was then “placed in the hole for medical

observation which was later changed to refusing lock ([w]hich means [he] refused to return to the

flooded cell).” (Id. at PageID #10.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against all Defendants as well as injunctive relief

“ordering Defendant’s to cease their illicit acts towards plaintiff herein.” (Id. at PageID #11.)

C. Analysis of the Complaint

1. Defendants Chambers-Smith and Okereke

As an initial matter, the complaint should be dismissed against Defendants Annette

Chambers-Smith, director of ODRC, and warden Josette Okereke. Although these Defendants are

listed as Defendants in the complaint (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID #s 7-8), the complaint

does not include any factual allegations against Chambers-Smith or Okereke. Absent any

allegation of wrongdoing, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

against these Defendants.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Chambers-Smith and Okereke liable for

their failure to correct the various allegations contained in the complaint, it is well-settled that the

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto

supervisory personnel. See, e.g., Wingo v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th

Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)). “In order to find

supervisory personnel liable, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisors were somehow personally

involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate, . . . or at least acquiesced in the alleged

unconstitutional activity of a subordinate.” Id. (citing Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th

Cir. 1982), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Colvin v. Caruso,

605 F.3d 282, 292 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 2009))

(to succeed on claim against supervisory state prison officials, the plaintiff must show the officials

“at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct

of the offending officers”). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Defendants

Chambers-Smith or Okereke directly participated in and/or authorized, approved, or acquiesced in

the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The mere fact that these Defendants hold

supervisory positions is not enough to impose liability on them under § 1983.

2. Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages

All of the claims against Defendants in their official capacities for money damages require

dismissal. Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damage suits under the Eleventh

Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). The State of Ohio has not constitutionally nor statutorily

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See Johns v. Supreme Court of

Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 1985); State of Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694

F.2d 449, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to actions where the state

is not a named party, but where the action is essentially one for the recovery of money from the

state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945),

overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).

A suit against defendants in their official capacities would, in reality be a way of pleading the

action against the entity of which defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against state officials in their official capacities are included in this

bar. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). See also Colvin v. Caruso,

605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009))

(“[A]n official-capacity suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is

thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation omitted)). Therefore,

Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary

relief, and Plaintiff’s claims seeking money damages must be dismissed against all Defendants on

this basis.

3. Claims Seeking Injunctive Relief

To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief ordering Defendants “to cease their illicit

acts” against him, the Court notes that Plaintiff is no longer being housed at the CRC and has since

been transferred to Richland Correctional. Because plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the

CRC—the place where the alleged violations of his rights occurred—his request for injunctive

relief against defendants is denied as moot. See Parks v. Reans, 510 F. App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir.

2013) (per curiam) (citing Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)) (holding that the

district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief based on

incidents that had occurred at a prison facility where he was previously confined because the

request was rendered “moot upon his transfer to a different facility”); cf. Dulaney v. Carnahan,

132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that request for injunctive relief based on Eighth

Amendment claim of denial of medical care was rendered moot by plaintiffs’ release from the

prisons involved in the case).

4. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were “completely negligent and deliberately indifferent to

his safety and medical needs.” (Doc. 1-1, at PageID #11.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims

as ones brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference to his

safety and serious medical needs.

A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 action alleging his safety is endangered due to the conditions

of his confinement only by showing that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference”

to inmate health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994). Deliberate

indifference is a much higher standard than negligence and requires establishing both objective

and subjective components of a claim. Id. at 834. That is, the risk of harm to the prisoner must

have been objectively serious enough to require constitutional protection, and the plaintiff must

also show that the official being sued “‘subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial

risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.’”

Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary,

273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Here, accepting all the facts in Plaintiff’s complaint as true and construing all inferences in

his favor, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the risks he faced were

sufficiently serious to require constitutional protection. Courts in this Circuit “have routinely held

that ‘slip and fall’ claims typically assert only negligence, which is insufficient to set out a valid

§1983 claim.” Henderson v. Lincoln County Jail, Case No. 4:23-cv-52, 2024 WL 268404 (E.D.

Tenn. Jan. 24, 2024) (Atchley, D.J.). In Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App’x 204 (6th Cir. 2017), the

Sixth Circuit considered similar facts. There, Lamb’s cell was flooded with several inches of toilet

water from a neighboring cell. Lamb notified corrections officers. Several hours later, while

trying to sidestep the water in his cell, Lamb slipped and hit his head. Id. at 206. He was

transported to the hospital and received six stitches. Thereafter, Lamb filed suit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging corrections officers violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

by being deliberately indifferent to his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The

district court dismissed Lamb’s complaint during the initial screen, finding his allegations, even

when liberally construed, did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. The Sixth

Circuit affirmed, noting as follows:

Accepting all facts in Lamb’s complaint as true, and construing all

inferences in his favor, he has not demonstrated that the risk he faced was

sufficiently serious. Lamb’s allegation is, in its essence, a slip-and-fall claim. Mere

negligence is not sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment, Farmer, 511 U.S. at

835, and the federal courts have nearly unanimously held that a “slip and fall,

without more, does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.” Reynolds v.

Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001)

(dismissing for failure to state a claim a prisoner’s complaint alleging

unconstitutional conditions of confinement where the prisoner was deprived of a

working toilet and was subjected to a flooded cell); White v. Tyszkiewicz, 27

Fed.Appx. 314, 315 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissing a prisoner’s complaint alleging

deliberate indifference where prisoner slipped and fell on ice); Bell v. Ward, 88

Fed.Appx. 125, 127 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding no § 1983 violation where prisoner

claimed that officials were aware of slippery conditions created by other prisoners

but took no action to remedy the problem, and where the prisoner slipped and fell

due to those conditions); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that slippery prison floors “do not state even an arguable claim for cruel

and unusual punishment”) (quoting Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 644 (9th Cir.

1989)).

Lamb alleges that federal courts have found that slippery floors may be

sufficiently dangerous to create a potential constitutional violation “where a

slippery prison floor is combined with one or more exacerbating factors.”

(Appellant Br. at 30–31.) Lamb lists four exacerbating factors that he asserts

support his deliberate-indifference claim. First, he alleges that the slippery

condition here is different than in many of the other slip-and-fall cases because it

occurred in an area that is not normally wet. Second, he claims that the slippery

condition was exacerbated by darkness. Third, Lamb claims that his repeated

warnings to the guards indicate the risk was serious. And lastly, he argues that the

water covering his floor was unsanitary toilet water rather than potable water and

that this fact is sufficiently exacerbating to warrant reversing the district court’s

dismissal.

It is true that courts have occasionally found that a slip-and-fall case that

has additional exacerbating factors can create a plausible allegation of

constitutional harm. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that where the plaintiff was disabled, had to use crutches, and had fallen

many times due to slippery conditions in the shower, and prison officials were

aware of all of these facts, the plaintiff could potentially state a deliberate-

indifference claim). But Lamb’s case lacks sufficient exacerbating factors to

survive even motion-to-dismiss review. Despite his attempt to differentiate this

case because the slippery condition occurred in his cell rather than a normally wet

area, such as a shower, this circuit has found that a temporarily flooded cell is

insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Dellis, 257 F.3d at

511. Further, even assuming it was dark the entire time from when the flooding

began at 7 p.m. until when Lamb fell at 11 p.m., this fact does not create

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Lamb was aware of the flooding in his

cell, and he does not allege that the guards failed to notify him of the condition.

Accordingly, it is hard to see how the darkness could have contributed further to

the risk that he faced.

Id. at 208-09.

Similarly, Plaintiff in this case has not demonstrated that the risk he faced was sufficiently

serious to trigger the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff’s complaint at most alleges that

Defendants were negligent in their duty to protect him from a hazardous condition. Plaintiff has

set forth what amounts to an unfortunate but commonplace slip-and-fall incident, and his

circumstances lack the type of exacerbating factors that the rare court has found sufficient to

survive an initial screening review. Like Lamb, Plaintiff was aware of the flooding in his cell prior

to his fall. The only potentially exacerbating factor alleged in the complaint is that Plaintiff had

surgery prior to his incarceration and was placed on a “bottom bunk-lower range medical

restriction.” (Doc. 1-1, at PageID #9). But the mere existence of this restriction does not establish

that Plaintiff lacked the faculties to avoid a slip and fall, or that prison officials should have known

there was a substantial risk that he would be unable to do so. To the contrary, Plaintiff saw the

water, alerted corrections officers to its presence, and requested a mop—presumably to handle the

situation himself. The incident happened shortly before lunch and Plaintiff does not allege his cell

was dark or that he could not otherwise see the hazard. At base, Plaintiff has alleged a temporary

inconvenience and potential negligence which is insufficient to elevate this slip-and-fall claim to

one of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety.

The same is true of Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

To demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding his medical treatment, Plaintiff

must show a “sufficiently serious” medical need to which Defendants responded with “deliberate

indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 842 (1994).

Again, there is both an objective and a subjective component to this type of claim. The

objective component requires the existence of a sufficiently serious medical need. Turner v. City

of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 646 (6th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the subjective component, the defendant

must possess a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” that is “tantamount to intent to punish.”

Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 478 F. App’x 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Horn by Parks v.

Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)). “Deliberate indifference is the

reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence, or even gross negligence,

will not suffice.” Wright v. Taylor, 79 F. App’x 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 835-36; Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).

As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that he laid on the floor in pain for approximately

twenty minutes before Lieutenant Holtz and the unnamed corrections officer took him to medical.

It is apparent from the face of the complaint that when Lieutenant Holtz and the unnamed officer

realized Plaintiff may have been injured, they sought medical care for him. Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged that any Defendant delayed or interfered with his treatment, or that he remained

in his cell for an extended period of time before being taken to the infirmary. See, e.g., Horne v.

Thurman, et. al., Case No. 3:23cv449, 2024 WL 3997465, *2, 5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2024)

(finding brief delay while corrections officers “drew the inference that Plaintiff needed medical

care” after a fall on a prison transport bus insufficient to state a claim for relief under section §

1983). Additionally, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Holtz and the unnamed officer

picked him up “contrary to medical protocol,” Plaintiff has alleged no facts describing how he was

picked up by these Defendants, and there is no basis for this Court to plausibly infer that these

Defendants acted with anything but good faith in their effort to get Plaintiff off the floor. There

are simply no facts in the complaint suggesting these Defendants had a sufficiently culpable state

of mind tantamount to an intent to punish Plaintiff. As such, it is RECOMMENDED that this

claim be DISMISSED against all Defendants.

Lastly, the Sixth Circuit distinguishes between cases “where the complaint alleges a

complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received

inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). Thus,

where a prisoner has received some level of medical care and the dispute is over the adequacy of

the treatment, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id. Additionally, “[i]n examining whether

a claimed injury is ‘sufficiently serious’” to sustain a claim for deliberate indifference, “courts

look to the effect of any delay in treatment caused by an officer’s inaction.” Vaughn v. City of

Lebanon, 18 F. App’x 252, 274 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original.) Specifically, a plaintiff

“who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place

verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical

treatment to succeed.” Id. (citing Napier v. Madison Cty., Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).

See also Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If the plaintiff’s claim, however,

is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately . . . the plaintiff must place verifying

medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical

treatment.”).

Here, Plaintiff received medical attention. The complaint states that Jane Doe II

(nurse/medical staff) checked Plaintiff’s vitals and examined his back, and Plaintiff was advised

he could return to medical hourly as needed for continued evaluation. (Doc. 1-1, at PageID #s 10,

14). Although Plaintiff alleges he was not given ice or medication for pain, he has not alleged any

detrimental physical effect from either the inadequacy of the care he received at the infirmary or

the twenty minute delay in receiving medical care. Accordingly, these allegations are insufficient

to evidence a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim

for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning denial of medical care. It is therefore

RECOMMENDED that this claim be DISMISSED against all Defendants.

5. Placement in the Transitional Program Unit

Finally, construing the complaint liberally and out of an abundance of caution, the Court

finds an attempt by Plaintiff to establish a constitutional violation for being temporarily placed in

the Transitional Program Unit (“TPU”), which Plaintiff characterizes as “in the hole.” (Doc. 1-1,

at PageID #10). Plaintiff has attached his grievance, wherein he states that he requested to be

placed in TPU because it was closer to medical. (Id. at PageID #14.) Plaintiff asserts that he

remained in TPU as discipline for refusing the return to the flooded cell (“refusing to lock”). (Id.

at PageID #15.) The grievance states Plaintiff remained at TPU from January 28, 2024, until

January 31, 2004. (Id.)

Confinement in observation and/or segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates

should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 467-73 (1983). Such confinement is not considered atypical and is significant only in

“extreme circumstances.” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts

consider the nature and the duration of the stay in assessing whether the confinement is either

atypical or significant, Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008), and accordingly,

this type of conditions of confinement claim is “highly fact-specific, but one guiding principle is

that the length of exposure to the conditions is often paramount.” Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App’x

204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017).

Regarding Plaintiff’s stay in the TPU, the Court notes that it was Plaintiff who requested

that he be temporarily housed there in order to have easier access to medical. And his stay was in

fact temporary, as it lasted three days. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied adequate food,

clothing, shelter, recreation, or medical care while in the TPU, and he has not alleged any harm as

a result of the conditions of the TPU. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim for

relief against any defendant.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any Defendant in either an individual or official capacity.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e).

October 1, 2024 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the

District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).