Fields v. Cottrill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GERALD D. FIELDS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:24-cv-3857

Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

HON. KELLY J. COTTRILL, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Gerald D. Fields, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state court judge, a county

prosecutor, a municipal police department, and a county sheriff, alleging that his constitutional

rights were violated during state court forfeiture proceedings against him. This matter is before

the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A

to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any

portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.

1997). Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $0.15 in his prison

account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number A765446) at the Noble Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to

the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial

payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or

the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately

preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Failure to State a Claim

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the federal in forma pauperis statute, Courts must sua sponte

dismiss an action upon determining that an in forma pauperis complaint fails to state a claim on

which relief can be granted. Thus, a typical initial screen involves consideration of the merits of

the claims asserted. In this case, however, upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned

determines that it is unnecessary to consider the merits of several of the claims he advances

because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such claims. When the face of the

complaint provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss an action as frivolous

and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urb. Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL

883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL

454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that he was tried in state court on several drug-related criminal offenses,

as part of which Defendant Assistant County Prosecutor Mark Zanghi sought forfeiture of $7,700

seized during Plaintiff’s arrest at his residence. (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1-1.) Although the jury

found that the funds were not subject to forfeiture, Plaintiff could not establish that he was the

sole owner of the funds and therefore Defendant Kelly Cottrill, a Muskingum County Common

Pleas Judge, denied Plaintiff’s request to return the funds to him. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiff alleges

that various subsequent proceedings in the state trial and appellate courts ultimately resulted in a

ruling by Defendant Cotrill releasing the funds as “abandoned” to Defendants Muskingum

County Sheriff Matt Lutz and the Zanesville Police Department. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that

the Ohio Supreme Court has abolished the procedure by which the law enforcement Defendants

obtained the seized funds, and that he has “no remedial mechanism” because his direct appeal

was dismissed. (Id.)

All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, no matter how liberally the Court

construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants Cottrill and Zanghi—a judge and a prosecuting

attorney, respectively—are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability. Judges and

prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suit when acting within the scope of their

duties. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (judges immune); Imber v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutors immune for actions taken within the scope of duty);

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citations omitted) (immunity overcome only if actions

taken are not within the judge’s judicial capacity or if the actions, “though judicial in nature,

[are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction”). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no

plausible allegations on which this Court could rely to conclude that the exceptions to judicial

and prosecutorial immunity apply to exempt the state-court judge and prosecutors he names.

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to invalidate orders entered by a state court, and a

doctrine known as Rooker-Feldman limits this Court’s ability to adjudicate such claims. See

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that

appellate review of state-court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings is limited

to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Ind.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “The pertinent question in determining whether a federal

district court is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter

jurisdiction over a claim is whether the ‘source of the injury’ upon which plaintiff bases his

federal claim is the state court judgment.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548. Here, Plaintiff’s alleged

injury—the release of $7,700 in seized funds to the Zanesville Police Department and the

Muskingum County Sheriff, instead of to Plaintiff—arises directly out of the state court’s orders

to that effect. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly seeks to overturn the state courts’ decisions

regarding the seized funds, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a

claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE