Zilinsky v. LeafFilter North, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

James Zilinsky, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

et al.,

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229

Plaintiffs,

Judge Michael H. Watson

V.

Magistrate Judge Jolson

LeafFilter North, LLC,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

James Zilinsky, Geraldine Zilinsky, Cory Simpson, Brian Dering, Theresa

Dering, Meagan McGinley, Sandy Armstrong, Sandra GarrettDorsey, and Alan

Armstrong (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for final approval of the Parties’ class

action Settlement, ECF No. 98, and for an award of attorney's fees and service

awards, ECF No. 70. LeafFilter North, LLC (“Defendant”) does not oppose either

motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint (“Action”) against Defendant in

December 2020, alleging that Defendant materially misrepresented that its gutter

protection system would not clog or overflow when, in fact, the system was

defective and allowed debris to accumulate on top of the gutters. Compl., ECF

No. 1. Plaintiffs assert consumer protection and common law tort claims under

various states’ laws. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs later filed an Amended

Complaint with substantially the same allegations. ECF No. 19.

The Parties fully briefed a motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 30, 33, & 36.

Before the Court ruled on the motion, the Parties moved for a stay pending

mediation, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 46 & 47. Subsequently, the

Parties notified the Court that they reached a settlement. ECF No. 50. The

Parties moved for preliminary approval of their Settlement Agreement, which the

Court granted. ECF Nos. 54, 56, & 58. The Court held a fairness hearing on

March 24, 2023, and now turns to Plaintiffs’ unopposed motions for final approval

of the Settlement and for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and service awards.

ECF Nos. 70 & 98.

B. The Settlement Agreement

Per the Parties’ representations at the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement

Agreement creates a $5.2 million Settlement Fund for the benefit of the Class.

The Settlement Fund will cover settlement payments to Class Members, costs of

notice to the Class and administration of the settlement, reimbursement of Class

Counsel’s reasonable costs and expenses, attorney's fees for Class Counsel,

and service awards to named Plaintiffs. See generally Settlement Agreement,

ECF No. 56-2. Class Members had the opportunity to submit a claim form to

receive one of four benefits: (1) vouchers for future gutter cleanings;

(2) reimbursement for past gutter cleaning; (3) a combination of vouchers and

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 2 of 22

reimbursement; and (4) partial reimbursement for removal of the gutter

protection system. /d.

The Settlement Class is defined as follows:

[A]ll LeafFilter customers in the United States who appear in

LeafFilter’s customer care database with a Debris-Related Final Issue

Code for their service request. The Class Period shall mean the time

period from January 1, 2016 through the date that the Settlement

Agreement is fully executed.

Id. at 11. The Parties represent that there are nearly 58,000 Class Members.

Id.

C. Notice

The Court appointed KCC Class Action Services, LLC (“KCC”) to be

the Settlement Administrator. See Order 6, ECF No. 58; Jue Decl. 1, ECF

No. 98-3. KCC was responsible for providing Notice to Class Members. See

generally Jue Decl., ECF No. 98-3. KCC reviewed the records provided by

Class Counsel, obtained updated mailing addresses and email addresses,

and sent the Notice via mail to 57,704 Class Members and via email to

39,855 Class Members.' Jue Decl. 7] 2-3, ECF No. 98-3. Although over

1,000 notices initially came back as undeliverable, KCC was ultimately able to

send notices to all but 354 Class Members. /d. J 6.

1 As the Parties represent that there are nearly 58,000 Class Members, the Court

assumes there were several Class Members that received both an email and a mail

version of the Notice.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 3 of 22

ll. APPROVAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT

To grant final approval of a settlement class, the Rule 23 requirements

must be satisfied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The Court has already preliminarily

approved the Class for settlement purposes, ECF No. 58, and now finds that the

standards required for final approval are satisfied.

A. Numerosity

To satisfy numerosity, the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “There is no strict

numerical test for determining impracticability of joinder.” In re Am. Med. Sys.,

Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he

numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each case

and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc., v. EEOC,

446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Here, the Class contains nearly 58,000 members.

Numerosity is satisfied because it would be impractical, if not impossible, to join

all of these members into one action.

B. Commonality

To establish commonality, there must be “questions of law or fact common

to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the Class Members have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-50, 2011) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The claims “must depend on a common contention . . . of

such a nature that is capable of classwide resolution—which means that

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 4 of 22

determination of its truth or its falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the

validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” /d. at 350.

Here, the lawsuit raised numerous common questions including whether

Defendant made the alleged misrepresentations and whether the gutter

protection system had a defect that allowed debris to accumulate on top of it. In

addition, the Class Members have the same alleged injury: the gutter protection

system did not perform as allegedly promised. Accordingly, the commonality

requirement is satisfied.

C. _Typicality

A class representative’s claim is typical if “it arises from the same event or

practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other Class

Members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” Beattie

v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The

typicality requirement “tend[s] to merge” with the commonality requirement. Gen.

Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 (1982).

Here, the typicality element is satisfied because the Class claims are

based on the same legal theories and the same alleged conduct.

D. Adequacy of Representation

The adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between

named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Products, Inc., v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). To determine the adequacy of

representation requirement, a court must consider two elements: “1) the

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 5 of 22

representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class,

and 2) it must appear that the representative[] will vigorously prosecute the

interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Pelzer v. Vassalle, 655 F. App’x

352, 364 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the Class Representatives and Class Members share common

interests. No conflict exists between the Class Representatives and the Class

Members they seek to represent. Also, Class Counsel have extensive

experience in class action litigation and corporate matters. See Warwick Decl.

8-21, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. | 4, ECF No. 56-8. Thus, adequacy is

met.

E. Rule 23(b) Requirements

Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a

showing that common questions of fact or law predominate over any individual

questions and that a class action is superior to other available methods for

adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

1. Predominance

“To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that

issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole

predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.”

Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’! Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 353 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted).

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 6 of 22

Predominance is satisfied here. There is one set of operative facts which

would render Defendant liable to each potential class member, as evident in the

definition of the class. Each class member had one of Defendant's gutter

protection systems installed and had a “Debris-Related Final Issue Code”

request in Defendant’s records. Consequently, the alleged injuries to Class

Members are of the same nature and each class member will have experienced

similar misrepresentations by Defendant. The Court therefore finds common

questions predominate over individual issues in this case.

2. Superiority

Finally, before certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find

that a class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). To make this decision,

the Court considers:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the

prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy

already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of

the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Id.

Here, class treatment is superior to other available methods. The Class

Members have little interest in individually controlling separate actions as the

amount of individual damages is likely to be small. “[S]mall awards weigh in

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 7 of 22

favor of class suits.” Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Mich., 654 F.3d 618, 631 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). The Court is not aware of

any litigation concerning this controversy that has already begun by or against

the Class Members. It is desirable to concentrate the litigation in this forum as

the Parties and, to a lesser extent, the Court have already expended significant

time and resources on this case. Last, the difficulties in managing a class action

do not outweigh the benefits of certifying a class in this case. Accordingly, a

class action is clearly the superior method of adjudicating this case.

For these reasons, the Class is certified for purposes of the Settlement,

and the Court appoints Varnell & Warwick, P.A. and Goldenberg Schneider, LPA

as Class Counsel.

lll. APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT

When deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, the Court must

consider whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

In making this determination, the Court considers the following factors:

(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely

duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by

the parties; (4) the likelinood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions

of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent

class members; and (7) the public interest.

Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 244

(6th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court

“enjoys wide discretion in assessing the weight and applicability of these factors.”

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 8 of 22

Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1992).

For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Settlement is fair,

adequate, and reasonable.

A. _ The Risk of Fraud or Collusion

First, the Court finds that there is no evidence—or even a suggestion—that

the Settlement was the product of fraud or collusion. See /UE-CWA v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 238 F.R.D. 583, 598 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“Courts presume the

absence of fraud or collusion unless there is evidence to the contrary.”). Rather,

the Settlement is the result of arm’s-length, well-researched, and protracted

negotiations. The Court concludes that this factor favors approval of the

Settlement.

B. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

Generally, “[mJost class actions are inherently complex and settlement

avoids the costs, delays, and multitude of other problems associated with them.”

In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1013 (S.D. Ohio 2001)

(quoting /n re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164,

174 (S.D. N.Y. 2000)). Here, the difficulty Plaintiffs would encounter in proving

their claims, the substantial litigation expenses, and the possibility of further

delay in recovery due to the appellate process weigh in favor of approving the

Settlement.

The Parties have been litigating this case for over two years. Absent the

Settlement, continued litigation of this case, as Class Counsel explained at the

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 9 of 22

hearing, would have resulted in substantial additional time and effort spent

preparing for litigation, including additional depositions, record review, expert

depositions, class certification and dispositive motions, and trial preparation.

Settling the case now saves time and money for the Parties and the Court.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement. It

secures a substantial benefit for the Class Members, undiminished by further

expenses and without the delay, cost, and uncertainty of protracted litigation.

C. The Amount of Discovery Engaged in By the Parties

To confirm that Plaintiffs “have had access to sufficient information to

evaluate their case and to assess the adequacy of the proposed Settlement,” the

Court must consider the amount of discovery engaged in by the Parties. /n re

Broadwing, Inc. ERISA Litig., 252 F.R.D. 369, 374 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citations

omitted). “In considering whether there has been sufficient discovery to permit

the plaintiffs to make an informed evaluation of the merits of a possible

settlement,” courts “should take account not only of court-refereed discovery but

also informal discovery in which parties engaged both before and after litigation

commenced.” UAW v. Gen’ Motors Corp., No. 05-CV-73991-DT, 2006 WL

891151, at *19 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006). In this consideration, “the absence of

formal discovery is not unusual or problematic, so long as the parties and the

court have adequate information in order to evaluate the relative positions of the

parties.” /d. (citing cases).

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 10 of 22

In this case, the Parties engaged in extensive discovery. Both sides have

ample evidence with which to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their

positions and determine that the Settlement is fair and reasonable under the

circumstances. The Court finds that both sides made well-informed decisions to

enter into the Settlement. This factor weighs in favor of approving the proposed

Settlement.

D. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits

“The most important of the factors to be considered in reviewing a

Settlement is the probability of success on the merits. The likelihood of success,

in turn, provides a gauge from which the benefits of the settlement must be

measured.” Poplar Creek, 636 F.3d at 245 (quoting /n re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co.

Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant misrepresented the capabilities of its

gutter protection system and that the system is defective. Defendant

unequivocally opposes all allegations. Among other issues, it would be difficult

for Plaintiffs to prove which specific misrepresentations were made to which

customers. Accordingly, due to the existence of uncertainties inherent in their

claims, Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of its claims remains

uncertain. This factor therefore weighs in favor of approving the Proposed

Settlement.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 11 of 22

E. The Opinions of Class Counsel and Class Representatives

The recommendation of Class Counsel, skilled in class actions and

corporate matters, that the Court should approve the Settlement is entitled to

deference. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983)

(‘The court should defer to the judgment of experienced counsel who has

competently evaluated the strength of his proofs . . . . [T]he deference afforded

counsel should correspond to the amount of discovery completed and the

character of the evidence uncovered.”); see a/so Kritzer v. Safelite Solutions,

LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0729, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74994, at *7 (S.D. Ohio May 30,

2012) (“The Court gives weight to the belief of experienced counsel that a

settlement is in the best interests of the class.”).

In this case, Class Counsel have extensive experience in class action

litigation and corporate matters. See Warwick Decl. {ff 8-21, ECF No. 56-7;

Goldenberg Decl. J 4, ECF No. 56-8. Equipped with extensive experience, Class

Counsel have concluded that the Settlement is not only fair and reasonable but

also confers substantial benefits on the Settlement Class. Warwick Decl. {J □□□

24, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. {§] 6-8, ECF No. 56-8. The Court therefore

finds that this factor favors approval of the Settlement.

F. The Reaction of Absent Class Members

The Court must also consider the reaction of the Class Members. Poplar

Creek, 636 F.3d at 244; In re Broadwing, 252 F.R.D. at 376.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 12 of 22

Individual notice packets were sent by first class mail to nearly 58,000

Class Members and via email to almost 40,000 Class Members. Jue Decl. {J 3—

6, ECF No. 98-3. Only 354 of those Class Members were unable to receive the

Notice. /d. at 76. Nearly 50 Class Members objected, and approximately 250

Class Members opted-out of the Settlement. /d. at {J 10-11; Notice, ECF No.

103; Notice, ECF No. 105. Thus, approximately 0.08% of Class Members

objected and 0.4% opted out; both percentages are quite low and demonstrate

that, as a whole, the Class supports the Settlement. Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 98-1.

Moreover, many objections expressed beliefs that Class Members should receive

a higher recovery. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 63, 75, & 88. Of course, it is

understandable that class members would want as high a recovery as possible,

but compromises are often required for settlement. As explained throughout this

Opinion and Order when one considers all the relevant factors, the settlement is

fair, adequate, and reasonable. Thus, the objectors’ desire for higher recovery

carries little weight.

In sum, the overall positive response from the Class Members weighs in

favor of approving the Settlement.

G. The Public Interest

“Public policy generally favors settlement of class action lawsuits.” Hainey

v. Parrott, 617 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (citation omitted). In this

case, the Settlement confers immediate benefits on the Class Members, avoids

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 13 of 22

the risks and expenses in further litigation, and conserves judicial resources.

The Court therefore finds that this factor favors approving the Settlement.

In sum, after considering all of the relevant factors, the Court concludes

that the Settlement provides a substantial benefit to the Parties and is fair,

reasonable, and adequate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

A. Attorney’s Fees

Class Counsel seeks an award of one-third of the total Settlement Fund in

the amount of $1,749,416.31. Mot. for Attorney’s Fees 1, ECF No. 131.

Defendant has not opposed this request for fees nor have any Class Members.

“When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make sure

that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the

results achieved.” Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516

(6th Cir. 1993). Rule 23 authorizes a court to “award reasonable attorney's fees

and non-taxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).

District courts apply a two-part analysis to assess the reasonableness of

an attorney fee petition. See In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litigs., 528 F. Supp.

2d 752, 760 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2007). First, the court must determine the

appropriate method to calculate the fees, using either the percentage of fund or

the Lodestar approach. /d. Whichever method is utilized, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit requires “only that awards of attorney’s fees

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 14 of 22

by federal courts in common fund cases be reasonable under the

circumstances.” Rawlings, 9 F.3d. at 516. Second, the Court must consider six

factors to assess the reasonableness of the fee. See Moulton v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009).

Here, the Court applies the percentage of the fund method. See, e.g.,

Gascho v. Global Health Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir.

2016) (indicating that the district court must make a “clear statement” as to which

calculation method is being applied (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court will

consider the following factors in determining whether the fee request is

reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value

of the services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were

undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s stake in rewarding

attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive

to others; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional

skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.

Moulton, 581 F.3d at 352 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Under the circumstances of this specific case, particularly where neither

Defendant nor any Class Member oppose the fee request and the Class has

received a “substantial benefit,” the Court concludes that all of these factors

weigh in favor of approving an award of attorney's fees.

As to the first factor, the Court has already described at length the benefit

conferred to the Class Members through Settlement. The total settlement

amount is for $5.2 million, and each class member had the opportunity to select

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 15 of 22

one of four benefits. This factor therefore weighs in favor of approving the

requested award.

Second, the value of the services on an hourly basis, multiplied by the

hourly rate, favors the proposed fee award. Here, although not required, a cross-

check using Class Counsel's lodestar amount weighs in favor of granting the

requested fee award of $1,749,416.31, which is a 2.18 multiplier of the lodestar

amount. “Because of the inherent risks of litigation, courts in this district award

multipliers of between 2.0 and 5.0.” Karpik v. Huntington Bancshares Inc., No.

2:17-cv-1153, 2021 WL 757123, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rudi v. Wexner, No. 2:20-cv-

30682022 WL 1682297, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2022) (“2.75 multiplier falls at

the low end of that reasonable range”).

Third, Class Counsel represents that they took on this case pursuant to a

contingency fee agreement. In doing so, Class Counsel assumed a real risk in

taking on this case, preparing to invest time, effort, and money over a period of

years with no guarantee of recovery. This factor weighs in favor of approving the

requested fee award. See, e.g., In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis

Liability Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 907, 936 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Absent this class

action, most individual claimants would lack the resources to litigate a case of

this magnitude.”).

The Court next considers whether the fourth factor, society’s stake in

rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits, militates in favor of an award of

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 16 of 22

the requested attorney's fees. Class actions such as this have a “value to

society more broadly, both as deterrents to unlawful behavior—particularly when

the individual injuries are too small to justify the time and expense of litigation—

and as private law enforcement regimes that free public sector resources.”

Gascho, 822 F.3d at 287 (citing cases). Without a class action, the individual

plaintiffs would not have had a strong incentive to pursue recovery because any

monetary award would have been severely outweighed by the costs to litigate

their cases.

The remaining two factors, the complexity of the litigation and the

professional skill and standing of the attorneys involved, also weigh in favor of

granting the requested award. This is a complex case with nuanced issues and

significant litigation.

Class Counsel have extensive experience in class action litigation similar

to this action. See Warwick Decl. J] 8-21, ECF No. 56-7; Goldenberg Decl. □□ 4,

ECF No. 56-8. As discussed above, the hours expended and time records

submitted by Class Counsel further underscore their competency and efficient

handling of this matter, favoring approval.

For these reasons, the Court approves the fee award of $1,749,416.31 to

Class Counsel.

B. Settlement Administration Costs and Out-of-Pocket Expenses

“Under the common fund doctrine, class counsel is entitled to

reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs in

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 17 of 22

the prosecution of claims and in obtaining settlement[.]” In re Cardizem CD

Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 535 (E.D. Mich. 2003). These costs include

“expenses incurred in connection with document productions, consulting with and

deposing experts, travel and other litigation-related expenses.” /d.

Class Counsel avers that out-of-pocket expenses, which currently amount

to $25,583.69, were necessary and directly related to this litigation. Warwick

Decl. J 19, ECF No. 70-2; Goldenberg Decl. 4 10, ECF No. 70-4. The Court

finds that all of these costs are reasonable and necessary to litigate and settle

this case and therefore approves the request of $25,583.69 for out-of-pocket

expenses.

C. Class Representative Awards

Service “awards are efficacious ways of encouraging members of a class

to become class representatives and rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf

of the class.” Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). Notably,

“courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the

services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of the class

action litigation.” Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-1694,

2010 WL 776933, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

Here, the Settlement Agreement proposes to award each Plaintiff

“household” up to $3,500. Each Plaintiff assisted in the prosecuting and settling

of the litigation, including communication with counsel and participating in

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 18 of 22

discovery. See James Zilinsky Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Geraldine Zilinksy

Decl. If] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Cory Simpson Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Meagan

McGinley Decl. ] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Sandra GarrettDorsey Decl. ff] 4-7, ECF

No. 70-7; Brian Dering Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Theresa Dering Decl. 1] 4—-

7, ECF No. 70-7; Alan Armstrong Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7; Sandy Armstrong

Decl. J] 4-7, ECF No. 70-7. In light of this service, the Court approves the

service award of up to $3,500 per household to Plaintiffs.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 19 of 22

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS final approval of the

Settlement and enters final judgment as follows:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Action and

may grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement, including all Exhibits to

the Settlement Agreement. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court also has personal

jurisdiction over the Named Plaintiffs, Defendant, and Class Members.

2. This Order granting final approval of class action settlement

incorporates by reference the definitions in the Settlement Agreement, and all

capitalized terms used herein that also appear in the Settlement Agreement shall

have the meanings set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

3. The Court grants final approval to this Settlement as it is fair, reasonable,

and adequate, consistent and in compliance with all applicable requirements of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Class Action Fairness Act, the United

States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), and the Rules of the

Court, and is in the best interests of each of the Parties and the Class Members.

Each Class Member is and shall be conclusively and forever bound by the

Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement shall be preclusive in all

pending and future lawsuits or other proceedings. It shall be binding as to all the

Released Claims as that term is defined by the Settlement Agreement. The

Court expressly adopts all defined terms in the Settlement Agreement, including,

but not limited to, the definition of Released Claims and Releasees.

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 20 of 22

4. The Class approved by this Court, and for which final approval is

given, is as follows:

All LeafFilter customers in the United States who appear in

LeafFilter’s customer care database with a Debris-Related Final Issue

Code for their service request during the time period from January 1,

2016 through June 24, 2022. Excluded from the Settlement Class

are: (1) LeafFilter; (2) any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of LeafFilter;

(3) any entity in which LeafFilter has a controlling interest; (4) any

officer, director, or employee of LeafFilter; (5) any successor or assign

of LeafFilter; (6) any Judge to whom the Litigation is assigned; (7) any

person who has resolved or otherwise released their claims as of the

date of the settlement; and (8) any Settlement Class Member who

opts-out of the settlement.

5. The Court finds that the Class Notice and the notice methodology

implemented pursuant to this Settlement Agreement: (1) constituted the best

practicable notice; (2) constituted notice that was reasonably calculated, under

the circumstances, to apprise Class Members of the terms of the Proposed

Settlement, the available relief, the release of claims, their right to object or

exclude themselves from the proposed Settlement, and their right to appear at

the fairness hearing; (3) were reasonable and constitute due, adequate, and

sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice; and (4) met all applicable

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Class Action Fairness

Act, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), the Rules

of the Court, and any other applicable law.

6. This Action and every Released Claim (including all individual claims

and Class-wide claims presented thereby) is hereby dismissed on the merits and

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 21 of 22

with prejudice, without fees or costs to any Party except as provided in the

Settlement Agreement and as adopted and ordered by the Court in this Order.

7. Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ Motion For Approval of Attorney's Fees

Expense Reimbursement, and Class Representative Service Awards, and based

upon all previous filings in this action, the Court concludes and orders as follows:

(1) Plaintiffs’ requested award of Attorney's Fees of $1,749,416.31 is reasonable

and, therefore, is awarded; (2) Class Counsel shall be reimbursed $25,583.69 for

these reasonable expenses and costs; and (3) the Court awards service awards

of $3,500 per Named Plaintiff household.

8. This Order adjudicates all of the claims, rights and liabilities of the

Parties to the Settlement, and is intended to be final and immediately appealable.

9. Without affecting the finality of this Order for purposes of appeal, the

Court retains jurisdiction as to all matters relating to the administration,

implementation, consummation, enforcement, and interpretation of this

Settlement Agreement and this Order, and for any other necessary purpose.

The Clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ihul LL

\ihuld| (ator

MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:20-cv-6229 Page 22 of 22