X v. 5510 Dunham Rd LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHIEF X ISRAEL, on behalf of, ) Case No. 1:24 CV 1263

RODNEY LOMAX ESTATE TRUST )

TRIBE, Pro Se, )

)

Plaintiff ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

)

v. )

)

5510 DUNHAM RD LLC, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants ) AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro Se Plaintiff Chief X Israel, on behalf of Rodney Lomax Estate Trust, filed this action

against 5510 Dunham Rd LLC, S & T Bank, U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Bureau of Land

Management (BLM), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), U.S.

Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Attorney General. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed an

application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2). The application is granted.

For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff appears to claim that he is a tribal chief, and he files this Complaint on behalf of the

“Rodney Lomax Estate Trust Tribe.” The complaint consists largely of incomprehensible,

disconnected statements concerning the “Lomax Indian Tribe” and the “Cashbox Trust Tribe” and

the tribes’ purported interest in property located at 5510 Dunham Road. (See ECF No. 1, PageID ##

6-9).

The Complaint contains several pages of a document titled, “Trepass Notice Land Reclaim

Interest and Acquisition” and numerous exhibits, including the following: (1) four pages of legal

citations to Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations, pertaining to the Bureau of Indian Affairs,

Department of the Interior, subsection titled “Trespass”; (2) an “Order for Summary Judgments”

containing a handwritten reference to Garfield Heights Municipal Court Case No. 2316720; (3) two

pages copied from Rule 7067-1 of Local Bankruptcy Rules of the Northern District of Ohio

(“Registry Fund”); (4) Affidavit of Indian Sovereignty and Self Government; (5) Notice to the Court

Regarding Reserved Rights Doctrine; (6) Affidavit of Indian Heirship and Beneficiary Designation,

in which Plaintiff states that he is a lawful Indian tribal heir; (7) a copy of a “cash check moneys

order” for $2,000,000, drafted by “Chief”; and (8) a copy of a judgment entry from the Garfield

Heights Municipal Court in 5510 Dunham Rd LLC v. Israel Bey, Case No. CVG 2316720, indicating

the matter is “deemed closed and dismissed.” (Id.; ECF Nos.1-1 through 1-3). Plaintiff’s civil cover

sheet indicates “this cause stems from an unlawful eviction.” (ECF No. 1-7).

Plaintiff states that he seeks “any equitable remedy available for treaty law violations, plus

treble damages.” (ECF No. 1-3, PageID # 33).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct.

700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30

L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks

an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed.

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2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,

99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised

on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be

sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to

include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

B. Analysis

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the

“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d

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413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to

conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts are not required

to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence

fragments. To do so would “require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of

a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would . . . transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to

the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies

for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum

notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff’s complaint

must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds

on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see

also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints

must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable

legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and

Iqbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing

that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains very few

facts. Rather, it contains disjointed statements concerning the “Lomax Indian Tribe,” “Cashbox Trust

Tribe,” and Indian sovereignty, as well as miscellaneous citations to legal authority. Further, it fails

to connect any alleged occurrence to a specific, cognizable injury, and Plaintiff fails coherently to

identify how each defendant has harmed him. Without any indication of a viable legal claim or

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sufficient facts to determine the factual basis for his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimum

pleading requirements of Rule 8 and his Complaint must be dismissed on this basis. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678.

To the extent the Court can construe Plaintiff’s Complaint as asserting a claim of unlawful

eviction, Plaintiff’s claim fails. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review cases litigated and decided in state courts. District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 2d 362, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); Patmon v. Mich.

Supreme Court, 224 F.3d 504, 506-07 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit has stated that, “[w]here

federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult

to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of a state

court judgment.” Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (amended on other grounds 243

F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001)) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95

L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987)). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United

States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16.

Here, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges the lawfulness of a state court eviction

judgment entered against him in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court, this challenge would require

the Court to review the same issues that were reviewed by the state court. The Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to do so. For this reason, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Flowers v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, 90 Fed.

App’x. 893, 894, 2004 WL 237410, at *2 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint

challenging the lawfulness of a state court forcible entry and detainer judgment on the basis of the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Poindexter v. Full Line Real Estate Construction, LLC, No. 4:

23-cv-1049, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161806, 2023 WL 5957103, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2023)

(dismissing complaint asserting claims challenging an eviction action brought in Youngstown

Municipal Court).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis (ECF No. 2) and dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the court

certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be good

faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

October 25, 2024

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