The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
STEVEN BOYD, ) CASE NO. 5:21-cv-775
)
)
PLAINTIFF, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) AND ORDER
SECURITY, )
)
DEFENDANT. )
Plaintiff, Steven Boyd, commenced this action to appeal a final administrative decision
denying his claim for disability benefits. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint).) On January 11, 2022, upon the
parties’ stipulation, this Court remanded the matter to defendant, Commissioner of Social Security,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. No. 16 (Order); Doc. No. 15 (Stipulated Remand).) On
March 22, 2022, upon the parties’ stipulation, the Court awarded plaintiff’s counsel $4,063.47 in
attorney’s fees, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc.
No. 18 (Order); Doc. No. 17 (Proposed Award).)
On remand, plaintiff was found disabled as of July 28, 2011, and awarded past due benefits
from November 2017. (Doc. No. 20-1, at 1–21.) In its notice informing plaintiff of his entitlement
to benefits, the Social Security Administration advised plaintiff that it was withholding $36,325.50
in benefits, representing an award of attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the total amount of past due
benefits to which plaintiff is entitled. (Id. at 3–4.)
1 All page number references herein are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual document by the
electronic filing system.
The matter is presently before the Court on the motion of plaintiff’s counsel for
authorization of attorney’s fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. No. 20 (Motion).) In the
motion, counsel requests fees in the amount of $8,797.50 for work in federal court. (Id. at 1.)
Counsel also acknowledges her previous award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and represents
that she will repay plaintiff the previously awarded EAJA fees to avoid a double recovery. (Doc.
No. 20, at 3 (citing Jankovich v. Bowen, 868 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1989)).)
To be entitled to an award under § 406(b), an attorney must show, and the Court must
affirmatively find, that a contingency fee sought, even one within the 25% cap, is reasonable for
the services rendered. Gisbrecht v. Barnard, 535 U.S. 789, 807, 122 S. Ct. 1817, 152 L. Ed. 2d
996 (2002). Section 406(b)(1) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements,” but rather “calls for
court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable
results in particular cases.” Id. A 25% contingency fee agreement “should be given the weight
ordinarily accorded a rebuttable presumption.” Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir.
1989) (en banc). A deduction of a contingency fee award may be appropriate when (1) counsel
acted improperly or provided ineffective assistance, or (2) “counsel would . . . enjoy a windfall
because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended.” Id. If the
foregoing reasons are not applicable, “an agreement for a 25% fee, the maximum permitted under
§ 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), is presumed reasonable.” Hays v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1991).
An award will not be considered improper merely because it results in an above-average
hourly rate. Royzer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 900 F.2d 981, 982 (6th Cir. 1990). As the
Sixth Circuit explained:
It is not at all unusual for contingent fees to translate into large hourly rates if the
rate is computed [by dividing the hours worked into the amount of the requested
fee]. In assessing the reasonableness of a contingent fee award, we cannot ignore
the fact that the attorney will not prevail every time. The hourly rate in the next
contingent fee case will be zero, unless benefits are awarded. Contingent fees
generally overcompensate in some cases and undercompensate in others. It is the
nature of the beast.
Id. Accordingly, the Court will not find that a contingency fee agreement has generated a windfall
to the attorney where “the hypothetical hourly rate determined by dividing the number of hours
worked for the claimant into the amount of the fee permitted under the contract is less than twice
the standard rate for such work in the relevant market.” Hayes, 923 F.2d at 422.
Here, counsel and plaintiff have a contingency fee agreement which provides that counsel’s
fees will be 25% of plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. No. 20-2 (Contingency Fee Agreement), at
1.) The submitted time sheets show that counsel spent 19.55 hours representing plaintiff before
this Court. (Doc. No. 20-3 (Time Sheets), at 2.) The fee of $8,797.50 sought by counsel translates
into a hypothetical hourly rate of $450. (See id.) Courts in this district have previously determined
that a fee of $350.00 per hour is not excessive in awarding fees pursuant to § 406(b)(1). See, e.g.,
Flickinger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-cv-02038, 2024 WL 3567705, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July
29, 2024); Koprowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-1216, 2013 WL 29804, at *2–3 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 2, 2013); Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:09-cv-2870, 2012 WL 6682112, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (citations omitted). Therefore, an hourly rate of $450 does not constitute
a windfall, as it is less than twice the standard rate for such work in the relevant market. See Hayes,
923 F.2d at 422. Moreover, there have been no allegations, nor has the Court found any instances,
of improper attorney conduct or ineffectiveness of counsel that would cause the Court to reduce
the amount of the requested fee. Quite the contrary, plaintiff was well represented by counsel in
this case, and his counsel achieved an excellent result. The Court finds that counsel has satisfied
her burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the requested fee.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion and AWARDS
attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,797.50 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), provided that plaintiff's
counsel refunds to plaintiff $4,063.47 in attorney’s fees that this Court previously awarded under
the EAJA.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 9, 2024 bt
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE