Bey v. Kenny

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ISAAC PETERSON BEY, ) CASE NO. 1:24 CV 964

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

)

MICHAEL KENNY, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants. ) AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Pro se plaintiff Isaac Peterson Bey filed this action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 and

the “American Treaty of Peace and Friendship” against Michael Kenny, “Priestess” Marisha

Cornisha, the State of Ohio, and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s

Statement of Claim alleges that he was summoned to court on “false charges” when he missed a

court date, he was “locked up or kidnapped” at his hearing, and he was forced to pay a ransom.

(Id. at 4). He seeks $10,000,000 and removal of “fingerprints data and DNA and all other

misleading records.” (Id.).

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The application

is granted.

II. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,

109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading

must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all

the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required

to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.

1998).

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III. Law and Analysis

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).

However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not

“abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The

Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf

of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)

(District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to

construct full claims from sentence fragments. To do so would “require . . . [the courts] to

explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would . . . transform the

district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the

strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although

specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See

Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid v.

Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable

legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and

Iqbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim

showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s very brief

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complaint is almost completely devoid of facts, and it fails to connect any alleged occurrence to

a specific, cognizable injury. Plaintiff also fails coherently to identify how each defendant has

harmed him.

Additionally, Plaintiff does not assert any legal claims. The Treaty of Peace and

Friendship between the United States and Morocco does not provide a private cause of action in

a civil case. See Bey v. Sessler, No. 23-3421, 2024 WL 2078564, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 29,

2024)(“Courts routinely reject the sort of ‘meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by tax

protesters, sovereign citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-Americans,’ such as the arguments

included in Bey’s filings”)(quoting United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.

2017)); Bey v. Ohio, No. 1:11-CV-01126, 2011 WL 4688780, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4,

2011)(“the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the International Religious Freedom Act do not

provide a private cause of action in a civil case”); Grayson-Bey v. Southfield Police Dep’t, No.

CV 19-13588, 2020 WL 7701016, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2020)(“Plaintiff’s invocation of

the Treaty of Peace and Friendship is “facially frivolous”). Likewise, Sections 241 and 242 are

criminal statutes and they do not provide a private right of action in a civil case. See Booth v.

Henson, 290 Fed. App’x 919, 2008 WL 4093498, at *1 (6th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Oguaju, 76 Fed.

App'x. 579, 2003 WL 21580657, *2 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.,

21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to assert violations of 18

U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. See Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing

among authority Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48

(1986)).

Without any indication of a viable legal claim or sufficient facts to determine the factual

basis for his complaint, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 2) and dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision

may not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Denakd C. Mugent

DONALD C. NUGENT

United States District Judge

DATED: August 30, 2024

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