Johanan v. Broaden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JESSICA JOHANAN, ) CASE NO. 1: 24 cv 277

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

v. )

)

LAKEISHA BROADEN, ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendant. )

Introduction

Plaintiff Jessica Johanan, proceeding without counsel, has filed a civil complaint in this

case against Lakeisha Broaden (Defendant), a private individual. (Doc. No. 1.) In her pleading,

Plaintiff details how she contends Defendant is stalking, cyberbullying, and harassing her

through the internet and on social media. She asserts she wants the harassment and stalking to

stop, and she states that her case is “an official Federal Notice that [she] does not want to be

bothered at all by [Defendant] for any reason,” and that “[i]t is equally unacceptable for

[Defendant] to use another person to contact [Plaintiff] on her behalf for any reason.” (Id. at 2.)

She also appears to seek damages. As the basis for her complaint, Plaintiff cites the federal

criminal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. (Id.). Her complaint also references other federal

criminal laws and provisions of the Ohio Revised Code. (See id. at 4.)

Standard of Review and Discussion

Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction

afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro

se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure

allegations on their behalf or construct claims for them. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,

577 (6th Cir. 2008); Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.

2008); Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001).

Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen

all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such

complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set

forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard articulated

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for

failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. It does not

state a plausible federal claim upon which this Court may grant her relief.

Only the United States Attorney can initiate criminal charges in federal court. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 7(c). Absent a private right of action, a plaintiff cannot recover civilly for violation of a

federal criminal statute. See, e.g., Saro v. Brown, 11 F. App'x 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2001)

(“Violations of these [mail and wire fraud] sections of the federal criminal code do not give rise

to independent causes of action.”); United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App'x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003)

(a plaintiff “has no private right of action” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242).

The federal criminal statute regarding stalking pursuant to which Plaintiff seeks relief in

this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, does not contain a private right of action. See Rock v. BAE Sys.,

556 F. App'x 869, 870–71 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261 and 2261A do not

provide a private right of action); Murray v. Williams, No. 3:15-cv-284, 2016 WL 1122050, at

*10 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2016) (concluding there is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. §

2261A). And her complaint does not allege any other plausible federal claim.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff may be asserting claims under Ohio law that may provide a

civil remedy for the internet stalking, harassment, and cyberbullying she alleges, this Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims.! And there is no independent

basis for asserting jurisdiction over such claims, as Plaintiff indicates that she and Defendant are

both citizens of the same state (Ohio). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal courts have diversity

jurisdiction only over cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000. . .

and is between . . . citizens of different states.”

Conclusion

Because there is no viable federal claim in the case, Plaintiff's application to proceed in

forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, but her complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).? The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal

from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

if

DGET ME N BRENNAN

Date: August 22, 2024 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

‘A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if that court

“has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See

also Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-1255 (6th Cir. 1996)

(“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will

point to dismissing the state law claims.)

2 Any state-law claims Plaintiff alleges are dismissed without prejudice.