Stiner v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTINE STINER, CASE NO. 1:24-cv-0146

Plaintiff, DISTRICT JUDGE

BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SECURITY, JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

Defendant.

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Christine Stiner filed a complaint against the Commissioner of

Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Doc. 1. This

Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court

referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the

preparation of a Report and Recommendation. Following review, and for the

reasons stated below, I recommend that the District Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Procedural Background

In February 2021, Stiner filed an application for disability insurance

benefits, alleging a disability onset date in November 2020.1 Tr. 84. In March

2021, Stiner filed an application for social security income, also alleging a

disability onset date in November 2020. Tr. 76. In her application, Stiner

alleged disability relating to shortness of breath, heart palpitations, blood

pressure, gastroesophageal reflux disease, edema, pink eye, and diabetes. Tr.

76, 84. The Commissioner denied Stiner’s application initially and on

reconsideration. Tr. 92–95.

In February 2022, Stiner requested a hearing. Tr. 135. Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter Beekman held a telephonic hearing in January 2023.

Tr. 43. Stiner appeared, testified, and was represented by counsel at the

hearing. Id. Qualified vocational expert Robert Breslin also testified. Tr. 66. In

March 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision, which found that Stiner was

not entitled to benefits. Tr. 16.

In April 2023, Stiner appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals

Counsel. Tr. 234. In December 2023, the Appeals Counsel denied Stiner’s

appeal, Tr. 1, making the ALJ’s March 2023 decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. Tr. 16–42; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

1 “Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the

onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x

422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).

Evidence2

1. Personal and Vocational Evidence

Stiner was born in 1963 making her approximately 57 years of age at

the alleged onset date. Tr. 84. She obtained a GED. Tr. 270.

2. Medical Evidence

In December 2020, Stiner contracted COVID-19. Tr. 396. In January

2021, David M. Rosenberg, M.D., diagnosed dyspnea3 and “post Covid

syndrome.” Tr. 609. Dr. Rosenberg noted that Stiner had persistent coughing,

fatigue, diarrhea, recent onset of diabetes, and some brain fog. Tr. 609. He also

recorded that Stiner complained of shortness of breath with talking or exertion,

but that “recent cardiac evaluation revealed no specific concerns.” Tr. 609.

In May 2021, Eric J. Shapiro, M.D., treated Stiner for complaints of

cramping and fecal urgency, often after eating. Tr. 513–514. Dr. Shapiro noted

that Stiner claimed “everything [was] worse since COVID-19” and advised that

Stiner “keep working on the diet,” eat “more vegetables, less of everything

else,” and schedule a colonoscopy. Tr. 514.

2 The recitation of medical evidence and testimony is not intended to be

exhaustive and is generally limited to the evidence that was cited in the

parties’ briefs.

3 Dyspnea is the medical term for breathlessness, shortness of breath, or

difficult or labored respiration. Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 576

(33rd Ed. 2020). Dyspnea on exertion happens when dyspnea is provoked by

physical effort or exertion. Id.

In July 2021, Dorothy Bradford, M.D., examined Stiner based on a

referral for a disability evaluation. Tr. 525–535. Dr. Bradford noted that Stiner

had COVID-19 in December 2020, and “did not require admission or home

oxygen.” Tr. 533. She also opined that Stiner was likely deconditioned due to

prolonged inactivity during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tr. 534. Dr. Bradford

diagnosed the following conditions: hypertension, non-insulin dependent

diabetes mellitus, morbid obesity, and trigeminal neuralgia. Tr. 534. Dr.

Bradford assessed that Stiner had no activity restrictions. Tr. 534.

In August 2021, a colonoscopy showed chronic active inflammation in

the cecum, which “given the short duration of symptoms,” was attributed “most

likely” to acute self-limiting colitis. Tr. 711. Stiner was advised to return to

normal activities the day after her colonoscopy, to resume her previous diet,

and to continue medications. Tr. 716.

In June 2022, Melinda Lawrence, M.D., noted Plaintiff’s history of back

and left-side radicular symptoms4 with pain that correlated to an L4 nerve

distribution. Tr. 810. Also in June 2022, Stiner underwent an echocardiogram,

which showed normal left ventricular function but mild aortic valve

regurgitation. See Tr. 764–765. A physical examination in June 2022 was also

4 Radiculopathy happens when the root of a nerve is compressed or

irritated. Radiculopathy, Cleveland Clinic Health Library,

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/22564-radiculopathy

[https://perma.cc/S8UE-8FYT]. Radiculopathy can cause pain, numbness, or

tingling in the area around the nerve. Id.

unremarkable and showed no increased effort in Stiner’s breathing or other

signs of respiratory distress. Tr. 774. In June and August 2022, Stiner also

discussed and received epidural steroid injections with Dr. Lawerence. Tr.

810–814.

In September 2022, Jordan McQuilkin, M.D., treated Stiner based on

complaints of pain her lower chest and back, which kept her from taking a deep

breath. Tr. 815. Dr. McQuilkin noted that Stiner experienced chest pain,

shortness of breath, and a cough but did not have palpitations or any

abdominal pain. Tr. 815. He observed that Stiner had a tachycardic5 heart rate

and significant shortness of breath with stable blood pressure. Tr. 816. Dr.

McQuilkin listed potential differential6 diagnoses including pulmonary

embolism, pneumonia, congestive heart failure, and viral syndrome,

andCOVID-19. Tr 816. Stiner was ultimately “admitted in stable condition”

and diagnosed with shortness of breath, pulmonary embolus, and tachycardia.

Tr. 817.

5 Tachycardia, or a tachycardic heart rate, describes a heart rate above

100 beats per minute. Tachycardia may be caused by anything from ordinary

exercise or stress to a more serious health condition. Tachycardia, Mayo Clinic,

Diseases & Conditions, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-

conditions/tachycardia/symptoms-causes/syc-20355127

[https://perma.cc/RT25-WCVK].

6 Differential diagnoses are list of possible conditions that all share the

symptoms described to a provider. This is not a final diagnosis but of the

process that a healthcare provider uses to reach a final diagnosis. Differential

Diagnosis, Cleveland Clinic Health Library,

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diagnostics/22327-differential-diagnosis

[https://perma.cc/6GHM-AU2F].

In October 2022, Dr. Rosenberg noted that Stiner showed no increased

effort when breathing or other signs of respiratory distress. Tr. 680. He also

remarked that Stiner was participating in aquatic therapy. Tr. 675. In

November 2022, Dr. Rosenberg reported that Stiner had normal blood

pressure, no increased effort when breathing, and no edema. Tr. 673. He

further concluded she was “doing well from a pulmonary perspective.” Tr. 667.

3. State Agency Consultants

On initial review, state agency medical consultant Dr. Michael Lehv

found that Stiner had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)7 to perform light

exertion work but that she was limited to frequently using her “right lower

extremity”—also commonly referred to as her “right foot”—for foot controls but

never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently climbing ramps and

stairs; and occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Tr. 80–81,

88–90. He also found that Stiner could have frequent exposure to extreme

temperatures, humidity, and fumes but must avoid all exposure to hazards

such as machinery and heights. Id. Dr. Lehv further remarked that the

consultative examiner “opined for no activity restrictions but light RFC

resolves uncertainties in [claimant’s] favor.” Tr. 82, 90. On reconsideration,

7 An RFC is an “assessment of” a claimant’s ability to work, taking his or

her “limitations … into account.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,

239 (6th Circ. 2002). Essentially, it is the Social Security Administration’s

“description of what the claimant ‘can and cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).

state agency consultant Dr. W. Scott Bolz affirmed the initial findings. Tr. 96–

109.

4. Hearing Testimony

Stiner, represented by counsel, testified at the January 2023 hearing

before the ALJ. Tr. 43. Stiner explained that her disability onset date was in

November 2020 because she contracted COVID-19 around that time and hadn’t

“been able to get myself together since. It’s kind of gotten worse.” Tr. 47. She

testified that she was unable to climb a flight of stairs and that she continued

have problems dressing, cooking, and washing dishes. Tr. 47. She described

that she used a nebulizer four times per day, she wore adult diapers due to

diarrhea, and that, due to her shortness of breath, she never went to the store

or to a doctor’s appointment without someone else accompanying her. Tr. 48–

49. Stiner also testified that she was unable to stand for more than about

fifteen to twenty minutes and that she was no longer able to drive. T 49. Stiner

explained that her doctors did not know her gastrointestinal symptoms’ exact

cause. Tr. 49. In relation to her shortness of breath, Stiner stated that she had

not passed out and was not on supplemental oxygen, but she felt better when

someone was with her. Tr. 50. She further described that she had blood clots

in 2022 and that she was taking blood thinners. Tr. 50.

Stiner also testified that she used a cane based on a prescription from

Dr. Lawrence. Tr. 51. Stiner stated that she did not do well with stairs and had

difficulty sleeping, but that she did not have side effects from her medications.

Tr. 59–60. Stiner further described that she did not generally lift anything, but

she could lift something like a gallon of milk, and that she could stand for about

20 to 30 minutes before she needed to sit. Tr. 61. She also discussed that she

no longer engaged in certain social activities, such as singing in her church

choir. Tr. 62

5. Vocational Expert

Qualified vocational expert, Robert Breslin, classified Stiner’s past work

as an appointment clerk performed as a sedentary semi-skilled position. Tr.

66. Breslin testified that a hypothetical individual described by the ALJ could

perform Stiner’s past work and could also perform other jobs including cashier

II, deli cutter/slicer, and production assembler, all of which existed in

significant numbers in the economy. Tr. 67–68. But Breslin further testified

that, if he were to assume the hypothetical individual needed two to four

restroom breaks ranging from five to ten minutes in addition to normal fifteen-

minute breaks and lunch, that individual would not be able to maintain

employment. Tr. 69.

6. Stiner’s Function Report

Stiner completed a Functional Report on March 7, 2021. Tr 294–301.

She reported that she is unable to hold a lengthy conversation without

shortness of breath and that she is unable to walk more than twenty feet

without her heart rate increasing and experiencing an exacerbation of her

difficulty breathing. Tr 294. Stiner explained that her shortness of breath

caused her to take longer to complete activities, but did not otherwise prevent

her from doing them. Tr. 295. She stated she could prepare meals, do laundry,

and clean, Tr. 296, as well as do her own shopping and take her parents to

doctor’s appointments, Tr. 297–298.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act

through June 30, 2026.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since November 20, 2020, the

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,

and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe

impairments: essential hypertension,

valvular heart disease, cardiac dysrhythmia,

respiratory disorder (obstructive sleep apnea

and dyspnea related to hypertension),

diabetes mellitus, and obesity. (20 CFR

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),

404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and

416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, I find that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform light

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and

416.967(b) except: She can frequently use foot

pedals with the right lower extremity; never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently

climb ramps and stairs; occasionally stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can have no

concentrated exposure to extreme cold,

extreme heat, smoke, fumes, pollutants, and

dust and must never be exposed to hazards

such as unprotected heights.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past

relevant work as an appointment clerk. This

work does not require the performance of

work-related activities precluded by the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (20

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, from

November 20, 2020, through the date of this

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).

Tr. 22–37.

Standard for Disability

Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence

of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).

An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a

disability determination:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. Does the claimant have a medically

determinable impairment, or a combination of

impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the

claimant is not disabled.

3. Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal

one of the listed impairments and meet the

duration requirement? If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

4. What is the claimant’s residual functional

capacity and can the claimant perform past

relevant work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

5. Can the claimant do any other work

considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work

experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d

417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the

burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden

shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The

claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional

capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the

duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).

Standard of review

A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it

determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which

“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains

‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than

a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by

substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at

99.

A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence

supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the

Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”

the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Discussion

Stiner’s issue presented, though captioned as one issue, consists of two

related arguments: (1) that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Stiner’s

subjective symptom complaints and (2) that the ALJ’s RFC determination is

not supported by substantial evidence. See Doc. 8, at 6. The Commissioner

refutes all of Stiner’s arguments. See generally Doc. 10.

To evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an

individual’s symptoms,” the ALJ considers medical evidence, the claimant’s

statements, other information provided by medical sources, and any other

relevant evidence in the record. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,

at *4 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Other relevant evidence includes:

(i) Your daily activities; (ii) The location, duration,

frequency, and intensity of your pain or other

symptoms; (iii) Precipitating and aggravating

factors; (iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side

effects of any medication you take or have taken to

alleviate your pain or other symptoms;

(v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or

have received for relief of your pain or other

symptoms; (vi) Any measures you use or have used

to relieve your pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying

flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes

every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and (vii) Other

factors concerning your functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). “The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors, but

should show that he considered the relevant evidence.” Hatcher v. Berryhill,

No. 1:18-cv-1123, 2019 WL 1382288, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2019) (citing

Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005)).

The ALJ found that Stiner’s “medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms” but that her

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record.” Tr. 28. Stiner’s initial argument arises out of this

finding. Stiner asserts that the ALJ did not “provide an adequate explanation”

as to any “genuine inconsistencies” between her statements and the medical

records, see Doc. 8, at 7, 8. This this end, Stiner lists certain medical evidence

summarized by the ALJ in his decision and highlights what she characterizes

as “attempts by the ALJ to justify his rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony[.]” Doc.

8, at 7–9 (citing to the ALJ’s decision). Stiner’s own brief, thus, demonstrates

that the ALJ did provide an explanation of why some of Stiner’s statements

were inconsistent and found not as severe as alleged. While Stiner may have

wanted the ALJ to go into more detail when explaining why her statements

were somewhat inconsistent, that was not required. See Thacker v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 99 Fed. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2004) (“An ALJ need not discuss

every piece of evidence in the record for his decision to stand.”).

Review of the ALJ’s decision further reveals that the ALJ properly

considered Stiner’s subjective complaints and adequately explained his

consideration under governing regulations. For example, the ALJ recognized

the two-step analysis in which he was required to engage, Tr. 27, and

proceeded to spend nearly eight pages detailing the medical record, all in the

context of evaluating the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the

symptoms described in Stiner’s function report and hearing testimony. See

Doc. 7, at 27–34. After describing Stiner’s function report and hearing

testimony, both of which contained Stiner’s self-described daily activities,

symptoms, treatments, and other details, the ALJ provided a summary of the

treatment records and explained that “the evidence summarized above does

not fully support [Stiner’s] allegations.” Doc. 7, at 34. The ALJ specifically

compared Stiner’s testimony regarding fecal urgency with the gastroenterology

records and found that those records “do not contain any objective

documentation of her allegations[.]” Doc. 7, at 34. Additionally, when

evaluating Stiner’s described shortness of breath and cardiological symptoms,

the ALJ specifically cited medical records and evaluated the consistency of

Stiner’s described symptoms with those records. Id.

Despite citing heavily to the same portions of the ALJ’s decision

described here, Stiner argues that the ALJ failed to “offer[] examples of any

genuine inconsistency between the subjective allegations and the other

medical evidence in this record.” Doc. 8, at 8 (citing Tr. 28–34). But the ALJ

did, as Stiner’s own brief demonstrates, appropriately articulate his

consideration of Stiner’s subjective complaints in compliance with the

applicable regulations. So to the extent that Stiner asserts remand is

warranted based on the ALJ’s failure “to comply with SSR 16-3p and 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529, 416.929,” Doc. 8, at 10, her argument lacks merit and provides no

basis for remand.

Stiner repeatedly asserts that the ALJ’s analysis did not articulate any

“genuine inconsistencies,” but Stiner does not dispute that inconsistencies

were articulated. So it is apparent that Stiner simply disagrees with the weight

that the ALJ afforded these inconsistences. As such, her “genuine

inconsistency” argument amounts to a dispute over the ALJ’s weighing of the

evidence. But the weighing of the evidence is a task left to the ALJ. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (explaining how the ALJ will consider and weigh medical

opinions and prior administrative medical findings); see also Rottmann v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 817 F. App’x 192, 196 (6th Cir. 2020)) (“this court does not

weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony—that’s the

ALJ’s job.”). The fact that Stiner can point to evidence that may support an

opposite finding does not mean that the ALJ’s decision was unsupported or in

error. Jones, 336 F.3d at 477 (“we must defer to an agency’s decision ‘even if

there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an

opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion

reached by the ALJ.’”). In so far as Stiner disputes the ALJ’s weighing of her

subjective symptom complaints, this argument is likewise unavailing.

Stiner proceeds to raise two arguments in her final two paragraphs, both

relating to the second facet of Stiner’s argument––her belief that the ALJ’s

RFC determination was improper. First, she argues that the ALJ’s error—the

alleged improper consideration of her subjective statements—was not

harmless because it prejudiced her by resulting in an RFC determination not

supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 8, at 10–11. Second, she asserts that,

even if substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision

must be overturned because the ALJ failed to follow applicable regulations.

Doc. 8, at 11.

As to the first of Stiner’s final arguments, she asserts that the ALJ

omitted restrictions related to her ability to climb stairs, her need for

additional bathroom breaks, and her ability to stand for no more than 15 or 20

minutes. See Doc. 8, at 10. As an initial issue, Stiner cites nothing to support

the idea that such limitations should have been included in her RFC. See Doc.

8, at 10. So she’s forfeited the argument. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d

989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed

waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the

most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.”) (internal

citations omitted). But even if the Court were to consider this argument,

Stiner’s allegation that the ALJ did not properly consider the evidence is

meritless. The fact that the ALJ did not include all of the restrictions that

Stiner believes should have been included, see Doc. 8, at 14, does not mean that

the RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. See Jones,

336 F.3d at 477. Stiner cites nothing other than her opinion that ALJ omitted

certain restrictions, to substantiate her argument that “the case a bar presents

an RFC which is not supported by substantial evidence.” Doc. 8, at 15. This

argument therefore is unavailing.

Likewise, the second part of Stiner’s final arguments fails. Stiner asserts

that the allegedly erroneous RFC determination was not harmless error

because, even if the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence,

the ALJ did not comply with applicable regulations for considering a claimant’s

testimony and symptom statements. Doc. 8, at 11. But, as discussed at length

above, the ALJ did comply with those regulations. So, this argument is also

unpersuasive and does not provide a basis for remand.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Dated: August 16, 2024

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th

Cir. 2019).