Specht v. City of Eastlake

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

James Michael Specht, Case No. 1:24cv00684

Plaintiff,

-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION

City of Eastlake, et al., AND ORDER

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff James Michael Specht filed this in forma pauperis action against the City

of Eastlake and Chirag Patel. (Doc. No.1). He lists as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction the

following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1519

(destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy); 18

U.S.C. § 1955 (prohibition of illegal gambling businesses); and 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (attempt to evade

or defeat tax). Plaintiff alleges in his brief complaint that the City of Eastlake allowed Chirag Patel

to “run his illegal slot machines that were tampered with for years, cheating people out of

winnings.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). He alleges that Patel maintains slot machines that are not “games of

skill,” and they “constantly reset with keys.” (Id.). He further alleges the defendants “are all

involved in corruption, cash business is illegal” and the defendants have never followed state or

federal laws of gaming. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff seeks monetary relief.

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants

that application.

I. Standard of Review

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,

30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if

it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827,

104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of

Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when

it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly

baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading

must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all

the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to

include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

II. Law and Analysis

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the

“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d

413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to

conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts are not required

to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence

fragments. To do so would “require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of

a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would . . . transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role

to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful

strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the

basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are

and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d

426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437

(6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all

material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements)

(citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and

Iqbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing

that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s very brief complaint is

almost completely devoid of facts, and it fails to connect any alleged occurrence to a specific,

cognizable injury. Plaintiff also fails coherently to identify how each defendant has harmed him.

The Court is not required to conjure factual allegations or to construct legally plausible claims on

Plaintiff’s behalf. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint consists solely of conclusory allegations or legal conclusions, which are

insufficient to state a claim and do not meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges the defendants’ actions violated 18 U.S.C. § 371,

18 U.S.C. § 1519, and 26 U.S.C. § 7201, his claim fails. These statutes are criminal statutes, and

they do not provide a private right of action in a civil case. See Petronzio v. Buckingham, No. 1:17

CV 365, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95829, *5 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 2017) (18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18

U.S.C. § 1519); Williams v. Lorain Cty. Cmty. College, No. 1:18CV1718, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

30402, *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2019) (26 U.S.C. § 7201); see also Woermer v. Hirsh, No.

3:18CV01898(KAD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223192, 2018 WL 7572237, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec.

11, 2018) (finding 26 U.S.C. § 7201, a criminal provision of the Internal Revenue Code that

prescribes penalties for attempting to evade or defeat taxes, does not provide a private right of

action to recover taxes on behalf of the government). Plaintiff therefore lacks standing to assert

violations of these statutes in a civil action. See Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th

Cir. 2004) (citing among authority Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 90

L. Ed. 2d 48 (1986)).

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 2). And the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further,

the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not

be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker ______

PAMELA A. BARKER

Date: 7/24/2024 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE