Townsend v. Rockwell Automation Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Faith Townsend, Case No. 1:24cv528

Plaintiff,

-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Rockwell Automation, Inc., et al., ORDER

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Faith Townsend filed this action against her former employer, Rockwell

Automation, Inc. (“Rockwell”), her former supervisor, Robert Rodgriguez, and Rockwell’s

Human Resources representative, Stephen Ostrom. (Doc. No. 1). Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff opposes the

motion. (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses this action.

I. Background

On November 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Rockwell and Rodgriguez,

asserting discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964. See Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., et al., No. 1:18CV2742 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28,

2018) (“Townsend I”). Plaintiff alleged the defendants created a racially hostile work environment,

retaliated against her, and constructively discharged her. The Court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims, granting summary judgment against Plaintiff after the parties engaged in discovery. (Id.;

Doc. Nos. 10, 66). Plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed this

Court’s decision. (Id.; Doc. No. 72). Plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the Court’s judgment

on the basis of fraud under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), and she requested a new

trial under Rule 59(a)(2). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. (Id.; Doc. No. 75).

On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against Rockwell, alleging that

Rockwell discriminated against her based on her sex and race in violation of Title VII. See

Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 1:21CV2226 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2021) (“Townsend

II”). The Court determined that Plaintiff’s new claims were sufficiently related to the claims

asserted in Townsend I and were therefore barred by res judicata. (Id.; Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff filed

a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied. (Id.; Doc. No. 20). And the Sixth Circuit

affirmed the Court’s decision in Townsend II, agreeing that the Court properly concluded that

claim preclusion barred Plaintiff’s claims alleged in Townsend II. (Id.; Doc. No. 22). More than

one year later, Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment on the basis of fraud under Rule 60(b)(3)

and Rule “59(2).” The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding her motion untimely and without

merit. (Id.; Doc. No. 30). Plaintiff then filed a “motion for reconsideration of motion to vacate on

the basis of fraud [under Rule] 60(d)(1).” (Id.; Doc. No. 31). The Court again denied Plaintiff’s

motion. (Id.; Doc. No. 32).

On December 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed an action against the United States of America

“seeking a remedy for harm” caused by United States District Judge James S. Gwin when he

granted Rockwell’s motion for summary judgment in Townsend I. See Townsend v. USA, No.

1:21CV2425 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 29, 2021) (Doc. No. 1) (“Townsend III”). The Court dismissed the

action, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims concerning her employment dispute with Rockwell were

barred by res judicata and the Court “has no authority to conduct additional appellate review over

[Townsend I].” (Id.; Doc. No. 4).

On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court, which was denied. See Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 23-303, 2023

U.S. LEXIS 4457 (2023). And the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. See

Townsend v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 23-303, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 466 (2024).

Plaintiff now files this action, alleging “Fraud on the Court FRCP 60(d)(3),” and “Perjury

18 U.S.C. § 1623.” (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint, once again, concerns Plaintiff’s

employment dispute with Rockwell. And once again, Plaintiff alleges fraud in connection with the

discovery process initiated in Townsend I. Plaintiff requests the Court vacate the judgment entered

in Townsend I.

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move for the dismissal of

claims when the claimant has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss under this rule, the function of the Court is to

test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993).

And in reviewing the complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Legal conclusions and unwarranted factual

inferences, however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (The Court is “not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).

Additionally, courts must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Federal Civil Procedure

Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a plaintiff need offer “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct.

2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596). Although specific facts are not

required to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, Plaintiff’s complaint

must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds

upon which they rest. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.

2008). The plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and

conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555. Factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Id.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,

30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). And the Court holds a pro se complaint to a less stringent standard than

one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing

Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). The Court is not required, however, to conjure unpleaded facts or

construct claims on a plaintiff’s behalf. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).

III. Law and Analysis

Although Plaintiff adds a defendant to this complaint and alleges fraud under a different

federal rule—Rule 60(d)(3), Plaintiff’s new complaint is barred by res judicata.

“Res judicata,” or claim preclusion, is the doctrine by which a final judgment on the merits

in an action precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or cause of

action or raising a new defense to defeat a prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). This doctrine precludes relitigating a

claim or cause of action previously adjudicated as well as litigating a claim or defense that should

have been raised, but was not, in a claim or cause of action previously adjudicated. Id. “If a later

suit advances the same claim as an earlier suit between the same parties, the earlier suit’s judgment

‘prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to

the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted in the prior proceeding.’” Lucky Brand

Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1954 (2020) (quoting Brown v.

Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). The purpose of res judicata is to “promote the finality of

judgments and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial

resources.” Stolmayer v. McCarthy, 171 F. Supp. 3d 690, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2016).

Here, undeterred by the numerous judgments against her, Plaintiff continues to raise claims

associated with her employment dispute with Rockwell nearly three years after the Sixth Circuit

affirmed the Court’s decision in Townsend I, including alleging fraud in connection with the

discovery process. She raised many of these same claims in her previous complaints, appeals, and

motions to vacate. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in this complaint fraud concerning her December

2009 paycheck, claiming that this document was not in her possession “despite repeated attempts

to collect all pertinent documents.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7). In her motion to vacate filed in Townsend

II, Plaintiff claims “the fraud is perpetrated by the omission of data concerning her 2009 wages.”

(Townsend II; Doc. No. 28 at 7). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and her motion to

reconsider purportedly filed under Rule 60(d)(1). (Townsend II; Doc. Nos. 30, 32). And even if

she did not raise these claims previously, res judicata bars Plaintiff from litigating matters in this

action because they could have been brought in her prior actions. Gargallo, 918 F.2d at 660.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s attempt to file this complaint under Rule 60(d)(3) fails. Rule 60(b)

is “generally a party’s exclusive avenue when seeking relief from a final judgment or order.”

Marcelli v. Walker, 313 F. App’x 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Beggerly, 524

U.S. 38, 46, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 141 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1998)). However, Rule 60(d), the “savings clause,”

provides a litigant “an escape from the one-year bar for fraud-based motions for relief from

judgment” and allows litigants to bring an independent action challenging the validity of the

judgment at any time. Duncan v. Lourdes Univ., No. 3:24-cv-152, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94825,

*7 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2024). An independent action under Rule 60(d), however, is rare and only

available “to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47. A “grave

miscarriage of justice” is a “stringent” and “demanding” standard that is “available only in cases

‘of unusual and exceptional circumstances.’” Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2011)

(citations and quotations marks omitted). Independent actions under Rule 60(d) are therefore

“reserved for those cases of ‘injustice which . . . are sufficiently gross to demand a departure’ from

rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hazel-Atlas

Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250, 1944 Dec.

Comm'r Pat. 675 (1944)); Duncan, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94825, at 8-9. Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate such grave injustice to warrant a departure from adherence to the principles of res

judicata.

To the extent Plaintiff alleges the defendants committed perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1623, Plaintiff’s claim fails. Section 1623 provides protections against perjury in civil

proceedings ancillary to a criminal case, but it does not provide a private cause of action where the

civil testimony does not have a nexus to an underlying criminal case. Nicole Energy Servs. v.

McClatchey, No. 2:08-CV-0463, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025, *18 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2010) (citing

United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753 (2nd Cir. 1994)); see also Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge

Co., No. 03-4205, 108 Fed. App’x. 307, 308 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2004) (holding that petitioner did

not possess a private right of action against the defendants for alleged violation of Section 1623, a

criminal statute); Williams v. Finnegan, No. 5:13 CV 2214, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73192, *5

(N.D. Ohio May 29, 2014). And “there is no authority to allow a private citizen to institute a

criminal action in a federal court; that power is vested exclusively in the executive branch.” United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974).

Finally, the Court notes that this is the fourth cause of action Plaintiff has filed concerning

her employment dispute with Rockwell. The Court dismissed the three prior actions. And Plaintiff

has repeatedly moved to vacate the Court’s judgment. In Townsend I, she filed a Rule 60(b)(3)

motion to vacate the judgment based on fraud, which the Court denied. In Townsend II, she filed

a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment before her appeal to the Sixth Circuit and a

Rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate based on fraud and a “motion for reconsideration of motion to

vacate on the basis of fraud [under Rule] 60(d)(1)” following her appeal, all of which were denied.

Plaintiff has also filed three appeals, including a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court, which was denied. At least three times, the courts have determined that Plaintiff’s

claims were barred by res judicata.

The Court is very tolerant of legal filings from pro se litigants. However, the Court will

not permit any litigant to use the Court’s resources to address filings which are clearly designed to

harass the Court or opposing counsel/parties. Federal courts have both the inherent power and

constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that impairs the ability to carry

out Article III functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986). The filing

of frivolous lawsuits and motions strains an already burdened federal judiciary. “Every paper filed

with the Clerk of ... Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the

[Court’s] limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are

allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109

S. Ct. 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989). The Court’s ability to perform its duties is compromised

when the Court is forced to devote limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous

filings. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179-80, 111 S. Ct. 596, 112 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1991).

This court has the responsibility to prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on

judicial machinery needed by others. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073. To achieve that end, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved enjoining vexatious and harassing

litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before submitting additional filings. Filipas v.

Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir. 1987); Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., Nos. 94-5453, 94-5593,

1995 WL 111480 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (authorizing a court to enjoin harassing litigation under

its inherent authority and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff’s new complaint appears to be filed for the sole purpose of obstructing the legal

process. Plaintiff is therefore cautioned that continued efforts to file patently repetitive and

frivolous documents or motions may result in sanctions being issued against her, including

declaring her to be a vexatious litigant and enjoining her from filing new actions without first

seeking and obtaining leave of court.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 6) and dismisses

this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker

PAMELA A. BARKER

Date: July 18, 2024 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE