Sinnott v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHANE SINNOTT,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

v.

6:21-CV-06197 EAW

MR. SMITH, MR. COOPER, DR. DWIGHT

D. LEWIS, NURSE ADMINISTRATOR BECK,

NURSE COOK,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Shane Sinnott (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, asserting claims that arose while he was incarcerated at Orleans Correctional

Facility (“Orleans”) against defendants Mr. Jeremy Smith (“Smith”), Mr. Gary Cooper

(“Cooper”), Dr. Dwight D. Lewis (“Lewis”), Nurse Administrator Beck (“Beck”), and

Nurse Cook (“Cook”) (collectively Defendants).1 Pending before the Court is Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff has filed no opposition. (Dkt. 30). For

the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted.

1 Defendants’ full names are taken from the transcript of the Court of Claims trial

involving Plaintiff, Cooper, Lewis, and Smith. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 113 (Cooper), 138

(Lewis), 184 (Smith)).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt.

30-5), which was submitted in accordance with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff

was warned by the Court that if he failed to file the required response, “all material facts

set forth in Defendants’ statement of material facts not in dispute will be deemed admitted.”

(Dkt. 31 at 2). Accordingly, the Court treats the material facts set forth in Defendants’

Statement of Undisputed Facts as true to the extent they are supported by the record. See

Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003). Considering Plaintiff’s pro se

status, the Court in its discretion has conducted an independent review of the record to

ascertain whether disputes of material fact exist that would preclude summary judgment in

favor of Defendants. See Daley v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. 12-cv-6316 (NSR), 2016

WL 880203, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2016), aff’d, 675 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 2017). When

a court independently reviews the record, “any verified complaint filed by the plaintiff

should be treated as an affidavit” on a motion for summary judgment. Jackson v.

Onondaga Cnty., 549 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209-10 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Patterson v. Cnty.

of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) and citations omitted); see Parker v. Fantasia,

425 F. Supp. 3d 171, 176 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (a “verified complaint is to be treated as an

affidavit for summary judgment purposes”) (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872

(2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v. City of N.Y., 96 F.4th 504 (2d

Cir. 2024) and citations omitted).2 The Court specifically notes that the record includes a

2 Plaintiff signed and filed his verified amended complaint under penalty of perjury.

(Dkt. 9 at 10).

transcript and exhibits from a New York State Court of Claims trial, Shane Sinnott v. The

State of New York, held on May 25, 2023, in front of Judge Debra A. Martin, in which

Plaintiff brought claims arising from the same series of events. (Dkt. 30-2 at 68-208; Dkt.

30-3).

On December 4, 2019, Plaintiff was working in maintenance while incarcerated at

Orleans. (Dkt. 30-2 at 74:9-12, 91:7-15; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 9). He normally worked as a

locksmith, but when there was a shortage of projects, he would be assigned tasks in other

areas. (Dkt. 30-2 at 74:18-24). Smith was a Department of Corrections and Community

Supervision (“DOCCS”) maintenance supervisor at Orleans whose responsibilities

included assigning work to incarcerated staff and civilian staff, processing work orders,

and managing construction projects. (Id. at 185:10-20). Cooper, a DOCCS employee at

Orleans under whom Plaintiff worked, tasked Plaintiff and another inmate with repairing a

motor for a ceiling fan. (Id. at 74:18-75:11, 118:10-12). Plaintiff testified that Cooper

tended to be irritated by the other inmate based on their past history and that Cooper was

also aggravated that it had taken Plaintiff and the other inmate longer than expected to

repair the motor. (Id. at 75:15-20, 84:19-85:1).

When Plaintiff and the other inmate informed Cooper that they had fixed the motor,

Cooper instructed them to test the motor to ensure that it rotated properly. (Dkt. 30-2 at

75:25-76:2, 93:12-14; see Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 20). To test a motor, the maintenance staff

generally used a device (the “testing device”) to connect the motor to a power source. (Dkt.

30-2 at 118:22-119:5, 191:3-16; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 24). The testing device, which resembled

a power cord, contained an electrical outlet at one end of the cord and a series of three

electrical leads at the other end of the cord. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 119:19-121:25; Dkt. 30-3 at

302-04, 340-42). The electrical leads had metal clips that a person attaches to prongs in

the motor. (See id.). When the testing device was attached to the motor and plugged into

a power source, a complete electrical circuit was created, allowing the motor to run. (See

id.). In other words, the testing device allowed the maintenance staff to simulate how the

motor would rotate once powered. The electrical leads were not supposed to touch one

another because doing so could create a short and blow the motor. (Id. at 123:21-24).

Cooper told Plaintiff to attach the testing device’s electrical leads to the motor

without allowing the metal clips on the leads to touch. (Id. at 78:11-16, 82:14-22, 123:16-

20). Plaintiff alleges that he told Cooper that the device was held together by duct tape and

did not look “right,” and that Cooper replied, “it’s fine, just don’t let the ends touch.” (Dkt.

9 at 6). Cooper thought that Plaintiff knew to hold the plastic coating on the clips, rather

than the clips themselves. (Dkt. 30-2 at 131:6-21; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 21). Plaintiff testified

that Cooper, who was standing next to Plaintiff, did not look at Plaintiff’s hands to ensure

they were not on the clips. (Dkt. 30-2 at 78:17-25, 82:25-83:8). Cooper and Plaintiff

communicated to each other that Plaintiff was ready for Cooper to turn the power on to test

the motor, and Cooper did so. (Id. at 82:25-83:18, 124:12-17, 129:17-130:1; Dkt. 30-5 at

¶ 22). Since his hands were on the metal clips, Plaintiff received an electrical shock and

fell down, as he felt the electricity go through his body for approximately five to eight

seconds. (Dkt. 30-2 at 78:17-25, 85:12-86:6, 94:5-12). Plaintiff described that he felt “real

bad tingling burning” and that “[i]t went through both my arms up to my head and just

straight through my whole body[,] and . . . everything was tight in my chest got tight and

kind of like it tensed my muscles . . . .” (Id. at 85:22-86:5). Plaintiff yelled and Cooper

cut the power supply. (Id. at 79:3-24, 125:4-6, 132:16-18). Smith, who had been in his

office approximately 30 feet away when the incident occurred, ran over to Plaintiff and

asked what happened, and Plaintiff said that he had been electrocuted but was okay. (Id.

at 80:1-9, 98:21-24, 126:2-5; 191:17-22, 192:6-12; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶¶ 26-27).

Cooper accompanied Plaintiff to get an immediate medical evaluation. (Dkt. 30-2

at 80:9-13, 86:9-16, 99:3-11, 126:2-13). A nurse at Orleans evaluated Plaintiff’s vitals and

noted that he was alert, oriented, and offered no complaints, and he underwent an

electrocardiogram (EKG). (Id. at 80:11-17, 141:23-142:5; Dkt. 30-3 at 42; Dkt. 30-5 at

¶ 36). Plaintiff did not suffer any burns or other visible injuries. (Dkt. 30-2 at 80:17-18;

Dkt. 30-3 at 42; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 37). Lewis, a clinical physician employed by DOCCS,

evaluated Plaintiff and recorded that Plaintiff’s EKG and examination were normal, with

no shortness of breath, chest pain, or murmurs, and his heart was regular. (Dkt. 30-2 at

140:3-10, 142:18-143:1-6; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 37). The same day, Plaintiff was taken to the

emergency department at Medina Memorial Hospital, where he was given another EKG

and fluids. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶¶ 38-39; see Dkt. 30-3 at 141-49). Testing revealed that Plaintiff

suffered mild muscle breakdown, for which treatment was intravenous fluids and support,

and Lewis testified that the condition would go away “rather quickly.” (Dkt. 30-2 at

145:11-19; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 38). Plaintiff was advised that he could return to his dormitory

at Orleans once he was released from the hospital emergency department, also on the same

day. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 39).

The day after Plaintiff suffered the shock, he returned to work in the maintenance

department, and Smith trained him on basic electricity, including how to connect electrical

test leads to a motor, to avoid a similar incident in the future. (Dkt. 30-2 at 86:24-87:1,

87:17-21, 106:24-107:5, 199:4-14).3 Plaintiff testified that Smith said Plaintiff should not

have used the testing device in question the day before because Cooper made it and it was

“Jimmy rigged.” (Id. at 87:10-17). Plaintiff further testified that Smith took out a “regular”

testing device and informed Plaintiff that he should have been using that device instead.

(Id.; see also Dkt. 30-2 at 33-34). Plaintiff testified that the testing device that Cooper gave

him was missing the plastic coating normally placed on each electrical lead to protect

against electrocution. (Dkt. 30-2 at 76:22-78:16, 80:21-82:8; see Dkt. 30-3 at 302-04).

Smith denied telling Plaintiff that Plaintiff should not have been using the testing

device that Cooper allegedly made. (Dkt. 30-2 at 199:15-21, 201:11-14). Cooper testified

that the testing device that Plaintiff used contained plastic coating on the electrical leads

and denied that the testing device was “Jimmy rigged” because it was “specially made for

that purpose.” (Id. at 122:13-123:7; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 16). Cooper asserted that the

maintenance department’s testing devices were safe and that he had been using them for a

3 In the amended complaint and during the Court of Claims trial, Plaintiff asserted

that officials at Orleans, including Smith, attempted to make him sign paperwork after he

was shocked to record that Plaintiff had been trained on how to properly test a fan motor.

(See Dkt. 9 at 7; Dkt. 30-2 at 104:8-106:23). Plaintiff refused to sign because he believed

that the officials were attempting to protect themselves against a possible lawsuit, since

Plaintiff had filed a “notice of intent,” presumably a reference to filing a Notice of Claim,

which is required when suing New York State in the Court of Claims. (Dkt. 30-2 at 105:17-

106:16; see Dkt. 9 at 7). See Court of Claims Act § 10(3). During the trial, the State

stipulated to the fact that Plaintiff was trained on the day after the incident, which the court

found resolved the paperwork issue. (Dkt. 30-2 at 106:24-107:9).

long time. (Dkt. 30-2 at 125:15-19; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 18). Smith testified that he “assumed”

that Plaintiff was given a testing device that had plastic coating on the electrical leads but

acknowledged that he was not in the room when Plaintiff was shocked. (See Dkt. 30-2 at

189:5-13; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶¶ 26-27).

One week after he suffered the electrical shock, on December 11, 2019, Plaintiff

had a follow-up visit with Lewis. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 39). Plaintiff reported numbness in his

hands, legs, and feet. (Id.). Lewis told Plaintiff that he did not need an MRI or other

additional testing after the shock because he had not suffered cardiac issues or loss of

consciousness. (Id. at ¶ 40). Plaintiff testified that it took him “over a week or two to

finally see Mr. Lewis” for the follow-up visit and that he had submitted multiple requests

before securing the appointment. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 109:8-18). Plaintiff alleges that Cook

told him to “stop being a pussy” and that his requests for medical attention were being

thrown out. (Dkt. 9 at 8, 52).

Plaintiff filed a grievance on January 17, 2020, alleging that he had tingling and

numbness in his arms, legs, and feet, and was not being provided proper medical attention,

including an MRI and an appointment with a specialist. (Dkt. 30-3 at 317). The Inmate

Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC) denied the grievance, noting that Plaintiff had

been evaluated on December 11, 2019, and that he was advised that an MRI was

unnecessary. (Id. at 318). Plaintiff’s appeal of the IGRC’s response was also denied. (Id.

at 321). DOCCS’ Central Office Review Committee held a hearing on April 29, 2020,

regarding Plaintiff’s grievance and noted that according to DOCCS’ Division of Health

Services, Plaintiff was receiving “appropriate treatment” and that an MRI and consultation

with a specialist were not medically necessary. (Dkt. 9 at 29).

On March 22, 2021, Lewis evaluated Plaintiff, who complained of numbness and

tingling in his hands, fingers, feet and legs for the past two years. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 42).

Plaintiff believed his symptoms resulted from the electrical shock, and Lewis ordered x-

rays and a nerve conduction study. (Id.). The x-rays of Plaintiff’s chest and cervical spine

were normal. (Dkt. 30-3 at 106-07). After scheduling delays due to the COVID-19

pandemic, Plaintiff underwent the nerve conduction study on July 9, 2021. (Dkt. 30-5 at

¶ 43). The study indicated that Plaintiff had not suffered any nerve issues to his upper

extremities from electrocution. (Dkt. 30-2 at 153:16-154:2; see Dkt. 30-3 at 108-09).

Plaintiff was advised to come back for a nerve conduction test of his lower extremities, but

he refused to have additional tests done. (Dkt. 30-2 at 154:6-12; see Dkt. 30-3 at 115).

Plaintiff filed two claims against the State of New York in 2020 in the Court of

Claims, based on the same series of events, and the Court of Claims consolidated the cases.

(Dkt. 30-2 at 2-66; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶¶ 5-8). Plaintiff brought a negligence claim, alleging that

Cooper improperly instructed him on how to test a fan motor, causing Plaintiff to suffer

the electrical shock. (Dkt. 30-2 at 2, 14; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 9). Plaintiff also asserted a medical

negligence claim, alleging that Orleans officials denied him proper treatment after the

incident. (Dkt. 30-2 at 24; Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 9). Judge Martin held a trial on Plaintiff’s

consolidated claims on May 25, 2023, and issued her decision from the bench. (Dkt. 30-5

at ¶ 11; see also Dkt. 30-2 at 204:18-205:18; Dkt. 30-4 at 7).4

The Court of Claims found that Plaintiff was not properly instructed on how to use

the testing device and that Cooper was negligent in not verifying the location of Plaintiff’s

hands before turning on the power to the device, causing Plaintiff to be shocked. (Dkt. 30-

2 at 204:18-205:1). Judge Martin also found that there was no documentation of any

injuries to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about the numbness and other

symptoms he experienced were “not consistent,” and that Plaintiff failed to prove a

correlation between the shock he suffered and his symptoms because he did not submit

expert testimony. (Id. at 205:3-14). Plaintiff was awarded $75.00 plus $0.62 in interest

for his experience at the time of the shock, including the sensations he felt for a period of

seconds, falling down, and being startled, as well as any filing fee he paid. (Id. at 205:14-

18; Dkt. 30-4 at 7).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on March 1, 2021. (Dkt. 1).5 Upon screening

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, the Court entered an Order dismissing

the claims against the State of New York, DOCCS, and the individual Defendants in their

4 Plaintiff had also filed an unrelated Court of Claims action, regarding a separate

medical issue, and the Court of Claims held a trial on that action on the same day as the

trial about the incident involving the electrical shock. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 12).

5 Plaintiff also filed a document that he identified as “Amended Claims.” (Dkt. 7).

In its first screening order, the Court treated the filing, which briefly reiterated Plaintiff’s

allegations, as a supplemental to the complaint, which remained the operative pleading at

the time. (Dkt. 8 at 1).

official capacities with prejudice and dismissing the claims against Lewis, Beck, and “other

nurses (Jane Does),” with leave to amend. (Dkt. 8). Plaintiff was allowed to proceed to

service on the claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect against Smith and

Cooper. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 25, 2021. (Dkt. 9). On May 2,

2022, the Court issued a screening order, allowing Plaintiff to proceed to service on the

claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

against Lewis, Beck, and Cook. (Dkt. 11).

Smith, Cooper, Beck, and Cook answered the complaint on August 1, 2022. (Dkt.

15). After the summons for Lewis was returned unexecuted (Dkt. 12), Magistrate Judge

Marian W. Payson entered a Valentin order, to which the New York Attorney General’s

Office responded. (Dkt. 17; Dkt. 19). Lewis answered the complaint on December 12,

2022. (Dkt. 21).

On November 10, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.

30). Plaintiff was ordered to file a response by December 18, 2023 (Dkt. 31), but failed to

do so.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment

should be granted if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds that no rational jury could

find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).

“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as

to any material fact . . . .” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486

(2d Cir. 2014). “Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the

party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the evidentiary

materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the

non-movant’s burden of proof at trial.” Johnson v. Xerox Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103

(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Once the

moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory

allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,

781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Rule 56 also provides that if a non-moving party fails to oppose a summary

judgment motion, the court may grant summary judgment “if the motion and supporting

materials . . . show that the movant is entitled to it[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “[W]here the

non-moving party ‘chooses the perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary

judgment motion, the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the

moving party’s submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no

material issue of fact remains for trial.’” Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co.,

373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir.

2001)). If the evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment does not

meet the movant’s burden of production, “summary judgment must be denied even if no

opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Amaker, 274 F.3d at 681. In deciding whether

the moving party has met its burden, “the district court may not rely solely on the statement

of undisputed facts contained in the moving party’s [Local Rule 56] statement. It must be

satisfied that the citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion.” Vermont Teddy

Bear Co., 373 F.3d at 244; see also Jackson v. Fed. Exp., 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014).

“The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that when a party moves for

summary judgment against a pro se litigant, either the movant or the district court must

provide the pro se litigant with notice of the consequences of failing to respond to the

motion.” Moran v. Livingston, 155 F. Supp. 3d 278, 284 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Gustin

v. Potter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 460, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)); see Irby v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,

262 F.3d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 2001). However, even where such notice has been given,

“failure to oppose or respond to a motion for summary judgment standing alone does not

warrant granting the motion: ‘the district court must still assess whether the moving party

has fulfilled its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’” Devers v. Goord, No. 06–CV–843S, 2014

WL 4923284, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting Vermont Teddy Bear Co., 373

F.3d at 244).

II. Res Judicata

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff

already had an opportunity to litigate his claims in the Court of Claims. (Dkt. 30-6 at 9-

14). “[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides that [a] final judgment

on the merits of an action precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or

could have been raised in that action.” Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.

Co., 600 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original and quotation omitted). The

doctrine “evokes the common law principles of judicial economy and comity.” Channer

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 527 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2008). “To determine whether the

doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action, we consider whether 1) the prior decision

was a final judgment on the merits, 2) the litigants were the same parties, 3) the prior court

was of competent jurisdiction, and 4) the causes of action were the same.” Brown Media

Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017). “A federal court must give

to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under

the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” N.Y. v. Mountain Tobacco Co.,

942 F.3d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 2019); see Grinols v. Beers, 532 F. Supp. 3d 95, 103 (W.D.N.Y.

2021) (“New York law governs the preclusive effect of a judgment from a New York state

court, and there is ‘no significant difference’ between New York preclusion law and federal

preclusion law.”) (internal citations omitted).

“However, a later claim arising from the same nucleus of facts as a previously

adjudicated claim is not barred if the initial forum lacked the power to grant the full

measure of relief sought in the later litigation.” Pack v. Artuz, 348 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69

(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Jacobson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir.

1997) and Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)); see Barrington v. N.Y.,

806 F. Supp. 2d 730, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Plaintiff’s claim is not barred under res judicata

if “‘formal jurisdictional or statutory barriers’ prevented him from ‘presenting to a court in

one action the entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands for relief that

might have been available to him under applicable law.’”) (quoting Jacobson, 111 F.3d at

265). “For that reason, courts in this Circuit have held that a suit in a forum where state

employees may only be sued in their official capacities does not bar an action against those

employees in their individual capacities.” Barrington, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (citing

Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1986) and collecting cases). More

specifically, it is well-established that a plaintiff is not precluded from pursuing a § 1983

claim against state employees in their individual capacities when the plaintiff previously

litigated a claim in the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Grinols, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (“The

case law is uniform that res judicata does not apply to Court of Claims decisions in later

lawsuits against individual state employees.”); Ceara v. Gilboy, No. 13-CV-6673-FPG,

2018 WL 4691043, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (“Since the Court of Claims does not

have jurisdiction to hear claims against state officials in their individual capacities, courts

have held that res judicata does not bar a later suit asserting claims against individuals.”)

(collecting cases); Pack, 348 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (“[T]he Court of Claims does not have the

power to grant the ‘full measure of relief’ sought in cases, such as the current one, where

the plaintiff seeks to recover against state officials in their individual capacities.”).

Defendants cite Livingston v. Goord, 225 F. Supp. 2d 321 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d

in part, vacated in part on other grounds, sub nom. Livingston v. Piskor, 153 F. App’x 769

(2d Cir. 2005), to support their argument that Plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the prior

Court of Claims action. (Dkt. 30-6 at 9-11). Defendants also cite Livingston and Ramsey

v. Busch, 19 F. Supp. 2d 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), when asserting that the availability of

punitive damages in the instant action—a remedy unavailable to Plaintiff in the Court of

Claims—still does not allow Plaintiff to relitigate his claims in federal court. (Id. at 14).

Those cases are not binding on this Court, which finds the conclusions and reasoning of

the more recent cases cited above to be more persuasive.6 In the Court of Claims, Plaintiff

could not bring his Eighth Amendment claims against named state officials in their

individual capacities. Accordingly, res judicata does not apply and does not preclude

Plaintiff’s § 1983 action against Defendants.

III. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue that collateral estoppel prevents Plaintiff from relitigating factual

issues adjudicated in the Court of Claims action. (Dkt. 30-6 at 11-12). “Under the doctrine

of collateral estoppel, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid

and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any

future lawsuit.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. LaGuardia, 679 F. Supp. 3d 34, 39 (S.D.N.Y.

2023) (quoting United States v. United States Currency in Amount of $119,984.00, More

or Less, 304 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310

F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties or

6 Defendants also cite Gagne v. Kaczor, No. 12-CV-545, 2015 WL 6829681, at *5

(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2015), for the proposition that New York’s rule against “claim

splitting” bars Plaintiff’s claims. (Dkt. 30-6 at 11). However, that case is distinguishable

because the final judgment in the prior action was a stipulation and settlement that

discharged DOCCS, the correctional facility, and the facility’s employees from future

claims arising from the same facts. See Gagne, 2015 WL 6829681, at *5-6. Here, there is

no prior settlement between the parties under which Plaintiff released Defendants from any

future claims.

their privies from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue of fact or law that was fully

and fairly litigated in a prior proceeding.”). Under New York law, “collateral estoppel has

two essential elements. ‘First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in

the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded

from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior

determination.’” Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Juan C.

v. Cortines, 89 N.Y.2d 659, 667 (1997) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

District courts “must accept the factual findings of the Court of Claims, if those findings

were necessarily and actually decided and plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate

the underlying issues.” Grinols, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (citation omitted). “It is well-

settled that collateral estoppel may bar a plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Casler v. W. Irondequoit Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 3d 60,

66 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Shell v. Brun, 362 F. Supp. 2d 398, 400 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)).

In the prior Court of Claims action, Judge Martin found that Plaintiff was not

properly instructed about how to use the testing device, including that he should not hold

the metal clips when the device was powered. (Dkt. 30-2 at 204:18-22). Judge Martin

further found that Cooper assumed but did not confirm whether Plaintiff’s hands were in

the correct location on the testing device, that Plaintiff experienced an electrical shock, and

that Plaintiff felt electricity go through his body and fell down. (Id. at 204:23-205:3).

Finally, Judge Martin found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any “shock related injuries”

and that the extent of what he experienced were “the feelings at the time of the shock for a

few seconds and then falling down . . . .” (Id. at 205:10-16). These factual findings by the

Court of Claims were necessarily and actually decided in order to resolve Plaintiff’s

negligence claims.

The question then becomes whether Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate his case in the Court of Claims. “This prong of the collateral estoppel analysis

requires a showing that the plaintiff ‘was fully able to raise the same factual or legal issues’

in the prior litigation as those asserted in the present case.” Cerny v. Rayburn, 972 F. Supp.

2d 308, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 274 (2d Cir.

2002)). In making this determination, courts consider multiple factors, including:

the nature of the forum and the importance of the claim in the prior litigation,

the incentive and initiative to litigate and the actual extent of litigation, the

competence and expertise of counsel, the availability of new evidence, the

differences in the applicable law and the foreseeability of future litigation.

Ceara, 2018 WL 4691043, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501

(1984)). Plaintiff’s prior action in the Court of Claims, a state court, was based on the same

body of facts and evidence as the instant proceeding. While Plaintiff was pro se before the

Court of Claims, he had the incentive and initiative to litigate his claims, as evidenced by

the complaint and amended complaint he filed in that case with supporting exhibits,

including personal statements, grievance complaints and appeals, requests for medical

treatment, and medical records. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 14-63). Plaintiff participated in his trial

at the Court of Claims, during which he testified and questioned Cooper, Smith, and Lewis.

(See generally id. at 68-207). Judge Martin asked Plaintiff numerous questions throughout

the trial to develop his testimony and offered him opportunities to submit additional

testimony and evidence. (See id. at 80:21-81:2, 85:9-19, 89:24-25, 102:15-18, 203:15-16).

Plaintiff was well-aware of the foreseeability of future litigation at the time of the Court of

Claims trial in May 2023, since his complaint and amended complaint in the instant action

had already been screened and discovery was ongoing. In sum, since Plaintiff “was fully

able to raise the same factual issues” in the Court of Claims, he is precluded from

relitigating the same factual issues, to the extent they are applicable to the instant claims.

See Cerny, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 319.

IV. Plaintiff’s Failure to Protect Claim against Smith and Cooper

Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff’s claims against Smith and Cooper are not

barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, they are still entitled to summary judgment

because the evidence introduced during the Court of Claims trial establishes that Smith and

Cooper were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. (Dkt. 30-

6 at 15-18).

As an initial matter, the Court of Claims’ finding that Cooper was negligent by

failing to verify the location of Plaintiff’s hands before turning on power to the testing

device neither precludes nor requires a finding that Cooper violated Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights. See Bertrand v. Demmon, No. 9:14-CV-1456 (GTS/DEP), 2017 WL

2303994, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017) (“if Plaintiffs are successful in proving

negligence . . . in the State action, they would still need to prove deliberate indifference in

order to be successful on their Eighth Amendment claims in this Court”) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994)); cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (agreeing that “deliberate

indifference [lays] somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or

knowledge at the other”); Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996)

(“[T]o state a cognizable section 1983 claim, the prisoner must allege actions or omissions

sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference; mere negligence will not suffice.”).

Under the Eighth Amendment, a “prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate” is unlawful. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.

The test for deliberate indifference is twofold. First, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk

of serious harm. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant

prison officials possessed sufficient culpable intent. The second prong of the

deliberate indifference test, culpable intent, in turn, involves a two-tier

inquiry. Specifically, a prison official has sufficient culpable intent if he has

knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm.

Santos v. Jones, No. 22-CV-6338-EAW, 2023 WL 1109755, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,

2023) (quoting Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620). An inmate’s work conditions in the correctional

facility are considered a condition of confinement. See Washington v. Artus, 708 F. App’x

705, 706 (2d Cir. 2017) (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that he faced unsafe conditions while

working in the prison mess hall under Eighth Amendment’s two-part analysis).

The objective component “can be satisfied even where no serious physical injury

results,” and “the focus of injury must be, not the extent of the physical injuries sustained

. . . but rather the existence of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” Mazyck v. Keller, 531

F. Supp. 3d 630, 642 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457,

473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)); see Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[t]o

meet the objective element, the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in

combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health,” with their severity

“evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency”). The Supreme Court has

recognized that exposed electrical wiring can represent a safety hazard, and other courts

have noted the inherent danger of working with electricity when analyzing the objective

component. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); Gray v. Garman, No. 4:21-

CV-01221, 2022 WL 2392931, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2022) (“the risk of electrocution is

a sufficiently significant danger”); McKinney v. Archey, No. 1:08 CV 112 JM, 2008 WL

3914978, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2008) (“Electricity and the means used to conduct it

are inherently dangerous . . . [I]t cannot be reasonably disputed that working with electricity

presents an objectively serious risk.”). Moreover, outside the Second Circuit, courts have

concluded that “forcing an inmate to work with faulty electrical equipment or near exposed

electrical wiring without appropriate protection can pose a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Calhoun v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10 Civ 182(LAK)(HBP), 2014 WL 144659,

at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (collecting cases); see Bentz v. Hardy, 638 F. App’x 535,

536, 538 (7th Cir. 2016) (inmate who suffered minor shocks after touching wall switch

exposed to rainwater faced a substantial risk of physical injury); but see Morisette v. Peters,

45 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1995) (no Eighth Amendment violation when plaintiff was

shocked on two occasions by exposed wires over his bed and complained of a boil one

month later).

Defendants argue that the testing device that Plaintiff used was not faulty and point

to Cooper’s testimony in the Court of Claims trial that the testing device given to Plaintiff

was safe and designed specifically to test fan motors. (Dkt. 30-6 at 17).7 However,

7 Smith admitted that he was not in the room when Plaintiff was shocked and that he

could only “assume” that the testing device Plaintiff used was the same as the photo of the

Plaintiff testified that the testing device was missing protective plastic coating on the

electrical leads and that Smith told him that it was “Jimmy rigged.” (Dkt. 30-2 at 76:20-

78:16, 80:21-82:8, 87:10-17). The Court of Claims made no findings as to the quality or

condition of the testing device that Plaintiff was given on the day he suffered the shock.

Therefore, there is a question of material fact as to whether the testing device was faulty or

unsafe for Plaintiff’s use, such that it created a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff.

“[F]ailure to train inmates for their work duty and use of unsafe equipment sounds

in an Eighth Amendment violation for unsafe prison conditions[.]” James v. Westchester

Cnty., No. 13-cv-0019 (NSR), 2014 WL 4097635, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014); cf.

Buckely v. Barbour Cnty, Ala., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (inmates’ use

of chainsaws without training created a substantial risk of harm). Defendants contend that

Cooper and Smith were not deliberately indifferent because Cooper “explained the testing

process to [Plaintiff]” and how to attach the device to the fan motor. (Dkt. 30-6 at 17). But

the Court of Claims found that Plaintiff was not appropriately trained on how to safely use

the testing device. Plaintiff was employed as a locksmith, and repairing and testing a fan

motor were outside of his normal responsibilities. The Court concludes that the failure to

train Plaintiff on how to safely use a device that serves as a conductor of electricity

objectively poses a substantial risk of serious harm.

Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff faced a constitutionally impermissible risk of harm,

Plaintiff cannot meet the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim against

testing device—which contained protective plastic coating—shown to him during the

Court of Claims trial. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 189:5-13; Dkt. 30-3 at 301-04).

Cooper and Smith because there is no evidence in the record that Cooper and Smith were

deliberately indifferent to the harm that Plaintiff faced. To establish liability for a failure

to protect claim, prison officials “must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). The state of mind requirement is

“more than negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of harm.”

Id. A prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety” and “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “An accident, although it may produce added anguish, is not on

that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

Plaintiff testified that the electrical shock was an accident and that Cooper “didn’t

do it on purpose.” (Dkt. 30-2 at 102:25-103:14, 129:25-130:2). There is no evidence in

the record that Cooper knew that Plaintiff’s hands were on the metal clips, and, indeed,

Plaintiff testified, “My hands were still on it, which he didn’t realize.” (Id. at 83:1-2

(emphasis added)); see also id. at 78:17-24 (“my main argument . . . is like [Cooper] didn’t

check to look at me to see if my hands were in the right spot . . . He’s just flip and then

next thing you know, I’m getting shocked . . . .”)). Cooper testified that he thought Plaintiff

knew to put his hands on the protective coating on the metal clips, rather than on the clips

themselves. (Id. at 131:12-18). While Plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that he

informed Cooper before the incident that the testing device was held together by duct tape

and did not look “right,” this general comment is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of

fact as to whether Cooper drew the inference that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm

from the device, especially since Cooper allegedly responded that the device was fine and

that Plaintiff should ensure that the electrical leads did not touch. (See Dkt. 9 at 6). Plaintiff

also does not allege that Cooper was aware that Plaintiff had not been trained on the basics

of electricity.

Also relevant to Cooper’s state of mind, Plaintiff testified that Cooper was

“irritated” and “aggravated” with Plaintiff and the other inmate working on the fan motor

at the time of the incident, in part because it had taken them longer than expected to fix the

motor. (See Dkt. 30-2 at 84:19-24, 103:1-5, 15-21). But even if this was true, this does

not establish that Cooper had “knowledge of a significant risk of harm to Plaintiff” or that

he disregarded such a risk because Cooper did not know that Plaintiff’s hands were in the

incorrect position when Cooper engaged the power. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also

Austin v. Craighead Cnty. Jail, 189 F. App’x 583, 584 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(affirming dismissal of case after bench trial when testimony established prison official

“believed the power to the wires had been cut off, and [plaintiff] did not show that

defendants actually knew of and disregarded, or were deliberately indifferent to, a risk to

his safety”). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Cooper was deliberately

indifferent, and the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on the claim against

Cooper.

As to Plaintiff’s claim against Smith, Plaintiff alleges that Smith “provided” the

purported faulty testing device that Plaintiff was using when he suffered an electrical

shock. (Dkt. 9 at 6). Plaintiff also seemingly asserts a claim of supervisory liability against

Smith based on Cooper’s alleged constitutional violation. (See id.). “[T]here is no special

rule for supervisory liability,” and “a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotations and

citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he violation must be established against the

supervisory official directly.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege nor is there evidence in the

record that Smith was aware that Plaintiff may have been using a substandard testing device

or that Plaintiff had not been properly tested on how to use the testing device before he

suffered the electrical shock. Smith was in his office, in a separate room, during the time

in which Plaintiff and the other inmate fixed the fan motor, Plaintiff connected the motor

to the testing device, and Cooper turned on the power to the testing device. (Dkt. 30-2 at

75:10-15). Since Smith was not physically present for these events, he lacks the requisite

personal involvement for a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot

demonstrate that Smith was deliberately indifferent, and the Court grants summary

judgment to Defendants on the claim against Smith.

V. Failure to Provide Medical Care Claim against Lewis, Beck, and Cook

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating the fact that

he did not suffer any injuries from the electrical shock, aside from what he experienced at

the time of the shock itself. (Dkt. 30-6 at 11). In addition, even if Plaintiff’s claims against

Lewis, Beck, and Cook are not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, Defendants

contend they are still entitled to summary judgment because the evidence introduced during

the Court of Claims trial establishes that Lewis, Beck, and Cook were not deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. (Id. at 18-19).

An Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care requires a

plaintiff-inmate to demonstrate that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious

medical need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. A claim for deliberate indifference has both an

objective and a subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).

Objectively, a medical need is serious for constitutional purposes if it presents “‘a condition

of urgency’ that may result in ‘degeneration’ or ‘extreme pain.’” Chance v. Armstrong,

143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66). “Subjectively, the

official charged with deliberate indifference must have acted with the requisite state of

mind, the ‘equivalent of criminal recklessness.’” Lapierre v. Cnty. of Nassau, 459 F. App’x

28, 29 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)).

The Court of Claims did not make any findings against New York State regarding

Plaintiff’s alleged insufficient medical treatment after he suffered the electrical shock.

Judge Martin found:

[T]here doesn’t appear to be any documentation of any injuries. The

subjective complaints of numbness [] were not consistent and not clarified as

to what the level of symptoms were or how these symptoms interfered in any

way with his activities. In other words, there was not a good description of

anything beyond the shock itself as to what any of the [] symptoms were.

Electrical studies, tests did not prove there was any shock related injuries.

Expert testimony would have been required to prove a correlation between

the shock and any symptoms, and that was not presented.

(Dkt. 30-2 at 205:3-14). The Court of Claims’ finding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate

any injuries caused by the electrical shock, aside from what he experienced for several

seconds at the time of the incident, can only lead this Court to conclude that Plaintiff did

not suffer from an objectively serious medical need. Plaintiff also is barred from litigating

whether Lewis, Beck, and Cook were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs because the Court of Claims did not find that state medical officials were negligent

or otherwise provided insufficient medical care, despite Plaintiff’s claims to the contrary.

“In deciding that there was nothing in the record to demonstrate negligence by plaintiff’s

medical providers, let alone evidence from a medical expert to suggest that plaintiff’s

medical providers failed to meet the appropriate standard of care, the Court of Claims

resolved the factual issues” relevant to this claim. Gathers v. Tan, No. 10-CV-0475S(Sr),

2014 WL 12648666, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (collecting cases and internal

alterations omitted), subsequently aff’d on other grounds, 619 F. App’x 19 (2d Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, collateral estoppel applies as to Plaintiff’s claims against Lewis, Beck, and

Cook, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

Even if Plaintiff was not estopped from arguing that he had a serious medical need,

the evidence does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. Plaintiff alleges

that after suffering the electrical shock, he had “extreme pain and internal ailments,”

including numbness and tingling in his extremities. (Dkt. 9 at 8). “[S]ubjective complaints

of pain are not sufficient to satisfy [the serious medical need] standard,” nor are complaints

of numbness or tingling. Martinez v. Aycock-West, 164 F. Supp. 3d 502, 512 (S.D.N.Y.

2016) (quoting Thomas v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 288 F. Supp. 2d 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y.

2003)); see Dallio v. Hebert, 678 F. Supp. 2d 35, 60 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (numbness in hands

and fingers not a serious medical need). Plaintiff has not identified specific medical

outcomes that he suffered from the alleged denial of medical care, nor has he alleged that

he was unable to engage in normal daily activities due to his symptoms. See Charles v.

Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he actual medical consequences that

flow from the denial of care are highly relevant in determining whether the denial of

treatment subjected the detainee to a significant risk of serious harm.”); Chance, 143 F.3d

at 703-04 (plaintiff’s inability to participate in normal activities is a relevant factor in

considering whether a serious medical need exists). The Court therefore concludes that

Plaintiff did not suffer from a serious medical need.

As to the subjective requirement for a failure to provide medical care claim, Plaintiff

cannot establish that Lewis, Beck, and Cook were deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs. An official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety

and “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists,” and “must also draw the inference.” Id. at 702 (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837). Lewis’ testimony in the Court of Claims establishes that he did not know

of facts nor draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff existed.

Lewis evaluated Plaintiff on the day that he was shocked and concluded that Plaintiff’s

physical examination was normal. (Dkt. 30-5 at ¶ 37). At a follow-up appointment one

week later, Lewis informed Plaintiff that he did not need additional testing because he had

not suffered cardiac issues or loss of consciousness. (Id. at ¶ 40). Plaintiff alleges that

Beck said that “in her opinion, [plaintiff’s] pain isn’t that bad[,]” and that Lewis and Cook

ignored Plaintiff’s requests for an MRI and to be seen by a specialist. (Dkt. 9 at 8-9). “It

is well-established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a

constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner

might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Approximately fifteen months after Plaintiff experienced the

shock and in response to Plaintiff's complaints of pain, Lewis ordered x-rays and a nerve

conduction study. (Dkt. 30-5 at 79 42-43). In sum, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff

was evaluated in response to his requests for medical care, and no reasonable factfinder

could find that Lewis, Beck, or Cook were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical

needs.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt.

30) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and

to close this case.

SO ORDERED. /

J. KOM

A__ JON ptt

ELIZABATH AAVOLRORD”

aroLetige

United States District Court

Dated: July 31, 2024

Rochester, New York

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