Wilson v. County of Cattaraugus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANNE WILSON, Individually, and as Temporary

Administrator of the Estate of James R. Wilson,

Plaintiff,

v. DECISION AND ORDER

23-CV-429S

COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS and COUNTY

OF CATTARAUGUS SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this removed action, Plaintiff Anne Wilson alleges that the County of

Cattaraugus (“the County”) and the County of Cattaraugus Sheriff’s Office are liable for

the suicide death of her son, James R. Wilson (“Wilson”), who was an inmate at the

Cattaraugus County jail. She brings claims for negligence, wrongful death, and violations

of Wilson’s constitutional rights.

Now pending is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.1 (Docket No. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is

granted, and Plaintiff is granted leave to replead consistent with the following decision.

1 In support of their motion, Defendants filed a notice of motion, a declaration with exhibits, a memorandum

of law, and a reply memorandum of law. (Docket Nos. 4, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 9.) Plaintiff filed a memorandum of

law in opposition, as well as a declaration with exhibit. (Docket Nos. 8, 8-1, 8-2.) This Court took the motion

under advisement without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND

This Court assumes the truth of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.2

See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed.

2d 338 (1976); see also Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128

F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff Anne Wilson is decedent James Wilson’s mother and the administrator of

his estate. Complaint, Docket No. 1-2, Exhibit C, ¶¶ 2, 4. From May 5-7, 2022, Wilson

was an inmate at the Cattaraugus County jail. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. On May 7, Wilson attempted

suicide by hanging, which resulted in him entering a comatose state. Id. ¶ 13. Wilson

never regained consciousness and died of his injuries on May 18, 2022. Id. ¶ 14. No

other facts concerning the circumstances of Wilson’s death are contained in the

complaint.

Defendants owned, provided, maintained, operated, managed, and controlled the

Cattaraugus County jail. Id. ¶ 7. They were also responsible for the appointment, training,

and supervision of Sheriff’s deputies, corrections officers, and other staff assigned to the

jail. Id. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused Wilson’s death by various acts and

omissions. See id. ¶ 14a.3 Defendants failed to receive and safely keep Wilson in their

custody; failed to monitor and supervise him while he was incarcerated; and failed to

properly screen and evaluate him for health, mental-health, and substance-abuse

2 A copy of the complaint, which Plaintiff originally filed in state court, is included as Exhibit C to Defendants’

Notice of Removal. (Docket No. 1.) The parties also included copies of the complaint in their submissions.

(Docket Nos. 4-2, 8-2.)

3 The paragraphs in the complaint are misnumbered; there are two paragraphs labeled 14. To avoid

confusion, this Court delineates the second of the two paragraphs 14a.

problems. Id. Defendants further failed to prevent Wilson from harming himself by failing

to place him in a detoxification unit while incarcerated; failing to adequately consider his

drug addiction in establishing his supervisory needs; failing to modify his person and

quarters to prevent suicide; failing to identify his suicide risk; and failing to place him on

suicide watch. Id. Defendants also failed to properly hire, train, supervise, and retain the

jail staff; failed to enact adequate policies, procedures, and customs to assess, monitor,

and treat inmates with medical and mental-health issues; and failed to enact adequate

policies, procedures, and customs to prevent inmate deaths. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts two causes of action. First, she alleges state-law negligence and

wrongful death claims. Complaint, ¶¶ 12-15. Second, she alleges federal claims under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 concerning violations of Wilson’s rights under the Fifth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.4 Id. ¶¶ 16-20. Defendants move to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12 (b)(6).

At the outset, this Court notes Plaintiff’s concession that each of her claims against

the County of Cattaraugus Sheriff’s Office must be dismissed because the Sheriff’s Office,

as an administrative arm of the County, is not an independently suable entity. See

Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 8, pp. 2, 7. Indeed, “[b]ecause a sheriff’s department

‘does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal

4 Plaintiff also purports to bring unspecified claims under “the Constitution of the State of New York, New

York State Penal Law, New York State Corrections Law, and the New York State common law.” Complaint,

¶ 18. Because Plaintiff does not allege facts connecting to these sources of law, she fails to state any

claims arising under them. See Broughton v. Truist Bank, 23-CV-6042 (LTS), 2024 WL 3227948, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2024) (finding that pro se plaintiff’s unspecified claims failed because he “does not

allege any facts indicating how these statutes are applicable to his claims”).

identity,’ it cannot sue or be sued.” Forrest v. Cnty. of Greene, 676 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75

(N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Baker v. Willett, 42 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)); see

also Gugino v. Erie Cnty., Case No. 1:21-cv-1319, 2024 WL 3510306, at *6 n. 4 (W.D.N.Y.

July 18, 2024); Long v. Cnty. of Orleans, 540 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2021).

Plaintiff recognizes the Sheriff’s Office’s status in her complaint, explicitly pleading that

“the County of Cattaraugus Sheriff’s Office was and is an administrative branch of the

County of Cattaraugus,” with no facts alleged to support a conclusion that it is an

independently suable entity. Complaint, ¶ 6. All claims against the County of Cattaraugus

Sheriff’s Office will therefore be dismissed by agreement.

A. Rule 12 (b)(6) Standard

Rule 12 (b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are

generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). But the plain statement must Apossess enough heft to show that the

pleader is entitled to relief.@ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 557, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d

868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” also will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “Nor does a complaint suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

ATo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); id. at 679 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). Facial plausibility exists when

the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct charged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility requires finding “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., but it is not a probability

requirement, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint

need only nudge the claim Aacross the line from conceivable to plausible.@ Id.

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it

liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff=s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.

2007). Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of

truthfulness. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Athe tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions@). “While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.” Id. at 662; id. at 686 (“[T]he Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a

complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.”).

A two-pronged approach is thus used to examine the sufficiency of a complaint.

This examination is context specific and requires the court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. First, statements that are

not entitled to the presumption of truth, such as conclusory allegations, labels, and

factually unsupported legal conclusions, are identified and stripped away. See id.

Second, well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations are presumed true and

examined to determine whether they Aplausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.@ Id.

AWhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct,@ the complaint fails to state a claim. Id.

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), “a district court must

confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents

appended to the complaint or incorporated into the complaint by reference, and to matters

of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99,

107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd.

v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). “[W]here

a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it

where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect,” thereby rendering the

document “integral to the complaint.” Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d

Cir. 2006) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002)).

But even where a document is “integral” to the complaint, it cannot serve as the basis for

dismissal unless there is no dispute as to its authenticity, accuracy, and relevance. See

Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

B. Plaintiff’s Causes of Action

1. Negligence and Wrongful Death Claims

The County argues that Plaintiff’s state-law negligence and wrongful death claims

must be dismissed because she fails to plead facts sufficient to establish a plausible claim

for relief. Plaintiff maintains that her complaint adequately pleads her state-law claims.

To state a negligence claim under New York law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and

(3) the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s breach. See Lombard v. Booz-

Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2002) (identifying the elements of a

negligence claim in New York); Bryndle v. Boulevard Towers II, LLC, 132 F. Supp. 3d

486, 494 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Bluth v. Bias Yaakov Acad. for Girls, 999 N.Y.S.2d 840,

841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)); S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp.

3d 176, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

The County first argues that any attempt by Plaintiff to hold it vicariously liable for

the allegedly negligent acts of the Sheriff’s Office must fail, because the County cannot

be held liable under a respondeat superior theory. Indeed, a county in New York “may

not be held responsible for the negligent acts of the Sheriff and his deputies on the theory

of respondeat superior, in the absence of a local law assuming such responsibility.” Villar

v. Cnty. of Erie, 5 N.Y.S.3d 747, 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Marashian v. City of Utica, 626 N.Y.S.2d 646, 646 (N.Y. App. Div.

1995)); Avant v. Cnty. of Erie, 20-CV-1689-LJV-HKS, 2024 WL 1856828, at *6 (W.D.N.Y.

Apr. 29, 2024). Plaintiff has not alleged that the County of Cattaraugus has enacted a

local law assuming respondeat superior liability for the acts of the Sheriff’s Office nor does

she identify any such law in her briefing.

Plaintiff offers no substantive response to the County’s legal argument that it

cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory and therefore abandons any such

claims. See Malik v. City of New York, 841 F. App’x 281, 284 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 2021)

(“But when a party fails adequately to present arguments in a brief, a court may properly

consider those arguments abandoned, especially in the case of a counseled party where

a court may infer from a party’s partial opposition that relevant claims or defenses that

are not defended have been abandoned.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted);

Guadagna v. Zucker, CV 17-3397 (SJF)(AKT), 2021 WL 11645538, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

19, 2021); Williams v. Suffolk Cnty., 284 F. Supp. 3d 275, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting

cases).

Instead, Plaintiff reiterates her position that she has adequately pleaded the

elements of a negligence claim. But in doing so, she focuses on the acts of the Sheriff’s

Office, not on the acts of the County. See Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 8, pp. 6-7

(stating that “Plaintiff’s decedent’s mental health and suicide risk should have been

apparent to those jail officials doing a screening”). And while she also argues that the

County, as the entity allegedly running the jail, knew or should have known that Wilson

was prone to suicide, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support the

conclusion that the County—as opposed to the Sheriff’s Office and jail authorities—was

running the jail or knew or should have known that Wilson was a suicide risk. Id. p. 6. In

short, there are no facts in Plaintiff’s complaint that give rise to a plausible claim that the

County was independently negligent in causing Wilson’s death.

Plaintiff also fails to address the County’s argument that the complaint fails to state

a claim against it for negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. Such a claim is

based on the employer’s direct negligence. See Bouche v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 11

Civ. 5246 (SAS), 2012 WL 987592, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012). “Claims for negligent

hiring and retention arise from an employer ‘having placed the employee in a position to

cause foreseeable harm, harm which the injured party most probably would have been

spared had the employer taken reasonable care in making its decision concerning the

hiring and retention of the employee.’” Saldana v. Port Chester, No. 09 Civ. 6268

(SCR)(GAY), 2010 WL 6117083, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010) (quoting Sheila C. v.

Povich, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342, 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)). Likewise, “[c]laims for negligent

supervision and training arise when an employer has notice of the employee’s tendency

for the bad conduct and its lack of supervision or inadequate training is the proximate

cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.” Id. “Thus, an essential element of a cause of action in

negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training is that the employer knew or should

have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury.”

Saldana, 2010 WL 6117083, at *5 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Moore

Charitable Found. v. PJT Partners, Inc., 40 N.Y.3d 150, 157 (2023) (setting out pleading

requirements for negligent supervision and retention, including that “the employer had

actual or constructive knowledge of the employee’s propensity for the sort of behavior

which caused the injured party’s harm”); Waterbury v. N.Y.C. Ballet, Inc., 168 N.Y.S.3d

417, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022) (setting out pleading requirements for negligent hiring and

retention, including that the employer knew of its employee’s harmful propensities).

Plaintiff’s sparse complaint is woefully inadequate when viewed against these

standards. It contains just one allegation relating to the County’s status as an employer—

that the County was “responsible for the appointment, training and supervision of Sheriff’s

Deputies, corrections officers, and other staff assigned to the Cattaraugus County Jail.”

Complaint, ¶ 8. And while it alleges that Wilson’s injuries and damages “were caused by

the negligence, carelessness, recklessness, and/or unlawful conduct on the part of each

of the defendants, and/or their agents, servants or employees,” this allegation is entirely

conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations. Id. ¶ 14a. Beyond these

deficiencies, Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever concerning the County’s knowledge of

its employees’ propensities, which is fatal to her claims.5 See Bouche, 2012 WL 987592,

at *9

Turning to Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, the necessary elements are “(1) the

death of a human being, (2) the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant by which

the decedent’s death was caused, (3) the survival of distributes who suffered pecuniary

loss by reason of the death of decedent[,] and (4) the appointment of a personal

representative of the decedent.” Chong v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 441 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25-26

(N.Y. App. Div. 1981); see also Proano v. Gutman, 180 N.Y.S.3d 978, 982-83 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2022) (citing Chong). Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim that the County’s

wrongful act, neglect, or default caused Wilson’s death, this claim fails at the second

element and must also be dismissed. See N.Y. EPTL § 5-4.1 (providing that a wrongful

death claim requires “a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent’s

death”); Piechowicz v. Lancaster Cent. Sch. Dist., 17-CV-845V, 2022 WL 22782841, at

*19 n. 13 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022) (Report and Recommendation) (finding that “a

5 Plaintiff also alleges in her first cause of action that the Defendants failed to enact policies and procedures

to prevent inmate deaths or to assess, evaluate, and monitor inmates with medical or mental-health issues.

Complaint, ¶ 14a. To the extent these allegations are directed at the County, they too are entirely

conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations.

plausible wrongful death claim requires a plausible negligence claim”), adopted by, 2022

WL 17540648 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s first cause of action must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Constitutional Claims

The County seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 on the basis that they are insufficiently

pleaded. Plaintiff contends that her complaint adequately states her federal claims.

Civil liability is imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only upon persons who, acting

under color of state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws. To properly plead a cause of action under § 1983, a

plaintiff’s complaint must include allegations that the challenged conduct “(1) was

attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a

right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997); Hubbard v. J.C. Penney

Dep’t Store, 05-CV-6042, 2005 WL 1490304, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 14, 2005).

As it pertains to municipalities, § 1983 imposes liability only when a municipality’s

official custom or policy causes an employee to violate an individual’s constitutional rights.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).

Municipal liability cannot be premised solely on a respondeat superior theory, but must

be based on constitutional deprivations caused by an officially promulgated, or de facto,

governmental “custom” or “policy[.]” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480,

106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). Thus, a municipality will be liable for a § 1983

violation only where the municipality itself was the “moving force” behind the deprivation

of a plaintiff’s federal rights. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 400, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997). That is, “a municipality

will not be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Bisignano v. Harrison Cent.

Sch. Dist., 113 F. Supp. 2d 591, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Consequently, “to establish the

liability of a municipality in an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by a municipal

employee below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must establish that the violation of his

constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or policy.” Vann v. City of New

York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, to adequately state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must plead

the existence of an official policy or custom that caused the denial of a constitutional right.

See Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). The existence of a

municipal policy or custom can be demonstrated in several ways, including: (1) showing

an officially promulgated and endorsed municipal policy, Monell, 436 U.S. at 658; (2)

showing that actions taken by officials with final policymaking authority caused a

constitutional violation, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–81; (3) showing that municipal

decision-making evidences “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those with whom

municipal employees come in contact, including failure to remedy an otherwise

constitutional policy so deficient and widespread that policymakers knew or should have

known with a high degree of certainty that constitutional violations could result, City of

Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985), or (4)

failure to train employees when training is necessary to prevent the violation of federal

rights, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989).

When the existence of a municipal policy or custom is premised on a failure to train, the

municipality’s failure to train its employees must rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993).

Deliberate indifference occurs where conscious disregard is

displayed for the consequences of actions, not just simple or

even heightened negligence. To prove deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a

policymaker knows to a moral certainty that his or her

employees will confront a given situation; (2) the situation

either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort

that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there

is a history of employees mishandling the situation; and (3)

the wrong choice by the municipality employee will frequently

cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.

Knicrumah v. Albany City Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 199, 207 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal

quotations omitted) (citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir.

1992)); see also Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1998). To

succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must ultimately show “a direct causal link between

a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Outlaw v. City

of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 373 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385).

In assessing a motion to dismiss a Monell claim, “[i]t is well settled that a plaintiff’s

conclusory allegations, which merely recite the elements of a Monell claim, are insufficient

to state a claim for municipal liability.” Bryant v. Ciminelli, 6:16-CV-06766 EAW, 2017 WL

3188988, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 26, 2017) (citing cases); Weaver v. City of New York, No.

13-cv-20 (CBA)(SMG), 2014 WL 950041, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[V]ague and

conclusory assertions are not sufficient to state a claim of municipal liability under

Monell.”) A plaintiff must allege facts tending to support, at least circumstantially, an

inference that the alleged municipal policy or custom exists. Dwares, 985 F.2d at 100.

Here, Plaintiff includes no factual allegations concerning municipal liability.

Nowhere does Plaintiff identify an official policy or custom that caused the denial of any

of Wilson’s constitutional rights. See Zahra, 48 F.3d at 685. The closest Plaintiff comes

is alleging that the County failed to “enact adequate policies, procedures, customs and/or

guidelines” to prevent inmate deaths or to “assess, evaluate, supervise, monitor and/or

treat inmates with medical and/or mental health issues.” Complaint, ¶ 14a. But these are

entirely conclusory allegations devoid of any factual content. And while Plaintiff further

alleges that the County failed to comply “with New York State and Federal regulations

and/or prior Stipulated Settlement Agreement” and failed to comply “with generally

recognized industry standards,” she fails to identify any of the regulations and standards

she alludes to and includes no factual allegations showing non-compliance. Id.

In short, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts giving rise to a plausible claim that the

County was the “moving force” behind the denial of any of Wilson’s constitutional rights.

See Brown, 520 U.S. at 400. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to assert a Monell claim. See

Costello v. City of Burlington, 632 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing Monell claims

on the basis that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a municipal policy

or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations); Bryant, 2017 WL 3188988, at *4

(dismissing Monell claim because the plaintiff failed to allege facts concerning a municipal

policy or custom); Houghton v. Cardone, 295 F. Supp. 2d 268, 278 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)

(dismissing Monell claim on the basis that the complaint “contain[ed] only the most

conclusory allegations” without “a single fact [] alleged in support of those allegations”).

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has requested an opportunity to replead if this Court finds any of her claims

subject to dismissal. See Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 8, p. 7. It is the usual practice

to allow leave to replead upon granting a motion to dismiss. Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum

Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991); Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344,

350 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a party to amend its

pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad faith.”); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so

requires.”). And while a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to

replead in the absence of such a request, see Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d

Cir. 2011), “leave to amend should be freely given unless there is ‘any apparent or

declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc.,’” see Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133,

148 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182-83, 83 S. Ct. 227,

230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)).

This Court cannot conclude at this time that the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint

cannot be cured by further pleading or that further pleading would necessarily be futile.

Leave to replead is therefore granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

must be granted. The complaint is dismissed as against the County of Cattaraugus

Sheriff’s Office by agreement. The complaint is dismissed as against the County for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but Plaintiff is granted leave to

replead.

V. ORDERS

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket No. 4) is

GRANTED, consistent with the foregoing decision.

FURTHER, that all claims against the County of Cattaraugus Sheriff’s Office are

DISMISSED by agreement.

FURTHER, that Plaintiff is afforded leave to replead her claims against the County

of Cattaraugus through the filing of an amended complaint within 14 days of the entry

date of this decision.

FURTHER, that in the event Plaintiff files a timely amended complaint, the County

must answer or otherwise respond to it within 28 days of the entry date of this decision.

FURTHER, that in the event Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint,

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without further order of this Court, and the Clerk of

Court is directed to CLOSE this case at the end of the 14-day time period.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2024

Buffalo, New York

s/William M. Skretny

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY

United States District Judge