Trotman v. Riley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

___________________________________

DAVID M. TROTMAN,

Plaintiff,

-v- 20-CV-06996 CJS

DECISION and ORDER

JEFFREY MCCOY, Deputy

Commissioner, New York State

Department of Corrections and

Community Supervision, CHRISTINA

OLNEY, Nutritional Food Services

Director, New York State Department of

Corrections and Community Supervision,

M. ANTONIK, Mess Hall Director, Five

Points Correctional Facility, individually

and in their official capacities,

Defendants.

___________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff, David M. Trotman, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), formerly a prison inmate in the

custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision

(“DOCCS”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Jeffrey

McCoy (“McCoy”), Christine Olney (“Olney”), and M. Antonik (“Antonik”), who were all

employed by DOCCS, violated his rights under the First Amendment when they served

him a diet that did not conform with his Rastafarian religious beliefs. Specifically, he

claimed that rather than being served an Ital diet,1 he was served a Kosher diet that

1 “The Ital diet purportedly symbolizes “a belief in life and an avoidance of symbols of death. Individual

dietary practices vary among Rastafarian individuals and sects, both inside and outside prison. To name

but a few variations of the Ital diet, generally Rastafarians do not eat meat and pork, and some do not eat

fish or dairy products. Some Rastafarians refuse to eat vegetables that have been cooked for more than a

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contained animal products, in violation of his religious beliefs. Now before the Court is a

motion (ECF No. 25) by Defendants for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants primarily contend that this action is

completely barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, since the instant

action is duplicative of a prior action filed by Plaintiff, which this Court dismissed with

prejudice on the merits. Alternatively, Olney and Antonik contend that they are entitled

to partial judgment on the pleadings, since Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state an

actionable claim against them. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees that

the action is barred as against McCoy, and that the Amended Complaint fails to allege

personal involvement by Olney or Antonik. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings is granted in all respects and this action is dismissed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed his first lawsuit in this Court, 6:19-CV-6876-

CJS, Trotman v. Riley, et al. The Complaint alleged that the defendants were violating

Plaintiff’s “religious freedom pertaining to his diet which is Ital adhering to Rastafarian

dietary guidelines, no animal products.” In addition to seeking money damages, the

Complaint demanded, inter alia, that DOCCS provide Plaintiff “a non-dairy vegan diet in

accordance to an Ital diet (kosher sealed products like almond milk, soy milk, peanut

butter hummus).” The Complaint indicated that Plaintiff had filed inmate grievances

concerning the matter at Five Points Correctional Facility (“Five Points”) and Gouverneur

few minutes, while other Rastafarians will eat only food that they have prepared themselves.” Rossi v.

Stevens, 04 Civ. 1836 (CM)(LMS), 2005 WL 8146896, at * 15 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2005) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

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Correctional Facility (“Gouverneur”). The defendants named in the Complaint were

McCoy, DOCCS “Chairman” Allen Riley (“Riley”), DOCCS Commissioner Anthony

Annucci (“Annucci”), “Deputy Superintendent of Programs at Five Points,” and “Mess Hall

Director at Five Points.”

On March 3, 2020, the Court issued an Order, granting Plaintiff leave to proceed

in forma pauperis, and screening his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(a). The Court indicated that it liberally construed the Complaint as alleging a

First Amendment freedom-of-religion claim under Section 1983 and a claim under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

1(a), 1(b)(1). The Court found that the Complaint failed to state a claim under either

Section 1983 or RLUIPA, observing that, “Plaintiff alleges nothing more [than] that he

complained about not being provided an Ital diet in conformance with his Rastafarian

beliefs.” The Court noted that in addition to failing to state a claim under either statute,

the Complaint also failed to allege the personal involvement of the named defendants in

the alleged violations. The Court indicated that the action would be dismissed unless

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that cured those deficiencies.

On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) that reiterated

his earlier claim, namely, that he was receiving “animal products even though he is

Rastafarian and has requested an Ital diet plan for religious purposes.” The Amended

Complaint named as defendants Riley, Annucci, and McCoy.

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However, on June 8, 2020, the Court issued an Order dismissing the action with

prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. In pertinent part, the Order

stated:

A liberal reading of the Amended Complaint, assumed to be true, tells the

following story. Plaintiff adheres to Rastafarian Dietary Guidelines, which

prohibit animal products. He alleges that despite his request to be given an

Ital or nonvegan diet in conformance with his religious beliefs, he continues

to receive meals made with animal products [such as] eggs, dairy, poultry

and beef. . . . Upon review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has failed to cure [the previously identified] pleading

defects. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges nothing more than that

he complained about not being provided an Ital diet in conformance with his

Rastafarian beliefs. Indeed, Plaintiff provides no new or additional

substantive allegations to support any alleged constitutional violation.

Accordingly, the Amended Complaint . . . is dismissed with prejudice for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

6:19-CV-6876, ECF No. 10.2

Rather than appealing the Court’s dismissal, Plaintiff waited approximately five

months, until November 19, 2020, and essentially re-filed the same action as the current

action, 6:20-CV-06996-CJS. The Complaint stated, again, that Plaintiff is a Rastafarian

who “adheres to [an] Ital diet,” which he claimed had been denied to him at Five Points

and Gouverneur. The Complaint further indicated that Plaintiff received DOCCS kosher

meals, but that they contained “beef, poultry, [and] dairy, amongst other animal products.”

The Complaint again named Riley and McCoy as defendants, along Olney (whom Plaintiff

identified as “DOCCS Nutritional Food Services Director”), Antonik (whom Plaintiff

2 Four months after the dismissal, in October 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court, requesting copies of

documents, in which he acknowledged that the action had been “dismissed in June on the Eighth day.”

6:19-CV-06876-CJS, ECF No. 12.

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identified as “DOCCS Mess Hall Director”), and Five Points Warden Matthew Thoms

(“Thoms”).

The Complaint did not reference Plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit, which the Court finds

odd, since Plaintiff was aware, from his prior lawsuit, that he should disclose whether he

had begun any other lawsuits in state or federal court involving the same facts as this

action.3 In any event, because of that omission, the Court failed to notice this action’s

relationship to the prior action.

On January 20, 2021, the Court issued an Order (ECF No. 7) granting Plaintiff’s

request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screening the Complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, and ordering that the claims for injunctive relief were

dismissed as moot since Plaintiff had been released from DOCCS custody; that the

claims against Olney and Antonik could proceed to service; that the claims against Riley

would be dismissed with prejudice; and that the claims against McCoy and Thoms would

be dismissed with prejudice unless Plaintiff filed an amended pleading setting forth a

basis to find their personal involvement.

On March 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9. The Court

subsequently issued an Order (ECF No. 11) dismissing the action as against Thoms with

prejudice and directing that the action could proceed as against McCoy, Olney, and

Antonik. In that regard, the Court indicated that the allegations against McCoy were “thin”

in that they alleged only that Plaintiff had sent two letters to McCoy, but that they were

sufficient to survive the screening process, although the Court indicated that it was

3 See, 6:19-CV-06876-CJS, ECF No. 8 at p. 2.

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expressing “no opinion as to whether Plaintiff’s claims c[ould] withstand a properly filed

motion to dismiss.”

On October 7, 2021, McCoy, Antonik, and Olney filed answers to the Amended

Complaint, and on April 28, 2022, they filed the subject Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings, ECF No. 25. Defendants first maintain that this action is barred by res judicata,

since it raises the same claims that were dismissed with prejudice in Plaintiff’s prior action:

Here, there can be no question that the facts alleged by Plaintiff in the

Complaint in this action arise from the same operative facts alleged in 19-

CV-6876-CJS. In his previous federal lawsuit 19-CV-6876-CJS, Plaintiff

named Jeffrey McCoy, Allen Riley, Anthony Annucci and Mess Hall Director

at Five Points Correctional Facility as Defendants and alleged that

Defendants violated his right to religious freedom when they denied him

meals in accordance with his religious belief. Docket No. 1 of 19-CV-6876-

CJS. Upon screening, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave

to file an Amended Complaint. Docket No. 7 of 19-CV-6876-CJS. Plaintiff

then filed an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 8 of 19-CV-6876-CJS), and

subsequently filed a motion to compel requesting injunctive relief. Docket

No. 9 of 19-CV-6876-CJS. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that

he adheres to Rastafarian dietary guidelines and alleged that despite his

request to be given an Ital or nonvegan diet in conformance with his

religious belief, he continued to receive meals made with animal products,

including eggs, diary, poultry and beef. Docket No. 8 of 19-CV-6876-CJS.

On June 8, 2020, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and

his motion to compel for injunctive relief was denied as moot. Docket

No. 10 of 19-CV-6876-CJS.

Then on October 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed his present pro se Complaint

(Docket No. 1) and on March 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed his pro se Amended

Complaint under 20-cv-06996-CJS. Docket No. 9. Plaintiff claims that he

adheres to Rastafarian dietary guidelines, which prohibit animal products,

and alleges that despite his request to be given an Ital or nonvegan diet in

conformance with his religious belief, he continued to receive meals made

with animal products, including eggs, diary, poultry and beef. Docket. No.

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9. These allegations involve the same essential facts as the allegations in

19-CV-6876-CJS. In order to prove his allegations in 20-CV-06996-CJS,

Plaintiff would have to reply on the same evidence as his claim in 19-CV-

6876-CJS.

In addition, Plaintiff had ample opportunities in his previous federal lawsuit

19-CV-6876-CJS to present this Court with all of the claims arising from the

same facts and events which he seeks to litigate again in this case. The

Court in 19-CV-6876-CJS allowed Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint as

well. See Cameron v. Church, 253 F.Supp.2d 611, 619–20 (S.D.N.Y.2003)

(quoting In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir.1985)).

Clearly, application of the doctrine of Res Judicata here would serve each

of the purposes articulated by the Supreme Court in Allen v. McCurry,

supra, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. 411: “[to] relieve parties of the cost and

vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by

preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”

Finally, while several of the Defendants named in the Complaint in this

action were not literally named as Defendants in Plaintiff’s previous federal

lawsuit, sufficient indicia of privity exist to require application of res judicata

as to all Defendants.

ECF No. 25-2 at pp. 6-8.

Alternatively, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine

of collateral estoppel, arguing that,

the dispositive factual and legal issues in Plaintiff’s claims of deprivation of

his constitutional rights in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action [are] identical to the

allegations asserted in his prior Federal Court proceeding in 19-CV-6876-

CJS. See Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 350

(1999). Indeed, Plaintiff raised an identical argument in his prior Federal

Court proceeding in 19-CV-6876-CJS that Defendants violated his rights

under the First Amendment when they did not provide him a diet consistent

with his religious beliefs as a Rastafarian who adheres to an Ital diet and

the Federal Court dismissed the Amended Complaint in 19-CV-6876-CJS

with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Docket 10 of 19- CV-6876-CJS. For res judicata purposes, dismissal for

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failure to state a claim is deemed to be judgment on the merits. See Ramirez

v. Brooklyn Aids Task Force, 175 F.R.D. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 164

F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1998); see also, Wise v. Battistoni, No. 92–CV–4288,

1992 WL 380914, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.10, 1992) (order dismissing pro se

plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failure to allege state action was Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal for failure to state a claim). A different judgment in the present

case involving Plaintiff’s allegations of not providing him with an Ital diet

“would destroy or impair right or interest already established on behalf of

the Defendants in prior action.” Rivera v. Patnode, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

40844, *14 (N.D.N.Y. 2012), quoting D’Andrea, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 446.

Furthermore, the prior federal court action afforded Plaintiff a full and fair

opportunity to litigate whether he was denied of diet consistent with his

religious belief as a Rastafarian who adheres to an Ital diet. In his prior

federal lawsuit 19-CV-6876-CJS, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to

submit an Amended Complaint pursuant to the Federal Court’s Order dated

Feb. 28, 2020. Docket No. 7 of 19-CV-6876-CJS. See Ruffolo v.

Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“Where

it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is

not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend”).

Moreover, in the present case, Plaintiff named Matthew Thoms, Jeffrey

McCoy, Christina Olney, and M. Antonik as Defendants who did not provide

him with meals consistent with his religious belief. Docket No. 9 of 20-CV-

6996-CJS. In his previous federal lawsuit 19-CV-6876-CJS, Plaintiff named

Jeffrey McCoy, Allen Riley, Anthony Annucci and Mess Hall Director at Five

Points Correctional Facility as Defendants who violated his right to religious

freedom when they denied him meals in accordance with his religious belief.

Docket No. 8 of 19-CV-6876-CJS. He named Jeffrey McCoy in both Federal

Court proceedings 20-CV-6996-CJS and 19-CV-6876-CJS. Under these

circumstances, where all Defendants are alleged to have been participants

in denying meals of religious belief, Plaintiff had a prior opportunity to raise

all claims related to the disputed facts. Accordingly, [a] sufficiently close

relationship exists between the Defendants to preclude Plaintiff from

proceeding against any of them in this subsequent, separate action. Hence,

because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in 19-CV-6876-CJS was dismissed

with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

he is precluded, in the present case, from asserting that same actions by

Defendants violated his right to religious freedom. Defendants respectfully

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submit, therefore, that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel.

ECF No. 25-2 at pp. 11-13.

As additional grounds for dismissal of the Amended Complaint, Defendants

maintain that claims against Defendants in their official capacities for damages are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment; that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, requiring DOCCS

to provide an Ital diet, are now moot since he is no longer in DOCCS custody; and that

the Amended Complaint fails to state actionable claims against Olney and Antonik. See,

ECF No. 25-2 at pp. 13-17. Regarding Olney and Antonik, Defendants assert that the

Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege their personal involvement in the alleged

denial of Plaintiff’s religious-freedom rights. More specifically, as to Olney, Defendants

argue that the pleading indicates only that Plaintiff sent a complaint to Olney, but does

not allege “where the letter was sent, what it said, or how it was sent.” Defendants

maintain that the Complaint is similarly deficient as to Antonik, since it does not even

allege that Plaintiff wrote to her. See, ECF No. 25-2 at p. 16 (“The Amended Complaint

does not allege any involvement of Defendant Antonik as well. Plaintiff has not indicated

that he even wrote a letter or complaint to Defendant Antonik and sent it to a specific

address or rather how Defendant Antonik has any knowledge of the fact.”). Additionally,

Defendants insist that an official’s “mere receipt of a letter complaining about

unconstitutional conduct is not enough to give rise to personal involvement” in any event.

The pro se Plaintiff, who was released from DOCCS custody after commencing

this action, filed a document in opposition to Defendants’ motion. See, ECF No. 26.

However, Plaintiff’s response does not address any of the legal issues raised by

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Defendants’ motion. For example, the response does not address the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, nor does it attempt to explain how the Amended

Complaint plausibly pleads personal involvement by Olney and Antonik. Instead, Plaintiff

asserts that, “The motion should be denied because the Plaintiff was not deposed and

the Plaintiff is still seeking redress for the wrongdoing described in the civil complaint.”

Otherwise, Plaintiff’s response consists of a brief reiteration of his claim, namely, that he

believes Defendants are liable to him since he was not given an Ital diet while at Five

Points and Gouverneur.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Pro Se Status

At the outset the Court notes that it has construed Plaintiff’s pro se submissions

liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See, Triestman v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that the

submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted “to raise the

strongest arguments that they suggest.”) (collecting cases).

Rule 12(c) Legal Principles

Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), and

standards applicable to such a motion are clear: ““In deciding Rule 12(c) motions, we

employ the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, accepting all

factual allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the

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nonmoving party's favor.” Hofmann v. Long Island Univ., No. 22-393-CV, 2024 WL

3262819 (2d Cir. July 2, 2024) (citation omitted).

As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, Rule 12(c) motions generally are limited to

the facts alleged in the complaint and must be converted into a motion for

summary judgment if the court considers materials outside the pleadings.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A court may, without converting the motion into one

for summary judgment, consider documents that are attached to,

incorporated by reference in, or integral to the complaint; and it may also

consider matters that are subject to judicial notice. See Chambers v. Time

Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir.2002); Brass v. Am. Film

Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993).

Byrd v. City of New York, No. 04-1396-CV, 2005 WL 1349876, at *1 (2d Cir. June 8,

2005).

Plaintiff has not submitted a substantive response to Defendants’ motion.

Nevertheless, the Court may not simply grant Defendants’ motion by default, but, instead,

must determine whether Defendants are entitled to the relief they seek as a matter of law.

See, e.g., Beter v. Baughman, No. 24-CV-0079 (GHW) (RFT), 2024 WL 2332099, at *1

(S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2024) (“Plaintiff's decision not to oppose Schoen's motion does not

automatically mean that the motion should be granted[.] . . . Instead, in deciding an

unopposed motion to dismiss, a court is to assume the truth of a pleading's factual

allegations and test only its legal sufficiency. A court evaluates an unopposed motion

based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.”) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-79-

GHW-RFT, 2024 WL 2325884 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024).

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Official-Capacity Claims for Damages and Claims for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff has sued Defendants in both their official capacities and individual

capacities, and seeks both money damages and injunctive relief. However, the Eleventh

Amendment bars claims for money damages against state officials sued in their official

capacities. See, Tripathy v. McKoy, 103 F.4th 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[Plaintiff’s]

request for damages against Defendants in their official capacities is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2002).

Tripathy therefore may seek only individual-capacity damages against Defendants[.]”).

Accordingly, the claims against Defendants in their official capacities for money damages

are dismissed.

Moreover, since Plaintiff is no longer in the custody of DOCCS, his claims for

injunctive relief requiring DOCCS to provide him with an Ital diet are now moot, and are

also dismissed. See, Tripathy v. McKoy, 103 F.4th at113, 116 (“A person's ‘transfer from

a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials

of that facility.’ Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other

grounds as recognized by Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2023). . . .

Tripathy's equitable claims were mooted by his release from prison. See Salahuddin, 467

F.3d at 272.”).

Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

A defendant may properly use a Rule 12(c) motion to raise the defenses of res

judicata and collateral estoppel, provided that the relevant facts are evident from the

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pleading or from other documents of which the Court may take notice. See, U.S. Fid. &

Guar. Co. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.-Petrobras, No. 98 CIV 3099 JGK, 2001 WL 300735,

at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2001) (“A collateral estoppel defense, however, may be

analyzed on a Rule 12(c) motion where all the relevant facts are set forth in the complaint

and in matters of which the Court may take judicial notice.”) (citations omitted). In this

regard,

even though the Court must accept Plaintiff's factual allegations as true and

draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, issue preclusion “will

nonetheless bar a plaintiff's claim when [a] plaintiff's ‘factual allegations

have been decided otherwise in a previous litigation.’” Poindexter v. Cash

Money Records, No. 13 Civ. 1155(RWS), 2014 WL 818955, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 3, 2014) (quoting Jacobs v. Law Offices of Leonard N. Flamm, No. 04

Civ. 7607(DC), 2005 WL 1844642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2005)); cf.

Linden Airport Mgmt. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev. Corp., No. 08 Civ.

3810(RJS), 2011 WL 2226625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011) (“[I]t is well

settled that a court may dismiss a claim on res judicata or collateral estoppel

grounds on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”). In such instances, dismissal is

appropriate when “‘it is clear from the face of the complaint, and

consideration of matters which the court may take judicial notice of, that the

plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law.’” Linden Airport Mgmt. Corp.,

2011 WL 2226625, at *3 (quoting Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l, 231 F.3d 82,

86 (2d Cir.2000)); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., No.

98 Civ. 3099(JGK), 2001 WL 300735, at *23 n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2001)

(relying on cases resolving Rule 12(b)(6) motions to identify that “[a]

collateral estoppel defense [ ] may be analyzed on a Rule 12(c) motion

where all the relevant facts are set forth in the complaint and in matters of

which the Court may take judicial notice”).

Lefkowitz v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 344, 360 (S.D.N.Y.

2014).

In particular, when evaluating a defendant’s arguments concerning res judicata

and collateral estoppel in the Rule 12(b) or Rule12(c) context, a court may consider

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documents that were filed in the plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, including the Court’s own orders.

See, e.g., Byrd v. City of New York, No. 04-1396-CV, 2005 WL 1349876, at *1 (2d Cir.

June 8, 2005) (“In this case, the District Court relied on materials outside the pleadings—

in particular, the Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance With Prejudice,

dated January 8, 2001, and the Release, sworn to January 16, 2001. It did so without

stating a basis for considering these materials as part of a Rule 12(c) motion or giving the

notice ordinarily required when a motion is converted to one for summary judgment.

Nonetheless, it is plain that the District Court would have been permitted to consider at

least the Stipulation of Settlement as part of Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss. The Stipulation

of Settlement was filed in connection with Byrd's prior lawsuits and was so ordered by the

court. That document is thus subject to judicial notice, and we have often held that

material that is a matter of public record may be considered in a motion to dismiss.”)

(citations omitted).

Turning to the merits of Defendants’ motion, a review of the pleadings in this action,

and of the documents filed in Plaintiff’s prior action, indicates that the claim in the two

actions is the same and arises out of the same events at Five Points and Gouverneur,

and that the first action was dismissed with prejudice on the merits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under similar circumstances, another District Judge in this Circuit

analyzed the effect of a prior dismissal with prejudice of a pro se plaintiff’s claims under

28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as follows:

Notwithstanding the liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings, there

are limits to how often a court can be asked to review the same allegations

against the same parties or their privies. The doctrines of res judicata and

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collateral estoppel limit such review. See Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d

447, 449 (2d Cir. 1993) (res judicata); Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792,

794-95 (2d Cir. 1996) (collateral estoppel). Res judicata prevents a party

from re-litigating issues that were or could have been brought in a prior

action. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2209,

60 L.Ed. 2d 767, 772 (1979). Under res judicata, “a final judgment on the

merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating

issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Flaherty v. Lang,

199 F.3d 607, 612 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). A district court has not only the power but the obligation to dismiss

complaints sua sponte on res judicata grounds when the litigation history

triggers it. Salahuddin, 992 F.2d at 449; Krepps v. Reiner, 377 Fed.Appx.

65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2010) (Courts have the authority to raise res judicata

issues sua sponte).

Similarly, “[c]ollateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has

the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an

identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial

economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Additionally, the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to pro se litigants.

Austin v. Downs, Rachlin, & Martin Burlington St. Johnsbury, 270 Fed.Appx.

52 (2d Cir. 2008); Cieszkowska v. Gray Line N.Y., 295 F.3d 204, 205-06

(2d Cir. 2002).

Here, as the Court can best discern, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

arise out of the same nucleus of facts that he alleged in [his prior action

which was] dismissed with prejudice on the merits. See, e.g., Berrios v. N.Y.

City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[D]ismissal for failure

to state a claim [under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ] is a final judgment on the

merits and thus has res judicata effects”). Because a final judgment on the

merits of a case will bar any subsequent litigation by the same parties

concerning the transaction out of which the first action arose, Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed. Indeed, “[o]nce a final judgment has

been entered on the merits of a case, that judgment will bar any subsequent

litigation by the same parties, or those in privity with the parties, concerning

the transaction or series of connected transactions out of which the first

action arose.” Manko v. Steinhardt, 12-CV-2964, 2012 WL 2367092, *2

(E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2012). Accordingly, the 1983 claims against Defendants

15

are precluded and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice [pursuant] to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Dixon v. Minglon, No. 17-CV-1195(JS)(AKT), 2017 WL 3588939, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.

18, 2017) (emphasis added); see also, Carpenter v. Corr. Officer "John DOE" of the

Nassau Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 15CV6685SJFAKT, 2016 WL 1448648, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Apr. 12, 2016) (“Since a final judgment dismissing plaintiff's Section 1983 claims with

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a

claim for relief was entered in the prior action on November 5, 2015, and the prior action

involved the same parties and the same claims as this action, plaintiff's Section 1983

claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”).

The Court agrees with the foregoing analysis, and finds that it requires the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against McCoy, on grounds of res judicata, since McCoy was

a defendant in the earlier action, which raised the identical claim and was dismissed with

prejudice. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to McCoy, on the

grounds of res judicata.

The issue is less clear as to Olney and Antonik, since they were not named parties

to the earlier action. In that regard, Plaintiff’s original complaint in the first action sued

“Mess Hall Director at Five Points,” apparently referring to Antonik. However, Plaintiff’s

amended pleading in the first action omitted any reference to “Mess Hall Director at Five

Points,” and the Court’s Decision and Order dismissing that action with prejudice states,

in pertinent part, that, “Plaintiff names as Defendants in this action Chairman Allen Riley,

Commissioner Anthony Annucci and Deputy Commissioner for Programs and Services

16

Jeff McCoy.” 6:19-CV-06876 CJS, ECF No. 10 at p. 3. Therefore, Antonik was not

technically a party to the earlier action when it was dismissed.

Consequently, the Court determines that Olney and Antonik would only be entitled

to dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel if they were “in

privity” with the parties in the first action. On this point, government officials sued in their

official capacities are deemed to be in privity with other officials of the same government

who were sued in their official capacities in the prior action. See, e.g., Kneitel v. Hynes,

No. 11-CV-2883 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 2747668, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011) (“It is well

established that government officials sued in their official capacity are considered to be

in privity with each other, ... such that a judgment for an official of a government agency

precludes a subsequent action on the claim against an official of the same government

agency.” Shekhem' El–Bey, 464 F.Supp.2d at 334 (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.

v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940) and collecting

cases).”). Accordingly, to the extent Olney and Antonik are sued in their official capacities,

the official capacity claims are barred by res judicata, since in the first action McCoy was

also sued in his official capacity. See, 6:19-CV-06876 CJS, ECF No. 8 at p. 2.

On the other hand, government officials sued in their individual capacities are

generally not deemed to be in privity with previously-sued officials. See, § 4458

Government and Official Litigation, 18A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4458 (3d ed.) (“The

relationships between a government and its officials justify preclusion only as to litigation

undertaken in an official capacity. Thus a judgment against a government or one

government official does not bind a different official in subsequent litigation that asserts a

17

personal liability against the official[.]”) (citations omitted). Consequently, since Olney

and Antonik were not parties to the prior action and are not in privity with the defendants

in that action, they may not assert the defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel to

bar the claims against them in their individual capacities. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion is denied insofar as it seeks dismissal as against Olney and Antonik in their

individual capacities based on res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants alternatively contend that the Amended Complaint fails to state

actionable claims against Olney and Antonik, since it does not plausibly allege that they

were personally involved in the alleged denial of a religious diet to Plaintiff. The applicable

legal principles are clear:

To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a complaint must

plead Aenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d

929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible Awhen the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. May 1, 2018).

In its review, the Court is entitled to consider facts alleged in the complaint

and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, documents

Aintegral@ to the complaint and relied upon in it, and facts of which judicial

notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence.

Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, 568 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. Jun. 3, 2014) (citations and

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internal quotation marks omitted).

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964B65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929

(2007); see also, ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d

Cir.2007) (ATo survive dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his

claim rests through factual allegations sufficient >to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.= @) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly ) (footnote omitted).

Here, beginning with Antonik, Defendants argue that the pleading fails to allege

any basis to find personal involvement in a constitutional violation. In this regard, as far

as establishing a factual basis to assert a claim against Antonik, the Amended Complaint

states only the following:

Defendant Antonik violated the Plaintiff David Michael Trotman Jr.’s First

Amendment rights under the United States Constitution when he displayed

deliberate indifference or intentional infliction of emotional distress when he

responded via facility correspondence with illogical or nonsensical

responses regarding the Plaintiff’s diet per religion. This defendant has

caused pain suffering mental anguish and severe emotional distress.

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9 at p. 3. The Court agrees that this fails to plausibly plead

a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by Antonik.

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More specifically, the vague and conclusory assertion that Antonik’s response, to

some unspecified complaint by Plaintiff about his “diet per religion,” was “illogical or

nonsensical” does not plausibly allege Antonik’s awareness of, let alone her personal

involvement in, a violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. See, e.g.,

Cijka v. Baker, No. 2:20-CV-168, 2022 WL 813832, at *6 (D. Vt. Feb. 11, 2022) (Allegation

that the defendant’s “responses to Plaintiff's questions were ‘vague’ and she ‘had no

answers’ to Plaintiff's ‘in depth questions’” was insufficient to state defendant’s personal

involvement), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-168, 2022 WL 813922

(D. Vt. Mar. 17, 2022); see also, Taylor v. Small, No. 22-CV-2762 (NSR), 2024 WL

1605066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2024) (“A supervisory official's denial of a grievance

can suffice to show personal involvement for purposes of Section 1983, but only where

the supervisor's response is detailed and specific, such that it provides some indicia of

knowledge or familiarity with the inmate's condition and fails to remedy the wrong. . . .

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that Supt. Russell received and denied her grievances,

which is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff does not allege,

for example, that Supt. Russell's denials were sufficiently detailed that when read

objectively demonstrated that he was on notice of the existence of constitutional violation.

Accordingly, the claims against Supt. Russell are deemed dismissed due to the lack of

personal involvement.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Fortunato v.

Bernstein, No. 12 CIV. 1630 AT, 2015 WL 5813376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015)

(“Although some courts have found personal involvement where a supervisor's actions

consist of more than the mere receipt of grievances, such decisions have required factual

20

allegations of involvement more specific than Plaintiff's vague contention here that

Bernstein ‘wrote statements’ as part of the grievance process.”) (citation omitted); Sterling

v. Akinyombo, No. 20-CV-10804 (CS), 2022 WL 2657223, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022)

(“Any allegation that Akinyombo, by virtue of his response to the letter, became personally

involved in failing to provide adequate medical care is conclusory and insufficient to

establish that, through his own actions, he violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, as there

are also no facts showing Akinyombo made any actual medical decisions.”) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Antonik is

dismissed.

Defendants also contend that the Amended Complaint similarly fails to plausibly

allege Olney’s personal involvement in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights. In this

regard, the Amended Complaint contains the following allegations concerning Olney:

Defendant Christina Olney is the Nutritional Food Services Director located

in Rome, New York & is legally responsible for the operation of nutritional

services religion included.

***

In the third quarter of 2019 the Plaintiff wrote a complaint to Christina Olney.

***

Defendant Christina Olney violated the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right

under the United States Constitution when she did not remove animal

products from the Plaintiff per diet per religion. Nutritional services is able

to provide an Ital diet plan and by not providing that diet per religion she

violated the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights under the United States

Constitution causing pain and suffering mental anguish and severe

emotional distress.

21

ECF No. 9 at pp. 1-3.

In addition to the Amended Complaint, the Court considers documents that are

incorporated by reference and integral to the pleading, consisting of communications

between Plaintiff and various DOCCS officials concerning his requests for various

changes to his diet, which are contained in Defendants’ Rule 26 Disclosure, ECF No. 23.

Such documents indicate, for example, that before Plaintiff requested an Ital diet, he

specifically indicated to DOCCS that a Kosher cold alternative diet (“CAD”) was

acceptable to him. See, ECF No. 23 at pp. 19, 23, 25. The documents further show that

Plaintiff later changed his mind about the CAD diet, and indicated that he wanted to

receive “the regular meal with the meatless tray.” Id. at p. 68. The documents further

show that Plaintiff then objected to receiving the meatless alternative diet, and requested

meals without any animal products. See, id. at p. 86. Although, in a grievance that Plaintiff

filed on August 5, 2019, he stated that he was “Rastafarian and adheres to an Ital diet

which is mostly vegan.” Id. at 113 (emphasis added).

The Court also considers a document that was attached to Plaintiff’s original

Complaint filed in his first action, 6:19-CV-06876 CJS, which is apparently Olney’s

response to Plaintiff’s communication to her, referenced in the Amended Complaint.

Specifically, the letter from Olney to Plaintiff, dated January 14, 2020, states, in pertinent

part:

Dear Mr. Trotman: This is in response to your request for changes to the

kosher diet. Changes to the kosher meal for purpose of making it an Ital

diet (mostly vegan) is not approved. Be advised, the department does offer

a meatless alternative menu. If you have further concerns, it is

22

recommended you contact the food service supervisor. Sincerely, Christina

Olney, Director of Nutritional Services.

6:19-CV-06876 CJS, ECF No. 8 at p. 12.

Finally, in considering whether the Amended Complaint states a claim against

Olney, the Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that, while Plaintiff maintains that the

Rastafarian Ital diet should contain no animal products, there is significant disagreement

as to what constitutes an acceptable Rastafarian Ital diet. See, e.g., Reed v. Faulkner,

842 F.2d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1988) (Purporting to summarize the beliefs of Rastafarianism,

including “that meat should not be eaten.”); see also, Njie v. Dorethy, 766 F. App'x 387,

390 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Many Rastafarians follow an Ital diet, but individuals’ dietary

restrictions vary. Njie restricts himself to organic, non-canned foods without preservatives,

and he avoids meat and foods containing lactose.”); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp.

570, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Many Rastafarians follow what is known as an “Ital” diet,

abstaining from meat, liquor, and caffeine, and eating only natural foods, although there

are variations in these practices.”), aff'd, 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990). Indeed, in Benjamin

v. Coughlin, the district court wrote the following concerning the Ital diet:

Ital symbolizes a belief in life and an avoidance of symbols of death.

Individual dietary practices vary widely among Rastafarian individuals and

sects both inside and outside prison. In general, Rastafarians do not eat

meat, and almost universally refrain from eating pork. Most Rastafarians

abstain from alcohol and caffeine. Some Rastafarians do not eat fish, and

some refuse dairy products. Some refrain from eating any foods that have

been processed, particularly canned food, believing that the can symbolizes

a coffin, or death. Some Rastafarians refuse to eat vegetables that have

been cooked for more than a few minutes, believing that overcooking

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destroys the food's natural value. Rastafarians also object to vegetables

that have been treated with non-organic pesticides or fertilizers.

Some Rastafarians will only eat food that is prepared and served in pots

and bowls made of natural materials: more specifically, clay pots and

calabash bowls. Some Rastafarians will eat only food that they have

prepared themselves. Others refuse food that has been prepared by a

woman during her menstrual period. Some of the inmates who testified eat

meat, dairy products, fish, canned foods from the commissary, and bread

made from processed flour.

Whenever pork is served, DOCS provides a meat substitute to all inmates

to accommodate the religious requirements of Jewish and Muslim

prisoners. No such substitute is offered when other meats are served. They

also offer a kosher food program at Green Haven Correctional Facility, and

a neutral diet at other facilities to inmates who have been in the Green

Haven program. Most of the vegetables served in DOCS institutions are

canned or frozen, because they are more cost-effective and because fresh

vegetables are not available all year. Vegetables are prepared by steaming

for a maximum of fifteen minutes.

The use of clay or calabash pots and bowls is impracticable because clay

is breakable, and it violates New York food preparation regulations which

forbid the use of wooden working surfaces other than hard maple. Porous

materials can retain and breed harmful bacteria.

It would be both expensive and a severe administrative burden for

defendants to provide Rastafarian inmates with a diet containing only

natural foods and nutritionally adequate meat substitutes.

Other prisoners understandably resent special treatment that is given to any

group, and the possibility of tension and confrontation is particularly

troublesome at mealtime, which is often the only time the entire prison

population is together.

Defendants provide Orthodox Jewish prisoners with kosher or neutral

meals. They provide special meals during Ramadan, and meat substitutes

so that Muslim prisoners can follow their religious proscription against pork.

To that extent, they do not appear “neutral” as between Jews and Muslims

on the one hand and Rastafarians on the other. But the inequality of

treatment, if it is perceived as such, reflects the fact that it would be much

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more difficult to accommodate the Rastafarians because their definitions of

an Ital diet are so varied. The complex of dietary restrictions that plaintiffs

described would impose undue financial and administrative burdens on

defendants to provide an Ital diet that met with the religious views of every

Rastafarian inmate.

Plaintiffs do have alternative means of exercising the right: they may receive

food from the outside through the prison package rooms, and they may buy

food at the prison commissary. They may also abstain from eating any food

provided in the mess hall that offends their religious beliefs. Although it may

not be acceptable to all Rastafarians, those who do not reject all dairy

products may obtain a nutritionally adequate “ovo-lacto” (i.e., including eggs

and dairy products) diet even abstaining from all meat, fish and poultry. See

Udey v. Kastner, 805 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.1986) (prisoner's request for a

natural food diet, based on sincerely held beliefs, refused on the basis that

it would create undue costs and administrative burdens, and have a

potentially disruptive effect on prison discipline).

Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.1975), held that the state must

provide kosher meals to Orthodox Jewish inmates. Factually, there were

few Orthodox Jewish inmates in the custody of DOCS. Further, Kahane

sought meals that complied with the laws of Kashruth, which are more well-

defined than the dietary practices described by plaintiffs. Defendants'

practices here do not run afoul of Kahane, read in the light of Turner and

O'Lone, nor do they impermissibly infringe on plaintiffs' First Amendment or

Equal Protection rights.

Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570, 575–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 571 (2d

Cir. 1990).

Against this backdrop, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded an actionable

claim against Olney. The Amended Complaint makes only a conclusory assertion that

Olney “violated the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right under the United States Constitution

when she did not remove animal products from the Plaintiff per diet per religion.”

However, Plaintiff has not provided a copy of the actual letter that he sent to Olney, nor

25

has he alleged what it said, except insofar as he vaguely implies that it involved “diet per

religion.” Consequently, there is no indication of how, if at all, Plaintiff explained the

religious significance of his request to Olney. Nor, from Olney’s response, does it appear

that she understood that Plaintiff’s request to change the diet involved a religious

requirement or necessity, as opposed to some personal preference of Plaintiff. After all,

Plaintiff had previously agreed to accept both the CAD diet and the regular diet with

meatless alternative tray, both of which contain some animal products, despite claiming

to be Rastafarian.

At most, the Amended Complaint indicates that Plaintiff, who now claims that he

should have been provided meals containing absolutely no animal products, asked Olney

to adjust the CAD kosher meal to make it “mostly vegan,” and that Olney responded by

indicating that she could not alter the established CAD diet, but that Plaintiff could request

a “meatless alternative menu” by “contact[ing] the food service supervisor.” To the extent

Plaintiff now claims that his religious rights were violated insofar as he was not given

meals that were completely free of animal products,4 there is no indication that he asked

Olney to provide him with such meals, or that he explained to Olney that such meals were

a requirement of his religious beliefs. Such facts do not plausibly allege that Olney was

personally involved in an alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, the claim against

Olney is dismissed.

4 See, Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) at ¶ ¶ 12, 25.

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Further Leave to Amend is Denied

The pro se Plaintiff has not requested further leave to amend, and in any event,

the Court denies such relief. The Court has already explained to Plaintiff on several

occasions the necessity of pleading personal involvement, and between the four

complaints that he filed in his two actions and his response in opposition to Defendants’

motion, he has had five opportunities to plead plausible claims. Consequently, further

leave to amend is denied as futile, and the claims are dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is granted and this action is dismissed

with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close this action. The Court hereby certifies,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would

not be taken in good faith, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person

is therefore denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests

to proceed on appeal as a poor person should be directed, on motion, to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Crea el

Charles’ J. Siraguisa

United States District Judge

DATED: August 12, 2024

Rochester, NY

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