Beaman v. New York City

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHELTON BEAMAN,

Plaintiff,

24-CV-2350 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NEW YORK CITY, et al.,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state

law, alleging that Defendants violated his due process rights by depriving him of access to

supportive housing. By order dated April 1, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court dismisses the complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow

the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal

conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded

factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely

possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is homeless, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his rights

by depriving him of access to supportive housing. Named as defendants are: (1) the City of New

York; (2) New York City Human Resources Administration (“HRA”); (3) New York City

HIV/AIDS Services Administration (“HASA”); and (4) Ms. Barnes, identified as an employee of

HASA who works closely with the Commissioner of HASA. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and

unspecified injunctive relief, as well as money damages.

The following information is taken from the complaint. Plaintiff is a client of HASA who

is eligible for supportive housing. In 2019, he submitted a Permanent Supportive Housing

(“PSH”) 2010e application for an apartment located at 257 West 29th Street in Manhattan, but

Defendant Barnes “adamantly claimed that a ‘Mental Diagnosis’ was a requirement for PSH

eligibility for HASA clients” at that apartment building.1 (ECF 1 ¶ 14.) On March 21, 2024,

Plaintiff met with Defendant Barnes and a Ms. Cherri in a conference room at the Crown

Residence (“Crown”), where he resides. Barnes informed Plaintiff that his recently filed PSH

2010e application would be processed and he would get a decision from HRA. Barnes then asked

Plaintiff whether he had previously submitted a PSH 2010e application, and he responded that,

he had in 2014, under a Veterans Affairs program. Barnes asked if Plaintiff had had a mental

diagnosis, and when Plaintiff said no, she told him that he would need a mental diagnosis to be

eligible for supportive housing. Barnes asked several more questions and typed information in a

laptop she had with her. She then stated that according to their records, Plaintiff had an approved

2019 PSH 2010e application, but that there was no indication of a mental diagnosis, and she

asked him if he had had a mental diagnosis, to which he responded, no. The following then

happened:

Barnes, with intent to injure and harass Plaintiff, issued an ineligible

determination with knowledge that Plaintiff could not have possibly asserted or

claimed that he had a mental diagnosis on the initial Supportive Housing 1020-e

application date in 2019, said “So then you’re not eligible!

(Id. ¶ 34.) Barnes then referred to Plaintiff’s residence at Crown since June 29, 2023, and left the

room to get Inez Logan, the Clinical Director of the Crown.

Less than a minute later, Barnes returned to the conference room with Logan. She stated

to Logan, “He doesn’t have a mental diagnosis so he’s not eligible.” (Id. ¶ 36.) Logan responded

that, since Plaintiff had been a resident of Crown for six months, that they would need to meet

with his case manager “to see what’s what.” (Id. ¶ 37.) After considering for a couple of days the

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar

are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.

“tremendous loss of housing as a result of an impermissibly imposed wrongful determination,”

Plaintiff filed this action. (Id. ¶ 38.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “had terminated [his] right to supportive housing since

he had no mental diagnosis, without due process[,]. i.e. written notification.” (Id. § 42.) He also

claims the following: (1) HRA had “negligently failed” to inform him of the approved 2019 PSH

2010e application (id. ¶ 15); (2) he was denied the right to apply for supportive housing without

a mental diagnosis; (3) Barnes and Logan threatened him with an unlawful eviction; (4) he was

denied access to viable permanent housing resource, which denied him an “opportunity to regain,

among other things, wellness and self-sufficiency” (id. ¶ 16); (5) he was denied the opportunity

“to participate in the achievement of housing stability, increasing his income and skills” (id.);

and (6) he was kept in a “chronic homelessness state,” and unidentified persons are “now

preparing to oust him into homelessness without the aid and assistance of housing program staff

and support services as a viable option” (id.). Plaintiff indicates his intention of filing a state

court action in the “Civil Court, State of New York.” (Id.) Along with his due process claim,

Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of abuse of process, negligence, and negligent infliction of

emotional distress.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims against HRA and HASA

Plaintiff’s claims against the HRA and HASA must be dismissed because agencies of the

City of New York are not entities that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll

actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought

in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise

provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also

Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is

generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Plaintiff’s claims against HRA and

HASA will be considered as brought against the City of New York, which he also names as a

defendant.

B. Procedural Due Process

The Court understands that Plaintiff is claiming that he has a right to supportive housing

without a psychiatric evaluation and that Defendants terminated his PSH 2010e application

without due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution. He bring his due process claims against the City of New York and Barnes under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Under Section 1983, an individual may bring claims in federal court, asserting

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person

acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

The constitutional requirement of procedural due process imposes constraints on

governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “The two

threshold questions in any Section 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether

the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or

federal statutes, and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that

interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).

Public assistance benefits “have long been afforded constitutional protection as a species

of property protected by the federal Due Process Clause.” Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d

Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970)); see also M.K.B. v.

Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Persons who are qualified to receive

welfare benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.”). Applicants for

benefits, no less than recipients, possess such a property interest. Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113. In the

context of public assistance benefits, due process typically requires pre-deprivation notice and an

opportunity to be heard. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260-61; Hart v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., No. 98-CV-8034, 2003 WL 22595396, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Where the government deprives a plaintiff of some property interest pursuant to an

established procedure,2 procedural due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of

hearing is provided before the individual is deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus, 644

F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). By contrast, where a person is deprived of a property right because

of a random and unauthorized act, rather than through the operation of established state

procedures, the Due Process Clause is satisfied if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that a “random and

unauthorized” deprivation of a protected interest does not result in a violation of procedural due

process, as long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy); Rivera-Powell v.

New York City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “[w]hen the state

conduct in question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies procedural due process

requirements so long as it provides meaningful post-deprivation remedy”).

New York State law provides public assistance applicants remedies to challenge the

denial of benefits, including fair hearings under N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 22 and 18 N.Y.C.R.R.

§ 358, as well as an appeals process through Article 78 proceedings. These procedures have been

found to be constitutionally sufficient to challenge adverse determinations in connection with

2 Conduct is undertaken in accordance with established state procedures when, for

example, it is “pursuant to a statute, code, regulation, or custom,” or is the result of a decision

made by a high-ranking official with “final authority over significant matters.” See Viteritti v.

Inc. Vill. of Bayville, 918 F. Supp. 2d 126, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Chase Grp. All. LLC v.

City of New York Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 152 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010)).

government entitlement programs. See, e.g., Banks v. HRA, No. 11-CV-2380, 2013 WL 142374,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); Vapne v. Eggleston, No. 04-CV-565 (NRB), 2004 WL 2754673,

at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).

Here, even if the Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff’s PSH 2010e application

constitutes a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protections, Barnes’ denial of the

application alone does not deprive Plaintiff of that interest. His claim is not viable because he

does not allege that he pursued an administrative remedy such as requesting a fair hearing or

pursuing relief in state court under Article 78 before filing this action. Because Plaintiff does not

allege that available state remedies are inadequate to challenge the adverse determination on his

PSH 2010e application, he does not state a due process claim against the City of New York or

Barnes. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. State law claims

Plaintiff also brings various state law claims, including negligent infliction of distress

caused by the denial of his application for supportive housing. A district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law

claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the

federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original

jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims

Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d

Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental

jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’”

(quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). All other

pending matters in this case are terminated.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge