American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company v. J.R. Contracting & Environmental Consulting, Inc.

USL SUNT

DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOCH

DATE FILED: 10/21/2024

American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance

Company,

Plaintiff, 1:23-cv-04942 (AT) (SDA)

-against- OPINION AND ORDER

J.R. Contracting & Environmental

Consulting, Inc.,

Defendant.

STEWART D. AARON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is a motion by Defendant J.R. Contracting & Environmental

Consulting, Inc. (“J.R.” or “Defendant”), pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to exclude

the proposed opinions of Plaintiff’s expert, Thomas M. Trezise (“Trezise”), which are offered

in rebuttal of the opinions of Defendant’s expert, Arthur R. Nelson (“Nelson”) (hereinafter,

the “Daubert Motion”). (Def.’s 8/16/24 Not. of Daubert Mot., ECF No. 75.)*

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Daubert Motion is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

* The Honorable Analisa Torres referred the Daubert Motion to the undersigned as a non-dispositive

motion. (Am. Order of Reference, ECF No. 54.) “Because Daubert motions are ‘nondispositive of the

litigation,’ they are routinely determined by magistrate judges, subject to ‘clear error’ review by the

district judge.” DoubleLine Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., No. 17-CV-04576 (DEH) (BCM), 2024 WL

1115944, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2024) (quoting /srael v. Springs Indus., Inc., No. 98-CV-05106 (ENV)

(RML), 2007 WL 9724896, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2007)) (cleaned up).

BACKGROUND2

I. Factual Overview

Plaintiff American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company (“AESLIC” or “Plaintiff”)

issued to J.R. a commercial excess liability policy (the “Policy”), which included a premium

charge to be computed as a percentage of J.R.’s gross receipts during the policy period. Am.

Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *1. Plaintiff assigned an advanced premium to the Policy based

on J.R.’s estimate of its gross receipts during the policy period, which was subject to

adjustment if a post-policy audit reflected that J.R.’s actual gross receipts exceeded its initial

estimate. Id.

The post-policy audit concluded that J.R.’s actual gross receipts exceeded its initial

estimate, and thus J.R. owed an additional premium in the amount of $487,386.00. Am.

Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *2. Following non-payment of this additional premium, AESLIC

brought this action on June 13, 2023, seeking to recover payment of said additional

premium. Id. On March 29, 2024, Nelson issued his expert report in support of J.R. Id.

II. Trezise Report

After Nelson issued his expert report in support of J.R. on March 29, 2024, Am.

Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *2, on May 29, 2024, Trezise issued his rebuttal report in

support of AESLIC (the “Trezise Report”). (Trezise Rpt., ECF No. 76-2.) Based on his review of

the audit and the Nelson Report, Trezise offered the following four opinions:

1. The Policy was a surplus lines policy and, as such, not regulated by the

State of New Jersey. [AESLIC] had full discretion to establish the forms

2 The Court assumes familiarity with its prior Opinion and Order regarding a Daubert motion filed by

Plaintiff. See Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. J.R. Contracting & Env’t Consulting, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-

04942 (AT) (SDA), 2024 WL 3638329, at *1-3. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2024).

and terms of the Policy as well as the rules and rates by which the

premium was determined.

. . .

2. The terms of the Policy solely define the relationship between [AESLIC]

and J.R. . . .. Standards and practices, whether of admitted or surplus

lines insurers, have no application.

. . .

3. The Policy provided coverage for significant risks. The coverage was not

illusory.

. . .

4. J.R. . . . and . . . Nelson cannot challenge the underwriting process of

[AESLIC].

. . .

(Trezise Rpt. at 4-10 (emphases omitted).) While addressing a number of Nelson’s premises

and assumptions, Trezise maintains that “rate [at issue] was unmistakably and clearly stated

and anyone familiar with basic arithmetic can understand how it determined the premium.

The Policy has no flaw as to the definition of the [r]ates and is, therefore, enforceable.” (Id.

at 7.)

On July 17, 2024, Defendant deposed Trezise regarding the opinions expressed in the

Trezise Report. (Trezise Dep., ECF No. 76-3.)

III. J.R.’s Daubert Motion And Relevant Procedural History

On July 26, 2024, J.R. moved for leave to file a Daubert Motion to exclude Trezise’s

proposed expert opinions. (Def.’s 7/26/24 Letter, ECF No. 72, at PDF p. 1.) Because there

was a Daubert motion to exclude the expert opinions of Nelson (the “Nelson Daubert

Motion”) pending before the Court at that time, on July 29, 2024, the Court ordered J.R. to

refrain from filing the motion until after the Court’s decision on the Nelson Daubert Motion.

(7/29/24 Order, ECF No. 73 (“Because the Court’s decision on such motion may affect the

scope of Nelson’s testimony, and by extension the scope of any rebuttal, Defendant shall

refrain from filing its motion until after the Court’s decision on [the Nelson Daubert

Motion.”).)

On August 2, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Nelson Daubert

Motion. Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329 at *1. Specifically, the Court found:

In sum, although Nelson shall not be permitted to testify about his

interpretation of the Policy, and any other legal conclusions, the Court finds

that it is more likely than not that Nelson is qualified to serve as an expert,

that his opinions are based on sufficient facts, that he applied reliable

principles and methods and that his opinions will help Judge Torres to

understand the evidence. Thus, Nelson may provide testimony about the

insurance industry and audits, and may provide his opinion regarding

premiums due under the Policy based upon a hypothetical set of facts.

2024 WL 3638329 at *10.

On August 16, 2024, J.R. filed its Daubert Motion (and supporting papers) to exclude

Trezise’s expert opinion. (Def.’s 8/16/24 Not. of Daubert Mot.; Palatucci Decl.; Def.’s Mem.,

ECF No. 77.) On August 29, 2024, AESLIC filed its opposition papers. (O’Connor Decl., ECF No.

79; Pl.’s Opp’n Mem., ECF No. 80.) On September 6, 2024, J.R. filed its reply memorandum.

(Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 81.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that parties can submit expert

testimony that is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject

matter identified by another party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). “Rebuttal [expert] evidence

is properly admissible when it will explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the

adverse party.” Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 315 F.R.D. 33, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation

omitted).

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of

testimony by expert witnesses, including rebuttal experts, provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the

proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;

and

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the

principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

The Rule 702 standard incorporates the principles enunciated in Daubert, 509

U.S. at 589, 597, in which the Supreme Court held that trial courts have a

gatekeeping function to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or

evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable, and in Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), in which the Supreme Court held that

Daubert’s general gatekeeping obligation applies not only to testimony based

on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other

specialized’ knowledge.

Atl. Specialty Ins. v. AE Outfitters Retail Co., 970 F. Supp. 2d 278, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (cleaned

up). Thus, “rebuttal experts must meet Daubert’s threshold standards regarding the

qualifications of the expert, sufficiency of the data, reliability of the methodology, and

relevance of the testimony.” Scott, 315 F.R.D. at 44 (citing cases).

The proponent of expert testimony must establish admissibility by a preponderance

of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987). Nevertheless,

Rule 702 “embodies a liberal standard of admissibility for expert opinions.” Nimely v. City of

New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395 (2d Cir. 2005), especially in the context of bench trials. See

Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329 at *3.

DISCUSSION

In determining the instant motion, the Court considers below the following criteria

for expert testimony, i.e., Trezise’s qualifications as an expert, whether his opinions are

based on sufficient facts or data, whether he used reliable principles and methods and

whether his opinion is helpful to the trier of fact.3

I. Qualifications

A. Parties’ Positions

Defendant argues that Trezise is not qualified as an expert because he lacks relevant

experience in conducting post policy premium audits, especially in connection with surplus

lines policies. (Def.’s Mem. at 11.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Trezise “possesses

knowledge, experience, training, and education” as to each of the areas relevant to his

opinions. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 5.) These areas, Plaintiff avers, include the excess and surplus

lines insurance market in New York and insurance company claims handling as to the

3 In rendering its decision, the Court is mindful that there will be a bench trial in this case and, as such, the

Court may take in the expert testimony freely and separate helpful expert opinions from ones that are

not grounded in reliable methodology. See Joseph S. v. Hogan, No. 06-CV-01042 (BMC) (SMG), 2011 WL

2848330, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011); see also Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329 at *3 (“While standards

for admissible evidence are not out the window entirely in a bench trial, all doubts at a bench trial should

be resolved in favor of admissibility.” (citation omitted)).

potential applicability of the cited exclusions contained in the insurance policies at issue

here.4 (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff proffers that Trezise (1) “has assisted underwriting

departments in the development, drafting, and approval of policy forms, underwriting

classifications, rate filings, and risk management service,” (2) “has worked for a total of over

thirty years in different capacities for various insurers,” and (3) “has served before as an

expert witness in insurance industry issues.” (Id. at 6.)

B. Legal Standards

The Court incorporates the legal standards regarding an expert’s qualifications that

are set forth in its prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *5. These

standards are as follows:5

Rule 702 requires a trial court to make an initial determination as to whether the

proposed witness qualifies as an expert. A court first must determine whether a proposed

expert is qualified to provide an opinion, before then assessing the reliability and relevance

of the expert’s proffered testimony. To determine whether a witness qualifies as an expert,

the court first must ascertain whether the proffered expert has the educational background

or training in a relevant field. Any one of the qualities listed in Rule 702—knowledge, skill,

experience, training or education—may be sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert. Even

if a proposed expert lacks formal training in a given area, he may still have practical

4 The complete list of areas that Plaintiff avers are relevant to the analysis of claims in this action can be

found in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *4.

5 In the following two paragraphs, the Court has omitted citations to the case law supporting each of the

statements. The citations can be found in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL

3638329, at *5.

experience or specialized knowledge qualifying him to given opinion testimony under Rule

702. But if the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then he must explain how

that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for

the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.

The Court must compare the area in which the witness has superior knowledge,

education, experience or skill with the subject matter of the proffered testimony. If the

expert has educational and experiential qualifications in a general field closely related to the

subject matter in question, the court will not exclude the testimony solely on the ground

that the witness lacks expertise in the specialized areas that are directly pertinent. Thus, an

expert should not be required to satisfy an overly narrow test of his own qualifications, and

the court’s focus should be on whether the expert’s knowledge of the subject is such that

his opinion will likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the truth. Assertions that the witness

lacks particular educational or other experiential background, go to the weight, not the

admissibility, of the testimony.

C. Application

The Court finds that Trezise is qualified as an expert (but not as to legal conclusions,

see Discussion Section III, infra). Trezise graduated cum laude from Western Maryland

College in 1975 with a Bachelor of Arts in American Studies and Political Science. (Trezise

Rpt. at 15.) He then obtained his Juris Doctor degree from Washington & Lee University in

1978. (Id. at 14.) In 2009, Trezise was licensed as an adjuster in the State of Florida.6 (Id. at

15.)

From 1978 to 1992, Trezise practiced as a trial attorney, where his experience

included commercial, and property & casualty and life insurance coverage and bad faith

litigation and his expertise included commercial litigation, premises and premises security

liability, and insurance coverage. (Trezise Rpt. at 14.) Trezise held various positions in the

insurance industry for over 30 years and, during that time, he supervised individuals who

conducted premium audits. (Trezise Dep. at 16-17.) He also was involved in litigation where

there was a dispute “over the premium owed or whether additional amounts were owed

under the policies.” (Id. at 27.) The policies in that litigation were “structured similar to the

policies in this case,” because there was “an [upfront] premium involved and then a premium

due at the end.” (Id.)

Additionally, Trezise’s self-identified expertise includes “the management of primary

and excess property and casualty liability, property, auto physical damage, and worker’s

compensation business operations, claims, coverage, and litigation, as well as reinsurance

and surplus lines issues in those lines.” (Trezise Rpt. at 12.) He also has assisted underwriting

departments in the development, drafting and approval of policy forms, underwriting

classifications, rate filings and risk management services. (Id. at 1; see also Trezise Dep. at

18-20.)

6 Trezise’s adjuster license has since expired. (Trezise Rpt. at 15.)

The Court finds that Trezise possesses “specialized knowledge” in insurance that will

more likely than not “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Also, because of his experience of over 30 years in the insurance

industry and related experience involving insurance coverage as a trial attorney, he has

“experiential qualifications in a general field closely related to the subject matter in

question.” Zyprexa Prods., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (citation omitted). Considering the “liberal

thrust” of the Federal Rules and their “general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers

to ‘opinion’ testimony,” Trezise is qualified as an expert to provide an opinion (but not as to

legal conclusions). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89; see also Zyprexa Prods., 489 F. Supp. 2d at

282 (“[T]he standard for qualifying expert witnesses is liberal.”).

II. Existence Of Sufficient Facts Or Data And Reliable Principles And Methods

A. Parties’ Positions

Defendant argues that Trezise’s opinions are not well-grounded, are not reliable, are

purely speculative, and lack analysis, because Trezise has no experience with post-policy

premium audits. (Def.’s Mem. at 11-14.) Plaintiff disagrees. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 8-10.)

B. Legal Standards

The Court incorporates the legal standards regarding the existence of sufficient facts

or data and reliable principles and methods that are set forth in its prior Opinion and Order.

See Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *7. These standards are as follows:7

7 In the following two paragraphs, the Court has omitted citations to the case law supporting each of the

statements. The citations can be found in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL

3638329, at *7.

In determining the reliability of an expert’s testimony or report, courts should

consider the indicia of reliability identified in Rule 702, namely, (1) that the testimony is

grounded on sufficient facts or data; (2) that the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods; and (3) that the witness has applied the principles and methods

reliably to the facts of the case. Often, this is reflected by means of a technical theory that

has been tested, subject to peer review and publication, has a known or potential rate of

error with some controlling standards and is generally accepted in the scientific community.

However, these factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test. The inquiry is a flexible

one and must be tied to the facts of a particular case with attention to the nature of the

issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.

There is no separate Rule 702 issue stemming from the fact that the relevant

reliability concerns focus upon personal knowledge or experience. Courts recognize that

experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned

Hand called general truths derived from specialized experience. A proffered expert

recounting his experience concerning the use of terms in the industry is “testable” under

Daubert in the sense that industry practice is provable (or disprovable) by equivalent

testimony by experienced participants in the industry. The proffered expert’s methodology

employed must be rooted in the expert’s practical experience.

C. Application

The Court finds that Trezise’s opinions, as permitted herein, are based upon sufficient

facts and reliable principles and methods drawn from his background, including relevant

experience. Trezise has decades of experience in the insurance industry (Trezise Dep. at 14),

during which he was exposed to the surplus lines market. (Id. at 41, 55.) Trezise’s opinions

regarding industry practice, including his opinions about the purpose of surplus lines policies

(see Trezise Rep. at 5-6) and the general existence of standards and practices in the surplus

lines market (see id. at 6; Trezise Dep. at 44), is based upon that experience.

Indeed, during his deposition, Trezise explicitly tied his conclusion regarding industry

practice to his specialized experience:

Q [Counsel for Defendant]: From your experience, is that pertinent these

items, these advanced premium numbers got

calculated?

A [Trezise]: In my experience, no. The classification itself

wouldn’t go in there--as I said earlier. It’s part of

the program. So, it’s more of identification of an

insured that you wanted to insure and not

necessarily going into the calculation of the

premium. It’s going to vary from insured to

insured. Not necessarily going into the

calculation of the premium. It’s going to vary

within insured to insured. Even in the admitted

market, it will vary from insured to insured. So,

[in] the Surplus Lines market it will be all over the

place.

(Trezise Dep. at 45, 55.)

Defendant argues that Trezise’s experience, which does not include participation in

post-policy premium audits, does not align with the issues here. (Def.’s Mem. at 12-14.)

However, such a “quibble” goes to the “weight and credibility,” and not the admissibility of

Trezise’s opinion. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995). Indeed,

the Court has allowed Defendant’s own expert, Nelson, who similarly does not have

experience with specific issues in this case, to provide his opinion in this case for the same

reason. Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *8, 10.

Because Trezise “tie[s] observations to conclusions through . . . general truths derived

from . . . specialized experience” in the insurance industry, Nicholas v. Bratton, 376 F. Supp.

3d 232, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up); “the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’” Kumho Tire, 526

U.S. at 141; there will be a bench trial; and the “standard of admissibility for expert opinions”

under Rule 702 is “liberal,” Nimely, 414 F.3d at 395, the Court finds that Trezise’s opinions

are based on sufficient facts and he used reliable principles and methods.

III. Helpful To The Trier Of Fact

A. Parties’ Positions

Defendant argues that Trezise lacks both experience and knowledge to assist the trier

of fact to determine the facts in issue, and that the Trezise Report and the opinions therein

should be excluded because the Trezise Report is comprised almost entirely of legal

conclusions. (Def.’s Mem. at 14-16.) Plaintiff argues that Trezise possesses both experience

and knowledge to help the trier of fact determine the facts in issue. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 6-

8.)

B. Legal Standards

The Court incorporates the legal standards regarding whether expert testimony will

be helpful to the trier of fact that are set forth in its prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire,

2024 WL 3638329, at *8-9. These standards are as follows:8

The Court must assess whether an expert’s knowledge more likely than not will help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. To be admissible,

8 In the following paragraph, the Court has omitted citations to the case law supporting each of the

statements. The citations can be found in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL

3638329, at *8-9.

a district court must conclude that proposed testimony will assist the trier of fact. Rule 702’s

requirement that the proffered testimony assist the trier of fact goes primarily to relevance

because if it does not relate to any issue in the case, it is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.

By attempting to opine on questions of law, the expert is not considered helpful to the trier

of fact because an expert is barred from giving testimony on issues of law.

C. Application

Having found that Trezise possesses the qualifications to serve as an expert in this

case, that he employed reliable principles and methods under Rule 702 (see Discussion

Sections I-II, supra), and having considered the content of Trezise’s opinion, the Court finds

it is more likely than not that Trezise, at the very least, will help Judge Torres to understand

the evidence and perhaps will help Judge Torres to determine a fact in issue.

Of note, too, Trezise’s opinion is provided as rebuttal of Nelson’s opinion, which the

Court has found to be helpful. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *9. “If Plaintiffs’ expert

testimony is helpful to the trier of fact, then [the] rebuttal of that testimony would also be

helpful.” See Boone v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 21-CV-00432 (GKF) (SH), 2023 WL

8470623, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2023).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Trezise, like Nelson, should not be permitted to

testify regarding legal conclusions. See American Empire, 2024 WL 3638329, at *9. Thus, the

legal conclusions that are set forth in the Trezise Report must be excluded, for the reasons

explained in the undersigned’s prior Opinion and Order. See id. (interpretation of, and

coverage provided by, insurance agreement are questions of law as to which expert

testimony is not permitted).

Here, portions of the Trezise Report and related deposition testimony improperly

reach legal conclusions. For example, the Trezise Report includes interpretation of policy

language, such as the discussion of whether a professional liability exclusion clause in the

Policy limits its coverage for New York Labor Law claims. (Trezise Rpt. at 9.) Similarly,

Trezise’s deposition testimony reflects legal conclusions, including the following:

Q [Counsel for Defendant]: On Point 2 on Page 6 of your report, you say, “As

a Surplus Line Insured the only obligation

American Empire must meet are those stated in

the contract of the policy. Normal rules of

interpretation [may be] applied to those terms

but nothing more than those words of

interpretations may be read into the contract.”

Do you see that section?

A [Trezise]: Yes.

Q [Counsel for Defendant]: You still stand by that opinion?

A [Trezise]: Yes, you got the contract and you have the rules

of interpretation. That’s what determines the

contract.

(Trezise Dep. at 75.)

Such legal conclusions are not helpful to the trier of fact, because an expert’s opinion

on questions of law is inadmissible even when an expert—like Trezise, who is a former

practicing attorney—has legal qualifications. See Thor Equities, LLC v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co.,

627 F. Supp. 3d at 342 (citing Bilzerian, 924 F.2d at 1294) (finding testimony about insurance

policy coverage inadmissible, which was given by law professor with expertise in insurance

law). Indeed, this case is analogous to that in Marx & Co. v. Diners’ Club Inc., where the

Second Circuit held that the trial court erred by permitting an expert witness, a lawyer, to

opine on the legal obligations of contracting parties in a breach of contract claim. See Marx

& Co. v. Diners’ Club Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1977).

Thus, like Nelson, see Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329 at *10, Trezise in rebuttal may

provide testimony about the insurance industry and audits, and he may provide his opinion

regarding premiums due under the Policy based upon a hypothetical set of facts. See Scott,

315 F.R.D. at 44 (“scope of a rebuttal is limited to the same subject matter encompassed in

the opposing party’s expert report”). Also, like Nelson, Trezise may not testify or provide his

opinion about his interpretation of the Policy, and may not testify about any other legal

conclusions. See Am. Empire, 2024 WL 3638329 at *10.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Daubert Motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

Additionally, now having determined the parties’ Daubert motions, pre-motion

conference letters for any contemplated motions for summary judgment shall be filed no

later than Wednesday, November 20, 2024, in accordance with Judge Torres’ Individual

Practices. (See 5/13/24 Order, ECF No. 57.)

Dated: New York, New York

October 21, 2024

kissed. Oa

STEWART D. AARON

United States Magistrate Judge

16